Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior

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Título: Loss-Framed Incentives and Employee (Mis-)Behavior
Autor/es: Czibor, Eszter | Hsu, Danny | Jimenez-Gomez, David | Neckermann, Susanne | Subasi, Burcu
Grupo/s de investigación o GITE: Microeconomía Aplicada (GIMA)
Centro, Departamento o Servicio: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Palabras clave: Loss-framed incentives | Multitasking | Incentive design | Stealing
Fecha de publicación: 17-feb-2022
Editor: INFORMS
Cita bibliográfica: Management Science. 2022, 68(10): 7518-7537. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280
Resumen: This paper explores how loss-framed incentives affect behavior in a multitasking environment in which participants have more than one way of recovering (expected) losses. In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we offer participants task incentives that are framed as either a reward (gain) or penalty (loss). We study their responses along three dimensions: performance in the incentivized task, theft, and voluntary provision of help. We find that framing incentives as a penalty rather than as a reward does not significantly improve task performance, but it increases theft and leads to a small and insignificant reduction in the share of participants willing to help the experimenter. Secondary analyses based on our theoretical framework help us pin down the mechanism at play and suggest that loss aversion drives participants’ response. Our findings have important implications for incentive design in practice.
Patrocinador/es: David Jimenez-Gomez is grateful for the funding from the Ministry of Science and Innovation and the European Regional Development Fund [Grant PID2019-107081GB-I00], from the Ministry of Science and Innovation through the project “Nudging applied to the improvement of regulation” [Grant RED2018-102761-T], and from the Valencian Community through the Prometeo program [Grant PROMETEO/2021/073].
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/125919
ISSN: 0025-1909 (Print) | 1526-5501 (Online)
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280
Idioma: eng
Tipo: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Derechos: © 2022, INFORMS
Revisión científica: si
Versión del editor: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4280
Aparece en las colecciones:INV - GIMA - Artículos de Revistas

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