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Abstract
Using notions such as aspectuality, metarepresentation, extended cognition, and distributed identity, which were first developed by cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind and later adapted to the study of fictional consciousness by cognitive narratology, this paper explores the social construction of Flora Saunt’s identity in Henry James’s ‘Glasses’ (1896). This short story is a fine specimen of a group of first-person Jamesian narratives which could be summarily characterized as tales of absent or effaced protagonists for the simple reason that their alleged central figures are seldom, if ever, directly available to the reader and mostly exist as sets of consensual or conflicted images lodged in the minds of other inhabitants of the storyworld. In the specific case of ‘Glasses’, for instance, an analysis of its cognitive make-up provides sufficient evidence to conclude that the construction of Flora as a vain, deceitful woman is heavily contingent on the gender peculiarities of the sources that represent and metarepresent her mind.

Key words: cognitive narratology; socially situated identity; short story; Henry James; ‘Glasses’

Preliminaries
Diversification has been the hallmark of narratology as this discipline transitioned from its austere structuralist origins in the 1960s to the mosaic of forms, emphases, and startling associations that have been collectively known as postclassical narratology for two decades now. Against this pluralistic backdrop, cognitive narratology emerged as one of the most successful postclassical attempts to enhance the study of narrative by triangulating—in David Herman’s expression—story-telling practices, communicative media (especially verbal language), and the growing knowledge of the mind contributed by the cognitive sciences. Implemented by extension rather than substitution, this programme preserved the conceptual and methodological core of classical narratology and grafted onto it a number of related concerns about the functioning of the human mind and its projection onto what could be loosely called the realistic literary character. In many respects, this paper is an enquiry into the critical possibilities of cognitive narratology and its capacity to probe the absent mind as it is deployed by Henry James in a short fiction of his post-dramatic, transitional years.

Among the critical parameters that have been proposed to differentiate modernist and premodernist fiction from its classical, nineteenth-century ancestry, it is commonplace to mention what might be formulated as the triumph of aspectuality, i.e. the ubiquitous shift between the narrative representation of things-as-they-are to
that of things-as-they-are-apprehended by the many embodied or disembodied epistemic positions to be found in stories. In this regard, aspectuality specifically means that the components of any storyworld are functions of unique acts of situated perception and cognition, that such components have no narrative relevance unless conjoined with a concrete perceiving mind, and therefore that they are in fact one thing or another according to the angle of vision. For a theorist of mind such as Rakoczy, propositional attitudes are aspectual precisely because they ‘represent objects and situations always and necessarily under some aspect or description only’; and similar views of this phenomenon are remarkably current in the field of narrative theory. ‘All reporting is undertaken from a specific viewing position, narrative perspective, subjectivity, or experiencing mind’, says Margolin, and Palmer, among others, concurs with him when he argues that ‘whenever events occur in the storyworld, they are always experienced from within a certain vision’. A direct consequence of the progressive aspectualization of narrative is the decline in modernist fiction of absolute panchronic and pantopic perspectives, and their replacement with more concrete, tangible, and experiential systems of observation and cognition.

As a forerunner of modernist narrative, Henry James made crucial contributions to the development of aspectuality in fiction both as a theorist in his discussion of perceptual and compositional centres and as a novelist by placing the focus of interest not on events or existents, but rather on experiences or, in other words, on how such events or existents impinge on characters and grow significant inasmuch as they mean something to somebody. He not only deplores ‘the mere muffled majesty of irresponsible “authorship”’, as he memorably describes the representation of events disconnected from situated experience, but he further argues, with reference to Christopher Newman, that ‘the interest of everything is all that it is his vision, his conception, his interpretation’. Likewise, he claims that he never saw ‘the leading interest of any human hazard but in a consciousness […] subject to fine interpretation and wide enlargement’, and that qualities such as ‘clearness and concreteness constantly depend, for any pictorial whole, on some concentrated individual notation of them’. In his fiction, he variously implemented this epistemic recipe by means of heterodiegetic, figural narration both simple (What Maisie Knew [1897] or The Ambassadors [1903]) and multiple (The Golden Bowl [1904]), but also, and very especially, with the deployment in his short stories of his characteristic personal, homodiegetic witness-narrators, despite his many qualms about ‘the terrible fluidity of self-revelation’ which, in certain circumstances, he imputed to this type of narrative framework.

The occurrence of first-person witness-narrators is specific of a substantial group of Jamesian stories that could be tentatively—and somewhat paradoxically—called tales of absent or effaced protagonists. In such tales, the character of whom the story is ostensibly told or who plays the role of prime mover forms an unbridgeable gap of variable width, either because he or she is dead, as in ‘John Delavoy’ (1898), ‘The Real Right Thing’ (1899), or ‘Maud-Evelyn’ (1900), because he dies before the tale
closes, as in ‘The Figure in the Carpet’ (1897), or because his or her direct presence is perversely stolen from the narrative limelight for a number of reasons, as in ‘The Death of the Lion’ (1894) or, even more glaringly, in ‘The Coxon Fund’ (1894). Here, Frank Saltram, the leading character and a presumed first-class converser and orator, never puts in a direct appearance, save for twenty-five perfectly irrelevant words—“Yes” […] “it’s there, I think, that I’m at my best; quite late, when it gets toward eleven—and if I’ve not been too much worried”—quoted in direct speech by the narrator within a text that is close to twenty-three thousand words in length. As a result of such deferring strategies, the protagonists of these tales melt deeply into the background, being overshadowed to the point of effacement by the narrator and other characters who discuss and think of them at several removes, constructing them aspectually with uncertain claims to authority.

If we put this in traditional critical terms, the central question is to determine how readers can have vivid and allegedly meaningful experiences of characters who hardly appear on the narrative stage, whose physical actions and speech acts are seldom, or even never, directly available to them. What really matters is to ascertain how readers (and critics, of course) can put together such absent characters, judge and interpret their actions, assess moral positions, develop sympathy or repulsion for them, and, above all, feel justified in so doing. Focusing on the communal construction of Flora Saunt, the effaced central figure of James’s ‘Glasses’ (1896), and specifically on how the stigma of vanity is attached to her, this paper attempts to cast some light on the undertheorized class of his tales of absent or effaced protagonists from the angle of cognitive narrative theory and, more concretely, from that of the adaptation to the study of fictional minds of concepts such as extended cognition, socially situated minds, and distributed identity.

Social minds in fact and fiction

Conceiving of minds as world-involved, social mechanisms is no recent development. As far back as the 1920s, and set against a backdrop of ideological collectivism promoted by the Soviet revolution, a group of Russian psychologists and philosophers of mind, such as Lev Vygotsky and his colleagues Alexander Luria and Alexei Leont’ev, began to elaborate a sociogenetic perspective on consciousness that foregrounded its interactive, pragmatic, and purposive nature to the detriment of its more individualistic and private aspects. This perspective was essentially based on a psycholinguistic approach to the development of inner speech in children which seemed to derive from the gradual internalization of earlier forms of social speech. Empirical observations of this kind led to the conviction that thinking is primarily an external, social activity with a strong pragmatic and teleological edge rather than a contemplative, solipsistic phenomenon. Quite in line with these views, later philosophers and theorists of mind such as E. Hutchins, Andy Clark, and David J. Chalmers developed in the late 1990s the controversial hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). Their basic contention was that cognitive processes do not exclusively occur
within the physical boundaries of the self, nor are they coextensional with the biological brain; they rather extend into the physical and social environment and form coupled systems—‘cognitive system[s] in their own right’—in which the external elements are not simply detachable aids to cognition, but integral parts thereof. So, whereas internalist views of mind seek to throw into relief the Cartesian divide between mind and world, the hypothesis of extended cognition pursues its obliteration. It is openly argued, moreover, that a locationally-wide mind entails a distributed identity, since those external resources which lie beyond the skin, and very especially the images held of us in the minds of other thinkers, are vital to our constitution as human beings and thus to our identity. So, if the hypothesis of extended cognition holds, minds make little sense in introspective isolation, but only as nodes in complex, intersubjective networks that render them meaningful.

The notions of an extended mind and a socially situated identity are made possible by two evolved adaptations of human cognitive systems—the so-called theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) and the metarepresentational ability. Whereas the former allows us to relate observable behaviour to the states of mind that lie behind it, ascribing mental life to ourselves and others on the evidence of external action, the latter forms the basis for embedding representations of objects or states of affairs in other representations (Ada’s father knew she feared darkness), thus recursively decoupling thought from reference (Ada’s father knew she feared her classmates had a grudge against Professor Little’s indifferent attitude to his job). The faculty to recognize other minds, discuss their contents, and assess their capacity or incapacity to develop subjective images of the world is a key component of the kind of approach sponsored in this paper, since the distribution of identity across minds, the possibility of locating it in more than one physical site, is only feasible if the ability to think about thinking is correctly in place. Equally crucial is the issue of the situatedness of sources, i.e. who knows, thinks, believes, understands, imagines, etc. that something is the case and when and where such mental activities occur, for the quality and circumstances of the mind that projects a subjective image of a state of affairs via metarepresentation are as important as the state itself, and both must be treated as a functional unit. Many practical problems do arise if we isolate a representation from its source, and we assume the former in ignorance of the latter.

One of the mainstays of cognitive narratology is the methodological assumption that realistic fictional minds are functionally equivalent to their real-life counterparts. Acting on this principle, which is endorsed both by literary theorists and real-mind scientists, narrative theory has developed models to explore the interiority of literary characters as socially distributed across a spectrum of epistemic positions or cognitive perspectives. These are embodied by the homodiegetic narrator and other characters who interactively reconstruct such interiority within their own at one or several removes and with varying degrees of accuracy and reliability. In fact, the process does not seem to differ fundamentally from the everyday use of our theory of mind and metarepresentational abilities to attribute all sorts of mental states to our conspecifics. Fictional characters are constructed much in
the same way as we construct, for instance, new workmates—by observing their behaviour, body language, and speech acts, by contrasting our conclusions with what others say or think of them, by filling in gaps with information pre-stored in our mental databases, and by updating their provisional images when new elements enter the picture. The only significant difference is that fictional minds can be accessed directly and authoritatively in omniscient narrative situations, a possibility which, in principle, lies beyond the limits of real-life cognition.

Considering fictional minds as sealed-off, perfectly delimited phenomena is thus a reductive view, as has been successfully argued by Sharon Cameron with specific reference to James’s fiction. In *Thinking in Henry James*, she identifies the existence of a noticeable tension between novels and prefaces as to the siting of consciousness. While James’s narratives project consciousness as an intersubjective, interpersonal, relational phenomenon placed *between* individuals rather than *in* them, the prefaces revert this tendency and undermine the social scope of thinking by emphasizing its ‘centrality, isolation, and sufficiency’, its relocation within the physical confines of the self. Perfectly compatible with Cameron’s communal view of consciousness as constructed by James’s novels, the idea of a socially extended self endowed with a socially situated identity is quite a potent one—it can yield many insights into how absent fictional characters are aspectually constructed by their peers out of the characterological bits and pieces embedded in their minds, just as it happens in the case of Flora Saunt.

‘Glasses’—the tale and its network of minds

In 1896, and fresh from his depressing theatrical experience of the early 1890s, Henry James published this short story first in *The Atlantic Monthly*, then in the collection *Embarrassments* (1896), and posthumously, after careful revision that has been interpreted as an attempt to stress the role of the narrator, in the uniform edition of his tales brought out by Martin Secker in September 1916. Two plot strands intertwine in this fiction. On the one hand, it is what has been called a ‘portrait story’, that is, an account of how an unnamed painter-narrator comes to repeatedly portray the heroine, Flora Saunt, and of the many aesthetic and gender issues involved in this activity; on the other, it is the story of how this heroine, who is endowed with extraordinary facial beauty, refuses to wear glasses—despite her seriously failing eyesight—in order to preserve her looks and her chances in the marriage market. Eventually, she becomes blind, with the paradoxical result that she can now show off her beauty liberally since glasses are no longer of any avail.

The earliest notebook conception of ‘Glasses’ dates back to 1895, specifically to an entry made on June 26, where one can find a concise, though perfectly recognizable, account of this tale. The elements that sustain the plot are all here—Flora’s amazing beauty ‘which she cherishes . . . more than anything on earth’; her plans to put it to practical ends; the threat on her sight and the necessity to wear heavy spectacles which will disfigure her face and thwart her aspirations for a fine
marriage; the two lovers, one ‘ridiculously ugly’ and ‘not brilliant in other ways’; but steadfast in his devotion and unaffected by her doom, the other ready to jilt her, she fears, should her infirmity lead to the loss of her beauty, as it eventually happens; and finally, from a technical angle, James’s characteristic purpose to tell the story in propria persona, that is, as a detached observer (‘what I, as narrator, see’, he says), rather than having it told by the leading character herself.

Two important elements emerge, however, in the process of composition which will bear on the social situatedness of Flora’s identity. First, James’s decision to make the narrator a professional painter, thus complicating the distinct gender concerns of ‘Glasses’ with aesthetic considerations; second, the invention of Mrs Meldrum, the narrator’s confidant and, as such, an indispensable technical convenience to set verisimilar limits to the flow of information throughout the tale and so curb the occurrence of unnatural, paraleptic knowledge. Given her function, she is a key instrument in the aspectual construction of Flora’s mind. In spite of the introduction of these two new elements, the main difference between the tale as envisaged in his notebooks and the finished product is probably one of compositional emphasis and has to do with the distancing effect provoked by James’s vocal option. While his early plans read as the monological, matter-of-fact account of an authoritative third-person narrator, the tale’s strategies of epistemic deferral tend to promote mild instabilities of meaning. These derive from the relativizing potential associated with metarepresentational sources—i.e. minds containing other minds—and the shifting cultural codes that lie behind them.

Four main characters, plus other minor ones, embody in ‘Glasses’ the epistemic positions or cognitive perspectives across which Flora’s identity is distributed. If placed on a cline ranging from the most to the least impact on the shaping of her identity, the unnamed homodiegetic narrator would come first, since, in principle, he is the only point of entry into the fictional world. ‘The story must be told by a 3d person, as it were, a spectator, an observer’, writes James. To him, in these circumstances, a ‘3d person’ obviously means a first-person narrator, a presumedly uninvolved witness based on a fictional projection of himself who doubles as a central link to the structure of narrative transmission and as a character in his own right. His typical dual nature conflates a narrating self and an experiencing self, both made discursively explicit in the text of ‘Glasses’, both endowed with functionally different minds set apart by temporal and epistemic gulfs, as well as by infrequent judgemental dissonances. The differential of knowledge is evident, for instance, in his condemnation of Flora as a pictorial subject when he sees her wearing dreadful goggles, only to repent his rashness years later in the final opera scene on a perception that proves, within minutes, to be wrong too. In this regard, one could speak of transitory bouts of unreliability, of occasionally raising what is just a fallible conviction to the status of fictional reality. Being a male and a painter, his gaze gives him a sense of superiority, a reifying power that is mainly exerted on Flora. He often judges people only from the angle of artistic valuation, describes them with the lethal eye and attention to significant form of a professional artist, as when he
pictures the ‘expression of [Flora’s] eyes’ as ‘a bit of pastel put in by a master’s thumb’ (‘G’ 569), and tends to aestheticize reality in ways reminiscent of one of his precursors, the young narrator of James’s ‘The Author of Beltraffio’ (1884).

Next to the narrator is Mrs Meldrum, his knowledgeable friend who updates him on Flora and her circumstances, though her sources of information are often blurred and untraceable. She is represented as a mannish, plain, effusive widow whose tread is that ‘of a grenadier’ (‘G’ 526), her age uncertain, her looks unappealing, and, being heavily bespectacled, her appearance is a premonition of Flora’s doom should she eventually submit to wearing glasses. The obvious physical contrast between both women and the attraction Mrs Meldrum develops for Geoffrey Dawling must be reckoned with as conditioning the image of Flora lodged in her mind. Dawling, for his part, is Flora’s Pateresque lover, physically ill-favoured too, fascinated by her portrait, and usually out of the loop on most that happens. And, as a fourth character, we have Flora herself, quite absent from the narrative focus, surviving for the reader on what others say or think of her, but also minimally supplying images of her own mind via infrequent instances of heavily mediated self-representation. Of the minor characters who may be said to hold versions of Flora in their minds, only Lord Iffield, a seemingly unworthy aristocrat and her ‘preferred lover’, is of any consequence; his conception of her, however, reaches the reader through so many layers of mental embedding, as will be shown, that it can hardly be said to contribute more than marginally to the young woman’s identity.

By all reasonable standards, Flora seems to make a baffling creature in the leading role of a protagonist. Often dubbed a ‘central figure’, her immediate presence in ‘Glasses’ is negligible and belies this description. Rather than the fictional image of a fully-fledged human being who enjoys autonomy and a Lebensraum of her own, she is little more than a topic of thought and conversation for others, which fits in fairly well with the gender stereotype of the reified, ‘virtually voiceless’ woman, or, in Virginia Woolf’s apt expression, ‘the most discussed animal in the universe’. It is true that James’s tales of absent or effaced protagonists feature both men and women in that role; but it is also true that a number of these stories—such as ‘The Death of the Lion’ (1894)—tend to feminize their male, effaced protagonists through the homoerotic fascination and morbid possessiveness of young, admiring narrators. However, to draw general conclusions about the interaction of gender and distributed identity in James’s shorter narrative clearly exceeds the scope of this paper.

For an alleged ‘central figure’, the signs of Flora’s direct presence are quite meagre and, by implication, they rather seem to underline her absence. Two types of indices, unequally effective, can be identified. The first type is the narrator’s reporting of her words in direct speech, a conventionally accepted degree zero of mediation in narrative whose mimetic capacity was nevertheless questioned decades ago by a theorist such as Meir Sternberg. It comes mainly in isolated phrases or even single, illustrative words almost buried in the flow of narratorial discourse (e.g. ‘G’ 538, 541, 555). Only twice is Flora’s direct speech minimally developed. First,
when she lies to the narrator about the true condition of her eyesight and when, close upon this, she offers to introduce Lord Iffield to him. This passage contains nine short sentences in direct speech, some of which are responses to comments made by the narrator and quoted both in direct and reported speech within a context entirely dominated by his mental meanderings (‘G’ 533-34). Second, when she participates at the end of chapter 10 in the only natural, if brief, dialogic exchange between herself and the narrator to be found in ‘Glasses’. This is, it seems, as close to Flora as one can go in the whole tale, or, put differently, where the contours of her unmediated physical presence best coincide with those of her identity:

‘Good-bye. I’m going to take my walk’.
‘All alone?’
She looked round the great bleak cliff-top. ‘With whom should I go? Besides I like to be alone—for the present’.
[...] ‘Oh I shall see you again! But I hope you’ll have a very pleasant walk’.
‘All my walks are pleasant, thank you—they do me such a lot of good’ [...] ‘I take several a day’, she continued [...] ‘The more I take the better I feel. I’m ordered by the doctors to keep all the while in the air and go in for plenty of exercise. It keeps up my general health, you know, and if that goes on improving as it has lately done everything will soon be all right. All that was the matter with me before—and always; it was too reckless!—was that I neglected my general health. It acts directly on the state of the particular organ. So I’m going three miles’. (‘G’ 558-59)

Considering that this is also the only episode of ‘Glasses’ in which readers are allowed a full view of Flora’s bespectacled face—evidence of her final surrender to medical advice—Izzo causally links the ephemeral recovery of her unmediated voice to the loss of her facial beauty. For her, being a woman in the context of this tale has several implications, namely a willing submission to the male’s gaze, being an object of contemplation, and suffering from poor or no articulacy, i.e. exactly the opposite of what Mrs Meldrum represents. No wonder, argues Izzo, that Flora’s freshly-acquired capacity to look actively at others through new prosthetic eyes entails an assertive voice, but comes at the price of beauty, that is, of womanhood.

Flora’s words are occasionally embedded in the narrator’s direct speech, three times as direct speech itself (“It’s a thing that’s awful, simply awful”—that’s the only account she would give me’ [‘G’ 553; see also 554, 555]), and twice as debatable instances of non-canonical free indirect speech terminating sequences of reported speech:

‘What she says is that she’ll put on anything in nature when she’s married, but that she must get married first. She has always meant to do everything as soon as she’s married. Then and only then she’ll be safe’. (554; emphasis added to the last sentence)

‘She says above all that he is not “her own sort”. She doesn’t deny that he’s good, but she insists on the fact that he’s grotesque. He’s quite the last person she would ever dream of’. (561; emphasis added)
Additionally, there are a few cases where Flora’s speech acts are *narrated* rather than *reported*, that is, appropriated by the narrator beyond any possibility of retrieval (‘G’ 544, 551). One is especially revealing owing to its confessional and teleological value. At the outset of chapter 9, Flora calls on the narrator to dispel his doubts about the health of her eyesight, but apparently breaks down in tears and confesses the truth. And yet the reader only experiences this situation vicariously, as the effect it makes on the narrator:

I had the strangest saddest scene with her. In showing me the whole of her folly it lifted the curtain of her misery. I don’t know how much she meant to tell me when she came—I think she had had plans of elaborate misrepresentation; at any rate she found it at the end of ten minutes the simplest way to break down and sob, to be wretched and true. *She shared in a word her long secret*, she shifted her sharp pain. (‘G’ 551; emphasis added)

Thus, an exchange which is quite fundamental to infer Flora’s disposition at first hand is reduced to a few factual brushstrokes smothered in a mass of mental attribution and judgement—an intriguing peak of opacity probably intended to control the flow of information about her motives and so foreground the narrator’s interview with Mrs Meldrum that occurs shortly afterwards.

Based on her physical actions, gestures, and visible behaviour, the second type of index of Flora’s presence has even less impact than the reporting of her speech acts. Three scenes can serve to exemplify her on-stage, silent performance—as well as the narrator’s voyeuristic frame of mind. First, her self-exhibition as the subject of a picture on the coast at Folkestone, posing in the distance as for a painter with ‘[h]er back […] turned’ to the view of Sandgate and Hythe, resting ‘with the aid of her elbows, thrust slightly behind her so that her scanty little shoulders were raised toward her ears, on the high rail that inclosed the down’ (‘G’ 531). Second, the toy-shop incident in the course of which her hideous spectacles are first seen for a split second ‘crookedly astride of her beautiful nose’ (‘G’ 543-44). A closely-knitted combination of external action and sporadically fallible mind attribution, this episode features the narrator observing from afar Flora’s movements, conjecturing the motives behind her behaviour, guessing the contents of her speech acts, meta-representing his own curiosity and confusion, and resorting to paraleptic and paraliptic moves to regulate, for effect, the information available to the reader. And third, the final opera episode when the narrator belatedly discovers Flora’s blindness (‘G’ 564-69) and which, considering how intelligence flows in it, forms an extended replica of the toy-shop incident. All three cases have much in common with the distancing strategy adopted in the opening passage of chapter 9, just mentioned. Apart from emphasizing the spatial divide between Flora and the prying narrator, they constitute fine instances of the inextricable combination of action, circumstances, and overwhelming ascription of mental states christened contextual thought report by Palmer. In metaphorical terms at least, readers are never left alone with Flora. Her external behaviour is *not* scenically available as a direct clue to her mind. Any
glimpse we get of it comes so heavily pre-processed and determined by the narrator’s highly obtrusive and fallible attributorial activity—he often misreads causal and intentional links and has to rectify later—that her physical actions are all but poor indices of effective presence.

But if not at the forefront, where is Flora to be found in ‘Glasses’? Or to put it less dramatically, on what grounds can readers and critics discuss her plight, pass ethical judgement on her conduct, or assess her personality and still feel confident about their conclusions? As implied from the outset, Flora is not a unitary, solipsistic essence encased in herself. Her identity is not contained within physical bounds, but rather socially constructed from without by those who have some type of access to her and can hypothesize her interiority via observable actions, body language, speech acts, and, of course, their own expectations and prejudices. Should we need a popular term of contrast, we could argue that her mind takes shape in opposition to that of Stephen in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). Her identity is a function of a network of interacting minds which includes the reader’s and, on rare, arguable occasions, even her own through self-representation. She mostly exists as a set of snapshots in the consciousness of others, her true nature being that of cognitive distribution, very much in line with Clark’s and Chalmers’ conviction that someone’s ‘mental states [can] be partly constituted by the states of other thinkers’. Readers thus experience Flora either in absentia or in praesentia; in other words, through the many refracted images evoked of her by the cognitive perspectives deployed in the story or through her minimal emergence into focus in what can be called a conventional degree zero of mediation. As a result, it does not seem extravagant to claim that the key to ‘Glasses’ is the syndicated construction of Flora’s identity by the homodiegetic narrator, Mrs Meldrum, Geoffrey Dawling, other minor figures of the Folkestone community like Lord Iffield, and, of course, the reader, who finally coordinates and confers sense on all these flows of information.

Cognitive narratology generally assumes that the purpose of fictional texts is to represent arrays of fictional minds in action. If one accepts the premise that reading fiction equates reading clusters of interdependent minds, then all narratives, even seemingly behaviourist ones, can be viewed as integrated systems of intelligence, not mere inorganic aggregates of isolated minds focused introspectively on themselves. Pressing the analogy a little, one could even argue that a narrative text behaves as the cockpit of an MD-80 airliner according to Hutchins’s famous discussion of it, i.e. as a cognitive gestalt where minds pool their resources and form a coupled system of a higher order. ‘Glasses’ is best suited to this approach for two reasons—first, because the number of minds involved is fairly limited and thus interaction gains in intensity and visibility; and second, because Flora’s effaced character does precisely emerge from such interaction. This settled, it does not seem especially problematic to make a large-scale description of the cognitive structure of this tale. Difficulties accrue, however, when one gets down to local details, to fine-grained discursive discriminations concerning levels of mental embedment and attributorial responsibilities.
As a cognitive gestalt, ‘Glasses’ turns on a massive first-person self- attribution of mind made by the homodiegetic narrator—and more concretely by his retrospective, narrating self—which surfaces in discourse by evidence of two kinds. First, we have a large number of verbs and terms of recollection in the present tense, obviously synchronic with the time of planning and writing, such as ‘I remember’, ‘I perfectly recall’, ‘As I turn my ear to the past’, ‘I recollect’, ‘it has come back to me since’, ‘it also comes back to me’ (‘G’ 525, 536, 541, 547, 558, 574), and so on. Second, there are three metalinguistic comments on the tale itself, two quite substantial:

Yes indeed, I say to myself, pen in hand, I can keep hold of the thread and let it lead me back to the first impression. The little story is all there, I can touch it from point to point; for the thread, as I call it, is a row of coloured beads on a string. None of the beads are missing—at least I think they’re not: that’s exactly what I shall amuse myself with finding out. (‘G’ 525)

I have spoken of these reminiscences as of a row of coloured beads, and I confess that as I continue to straighten out my chaplet I am rather proud of the comparison. The beads are all there, as I said—they slip along the string in their small smooth roundness. (‘G’ 555)

and a third one reduced to the single word ‘piece’, meaning ‘tale’, in the sentence ‘He became from this moment to my mind the interesting figure in the piece’ (‘G’ 541). Positing this all-inclusive layer of mind, which is the result of an explicit effort of remembrance and disposition made by the narrating self, agrees well with Nüning’s view of what he calls the narrator perspective, a constructivist interpretation of how homodiegetic narrators create higher-order, subjective images of the fictional world in which the narrator-as-character, or experiencing self, features on a par with other characters.44 Within this subjective projection of the entire world of ‘Glasses’, minds are variously represented and metarepresented.

Access to interiority either by the narrating self or by the experiencing self is not a form of paralepsis in this tale, though it might occasionally feel as such. Telepathic insights are inhibited by the narrator’s human embodiment, a convention which James takes seriously in his willingness to contain omniscience. It never seems imperative in ‘Glasses’ to drastically separate the narrating and the experiencing functions of the narrator by severing the existential link between both and positing an impersonal voice to generate statements about Flora’s ‘desire to please tower[ing] high’, Dawling’s ‘refinements and […] dreary and distinguished knowledge’, and Mrs Meldrum’s ‘conviction that nothing was to be expected’ of Lord Iffield (‘G’ 526, 535, 539).45 Mental reporting is naturalized in ‘Glasses’ by inference or by confidence, that is, by hypothesizing states of mind behind external behaviour (e.g. ‘He stared and blushed at this: it was plain the idea frightened him’ ['G’ 536]), or by explicitly resorting to Mrs Meldrum’s consistent role as purveyor of intelligence about Flora’s past and mindset (e.g. ‘Mrs Meldrum’s further information contributed more to these indulgences’ ['G’ 529]). This certainly justifies the narrator’s position, but displaces
the problem to his confidant whose sources are rarely stated, as if James were only concerned with validating his narrator’s knowledge and cared much less for the fuzzy attributional area from which it emerges.

The system of minds conjured up in ‘Glasses’ by the retrospective narrator’s act of self-attribution—‘I remember’—can be described according to variables such as depth of mental embedment; first-person or third-person ascription, i.e. whether speakers represent their own minds or those of others; source of representation, which denotes if it is the narrating self or another character—including the narrator-as-character—who engages in discussing consciousness; and vehicle of representation, either thought or speech, or combinations thereof if recursive metarepresentation occurs. Keeping for the moment to one-level embedment, both the retrospective narrating self and his characters are sources of mental representations. The narrating self endlessly comments on other minds, especially Flora’s, as well as on that of his own experiencing self. The young woman, for instance, had an ‘air of infallibly knowing’, an ‘air of assurance’ (‘G’ 526, 559); she was a ‘frail creature’, ‘an odd creature’, ‘vulgar enough’ (‘G’ 528, 534, 537), and so on. The narrator-as-character, for his part, was ‘struck by the beauty of a face’, ‘had no objection’, felt ‘a worrying impulse’, had ‘a vague idea’, was ‘mystified’, “recognised”, ‘perceived’ (‘G’ 526, 527, 533, 533, 565, 569, 569), etc. When characters speak, they also attribute minds to others and to themselves. Conversing either with Mrs Meldrum or with Dawling, the narrator-as-character represents Flora’s ‘preposterous evasions and childish hopes’ and the loss of ‘her extraordinary nerve’ (‘G’ 554, 554), whereas Mrs Meldrum and Dawling do likewise when they attribute her recklessness (‘That girl doesn’t care a button’ [‘G’ 528]), idiocy (‘an idiot too abysmal’ [‘G’ 528]), self-complacency (‘too pleased with herself’ [‘G’ 528]), and even derangement (‘She is mad!’ [‘G’ 547]). One could even argue that Flora attributes herself states of mind both in reported speech (‘[she] asseverate[d] that she hadn’t in the least wished to get Mr. Dawling’ [‘G’ 538]) and in free indirect speech (‘She didn’t know I would take it that way’ [‘G’ 542]), though the latter reading is purely contextual and open to debate.

Minds in ‘Glasses’ are also evoked through recursive metarepresentation, which obviously adds distancing potential and hence a tendency to the blurring of sources. Even if we only consider attributional chains that terminate in Flora’s mind, what Zunshine calls socio-cognitive complexity grows exponentially. The retrospective narrator attributes states of mind to others, especially to Mrs Meldrum and Dawling, but also to himself both as narrating self and experiencing self, from which Flora’s own mind figuratively hangs. Thus we find that Mrs Meldrum ‘knew that Flora was acting on system and absolutely declined to be interfered with’ (‘G’ 539), but also that ‘I ns don’t know how much she ri meant to tell me’ (‘G’ 551) and ‘I es wondered whether she ri didn’t know meat all’ (‘G’ 557). Embedded ascriptions occur in the speech of characters too, though less frequently. Speakers can make these ascriptions to others or to themselves, and they often contain glimpses of Flora’s mind. An innocent-looking phrase uttered by Dawling such as ‘Why, that she ri can’t bear the sight of her Md’ (‘G’ 548) can be decoded in context as Dawling’s conviction that Mrs Meldrum
suspects that Flora cannot bear the sight of Mrs Meldrum herself. Likewise, the sentence ‘I only rejoined that it struck me Flora was playing a particular game’ (‘G’ 546) denotes the attribution of a state of mind made by the narrator to himself in reported speech causally connected to Flora’s attitude.

Recursive embedment beyond two successive levels of minds also occurs in ‘Glasses’, though instances are comparatively few. At one point, the narrator says of Flora that nothing could have been ‘less acceptable to her than to be thought not perfect in every particular’ (‘G’ 534) and, similarly, that she ‘couldn’t submit to the imputation of a fault’ (‘G’ 534). In both cases, several minds form miniature coupled systems that could be tentatively expanded as ‘the narrator assumes that Flora thinks it is unacceptable that someone thinks she is not perfect’, or, in the second example, as ‘the narrator assumes that Flora cannot submit to the fact that someone thinks she has a fault’. (In fact, nominalized forms like “imputation” encode tiny intelligence systems integrated by more minds than one.) Flora’s interiority can also be metarepresented via a narratorial first-person attribution, containing Dawling’s mind and, in turn, Flora’s, as in ‘I could see […] he would be filled with a passionate pity ever so little qualified by a sense of the girl’s fatuity and folly’ (‘G’ 550), and also in the direct speech of characters, as in Mrs Meldrum’s allusive statements, ‘She knows best of all what I think of Flora Saunt’ (‘G’ 528) and ‘she feels I’ve one [instinct] about her’ (‘G’ 530). But all this is just formal illustration of how minds in ‘Glasses’ contain, and are contained in, other minds and form more or less complex associations. A more substantial issue, however, and one which allows a better view of the potentialities and pitfalls of socially distributed identity, is to examine how Flora takes shape as a vain creature in this story.

The social situatedness of Flora’s vanity

If we indulge in the New Critical affective fallacy for a short while, it is hard to ignore that few readers of ‘Glasses’ would hesitate to describe Flora as a vain woman in the standard sense of ‘having or showing undue or excessive pride in one’s appearance or achievements’ (Merriam-Webster). Professional critics, moreover, follow suit. ‘Excessive vanity literally and figuratively destroys vision’, argues Tintner; Gage pronounces Flora ‘a young and vain woman’, Dean underlines ‘her vanity throughout the tale’ and calls her ‘a shallow young woman’, Martin and Ober also note ‘her vanity’, while Izzo foregrounds her narcissism which surely counts as a form of vanity.47 And yet one may wonder about the grounds for this consensus and, in particular, how Flora and the concept of vanity are made to coincide in a single phenomenological unit.

Images of a vain Flora are invoked and circulated in ‘Glasses’ at least in two different ways. First, by direct attribution, that is, by ascribing this mindset to Flora in unequivocal, finalized terms. This leaves, in principle, little room for readers to exercise their interpretative skills, as when the narrating self pictures Flora as ‘a being whom vanity had put so off her guard’ (‘G’ 529). Second, by inferential
attribution, a more subtle method in which the reader’s complicity is required to construe certain physical actions, appearances, speech acts, or attributions of mind as clues to vanity even if vanity itself is not explicit in them. A fine sample of this is when a blind Flora, in the final opera episode, is represented as looking through her binoculars, smiling, and nodding in acceptance of the homage the house pays, she presumes, to her beauty (‘G’ 569). No one makes here a direct attribution of vanity, but her external behaviour in the circumstances is sufficiently eloquent. Likewise, when the narrating self asserts that Flora’s ‘beauty was as yet all the world to her’ (‘G’ 529), he is not ascribing vanity *tout court* but a state of mind few would fail to identify as such.

Explicit projections of Flora’s vanity populate the minds of the narrating self, Mrs Meldrum, and the experiencing self, i.e. the narrator-as-character. On a first level of mental embedment, they materialize in narratorial discourse in the first case and in direct speech in the other two. Thus Flora’s vanity, for the narrating self, ‘was the only vanity [he had] ever known that made its possessor superlatively soft’ (‘G’ 529); and, at the close of the tale, he still insists that ‘her vanity’ partakes of the life of her restored beauty (‘G’ 568) and that ‘her old vanities were justified and sanctified’ (‘G’ 569). Mrs Meldrum, for her part, ascribes her a ‘vanity that is beyond all making or mending’ (‘G’ 528) and even the experiencing self converses on ‘her vanity but half account[ing]’ for her self-delusion (‘G’ 554). Broadly equivalent terms and expressions are often used to invoke images of irresponsible vanity. Flora suffers from ‘egotism’ and ‘folly’ (‘G’ 537, 551), is ‘a creature of illusions’ and ‘at liberty to be silly’ (‘G’ 559, 528), radiates delirious ‘happiness’ and ‘incredible buoyancy’ (‘G’ 552, 562) despite her bleak prospects, exhibits ‘idolatry for her beauty’ (‘G’ 545), has a ‘foolish little mind’ and ‘so little proper feeling’ (‘G’ 561, 561), and is even presented as perpetrating a ‘fraud’ to marry money and social status (‘G’ 555).

Based on the representations of both behaviour and consciousness which occur, just as above, in the discourse of the narrating self and in the direct speech of Mrs Meldrum and the experiencing self, inferential images of a vain, deceitful Flora are also a constant in ‘Glasses’. Two pages into the tale, she is already represented as ‘always bringing [her face] close to somebody’s’ (‘G’ 527) in an attempt, one concludes, to enhance her beauty by sheer contrast with ordinary folks. Similarly, her desperation to conceal her goggles from Lord Iffield and her resistance to tying herself to glasses for good, both voiced by the narrator-as-character in conversation (‘G’ 546, 553), are enacted for the reader as symptoms of a vain disposition. Much more frequent, however, is the attribution to Flora of peculiar states of mind connoting vanity. ‘She would clearly never explain anything by any failure of her own power’ (‘G’ 534), says the narrator in what rings as a fairly accurate definition of vanity itself. He further adds that Flora ‘had grown to regard [his] studio as the tabernacle of her face’, that she held ‘the attitude of the lone orphan who had to be a law unto herself’, and that ‘[t]he only moral she saw in anything was that of her incomparable countenance’ (‘G’ 537, 537, 540). Flora’s image of vanity and conceit is often underlined by implication, as when the narrating self describes Dawling’s
many assets and talents and shows his incredulity that ‘such a man should be at the
same time fond of Flora Saunt’ (‘G’ 540) and that she should, moreover, unwise
ly reject his timid advances. Similar attributions are made in direct speech by Mrs
Meldrum and the experiencing self. The former admits that Flora ‘wants naturally
enough a much wider field’ and places her ‘in London’—the very heart of Vanity
Fair—because ‘her game is there’ (‘G’ 530); the latter, for his part, suggests Flora’s
vanity and its subsequent defeat as he retells Mrs Meldrum the gist of the opening
scene of chapter 9, where Flora comes ‘to triumph’ (‘G’ 553) and ends up routed by
her incapacity to maintain her imposture.

At times, images of a vain Flora are metarepresented, that is, recursively held in
multiple minds. In a passage of chapter 7, when the narrating self is ruminating on
how Dawling reacted to Flora’s eye malady, he reports the following confidence:

He had had a formless perception of some secret that drove Miss Saunt to
subterfuges, and the more he thought of it the more he guessed this secret to be the
practice of making believe she saw when she didn’t and of cleverly keeping people
from finding out how little she saw. (‘G’ 548-49)

Here the narrator tells the reader how Dawling reconstructs his own mind (‘formless
perception’, ‘he thought’, ‘he guessed’), which in turn focuses on Flora’s secret of
defection and conceit, namely her design to keep people in ignorance of the true
state of her eyes for practical reasons. Several layers of intentionality and deceit
concur in this fragment, as well as in the one below, in which the narrator, apprised
by Mrs Meldrum, sums up the mental process that led Lord Iffield to break his
engagement:

What had happened was simply that Flora had at the eleventh hour broken down in
the attempt to put him off with an uncandid account of her infirmity and that his
lordship’s interest in her had not been proof against the discovery of the way she had
practised on him. Her dissimulation, he was obliged to perceive, had been infernally
deep. (‘G’ 562)

As usual, sources beyond Mrs Meldrum are untraceable, but the whole metarepre-
sentational chain can be more or less decoded as ‘the narrator assumes that Mrs
Meldrum (somehow) knows that Flora manoeuvred to deceive Lord Iffield who,
de spite his partiality for her, read her mind and avoided the snare’. Less explicit
though equally telling is how the narrator reports the postscript to a letter received
from Mrs Meldrum who is travelling in Italy with Flora after the Lord Iffield affair.
‘In our young lady’s calculations’, he says, ‘the lowest numbers were now Italian
counts’ (‘G’ 563). This is, of course, a tacit comment on Flora’s incorrigibility and her
renewed plans to captivate aristocrats, but it is worth noting that this image is first
constructed in Mrs Meldrum’s mind, then given written form, absorbed by the
narrator, and finally relayed to the reader.
The foregoing evidence that Flora’s vain disposition is socially distributed and hardly forms part of a supposed solipsistic essence coextensional with her physical self raises a number of compelling questions. First, there is the all-important issue of aspectuality. Like any other element of a storyworld, ‘Flora’ is an amalgam of unique perceptions. So, to simplify, we have a narrator’s ‘Flora’, a Mrs Meldrum’s ‘Flora’, a Dawling’s ‘Flora’, a Lord Iffield’s ‘Flora’, even a Flora’s ‘Flora’, and obviously a reader’s ‘Flora’, which is a composite of all the others, plus his or her own extratextual perspective. According to standard cognitive narratology, one of the deepest interests of fiction is to observe how the aspectual images of a given character reinforce or undercut each other by agreement or by contradiction, resulting in homogeneous or conflicted identities—as when witnesses in court systematically support the same res gestae or else depose contradictorily and cannot be proved right or wrong. In this tale, however, aspectuality does not seem to lead to a cognitive deadlock. At first sight, Flora’s identity is not problematic, for the images of her lodged in the minds of her fictional counterparts are essentially alike: she is a young orphan woman, fanciful, immature, deceitful, and vain, who must be guided, protected, and saved from her own self-destructive folly. Taken in isolation from its metarepresentational sources, this prevailing image of Flora goes unchallenged and is authoritative in the commonly accepted sense of the term. Critics and readers seldom proceed beyond this point.

Representing minds within minds, however, requires superstitious attention to the sources and circumstances of representation. To metarepresent is to relativize, that is, to make a mind contingent on sources and circumstances, and one may wonder if the network of interacting minds moulding Flora’s consensual identity is in any way peculiar. To begin with, and to all practical effects, it is an all-male cognitive system, since Mrs Meldrum, biologically a woman, is often masculinized in looks and demeanour, and, as Izzo has argued, her ugliness stands for the negation of womanhood within the gender make-up of ‘Glasses’. This cognitive gestalt, which is socially and historically positioned, holds patriarchal values all along, monolithically, and in particular a strong tendency to protect and guide unruly women and to subject them to containment by means of approved forms of marriage. Flora’s decisions, such as her refusal to wear glasses or to marry Dawling, are regularly met with disapproval, while she is patronizingly referred to as ‘poor dear’, ‘poor thing’, ‘poor creature’, ‘poor girl’, ‘poor little Flora Saunt’, and ‘poor Flora’ (‘G’ 528, 546, 553, 554, 557, 560). All wish to exert power on Flora, each in his or her own way—the narrator by reifying her in his portraits; Mrs Meldrum by decrying her shallowness early in the tale and later, when the older woman falls for Dawling, by discreetly trying to marry Flora off to avoid competition; Dawling by fits of smothering over-protection; Lord Iffield by his rank and wealth; and even the unnamed, unspecified oculists by their male, scientific authority that condemns the young woman to ‘perpetual nippers’ (‘G’ 550). Since Flora is little more than a precipitate of this array of minds, it is quite fit to ask where her vanity is situated and if what passes for an ethical shortcoming might simply be a natural, self-preserving
response, not devoid of courage and risk, against the insidious exercise of male dominance under the guise of protection.

Critics, however, tend to discuss Flora as an essence, not as a construct distributed across minds which have all sorts of interests, inclinations, and aversions. Putt, for instance, speaks of ‘Flora’s own valuation’ of the tale and of ‘the valuation of the fascinated narrator’, as if both existed on the same plane and had the same epistemic weight, while reputed critics like Ron retell the plot of ‘Glasses’ taking at face value events, characters, and attitudes. Metarepresentational processes and their sources are at times neglected or even misattributed, as when Ginsburg reports that, after calling Lord Iffield ‘a regular beast’ (‘G’ 560) and ‘that brute’ (‘G’ 561), Mrs Meldrum comments that, in breaking his engagement with Flora, “He had conducted himself like any other jockeyed customer—he had returned the animal as unsound”.

Yet it is obvious that the comment is the narrator’s, not Mrs Meldrum’s, even if information might have seeped through the latter. Similarly, as Izzo discusses the animal imagery associated with Flora, her discrimination between sources is somewhat inaccurate—in reality, it is the narrator, not Lord Iffield, who likens her to an unsound ‘animal’ (‘G’ 561) and Dawling who describes her as ‘a shying mare’ (‘G’ 547).

In the limited compass of this paper, and taking ‘Glasses’ as a case study, an attempt has been made to explore how the identity of absent characters in first-person narratives can be communally pieced together out of mental representations ranging from mere hints to fully developed profiles, and how these characters can acquire such vividness as to enable readers to lose sight of their distributed nature and react to them as if constantly placed in the narrative limelight. ‘Glasses’, after all, inhabits the intersection of two sets of Jamesian stories—those with absent or effaced protagonists and those which could be broadly described as tales of unwanted protection (e.g. ‘The Death of the Lion’ [1894] or ‘The Turn of the Screw’ [1898]). In the latter, a fictional agency—usually the narrator—bestows some kind of protection on characters ostensibly for their welfare, but in fact to satisfy a disturbing instinct for possessiveness that becomes obvious as soon as one discounts the effects of interposing minds. In the case of ‘Glasses’, for instance, and resorting to cultural and gender theory, Ginsburg attempts to acquit Flora and he does so, one could argue, by reading round and past her situated construction. Endangering her eyesight by refusing to wear spectacles may not be evidence of rashness or fatuity, but rather of a transgressive disposition, of a definite will to shake off male tutelage, whatever the cost, and ‘exercise some control over her life’.

So it may not be extravagant to read an unfinalized, polyhedral Flora in ‘Glasses,’ or, more exactly, to view in her the operation of two opposed mindsets as she comes to grips with her own situation. She is a pitiable, vain, irresponsible woman if we just ignore the cognitive framing of this story and uncritically accept the consensual identity projected by her peers’ minds. But if we consider the specificity of these sources and their precise socio-historical positioning in terms of gender politics, we may begin to see courage, nerve, and daring where others can only see arrogance.
and foolishness. Flora’s stance on her plight, whatever one holds it to be, does not mitigate its true nature. She is preyed upon by inequality and submission, by general expectations of passivity and compliance which she will not fulfil, and, literally, by the greed of rapacious acquaintances such as the Hammond Synges (“G” 529). She is, moreover, a member of the substantial class of Jamesian women mercilessly harassed by the requirements of the marriage market. As an orphan with a petty middle-class background and a rapidly dwindling inheritance, Flora is placed at the bottom of the ladder of power, and it is touching to see how she schemes to climb it on the strength of facial beauty, her only asset to gain social standing and economic security. In the ultimate analysis, however, and even if her identity and mental disposition are just refractions in the minds of others, the gender conventions that weigh her down and determine her behaviour are all too real.

Notes


6 Ibid., p. 37.

7 Ibid., pp. 67, 69.

8 Ibid., p. 321.
22 Cameron, Thinking in Henry James, p. 41.
This brings in the time-honoured issue of consonance vs. dissonance in first-person narration, i.e. identification of the narrating self with the experiencing self vs. distancing and judgement of the latter by the former; see Dorrit Cohn, *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978), pp. 145-61.

30 Henry James, ‘Glasses’, *Complete Stories, 1892-1898* (New York: Library of America, 1999), pp. 525-71 (pp. 363, 365); henceforth cited parenthetically in the text as ‘G’. To avoid pronominal confusion, the following subscript keys will be occasionally used: Ns, narrating self; Es, experiencing self; Fl, Flora Saunt; Md, Mrs. Meldrum; Dw, Geoffrey Dawling; If, Lord I菲尔德.


42 See E. Hutchins, ‘How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds’, *Cognitive Science*, 19 (1995), pp. 265-88 (pp. 265-67). In this epoch-making essay, Hutchins basically argues that the calculation of landing speeds and wing configurations in airliners is not carried out by a set of individual minds externally assisted by flying instruments. For him, the whole cockpit—
individual minds plus instruments—forms a ‘supersized’ mind, a cognitive gestalt, a coupled socio-technical system which should be taken as the true unit of analysis. Memory of speeds is thus socially distributed among the members of the crew and physically distributed among the flying instruments. Hence the analogy with the network of minds that can be seen to operate as a system in a narrative work.

Apart from these, there are other verbs and expressions in the present tense not specifically denoting recollection but also synchronic with the narrating: ‘I think’, ‘I say’, ‘Let me say at once’, ‘I confess’, ‘I seem even now’, ‘I think’, ‘a sharpness that I hear at this hour’, ‘I don’t know how much she meant to tell me [ … ] I think she had had plans’, ‘I confess’, ‘I feel to this moment’, ‘I say’, ‘I don’t know’ (‘G’ 529, 532 twice, 537, 540, 541, 544, 544, 551, 563, 565, 565, 566), etc.


Izzo, ‘Woman as Image’, pp. 103, 104.