Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market
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Título: | Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market |
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Autor/es: | Escrihuela Villar, Marc | Gutiérrez-Hita, Carlos | Vicente-Pérez, José |
Grupo/s de investigación o GITE: | Laboratorio de Optimización (LOPT) |
Centro, Departamento o Servicio: | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Matemáticas |
Palabras clave: | Mixed oligopoly model | Electric power market | Supply function competition |
Área/s de conocimiento: | Estadística e Investigación Operativa |
Fecha de publicación: | ago-2020 |
Editor: | Wiley Periodicals |
Cita bibliográfica: | Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2020, 22(4): 1151-1175. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12432 |
Resumen: | In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus. |
Patrocinador/es: | Financial support under the projects PGC2018‐097965‐B‐I00 (MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE), ECO2015‐67901‐P and ECO2016‐77200‐P (MINECO/FEDER, UE) is gratefully acknowledged. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10045/108379 |
ISSN: | 1097-3923 (Print) | 1467-9779 (Online) |
DOI: | 10.1111/jpet.12432 |
Idioma: | eng |
Tipo: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Derechos: | © 2020 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
Revisión científica: | si |
Versión del editor: | https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12432 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | INV - LOPT - Artículos de Revistas |
Archivos en este ítem:
Archivo | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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Escrihuela-Villar_etal_2020_JPublicEconTheory_final.pdf | Versión final (acceso restringido) | 1,3 MB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Solicitar una copia |
Escrihuela-Villar_etal_2020_JPublicEconTheory_preprint.pdf | Preprint (acceso abierto) | 462,57 kB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Vista previa |
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