Asociación de Historia Contemporánea
Actas del XIV Congreso

DEL SIGLO XIX AL XXI. TENDENCIAS Y DEBATES
(Alicante, 20-22 de septiembre de 2018)

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Del siglo XIX al XXI. Tendencias y debates: XIV Congreso de la Asociación de Historia Contemporánea, Universidad de Alicante 20-22 de septiembre de 2018 / Mónica Moreno Seco (coord.) & Rafael Fernández Sirvent y Rosa Ana Gutiérrez Lloret (eds.)


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Introduction

This paper deals with the political instrumentalization of historical images that helped to influence the creation of borders, maps, and states in Southeastern Europe. In my PhD project, I analyzed the Western historical images about Serbia and the Serbs during the nineteenth and twentieth century in the public discourse of four countries, namely Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and the USA. For the twentieth century, my sources were mainly newspaper reports about Serbia and the Serbs from these countries as well as sources from the New York Times papers archived in the New York Public Library, but also speeches and public statements by US presidents as dominant power during the wars of Yugoslav succession. For the nineteenth century, I analyzed travelogues as well as scientific and journalistic reports, especially from the Austria-Hungarian travel writer and illustrator Felix Philipp Kanitz. The analysis shows the different use of narratives in each country that gave rise to a certain historical image. It also shows that the well-established historical images that derived from the nineteenth century served as a guide for Western journalists who were reporting on the Balkans wars in 1912/1913 and in the 1990s. However, wars in the Balkans led not only to Western intervention throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, but also to redrawing of the map guided or protected by the West.

The Western narrative of the unstable Balkans slowly emerged with the «awakening» of the Serbian people in 1804, when «defiant Serbs» tried to overthrow the Ottoman rule. It lasted until 1830, before Serbia became an independent principality. Since then, and especially during the Balkan wars 1912/1913, uprisings of Serbs within the principality as well as anywhere else on the Balkans were challenging the «European concert», meaning the balance of power between

5585 Felix Philipp Kanitz often described the Serbian nation as being awakened from a «magical sleep», when he started travelling throughout the Balkans. He meant the liberation of Ottoman rule and establishment of an independent state, see, for example: Felix Philipp KANITZ: Das Königreich Serbien und das Serbenvolk von der Römerzeit bis zur Gegenwart. Erster Band: Land und Bevölkerung, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 253; The text passage I am referring is, like many other, also published in Kanitz’ first book about Serbia, see: Felix Philipp KANITZ: Serbien. Historisch-ethnographische Reisestudien aus den Jahren 1859-1868, Leipzig, 1868, pp. 15; also, the British travel writer, Mary Edith Durham, stated, that «after that long night they awoke... they found the face of the world had changed...», see: Mary Edith DURHAM: The Burden of the Balkans, London, 1905, pp. 4-5; The historian Holm Sundhaussen explained, that the Serbian nation neither awakened, because it never existed, nor was the Serbian nation invented in those days, because the elements for the construction of a nation, like common language and history, already existed, see: Holm SUNDAUSSEN: Geschichte Serbiens, Wien-Köln-Weimar, 2007, pp. 120.


the dominant European realms, in particular their interests. Especially the Austrian monarchy felt threatened by the upcoming Serbian nation and worried about her southern peripheries, where people lived that spoke the same or at least a similar language than the Serbs.

The map of Central Europe was partly dominated by the Habsburg Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century, a double monarchy that bordered in the East to Russia and in the Southeast to the Ottoman Empire. Both, the Russian as well as the Ottoman Empire were excluded from the notion of the rising West. Especially the European parts of the Ottoman Empire were described as «European Orient» and labeled with the same stereotypes as the «Asiatic Turkey». This part of the world was considered as dangerous, exotic, and uncivilized, so was the uprising region at the Southern border of the Habsburg Empire during the nineteenth century. When Serbian nationalism was «awakened» (of course influenced by exchanges with Western intellectuals), the boundary line of Serbia that didn’t border on the Habsburg Empire were unknown in the West.

This was changed in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, where the European Great Powers, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and four Balkan states, including Serbia, determined the boundary lines of the newly emerged countries in Southeast Europe. The «Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the Settlement of Affairs in the East», which was signed on July 13, charted the right for the Habsburg Empire of occupying and administering the «Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina» and to «keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads» in the Sandžak of Novi Pazar, which was stripe of land between Serbia and Montenegro and a formerly part of the Vilayet of Kosovo. Both, the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Vilayet of Kosovo including the Sandžak of Novi Pazar developed to play a crucial role in freezing unsolved conflicts and establishing historical images.

Historical images as Category of Analysis

Historical images contain fragments of knowledge and narratives about certain communities and their past. They create a basic knowledge about the «others» and hence reality. Therefore, they represent similar phenomena as myths\(^{5997}\). The main difference and advantage between the analytical category of historical images and myths is that they do not investigate mastering narratives but a plurality of underlying perceptions, notions, and stereotypes of the perceived self and the imagined stranger. In the twentieth century, Western journalists oriented their reporting on traditional historical images about Serbia and the Serbs.

Historical images as well as myths fulfill important social functions: they work by integrating, which excludes others; they are reflectors of a self-image in which the self is measured against the other; and they create realities that have the power of mobilizing and legitimizing. Historical images capture time horizons and spatial concepts, thus equipping their inherent narrative. Not only have they been carried on and shaped by the journalists, but they have also been used by Western politicians through public discourse, as a political tool to influence wars, peace treaties and post-war orders in the Balkans during the twentieth century.

Historical images are a powerful political tool, because they consist of many, even contradictory, narratives. Depending on the composition of the narratives, the image functions as a concept that can be decoded by a particular public (Western to national, regional). The concept often finds expression in the use of recurring pictorial and linguistic metaphors, which does not mean that the metaphor cannot change its meaning. This concept is created through the narratives with which it is built. It could therefore be used politically by highlighting and hiding some narratives, or reshaping them and hence serve as a tool to manipulate the public discourse, as the following case study of the wars around Kosovo shows.

Wars around Kosovo that led to Borders and Vice Versa

Based on newspaper reports of Western countries, I reconstruct historical images about Serbia and the Serbs in order to show how they were used as a political tool for gaining influence in co-

determining maps and in redrawing borders in Southeast Europe. In this paper, I focus on one formerly Ottoman administrative district: The Vilayet Kosovo.\footnote{Vilayet is a Turkish term and means province in English. The Vilayets were divided into several Sandžaks.}

The Vilayet Kosovo in the nineteenth century

In the nineteenth century, the border north of Serbia was clearly marked out by the rivers Danube and Sava that separated the Habsburg Empire from the «European Orient», but Western travelers had great difficulties with the definition of the southern territorial of the new principality. From an Austrian point of view, the gaps and discrepancies in the contemporary maps had to be explored, especially to be able to realize the railway project, which was a communication line from Vienna to Egypt and India. The educated illustrator and self-appointed ethnographer from Austria-Hungary, Felix Philipp Kanitz, travelled over five decades through the Bosnian, Bulgarian, Montenegrin, and Serbian territories. He was one of the most popular Western travelogue writers for the Balkans in the nineteenth century.\footnote{Đorđe S. KOSTIĆ, «Jeder Reisende sehnt sich nach Stärkung und Erquickung», en Đorđe S. KOSTIĆ (eds.): Balkanbilder von Felix Kanitz. Slike sa Balkana Feliksa Kanica, Belgrad, 2011, pp. 39-54, here pp. 39.} The «Columbus of the Balkans»,\footnote{Zoltán HAJDÚ: «Hungarian researchers on the Southeast-European space (the Balkans)», en Zoltán HAJDÚ, Iván ILLÉS y Zoltán RAFFAY (eds.): Southeast-Europe. State Borders, Cross-border Relations, Spatial Structures, Pécs, 2007, pp. 9-44, here pp. 14; Edit KIRÁLY: «Die Zärtlichkeiten des Kartografen. Die Reiseberichte von Felix Kanitz», en Endre HÁRS et al. (eds.), Zentren und Peripherien in Herrschaft und Kultur Österreich-Ungarns, Tübingen-Basel, 2006, pp. 239-253, here pp. 239.} described the southernmost point of Serbia on the border with the Ottoman Empire as follows: «In the South, there were [...] profiles of the Balkan chain ... dark gray lay on this ancient Serbian region [...] There lies ... Plain of Kossovo, the ‘Amselfeld’ ['blackbird field']\footnote{Original: «Im Süden zeigte sich ... Profile der Balkankette ... Düsteres Grau lag auf diesem alt-serbischen Landstriche ... Dort liegt ... Ebene von Kossovo, das 'Amselfeld'}, see: Felix KANITZ, «Das serbisch-türkische Kopavnik-Gebiet. Vortrag, gehalten in der Sitzung der k.k. geogr. G. am 4. Dezember 1867», Mitteilungen der k.k. Geographischen Gesellschaft, Wien (1876), pp. 56; In the 19th century, Kosovo was written with two «s».\footnote{Andrew Archibald PATON, Servia, the Youngest Member of the European Family or, A Residence in Belgrade and Travels in the Highlands and Woodlands of the Interior, during the years 1843 and 1844, London, 1845, pp. 211-212.}

The fame of «Kossovo» in the West is due to the historical event of the local battle in 1389. From an English perspective, the battle of Kosovo was a part of European history.\footnote{On June 28, 1389 (June 15, according to the Julian calendar), the Serbian mediaeval Empire lost the battle on Kosovo Polje to the Ottoman army. The Serbian prince Lazar, who ruled over central Serbia and parts of Kosovo, died in this battle. In texts written shortly after the battle, he was proclaimed as Christ's successor. Later, the narrative developed further. It was said that Lazar sacrificed himself and renounced the earthly kingdom for the sake of Serbian people who shall become a heavenly nation, with Kosovo as the promised land.} The term Kosovo served as a container for the territory south of Serbia, which was not explored, and therefore did not allow accurate cartography. Combined with the well-known Kosovo myth, it was open to a broad range of imaginations.
Not only the imaginations on Kosovo differed in texts of travelers and newspapers, but also the term of the region in the South of Serbia was not clear yet. In the books and articles of Felix Kanitz and his colleagues, there were some terms often blurred and used synonymously. One of them was Kosovo, another one was Sandžak Novi Pazar, Old Serbia (Stara Srbija) or even Raška. After the Serbian Kingdom of Raška ceased to exist in 1459 (not in 1389), Serbia disappeared on the map, but also in the collective memory of Europe. While «Bosnia» and the «Herzegovina» remained as an administrative term within the Ottoman Empire, the previously rarely used name «Serbia» was not adopted. Latin sources mainly cited «Rascia» and «Rassia», terms that for Kanitz associated the «origin» and «cradle of the Serbian freedom».

In a lecture in 1867, Felix Philipp Kanitz told the members of the Viennese k.k. geographischen Gesellschaft that the «Serbian-Turkish» region is a «field of unhappiness [that] represents the cradle of the oriental question». Kosovo not only became a central narrative for the Serbian national movement, but was also perceived by Felix Kanitz as area that once belonged to the Serbian kingdom and became Albanian territory. He warned that this could also happen to «Mitteleuropa» (Central Europe).

Also, the English traveler Andrew Archibald Paton observed in 1843/44 in the Sandžak of Novi Pazar that the Albanian displaced the Serbian or Bosnian language. «Through this increase [of Albanian population]», stated k.k. Consul Georg Hahn in 1868, «the ethnographic border of Albania is pushed forward by half a degree to the north and the Albanese ... became immediate neighbors of the Serbs tribe». Felix Kanitz stated that he could tell that there were «old Serbian landscapes», because of the Serbian names for places, villages, and valleys.

5604 See for example: Johann Georg HAHN: Reise von Belgrad nach Salonik nebst vier Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte des Moravagebietes, 2. Aufl., Wien, 1868, pp. 120.
5606 KANITZ, Serbien, pp. 55.
5607 KANITZ, «Das serbisch-türkische Kopavnik-Gebiet», pp. 56.
5608 PATON: Servia, the Youngest Member of the European Family, pp. 204.
5609 HAHN: Reise von Belgrad nach Salonik, pp. 45.
Thus, it can be explained that the term Old Serbia established itself as another synonym for the predominantly Albanian populated Sandžak of Novi Pazar, and replaced the medieval name Raška that occurred in the nineteenth century Western media and travelogues. Old Serbia has to be considered as a political term, because it claimed that the territory was Serbian, based on the «Golden Ages» of Serbia during the Middle Ages that ended in the myth with the battle of Kosovo.

The history and existence of Serbia as a nation and a state were placed in the European media discourse of the nineteenth century. Although, Raška, Old Serbia or Kosovo were for the Western audience abstract terms without a defined territory or borders. Pictorial representations of Raška, Old Serbia or Kosovo are not to be found in the form of maps, but in the illustration of medieval castles or fortresses through drawings from Felix Philipp Kanitz (Picture 2) that were published in his books as well as in illustrated newspapers.

Picture 2. The mediaeval castle in Užice


This was one of Kanitz’ favourite drawing topics: empty and spleepy spaces that remind you of the middle ages, or of illustrations in fairytales.

Behind Kosovo were several levels of meaning, depending on the perspective, but the term was rarely referred to a geographically defined terrain. Kosovo served as a puzzle piece of the historical image of Serbia and was full of mystic imaginations. This historical image about the old Serbian region in the South of the kingdom was perfectly used by Serbian migrants in the United States of America, who placed Kosovo in the US public discourse.

The «Kossovo Day» in New York

In contrast to a long tradition of successors to the heirs of the monarchist European powers Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Germany (Prussia) and their historic-mythical, religiously legitimized rule, the United States considered themselves as pioneers of a democratic and free country. According to their own tradition of expansion to the West, the United States put the spread

5610 SUNDHAUSSEN: Geschichte Serbiens, 120.
of democracy on their flags (frontier myth)\textsuperscript{5611}. From the point of view of the US, the Balkan nations were as ready to receive and learn democracy as the formerly «wild West». Like the «American border in the old days» before, the Balkan states were imagined as romantic, mystical and adventurous\textsuperscript{5612}.

At the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, Serbia was perceived as an emerging nation by the USA that soon would be integrated in Europe. The young kingdom achieved its freedom from the Ottoman Empire in 1833 and its kingdom status in 1878. With the assassination of King Alexander Obrenovic in 1903, US newspapers spotted Serbia’s difficult but willing path towards becoming a stable and independent nation in the following years. Although the image of Serbia contained narratives about its oriental part, an analysis of US newspapers clearly shows the sympathy of the US citizens with the young nation that freed itself from Ottoman rule.

Similar to my results, the historian Andrea Despot emphasizes in her work «America’s Path to the Balkans» («Amerikas Weg auf den Balkan») the strong solidarity of the American public with the insurgent Balkan nations during the Greek Revolution (1821-1832) and the Bulgarian Uprisings (1876)\textsuperscript{5613}. The liberation movements and uprisings of the Serbs seemed to be in the same wave of solidarity. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the notions of the Serbs and Serbia within the US public discourse were quite positive, especially compared with the historical images circulating through Austria-Hungary. Reports from Europe depicted Serbia as a country that still belongs to an «Old World», not yet ready to be part of the progressive European continent, while the US newspapers highlighted the narrative of the Serb fighters who stood up for freedom and even democracy. How is the different use of narratives to explain and what influenced the US historical image of Serbia?

I argue that the general historical image of Serbia resulted from the poor knowledge of the Balkans in the United States that was bolstered with (life) stories, memories, and experiences from Serbian migrants who left their home-country during the nineteenth century. Due to the Serbian migrants, the history and current situation of the Balkans was translated into suitable narratives that helped shape the US public image about Serbia and the Serbs. While the reports about Serbia or the Serbs were absorbed from London, or sometimes Vienna, Constantinople, and Paris\textsuperscript{5614}, the editorial articles as well as opinions picked up another perspective. In addition, the voices of Serbian migrants were often published, mainly from those who had achieved a successful life in their new US hometown.

One of the successful life stories was from the natural scientist and self-appointed friend of Woodrow Wilson, Mihajlo Pupin, who was a Professor at Columbia University. Pupin had Serbian

\textsuperscript{5611} For Paul Chilton and George Lakoff, the term «frontier» is a powerful metaphorical concept that can be found again and again in the US public discourse. With the demise of the bipolar world division, this concept had to be repurposed, but again it contained the narrative of the law-and-order function that the United States must take over within the West. See: Paul CHILTON y George LAKOFF: «Foreign Policy by Metaphor», en Christina SCHÄFFNER y Anita L. WENDEN (eds.): Language and peace, Dartmouth, 1995, pp. 37-59, here pp. 42.

\textsuperscript{5612} Andrew HAMMOND: British Literature and the Balkans. Themes and contexts, Amsterdam, 2010, pp. 10.


\textsuperscript{5614} By means of the statistical software R, those New York Times reports were filtered on the basis of a full-text search in the NYT online archive, which addressed Serbia from 1903 to 1913. A total of 1,803 data sets under the search terms «Servia*» or «Serbs» were issued by the software, including text messages and announcements. 633 of these records are from articles whose source information is not from New York but from other cities. Almost half of the 633 articles were from London.
roots, and during the reconfiguration of the map of Southeast Europe during World War One he acted as an intermediary between Serbia and the US government. He was one of the main actors of the little explored Serbian National Defense League of America. Pupin took over the American idea of freedom and self-determination and used it to convince the Serbian migrants, as well as the Serbian government to fight for their home country with those same principles. Through the Serbian National Defense League of America he helped organizing that Serbian migrants from the US travelled to the frontiers of Southeast Europe\textsuperscript{5615}.

In 1918, the New York Times reported vividly about the activities of the movement of the Serbian National Defense League of America as well as of one of the most impressive events that could happen in New York: «The Kossovo Day in America»\textsuperscript{5616}. It served as medium to strengthen the positive historical image about the Serbs who fought for their home country, including the imagined lost territory of Old Serbia.

So Kossovo Day of the year is one of the most remarkable in the Serbian history. It is a day which brings the remote, sorely stricken Serbian nation into the closest contact with the greatest democracy of the world, a day which forms a common glorious page of American and Serbian history\textsuperscript{5617}.

The New York Times reported on the celebrations and printed the article of the president of the «Defense League», Dr. Milosh Trivounatz. It was even explained that the entrance fees for the Kosov festival benefited the Serbian National Defense League of America\textsuperscript{5618}. The peculiarity of the Vidovdan or the «Kossovo Day» in 1918 laid in the declaration of the US government, in which it publicly expressed its sympathy for the national aspirations of small countries under Austro-Hungarian rule. In early August 1918, the New York Times announced a collaboration between the US-migrants of the «oppressed nationalities» like the Serbs, including Trivounatz, and the US government. The stated purpose of this exchange was to convince the US public of the need to free the «oppressed races of the Dual Monarchy», which was legitimized by Wilson's 14-point plan\textsuperscript{5619}. But it was only at the Paris Peace Conference that Robert Lansing realized that the redrawing of the borders in (South) Eastern Europe brought with it unforeseen complications due to the different views of the local population. For Lansing, it was clear then that the concept of self-determination in world politics could not work\textsuperscript{5620}. Nevertheless, he was a defender of the Serbian cause in 1918. Speaking to the delegation leader of the «Serbian War Mission», who had a meeting with US officials in Washington, Lansing stated that Serbia would be freed from tyranny.


\textsuperscript{5619} S. a.: «Four-Minute-Men to Aid Oppressed. Better Understanding Between Native Americans and Immigrants to be Promoted», \textit{The New York Times}, 4 de agosto de 1918, pp. 3.

and injustice like America\textsuperscript{5621}. Therefore, the official US declaration of support for the Serbian cause was a strong public symbol and political signal.

In addition to the many other articles on the occasion of the «Kossovo Festival», the New York Times printed already in June 1918 a map with first ideas of the new states and approximate borders of Europe. The sociologist Herbert A. Miller did basic work for this by drawing the map on the basis of the linguistic regions (picture 2). He referred to the many highly mixed regions that could not possibly be mapped, but «[g]enerally speaking, the language map is a correct indication of the extent of nationalities […] this map, based on the distribution of languages, presents a general picture of the distribution of races» in «Central and Southeastern Europe»\textsuperscript{5622}.

Of course, the map had a political purpose. It served as proof that in Austria-Hungary «three-fifths of the total population»\textsuperscript{5623} had a different nationality than the German one. One has to acknowledge that the first «ethnographical maps» in Southeast Europe were drawn by scientists from Austria-Hungary. They started to count and organize the Balkan population based on criteria like language, religion, and later on, nationalities. The purpose of the «ethnographical maps» from the second half of the nineteenth century was to show cartographically where the Serbian territory had to end, and where different nationalities live and hence have either their own nation-state (Albania) or could be claimed by Austria-Hungary (Bosnia-Herzegovina)\textsuperscript{5624}. In 1918, this kind of maps were used to support those nationalities that insisted on their right of self-determination. In addition, the map presented the locations of those nationalities that were hostile to Austria-Hungary and Germany, and thus could act on the side of the Entente. The New York Times’ dominant historical image of a freedom-loving Serbia that wished to unify all the same-language sections of the Balkans in one single state determined the attitude of the US public and US policy in the years of Europe’s reorganization the first half of the twentieth century. With great pleasure of the US, in December of 1918 the first Yugoslavia was created. It used to have the name «Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes» and was partly build on the downfall of the Habsburg Empire and based on the US narrative of self-determination.

\textsuperscript{5622} S. a.: «Slavs as our Allies. Suggestion That Men of Small Slavic Nations Be Organized Into Armies to Fight Germany», \textit{The New York Times}, 16 de junio de 1918, pp. 34.
\textsuperscript{5623} Ibid.
The parallels between the narratives in the Kosovo War and World War One

In 1918, the US supported Yugoslavia respectively Serbia with a positive historical image about a progressive and democratic nation, which was boosted with powerful narratives that were brought and translated by Serbian migrants. This historical image was marginally detected in US public discourse during the 1990s Yugoslavian breakup. Nevertheless, it was clearly overshadowed by reinterpretations of the once translated narratives. At the end of the twentieth century, the region Kosovo itself was broadly perceived as young nation that had the right of self-determination and of help in becoming a constitutional democracy. Now, like the Habsburg monarchy before, Serbia was imagined to oppress nationalities within the country’s borders.

The narrative that Serbia bears the war guilt of the Yugoslav War of Succession has triumphed throughout the West. Similar to the historical image circulated in the Austrian-Hungarian public discourse about the Serbian society that is permeated by secret agents and warmongers, the West decided to enter the Kosovo War. On 24 March 1999, the NATO air strikes on Serbia began. The US policy used the narrative in public, according to which it was only possible to achieve peace in Serbia with war, just like Austria-Hungary did it at the beginning of the twentieth century. First and foremost, I found the centuries-old metaphors of the «Powder Keg in the Balkans» or the «Balkan tinder box» in US public discourse, which were also used by Bill Clinton at the beginning of his speech on March 26, 1999.625

(…) why we have taken this step. To save the lives of innocent civilians in Kosovo from a brutal military offensive. To defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice

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625 Widmer FOIA [Freedom of Information Act], William J. Clinton Presidential Library and Museum, Clinton Digital Library, Office of Communications, Office of Speechwriting, Edward Widmer. Recuperado de internet (https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/solr-search?q=kosovo&facet=collection%3A%22Speechwriting%22&facet=collection%3A%22Office+Edward+Widmer%22). Widmer was one of Clinton’s Speechwriters. He wrote the most speeches that dealt with the Kosovo War.
in this century with catastrophic results. To prevent a wider war (...). To stand with our allies for peace.\footnote{William Jefferson CLINTON, Radio Address on Kosovo (The White House), Clinton Digital Library, FOIA, Widmer, Case Number: 2006-0471-F, Kosovo Radio, March 22, 1999.}

In addition to a metaphorically large-scale fire, which needed to be prevented, it was the narrative of the «ethnic hatred»,\footnote{Ibid.; see for example: S. a.: «The Balkan War scare», \textit{The New York Times}, 2 de octubre de 1912; s. a.: «The peace of Europe», \textit{The New York Times}, 28 de octubre de 1912, pp. 10.} that were to be pacified. These two central legitimacy arguments for US intervention have been enforced in the White House since 1998 and made public general knowledge about Kosovo. After all, the US government had big problems with clarifying the interests of the US in the Balkans to its people. At the end of his speech, Bill Clinton elaborated on the design of a threat scenario:

Americans have learned the hard way that our home is not that far from Europe. Through two world wars and a long cold war, we saw that it was a short step from a small brush fire to an inferno -especially in the tinderbox of the Balkans. The time to put out a fire is before it spreads and burns down the neighborhood (...) For America, I believe there is no greater calling than being a peacemaker. But sometimes you have to fight in order to end the fighting. (...) our prayers are with all the people of the Balkans, searching for the strength to put centuries of division to rest, and to join us in building a better future.\footnote{William Jefferson CLINTON, Radio Address on Kosovo.}

The final part of the speech is the culmination of US policy-making strategies to legitimize the entry into the war, based on the history of the Balkans, especially on the historical events from Serbia. With this strategy, the history of World War One is even being rewritten from the point of view of the USA, in which Serbia was blamed for the outbreak of it.

One has to acknowledge, that some readers of the New York Times protested in letters sent against the attempt to denounce former allies in the First as well as in the Second World War in such a way. Unsurprisingly, it was not uncommon for US citizens with Serbian roots to be behind the angry letters\footnote{The analyzed folder is archived in the New York Public Library and contains 24 letters to the editor. This documentary provides a good insight into the attitudes of the New York Times audience, see: New York Public Library, Manuscript and Archives Division, New York Times Company Records, William Safire papers, Reader's Mail, box 4 folder 24 & box 5 folder 1.}. Also, not all US journalists were in agreement with the new historical image about Serbia, which originated in Austria-Hungary. They still pictured the Serbs as honorable people fighting for freedom and their own rights of self-determination within borders that were drawn by people from within the region. One of the dominant voices against NATO air strikes was the former New York Times editor A. M. Rosenthal\footnote{New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Times Company records, A. M. Rosenthal papers.}. He stated that Kosovo must have the right to self-government, just as the Yugoslav government must secure the right to take over those areas within Kosovo that are considered sacred to the Serbs\footnote{A. M. ROSENTHAL, «Lessons of Kosovo», \textit{The New York Times}, 16 de abril de 1999, pp. A25.}.

The US population was as divided as public opinion worldwide, the New York Times noted: those who spoke out in favor of the NATO bombing of Serbia and those who argued against such

\footnote{William Jefferson CLINTON, Radio Address on Kosovo (The White House), Clinton Digital Library, FOIA, Widmer, Case Number: 2006-0471-F, Kosovo Radio, March 22, 1999.}
a military intervention

Opponents of the air strikes on Serbia were present in all four research countries, not least because of the lack of a UN mandate, which led to the construction of a public-effective «peace myth» by NATO. Out of a crisis of legitimacy, the «world media» , like CNN, had to become «part of the battlefield» with NATO-led messages. The plan worked, CNN reporting on the Kosovo war fed 61 percent from NATO sources. The narrative was kept simple, the military intervention served a peace-making mission -both to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and spread the war across the Balkans. The second mission was to transform the Balkan countries into functioning democracies after pacification and thus to defuse the powder keg. The Clinton administration took over those narratives that doubted the ability of Serbia to become a democratic and peaceful country on their own, and represented an intervention by the West as a dutiful assistance. Thus, the USA, like Austria-Hungary before, legitimized its intervention with a peacemaking myth while taking up a battle position.

Historical Images and Myths of War and Peace

Historical images are available to political decision-makers as an instrument for framing current events historically and geographically, thereby guiding a discourse on legitimacy. When it comes to entering the war, mediated historical images that were circulated through governments can clearly have a mobilizing effect. This made Western journalists to bearers of discourses on legitimacy. Their contributions to the «media truth» followed certain mechanisms steered by national or Western interests as well as by their own worldviews and beliefs. Historical images transport not only stereotypes and mental maps, but have also the potential to demonize the so-called «other» or enemy side. An analysis of historical images can reveal not only their political instrumentalization, but also how military interventions were even made mainly publicly accepted

At the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century, the USA pursued a different kind of intervention in the Balkans than the European states. In accordance with their worldview and their self-image, they wanted to expand the border of independent democracies in Europe, and then establish stable economic relations, while Central Europe in particular did not want to lose direct

5634 Ibid., Calic quoted the NATO-Commander Wesley Clark.
5635 Ibid.
5636 Clinton Doctrine, Clinton Digital Library, FOIA, Widmer, Case Number: 2006-0471-F.
5638 Ibid., pp. 177.
political and economic influence. Of course, both approaches are outcomes of hegemonic power relations. According to the ideas and requirements of the United States, new countries should be established, a project that continues to this day in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As US Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson put it in PBS Newshour with Jim Lehrer: «I think we're trying to Americanize the Balkans»\(^{5640}\). Hutchinson was one of those politicians who questioned not only the US worldview as a superpower, but also the media-dispersed narratives and the political actions based on them. The Americanization of the Balkans is also literally seen in Kosovo: on the boulevard in Pristina, which is called Bill Clinton Boulevard, there is a Hillary boutique and a three-meter Bill Clinton statue (picture 4). Kosovo has realized that it can only exist with the help of US policy and makes symbolic concessions. With this, the independent country, which has been recognized since 2008, supports the US public worldview to be a superpower. This self-image played a significant role in the NYT readers’ letters during the Kosovo war: The US population wanted the US to show strength, and, to actively support or even create democracies, when necessary.

![Picture 4: Bill Clinton in Pristina](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Statue_of_Bill_Clinton_in_Pristina-Kosovo-2014.jpg)

Statue of Bill Clinton in Pristina, Kosovo. 24 April 2014.

«Jo Nego ciata Vetevendosje!» In the background of picture 4 is a message from the Albanian party that says they reject outside influence. In the foreground, you can see the three meter high statue of Bill Clinton, which was unveiled in 2009. It shows the transfer of Western narratives to Kosovo during times of war: it is reminiscent of the Statue of Liberty in New York, which also stands on a pedestal, one hand raised (but the right one), holding a document in the other. The Bill Clinton statue does not have a torch in hand, but is in the typical posture of a greeting president, who presents himself to the mass. In the right hand, the statue holds a document engraved with the date NATO bombing began (March 24, 1999). The symbolism draws parallels to the Statue of Liberty: Both statues bear witness to the gains of freedom (100-year US Declaration of Independence and 2008 recognized independent republic of Kosovo), which is now considered

consolidated, and the upholding of human rights (abolition of slavery in the US and rescuers of «ethnic cleansing» by NATO air strikes).

Historical images, like political myths, are formed primarily in war or conflict situations. Wars therefore play a central role in the construction of postwar realities. They give rise to ideas and stereotypes that flow into the post-war order, if not even determine it. The images of enmities derived from wars survive in peacetime, if only in the archive of cultural memory. They consciously or unconsciously confirm prevailing mental maps and are used as a weapon in subsequent wars or conflicts.

Literature


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