The paradox of scrap and the European steel industry’s loss of leadership (1950–1970)

Abstract

According to Neil Rollings and Laurent Warlouzet, the historical analysis of the European competition policy has been a priority in the research on institutions but the reaction of companies to these policies has received less attention. This study highlights the importance of analyzing how public policies affect business strategies in innovation. More specifically, how the policy adopted by the High Authority of the ECSC regarding the scrap market influenced the strategies implemented by the steelmakers in the innovation of their production processes. The High Authority banned exports and established maximum prices and a system to equalise internal prices with import prices. This policy was considered a success by both institutions and companies. It decisively influenced the scrap price to be maintained at affordable levels in Europe. But this success in resolving the scrap problem created a larger one as it delayed innovation. This was the scrap paradox suffered by Europe.