Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior
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Título: | Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior |
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Autor/es: | Czibor, Eszter | Hsu, Danny | Jimenez-Gomez, David | Neckermann, Susanne | Subasi, Burcu |
Grupo/s de investigación o GITE: | Microeconomía Aplicada (GIMA) |
Centro, Departamento o Servicio: | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Palabras clave: | Loss-framed incentives | Multitasking | Incentive design | Stealing |
Fecha de publicación: | 17-feb-2022 |
Editor: | INFORMS |
Cita bibliográfica: | Management Science. 2022, 68(10): 7518-7537. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280 |
Resumen: | This paper explores how loss-framed incentives affect behavior in a multitasking environment in which participants have more than one way of recovering (expected) losses. In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we offer participants task incentives that are framed as either a reward (gain) or penalty (loss). We study their responses along three dimensions: performance in the incentivized task, theft, and voluntary provision of help. We find that framing incentives as a penalty rather than as a reward does not significantly improve task performance, but it increases theft and leads to a small and insignificant reduction in the share of participants willing to help the experimenter. Secondary analyses based on our theoretical framework help us pin down the mechanism at play and suggest that loss aversion drives participants’ response. Our findings have important implications for incentive design in practice. |
Patrocinador/es: | David Jimenez-Gomez is grateful for the funding from the Ministry of Science and Innovation and the European Regional Development Fund [Grant PID2019-107081GB-I00], from the Ministry of Science and Innovation through the project “Nudging applied to the improvement of regulation” [Grant RED2018-102761-T], and from the Valencian Community through the Prometeo program [Grant PROMETEO/2021/073]. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10045/125919 |
ISSN: | 0025-1909 (Print) | 1526-5501 (Online) |
DOI: | 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280 |
Idioma: | eng |
Tipo: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Derechos: | © 2022, INFORMS |
Revisión científica: | si |
Versión del editor: | https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | INV - GIMA - Artículos de Revistas |
Archivos en este ítem:
Archivo | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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Czibor_etal_2022_ManagSci_final.pdf | Versión final (acceso restringido) | 1,08 MB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Solicitar una copia |
Czibor_etal_2022_ManagSci_revised.pdf | Versión revisada (acceso abierto) | 6,22 MB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Vista previa |
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