Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences

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Title: Social motives vs social influence: An experiment on interdependent time preferences
Authors: Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael | Ponti, Giovanni
Research Group/s: Microeconomía Aplicada (GIMA)
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Keywords: Social preferences | Risk and time preferences | Social influence | Belief elicitation
Knowledge Area: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Issue Date: Sep-2017
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Games and Economic Behavior. 2017, 105: 177-194. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.007
Abstract: We design an intertemporal Dictator Game to test whether Dictators modify their discounting behavior when their own decision is imposed on their matched Recipients. We run four different treatments to identify the effect of payoffs externalities from those related to information and beliefs. Our descriptive statistics show that Dictators display a marked propensity to account for the intertemporal preferences of Recipients, both in the presence of externalities (social motives) and/or when they know about the decisions of their matched partners (social influence). We also perform a structural estimation exercise to control for heterogeneity in risk attitudes. As for individual behavior, our estimates confirm previous studies in that high risk aversion is associated with low discounting. As for social behavior, we find that social motives outweigh social influence, especially when we restrict our sample to pairs of Dictators and Recipients who satisfy minimal consistency conditions.
Sponsor: Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2014-58297-R and ECO2015-65820-P), Generalitat Valenciana (Research Projects Grupos 3/086) and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) is gratefully acknowledged.
ISSN: 0899-8256 (Print) | 1090-2473 (Online)
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.007
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Rights: © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (
Peer Review: si
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Appears in Collections:INV - GIMA - Artículos de Revistas

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