Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling
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Título: | Pooling or fooling? An experiment on signaling |
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Autor/es: | Feri, Francesco | Meléndez Jiménez, Miguel Ángel | Ponti, Giovanni | Vega-Redondo, Fernando | Yu, Haihan |
Grupo/s de investigación o GITE: | Microeconomía Aplicada (GIMA) |
Centro, Departamento o Servicio: | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Palabras clave: | Signaling games | Sequential decision-making | Insider information disclosure |
Área/s de conocimiento: | Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
Fecha de publicación: | ago-2020 |
Editor: | Elsevier |
Cita bibliográfica: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2020, 176: 582-596. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.012 |
Resumen: | We compare two zero-sum versions of the so called Chinos Game, a traditional parlour game played in many countries. In one version, which we call Preemption Scenario, the first player who guesses right wins the prize. In the alternative version, called the Copycat Scenario, the last player who guesses right wins the prize. While in the Preemption Scenario there is a unique and fully revealing equilibrium, in the Copycat Scenario all equilibria have first movers pool (i.e. hide) their private information. Our experimental evidence shows, however, that in the latter case early movers do not pool but try to fool, i.e. to “lie” by systematically distorting behavior relative to equilibrium play. In fact, doing so they benefit, although the resulting gains diminish as the game proceeds. This highlights the point that, as players adjust their behavior off equilibrium, they also attempt to exploit the induced strategic uncertainty whenever the game allows for this possibility. |
Patrocinador/es: | Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economic Development (ECO2014-52345-P and ECO2015-65820-P), Generalitat Valenciana (Research Projects Grupos 3/086) and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) is gratefully acknowledged. |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10045/109521 |
ISSN: | 0167-2681 (Print) | 1879-1751 (Online) |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.012 |
Idioma: | eng |
Tipo: | info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
Derechos: | © 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V. |
Revisión científica: | si |
Versión del editor: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.012 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | INV - GIMA - Artículos de Revistas |
Archivos en este ítem:
Archivo | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
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Feri_etal_2020_JEconBehaviorOrg_final.pdf | Versión final (acceso restringido) | 985,32 kB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Solicitar una copia |
Feri_etal_2020_JEconBehaviorOrg_preprint.pdf | Preprint (acceso abierto) | 1,33 MB | Adobe PDF | Abrir Vista previa |
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