A Concessions-Based Procedure for Meta-Bargaining Problems

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Title: A Concessions-Based Procedure for Meta-Bargaining Problems
Authors: Marco, M. Carmen | Peris, Josep E. | Subiza, Begoña
Research Group/s: Desarrollo, Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica (DMCTE)
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Keywords: Bargaining problem | Procedure | Meta-bargaining | Axiomatic approach
Knowledge Area: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Issue Date: Nov-2020
Publisher: Springer Nature
Citation: Homo Oeconomicus. 2020, 37: 105-120. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00096-8
Abstract: In 1950, Nash’s seminal paper introduced the axiomatic approach to the analysis of bargaining situations. Since then, many bargaining solutions have been proposed and axiomatically analyzed. The fact that agents, when face with a bargaining problem, can come up with different solution concepts (that is, different notions of fairness and equity) was first introduced by van Damme (J Econ Theory 38:78–100, 1986) with the meta-bargaining model. In this paper we present and axiomatically analyze a procedure for solving meta-bargaining problems, which we call Unanimous–Concession. As an example, we show that the Nash solution is the result of the meta-bargaining process we define, when agents have dual egalitarian criteria. Finally, we compare, from an axiomatic point of view, our proposal with other meta-bargaining procedures.
Sponsor: Financial support from Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under Project ECO2016-77200-P is gratefully acknowledged.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/110907
ISSN: 2366-6161
DOI: 10.1007/s41412-020-00096-8
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Rights: © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Peer Review: si
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00096-8
Appears in Collections:INV - DMCTE - Artículos de Revistas

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