DSpace Colección:http://hdl.handle.net/10045/306302024-03-28T09:22:24Z2024-03-28T09:22:24Z¿Hay alternativa no escéptica al cognoscitivismo? A propósito de ¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?, de Pierluigi ChiassoniLifante Vidal, Isabelhttp://hdl.handle.net/10045/1417992024-03-26T01:22:48Z2023-12-20T00:00:00ZTítulo: ¿Hay alternativa no escéptica al cognoscitivismo? A propósito de ¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?, de Pierluigi Chiassoni
Autor/es: Lifante Vidal, Isabel
Resumen: En este artículo se discute el trabajo “¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?” de Pierluigi Chiassoni, en el que se plantea la cuestión de si hay espacio para la verdad en el ámbito de la interpretación jurídica y en el que expresamente defiende las siguientes tesis: (1) la verdad empírica no es predicable del resultado de la actividad interpretativa (en sentido propio y función práctica) y (2) el cognoscitivismo es una concepción equivocada respecto a la naturaleza de la actividad interpretativa judicial. Las críticas que en este trabajo se presentan no son tanto respecto a estas dos tesis (que son compartidas), sino respecto al aparato metodológico que Chiassoni desarrolla para defender sus tesis y del cual parece querer extraer algunas consecuencias. Las discrepancias fundamentales que aquí se presentan con las tesis de Chiassoni lo son respecto a su concepción del Derecho como un sistema de normas (o de disposiciones y normas) y de la racionalidad práctica como una racionalidad puramente instrumental, que serían los presupuestos profundos en los que descansa su construcción.; This paper discusses the work “¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?” by Pierluigi Chiassoni, in which he raises the question of whether there is room for truth in the field of legal interpretation and in which he expressly defends the following theses: (1) empirical truth is not predictable from the result of interpretative activity (in its proper sense and practical function) and (2) cognitivism is a misconception regarding the nature of judicial interpretative activity. The criticisms presented in this paper are not so much with respect to these two theses (which are shared), but with respect to the methodological apparatus that Chiassoni develops to defend his theses, from which he seems to want to draw some consequences. The fundamental discrepancies presented here with Chiassoni’s theses concern his conception of Law as a system of norms (or provisions and norms) and practical rationality as purely instrumental rationality, which would be the deep presuppositions on which his construction rests.2023-12-20T00:00:00ZPresumptions, Legal Argumentation, and DefeasibilityAguiló-Regla, Josephttp://hdl.handle.net/10045/1380252023-10-21T00:10:39Z2023-08-01T00:00:00ZTítulo: Presumptions, Legal Argumentation, and Defeasibility
Autor/es: Aguiló-Regla, Josep
Resumen: In this paper, I propose to differentiate two types of presumptions in law and in legal argumentation. On the one hand, the so-called hominis presumptions, that is, those made by people when they make factual inferences and, on the other, the presumptions established by legal norms (legal presumptions). In order to emphasize the differences between them, I will use these two expressions respectively: “it is presumable” and “it must (shall) be presumed”. Next, once the notion of legal presumption has been properly clarified, I will try to show that the distinction between rules and principles is applicable to presumption norms (to legal presumptions). Consequently, I will distinguish between norms of presumption that are rules (presumption rules) and norms of presumption that are principles (presumption principles). Finally, I will focus on the defeasibility of presumptive reasoning and how cognitive sciences can help detecting material fallacies.2023-08-01T00:00:00ZIntuitionism, Practical Reasoning and DefeasibilityGonzález Lagier, Danielhttp://hdl.handle.net/10045/1380242023-10-21T00:10:39Z2023-08-01T00:00:00ZTítulo: Intuitionism, Practical Reasoning and Defeasibility
Autor/es: González Lagier, Daniel
Resumen: This text considers the contributions that cognitive sciences can make to the study of legal reasoning, distinguishing between descriptive, conceptual and normative impacts. In particular, it is concerned with exploring Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism thesis, which says that, when we reason about moral and practical issues, we make a decision intuitively, which we then rationalise a posteriori (although at this stage reason cannot change the decision made). The text considers how this thesis would apply to the problem of the defeasibility of rules, which it takes as one of the characteristic features of legal reasoning. Finally, some objections are presented to Haidt’s thesis and to the normative claims of some cognitive scientists.2023-08-01T00:00:00ZDefeasibility and BalancingAtienza, Manuelhttp://hdl.handle.net/10045/1380222023-10-21T00:10:41Z2023-08-01T00:00:00ZTítulo: Defeasibility and Balancing
Autor/es: Atienza, Manuel
Resumen: “Defeasibility” and “balancing” are expressions introduced in recent times to deal with long-standing legal phenomena, which in the context of the constitutional state acquire a special prominence. What is at issue, in fact, is the necessity to recognise exceptions implicit in the norms, in order to provide the legal system with the flexibility needed to maximise the chances of finding a correct—just—answer without abandoning the legal system; and (which to a large extent is another aspect of the same phenomenon) to resolve difficult cases (those for which there is no predefined rule, but only principles) argumentatively, by resorting to a procedure, balancing, the use of which does not necessarily imply an exercise in arbitrariness, although it does involve certain risks that recommend a prudent and limited use of this resource. The last part of the paper summarises the ideas that legal theorists and practitioners should bear in mind in order to understand and make proper use of these two controversial but indispensable notions.2023-08-01T00:00:00Z