QUINTILIAN
AND THE LAW

The Art of Persuasion
in Law and Politics

Edited by

Olga Tellegen-Couperus

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FRANCISCO CHICO-RICO

SOME (SEMIOTIC) ASPECTS OF ELOCUTIO IN QUINTILIAN

More about Latinitas, Perspicuitas, Ornatus, and Decorum

1. INTRODUCTION

As is well known, elocutio, which the Greeks called phrāsis, is the rhetorical operation responsible for the linguistic formulation or the outward expression through means of a language of the ideas found in inventio and organized by dispositio;¹ in other words, it is the rhetorical operation responsible for the conversion of the textual macro-structure, which results from the rhetorical operations of inventio and dispositio, into the textual micro-structure or textual linear manifestation.² Elocutio is, therefore, together with inventio and dispositio, a discourse-building rhetorical operation, because its activity results in the construction of a level of discourse, i.e., the level of the micro-structure of the text or textual linear manifestation.³

Book VIII of Quintilian’s Institutiō oratoria, the object of the present study, is dedicated, together with Book IX, to the treatment of the rhetorical operation of elocutio. The stylistic expressiveness, which results from the author’s artistic success in the realization of this rhetorical operation, is a unique characteristic not only of rhetorical discourse (rhetorical expressiveness) but also of poetic discourse (poetic expressiveness).⁴ The rhetorical and poetic theories of these two books have fed upon each other during centuries, so as to create one of the best compendia of ancient knowledge about rhetorical imagery.⁵

³ Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), pp. 57-64, 117-127.
In an attempt to present synthetically the content of Book VIII, I will say that the author of the *Institutio oratoria* begins his argument in the preface to this book with the recapitulation of the fundamental principles of the rhetorical theory described and explained throughout the earlier books. His purpose is to coherently and solidly associate them with the treatment of the rhetorical operation of *elocutio* (VIII.pr.1-12). One of the tasks of the orator, as Quintilian reminds us in this context, is that of delighting his hearers. This point allows him to introduce directly the rhetorical operation of *elocutio*, since delight depends primarily, though not solely, on style (VIII.pr.7). Immediately thereafter, he deals with the doctrine of style, a doctrine which is, for most orators, the most difficult of all (VIII.pr.13). Following Cicero, the author of the *Institutio oratoria* affirms that while invention and arrangement are within reach of any intelligent man, eloquence belongs only to the true orator (VIII.pr.14). In this sense, Quintilian defines the rhetorical operation of *elocutio* in the following manner (VIII.pr.15).

For the verb *elocuit* means the production and communication to the audience of all that the speaker has conceived in his mind, and without this power all the preliminary accomplishments of oratory are as useless as a sword that is kept permanently concealed within its sheath.

*Elocutio* is, as the author of the *Institutio oratoria* tells us, that part which is most needy of learned art, of great effort, of training, and of imitation (VIII.pr.16), since both the efficiency and inefficiency of rhetorical discourse depend, to a large extent, on rhetorical expression (VIII.pr.17). That fact does not mean, however, that one must place concern for the words above concern for the ideas: for Quintilian, the formal and sonorous appeal of words is extremely beautiful in discourse, but only when it is consistent with the power of ideas, which are like the soul of discourse (VIII.pr.18-22). The fact that the author of the *Institutio oratoria* appreciates the relationships between ideas and words in the discourse, between its background and its form, is very important for understanding the relevance of Quintilian’s thought for our times; it also explains how it has become distorted throughout history, leading to the absolute and undeserving impoverishment of Rhetoric as the classical science of persuasive discourse, which has resulted in the separation and disconnection of the five traditional rhetorical operations and the exact hypertrophy of the rhetori-

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6 Quintilian explains it as follows (*Inst. or.*, VIII.pr.7): ‘I attempted to show that the duty of the orator is composed of instructing, moving and delighting his hearers, statement of facts and argument falling under the head of instruction, while emotional appeals are concerned with moving the audience and, although they may be employed throughout the case, are most effective at the beginning and end. As to the element of charm, I pointed out that, though it may reside both in facts and words, its special sphere is that of style.’ In this essay, I use the text edition and the English translation by Butler (see ‘Introduction’, note 27).

7 For Quintilian, (*Inst. or.*, VIII. pr.17): ‘the failure of the orators of the Asiatic and other decadent schools did not lie in their inability to grasp or arrange the facts on which they had to speak, nor, on the other hand, were those who professed what we call the dry style of oratory either fools or incapable of understanding the cases in which they were engaged. No, the fault of the former was that they lacked taste and restraint in speaking, while the latter lacked power, whence it is clear that it is here that the real faults and virtues of oratory are to be found’.
cal operation of *elocutio*. Using the image of the healthy body, the author of the *Institutio oratoria* alludes to the necessary preeminence of ideas over words in the following way (VIII.pr.19-20).

19. Healthy bodies, enjoying a good circulation and strengthened by exercise, acquire grace from the same source that gives them strength, for they have a healthy complexion, firm flesh and shapely thaws. But, on the other hand, the man who attempts to enhance these physical graces by the effeminate use of depilatories and cosmetics, succeeds merely in defacing them by the very care which he bestows on them. 20. Again, a tasteful and magnificent dress, as the Greek poet tells us, lends added dignity to its wearer: but effeminate and luxurious apparel fails to adorn the body and merely reveals the futility of the mind.

In order to do so, Quintilian demands that the orator will be careful in his choice of words, but that he will have deep concern about the ideas: *Curam ergo verborum, rerum volo esse sollicitudinem* (VIII.pr.20 in fine).

The author of the *Institutio oratoria* also proposes the adaptation of the ideas and the words in discourse, because the best expressions depend on the ideas, i.e., on the best ideas, and are those which seem natural and are modeled on the reality and on the truth of all things (VIII.pr.21,23). Remembering Cicero, Quintilian is of the opinion that ‘the worst fault in speaking is to adopt a style inconsistent with the idiom of ordinary speech and contrary to the common feeling of mankind’ (VIII.pr.25). Words which do not correspond to ideas are devoid of strength and virtue.

The necessary conditions for the orator to attain the best expression will be, in this sense, the constitution, through study, of ‘a true conception of the principles of eloquence’, the accumulation of ‘a copious supply of words by wide and suitable reading’, the application of ‘the art of arrangement to the words thus acquired’, and the development, through exercise, of the necessary faculties ‘to use his acquisitions so that every word is ready at hand and lies under his very eyes’ (VIII.pr.28). He who follows these instructions will see that his ideas will spontaneously present themselves together with the most appropriate words for their expression (VIII.pr.29).

For this reason, the final advice of the author of the *Institutio oratoria* is to take great care with style, and yet realize that ‘nothing should be done for the sake of words only, since words were invented merely to give expression to things: and those words are the most satisfactory which give the best expression to the thoughts of our mind and produce the effect which we desire upon the minds of the judges’ (VIII.pr.32). Only then will words guarantee a pleasant and admirable style which is ‘praiseworthy and dignified’ (VIII.pr.33).

In the first Chapter of Book VIII, Quintilian divides the treatment of style in two ample sections, since style manifests itself not only in individual words but also in groups of words (VIII.1.1): *Ea spectatur verbis singulis aut coniunctis*. Individual words should be Latin or pure, clear or transparent, elegant, and accommodated or

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9 *De oratore*, I. 12.
well-adapted to produce the desired effect. Groups of words, on the other hand, ought to be correct, aptly placed, and adorned with suitable figures. This is how the author of the *Institutio oratoria* introduces the four traditional qualities of the rhetorical operation of style, without which rhetorical discourse would have deficiencies that would impede the attainment of its persuasive objective: *latinitas* (VIII.1), *perspicuitas* (VIII.2), *ornatus* (VIII.3), and *decorum*.

2. LATINITAS, OR PURITAS

The first of these qualities of style, *latinitas*, or *puritas*, corresponds to the appropriate use of the Latin language, to the linguistic purity of language, and consists of the use of the correct expressions in the frame of the language in which the rhetorical discourse is constructed. As Quintilian recognizes (VIII.1.2), this quality of style responds to the need to follow the rules of Grammar, understood as *recte loquendi scientia* (I.4.2), the indispensable condition for achieving good speech that is unique to Rhetoric, understood as *ars bene dicendi* (II.17.37) or *bene dicendi scientia* (II.14.5).

3. PERSPICUITAS

The *perspicuitas* of style corresponds, in general, to the clarity or transparency of the expression used in the construction of the micro-structure of the text. The clarity or transparency of the textual micro-structure is fundamental in order for the rhetorical discourse to be understandable to the receiver, and therefore, for the orator to reach his persuasive objective. It deals with a quality of style based on *latinitas*, because to achieve the clarity or transparency of the expression, it is necessary to use the correct expressions in the frame of the language in which the rhetorical discourse is constructed. However, *perspicuitas* adds to *latinitas* the propriety in the use of words (VIII.2.1), a propriety which will always be the fruit of the linguistic effort of the orator, in some cases to call the items dealt with by their own names and in other cases to avoid obscene, rude or sordid terms because of its inadequacy to the dignity of the themes and/or to the dignity of the persons to whom the rhetorical discourse is directed (VIII.2.1-2).

Very close to *perspicuitas* we find *urbanitas*, the quality understood as elegance of style, and *venustas*, the quality understood as beauty in speech, upon which depends the pleasure that the rhetorical discourse will produce in the receiver. While Quintilian does not consider these to be qualities belonging exclusively to *elocutio*.

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10 If the Latin designation of *puritas* is *latinitas*, the Greek designation of this quality of *elocutio* is *hellenismós*. This corresponds to the appropriate use, respectively, of Latin and Greek. Cf. Lausberg (see note 1), §§463-527; Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), pp. 124-125.
12 Lausberg (see note 1), §§528-537.
13 Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), 125-126.
(in fact, the author of the *Institutio oratoria* treats them in Book VI, dedicated to the peroration and the excitation of the emotions or the feelings), they are considered to be general qualities of the rhetorical discourse that affect not only the syntactical-semantic range of the words but also the pragmatic-communicative dimension of the act of expression; in other words, not only the rhetorical operations of *inventio*, *dispositio*, and *elocutio*, on the one hand, but also the rhetorical operation of *actio* or *pronuntiatio*, on the other. However, they are general qualities of the rhetorical discourse centered on the syntactical-semantic range of the words and, above all, on the rhetorical operation of *elocutio*, since style constitutes the focal point of these qualities, as is shown in the following fragment from Quintilian’s work (VI.3.17-18).

17. First, there is *urbanitas*, which I observe denotes language with a smack of the city in its words, accent and idiom, and further suggests a certain tincture of learning derived from associating with well-educated men; in a word, it represents the opposite of rusticity. 18. The meaning of *venustus* is obvious; it means that which is said with grace and charm.

With style as the focal point, these general qualities of the rhetorical discourse are those which guarantee that, according to the principle of *decorum*, the referential construction of *inventio* and the macro-structural organization of *dispositio* appear with an appropriate textual micro-structure at the discourse level of *elocutio* and with an appropriate oral and gestural realization on the performative level of *actio* or *pronuntiatio*. As general qualities of the rhetorical discourse which are very close to *perspicuitas*, *urbanitas* and *venustas* are, like the former, based on *latinitas*, which provides a necessary grammatical base for the orator to achieve the textual microstructure which is not only correct but also elegant and beautiful in its formal aspect and in its expressive aspect. 14

4. *ORNATUS*

The appropriate use of the Latin language and the clarity or transparency of the expression are basic to the construction of the micro-structure of the rhetorical discourse, since *latinitas* and *perspicuitas*, as qualities of *elocutio*, belong to the utility of the cause (VIII.3.2). Yet, on the basis of *latinitas* and *perspicuitas*, the true orator, the consummate orator, can and ought to seek *ornatus*, a ‘plus’ (significant, if not rationally, at least sentimentally), as David Pujante-Sánchez labels it. 15 *Ornatus* is that which guarantees the success of persuasion by means of adornment of words,

14 Mortara-Garavelli (see note 5), pp. 152-156; Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), pp. 126-127; Mayoral (see note 11), pp. 20-27; Pujante-Sánchez (see note 5), pp. 173-175.

15 Pujante-Sánchez (see note 5), pp. 167-168, 181ff. According to Quintilian, *Inst. or.* VIII.3. 61: ‘The ornate is something that goes beyond what is merely lucid and acceptable. It consists firstly in forming a clear conception of what we wish to say, secondly in giving this adequate expression, and thirdly in lending it additional brilliance, a process which may correctly be termcd embellishment. Consequently we must place among ornaments that *enargia* which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice’.
excellence of expression, and, finally, artistic efficacy.\textsuperscript{16} We must stress the fact that \textit{ornatus}, as a quality of \textit{elocutio}, is not to be understood as an ornamental addition, since it is not possible to add new elements to a linguistic construction without the substantial modification of its nature due to the systematic character of language; \textit{ornatus} is understood as the result of the transformation of the linguistic code into its different levels so as to achieve the sublimity, the splendour, the brilliance, and the authority in the words.\textsuperscript{17} Along these lines, the following considerations of Quintilian prove to be of indubitable interest (VIII.3.1-4).

1. [...] For a speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact his speech seems rather to be free from blench than to have any positive merit. 2. Even the untrained often possess the gift of invention, and no great learning need be assumed for the satisfactory arrangement of our matter, while if any more recondite art is required, it is generally concealed, since unconcealed it would cease to be an art, while all these qualities are employed solely to serve the interests of the actual case. On the other hand, by the employment of skillful ornament the orator commends himself at the same time, and whereas his other accomplishments appeal to the considered judgment of the learned, this gift appeals to the enthusiastic approval of the world at large, and the speaker who possesses it fights not merely with effective, but with flashing weapons. 3. If in his defence of Cornelius Cicero had confined himself merely to instructing the judge and speaking in clear and idiomatic Latin without a thought beyond the interests of his case, would he ever have compelled the Roman people to proclaim their admiration not merely by acclamation, but by thunders of applause? No, it was the sublimity and splendour, the brilliance and the weight of his eloquence that evoked such clamorous enthusiasm. 4. [...] In my opinion the audience did not know what they were doing, their applause sprang neither from their judgment nor their will; they were seized with a kind of frenzy and, unconscious of the place in which they stood, burst forth spontaneously into a perfect ecstasy of delight.

The author of the \textit{Institutio oratoria} concludes Book VIII with the description and explanation of various ornamental resources, among which stand out amplification (\textit{amplificatio}) and attenuation (\textit{abbreviatio}), the 'sentence' (\textit{sententia}), and the tropes. The tropes may be one of two types. First, there are those which are used to help out our meaning: metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, antonomasia, onomatopoea, catachresis or abuse, and metalepsis or transumption. Second, there are those which are used to adorn our style: epithet, allegory, riddle, irony or \textit{illusio}, paraphrasis, hyperbaton, and hyperbole (VIII.4-6).

5. \textit{DECORUM, ACCOMODATUM OR APTUM}

Finally, \textit{decorum}, \textit{accomodatum} or \textit{aptum}, corresponds to the necessary adaptation which must take place between the ideas and the words of discourse, between its background and its form, between the macro-structure and the micro-structure. Let us remember what we said a moment ago: 'the best expressions depend on the ideas, i.e., on the best ideas, and are those which seem natural and are modeled on the real-

\textsuperscript{16} Lausberg (see note 1), §§538-1054.

\textsuperscript{17} Montara-Garavelli (see note 5), pp. 157 ff.; Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), p. 132; Mayoral (see note 11), pp. 20-27; Pujante-Sánchez (see note 5), pp. 181-213.
ity and on the truth of all things [...]. Words which do not correspond to ideas are
devoid of strength and virtue’.

But decorum also corresponds to the necessary adaptation between the rhetorical
discourse and the general communicative context in which it is produced or delivered
by the orator and received by the public. This adaptation should take place, on the one
hand, on all the levels which pertain to the referent of the text and to the text itself or
the rhetorical discourse and, on the other hand, on those levels and the distinct ele-
ments of the rhetorical fact. The latter includes not only the rhetorical discourse but
also the interaction between that discourse, the orator, the public, the referent of
the text, and the context in which the rhetorical communication takes place. In other
words, decorum corresponds to the necessary adaptation which takes place in two
ways. First, between (a) the constructive level of inventio which semiotically is of a
semantic-extensional nature and corresponds to the referent of the rhetorical dis-
course, (b) the constructive level of dispositio which is of a syntactical-semiotic
nature and which is equivalent to the textual macro-structure, and (c) the constructive
level of elocutio which is equally syntactic from a semiotic point of view and is iden-
tified with the textual micro-structure. Second, adaptation should take place between
those levels and the pragmatic-communicative level of actio or pronuntiatio, i.e., the
orator’s oral and gestural realization of the micro-structure of the rhetorical discou

Decorum is, then, a principle of structuralization of the textuality and of the
rhetorical communication; it is a principle of coherence which dominates the total-
ity of the rhetorical fact and affects the interaction between the distinct elements of
the rhetorical fact - the rhetorical discourse, the orator, the public, the referent of
the text, and the context in which the rhetorical communication takes place. Moreover,
upon decorum depend the suitability and the effectiveness of rhetorical discourse.
We are dealing then with a characteristic, a quality or a principle, not only of the
rhetorical operation of elocutio but also of the rhetorical operations of inventio, dis-
positio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio. Therefore, it determines the internal
coherence as well as the external coherence of the rhetorical discourse. In other
words, it determines the semantic-semiotic or semantic-extensional coherence
derived from the adaptation of the text to the referent, the syntactical-semiotic cohe-
rence derived from the adaptation of one linguistic level to another in the interior of
the rhetorical discourse, and the pragmatic-semiotic or pragmatic-communicative
coherence derived from the adaptation of the text to the general communicative con-
text, and, especially, to the orator and the public.

For this reason, Tomás Albaladejo-Mayordomo understands decorum as the sup-
port of an authentic semiotic coherence in the field of Rhetoric, which constitutes a
proof of the importance of the coordination of all the elements, textual as well as
extra-textual, within the rhetorical conscience. This has become one of the most
solid and reliable theories of discourse available.

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18 Mortara-Garavello (see note 5), pp. 129-133; Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), pp. 43-53; Id.,
‘Estructuras retóricas y estructuras semioticas. (Retórica y hecho literario)’, in: VV.AA., Investigaciones
Semioticas, III. Retórica y Lenguajes (Actas del III Simposio Internacional de la A.E.S.), I, Madrid:
19 Albaladejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), p. 53.
In this sense, all the rhetorical operations are led or driven in their development by the principle of decorum. In that which deals with the rhetorical operation of elocutio, which is the one that most interests us, on decorum depends the value which the rest of the stylistic qualities can achieve, latinitas, perspicuitas, and ornatus: the first, in its search for the linguistic purity of language; the second, in its search for the propriety in the use of words; and the third, in its search for the excellence of expression and, more specifically, for artistic efficacy.

6. DECORUM AND INTELLECTIO

In this revisionist context, in which, from a semiotic point of view, I deal with the conception of elocutio as described and explained in the Institutio oratoria, I would like to take advantage of this occasion to propose, even if just in summary, the idea that the search for and the preservation of decorum as a traditional quality not only of the rhetorical operation of elocutio but also of the rhetorical operations of inventio, dispositio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the rhetorical operation of intellectio.\footnote{This idea has been put forward by T. Albaledejo-Mayordomo in two essays: ‘El texto político de escritura periodística: la configuración retórica de su comunicación’, in: Joaquín Garrido Medina (ed.), La lengua y los medios de comunicación, Madrid: Universidad Complutense de Madrid 1999, pp. 390-396; Id., ‘Sociolingüística en Retórica: alteridad y diversidad en la acción discursiva’, in: Pilar Díez de Revenga & José M. Jiménez Cano (eds.), Estudios de Sociolingüística. Sincronía y diacrónica, II, Murcia: Diego Martín 1999, pp. 35-51. Starting with the review of historical texts on rhetorical theory like the Institutiones oratoriae by Sulpitius Victor and De rhetorica liber by Aurelius Augustinus and agreeing with the principle of recuperation of historical thought which dominate some of the most contemporary, committed, and responsible neo-rhetorical positions [García-Berrio, ‘Retórica’ (see note 4); Id., Teoría (see note 4); Id., ‘Retórica general literaria o Poética general’, in: VV.AA. (see note 19), pp. 11-21], the model that is made up of the five traditionally established rhetorical operations (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio) has been expanded to include the special operation of intellectio and its subsequent elaboration. Cf. Chico-Rico (see note 2), pp. 93ff.: Id., ‘La intellectio. Notas sobre una sexta operación retórica’, in: Castilla. Estudios de Literatura, 14 (1989) pp. 47-55; Id., ‘Intellectio’, in: Gert Ueding (ed.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, IV, Tübingen, Niemeyer 1998, pp. 448-451; Id., ‘La intellectio en la Institutio oratoria de Quintiliano: ingenium, iudicium, consilium y partes arsit’, in: Tomás Albaledejo-Mayordomo, Emilio del Río Sanz & José A. Caballero (eds.), Quintiliano: historia y actualidad de la Retórica. Actas del Congreso Internacional ‘Quintiliano: historia y actualidad de la Retórica’, Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos 1998, pp. 493-502; Albaledejo-Mayordomo (see note 2), pp. 65ff.; Albaledejo-Mayordomo & Chico-Rico, ‘La intellectio en la serie de las operaciones retóricas no constituyentes de discurso’, in: Tomás Albaledejo-Mayordomo, Francisco Chico-Rico & Emilio del Río Sanz (eds.), Retórica hoy, Alicante-Madrid, Universidad de Alicante-Verbum = Teoría/Critica 5 (1998), pp. 339-352.} It is generally recognized that intellectio allows the orator to initiate and regulate the rhetorical operations of inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio within a systematic strategy of textual production in which all the elements that compose the rhetorical fact must be taken into account. It is the mission of intellectio, then, to begin the activity of the series which is integrated by the five traditionally established rhetorical operations and the preservation of the same in the communicative conditions most conducive to the communicative situation in general and to each of its components in particular. Thus, intellectio has been described and
explained as an instructive rhetorical operation which yields not a constructive level in the field of the rhetorical construction but an instructive level in the domain of the rhetorical fact. This level would contain the totality of the instructions described as semantic-semiotic or semantic-extensional, syntactical-semiotic - macro-structural and micro-structural - and pragmatic-semiotic or pragmatic-communicative which, guided towards inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio, would contribute, among other things, to the achievement of decorum which is necessary to guarantee the suitability and the effectiveness of the rhetorical discourse.

We affirmed in another place that a rhetorical operation like intellectio belongs more to ingenium (talent) or natura (nature) than to ars (art) or doctrina (learning). This is the reason that it has commonly been excluded from the traditional rhetorical system of the partes artis and connected, mistakenly, with inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio. According to rhetorical tradition, ingenium is one of the natural qualities of the orator and, in general, of writers and poets. Together with iudicium (judgment) and consilium (sagacity), it is a quality which cannot be substituted by ars. To speak of ingenium must necessarily mean making reference to iudicium and consilium, natural qualities of the orator that are closely related to ingenium. Although we cannot affirm that those qualities are one and the same with the latter, we can at least say that the latter - together with ars - is led and guided towards decorum by the former.

In effect, iudicium (judgment) is the principle which leads to the achievement of internal decorum for the rhetorical construction, a decorum which we could call semantic-semiotic or semantic-extensional and syntactical-semiotic, macro-structural and micro-structural. Consilium (sagacity), on the other hand, is a principle which leads to the achievement of external decorum for the rhetorical fact, a decorum which we could call pragmatic-semiotic or pragmatic-communicative. From

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21 Chico-Rico (see note 20).
22 It would seem evident that iudicium is one of the essential principles of intellectio, precisely that which explains the fact that this is a rhetorical operation which initiates and regulates the totality of the constructive-communicative rhetorical process, once it has allowed the orator to examine the cause and the communicative situation in which he finds himself as well as the possible changes in the course of the communicative-textual activity which may arise. For this reason, iudicium, through intellectio, is incorporated in inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio or pronuntiatio and is inseparable from them. On this subject, see Lausberg (see note 1), §§1055-1062.
23 Quintilian writes the following on the matter of consilium (Inst. or. VI.5.4-11): 'But here again you must not expect me to lay down any general rules. For sagacity depends on circumstances and will often find its scope in something preceding the pleading of the accuse [...]. And again in the actual pleading sagacity holds the first and most important place. For it is the duty of sagacity to decide what we should say and what we should pass by in silence or postpone; whether it is better to deny an act or to defend it, when we should employ an exordium and on what lines it should be designed, whether we should make a statement of facts and if so, how, whether we should base our plea on law or equity and what is the best order to adopt, while it must also decide on all the nuances of style, and settle whether it is expedient to speak harshly, gently or even with humility. But I have already given advice on all these points as far as each occasion permitted, and I shall continue to do the same in the subsequent portions of this work. In the meantime, however, I will give a few instances to make my meaning clearer, since it is not possible, in my opinion, to do so by laying down general rules [...]. It is enough. I think, to say that there is nothing not merely in oratory, but in all the tasks of life that is more important than sagacity and that without it all formal instruction is given in vain, while prudence unsupported by learning will accomplish more
this point of view, as Heinrich Lausberg very adeptly states, *iudicium* is led by *consilium* toward *utilitas*. 24 We would add that *intellectio*, by means of its essential principles (*iudicium* and *consilium*), is led toward the principle of *decorum*, which the rhetorical operations of *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio*, *memoria*, and *actio* or *pronuntiatio* ought to have qualitatively materialized at their corresponding levels: poetical and practical, constructive and performative.

7. CONCLUSIONS

This approach leads us inevitably to considering *elocutio* as a rhetorical operation which is intimately linked to and absolutely dependent upon the other rhetorical operations. Although *elocutio* is responsible for the linguistic formulation (or the outward expression through means of a language) of the ideas found in *inventio* and organized by *dispositio*, it cannot be separated from these in the practice of linguistic communication in general and of rhetorical communication in particular. The linguistic formulation of the ideas found in *inventio* and organized by *dispositio* responds always, in virtue of the rhetorical operation of *intellectio*, to a general plan of micro-structural construction of rhetorical discourse in close connection with the general processes of textual construction and rhetorical communication between orators and hearers. In this sense, not even *elocutio* is separable from *intellectio*, *inventio*, *dispositio*, *memoria*, and *actio* or *pronuntiatio*; even its four traditional qualities (*latinitas*, *perspicuitas*, *ornatus*, and *decorum*) can be considered as exclusively dependent upon the rhetorical operation of *elocutio*. We appeal, therefore, to the universal principle of the inseparability of ideas and words, of background and form, of macro-structure and micro-structure.

If we focus on the traditional quality of *ornatus* - this ‘plus’ which guarantees the success of persuasion by means of adornment of words, excellence of expression, and, finally, artistic efficacy - this approach makes us consider *ornatus* as the result of the discovery of the reality which one desires to communicate. Therefore, we also consider it as the result of the interaction of *elocutio* with *inventio*, upon which depends the finding of the ideas for rhetorical discourse as well as for poetic discourse, and with *dispositio*, which permits and explains its macro-structural organization. In this context, metaphor, for example, cannot be seen as a form of linguistic-material embellishment which has been added to the discourse with the object of substituting the canonical or direct form or word, but as the result of the discovery of the proper or true form or word, as the only means of expressing the truth of reality through language. Metaphor is, in this sense, an expressive-communicative means which is necessary in rhetorical and in poetic discourse; it is the only way to represent by means of language that which one desires to express communica-

than learning unsupported by prudence. It is sagacity again that teaches us to adapt our speech to circumstances of time and place and to the persons with whom we are concerned. But since this topic covers a wide field and is intimately connected with eloquence itself, I shall reserve my treatment of it till I come to give instructions on the subject of appropriateness in speaking'.

24 Lausberg (see note 1), §1154.
tively. For this reason, *ornatus* in Quintilian’s *Institutio oratoria* is understood not as an ornamental addition, but as the result of the transformation of the linguistic code into its different levels (phono-phonologic, morpho-syntactic, and semantic-intensional) for the purpose of achieving the sublimity, the splendour, the brilliance, and the authority in words.

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