A vueltas con la prohibición del mandato imperativo

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Campo DCValorIdioma
dc.contributorTeoría del Derechoes_ES
dc.contributor.authorLifante Vidal, Isabel-
dc.contributor.otherUniversidad de Alicante. Departamento de Filosofía del Derecho y Derecho Internacional Privadoes_ES
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-05T09:13:03Z-
dc.date.available2021-01-05T09:13:03Z-
dc.date.issued2020-06-01-
dc.identifier.citationTeoria politica. Nuova serie Annali. 2020, 10: 61-84es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0394-1248-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10045/111700-
dc.description.abstractShould the prohibition on the imperative mandate be removed from our current constitutional legal systems (which would not only imply repealing the constitutional provisions in which it is contemplated, but change the own understanding of representative democracy)? The arguments that are argued today in favor of establishing the institution of the imperative mandate have to do, fundamentally, with the safeguarding of the intermediation role that political parties play in the current representative democracies and the challenges that phenomena such as floor crossing or populism represent for this role. Despite this, this article firmly defends the need to continue excluding the imperative mandate from our representative political practices. To successfully tackle any of the problems that affect our democracies, it is necessary to start from a correct understanding of what constitutes the good performance of representative activity in general, and of political representation in particular. This contribution, therefore, addresses this question in some detail. In the author’s opinion, the activity of representation consists of acting in defense of the interests of those who are represented. This activity cannot be reduced, in any field, to mere obedience to the will of those represented, and much less in the sphere of political representation, one of whose presuppositions is precisely the idea that the national will is not something that pre-exists representative activity itself. It is the representatives themselves who must shape this «national will», for which it seems necessary that they can deliberate and negotiate freely among themselves to be able to reach agreements. The prohibition of the imperative mandate thus appears as a necessary (although obviously not sufficient) requirement for parliamentarians to adequately carry out their responsibilities as collegiate representatives.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipPara la elaboración de este trabajo ha contado con el apoyo financiero del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad a través del proyecto de investigación DER2017-86643-P: «Una teoría postpositivista del Derecho».es_ES
dc.languagespaes_ES
dc.publisherMarcial Ponses_ES
dc.rights© Marcial Ponses_ES
dc.subjectImperative mandatees_ES
dc.subjectPolitical representationes_ES
dc.subjectRepresentative democracyes_ES
dc.subjectCollective representationes_ES
dc.subjectCollegiate representationes_ES
dc.subject.otherFilosofía del Derechoes_ES
dc.titleA vueltas con la prohibición del mandato imperativoes_ES
dc.title.alternativeOn the prohibition of imperative mandate once againes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.peerreviewedsies_ES
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://journals.openedition.org/tp/1051es_ES
dc.identifier.cvIDA10296810-
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/DER2017-86643-P-
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