COGNITIVE MOBILISATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG EU MOVERS[1]

LA MOVILIZACIÓN COGNITIVA Y LA DINÁMICA DE LA PARTICIPACIÓN POLÍTICA ENTRE LOS MIGRANTES INTRAEUROPEOS

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Abstract

Non-conventional participation has dramatically spread because of cultural and social change, favouring a deinstitutionalisation of politics. To verify if there is a link between this spread of non-conventional participation and the mobility of Europeans living in other European countries, we have explored the data gathered by the MOVEACT European project, including data on the political behaviour of "old Europeans" (British and Germans), and "new" Europeans" (Poles and Romanians), resident in Greece, France, Italy and Spain. Our analysis has confirmed that a plurality of variables affect the relation between movers and non-conventional participation. There are three relevant dimensions to explain the unconventional political participation of EU movers: social integration, situational context and individual characteristics. On the other hand, the key aspect to understand the non-conventional participation of EU movers is the degree of Cognitive Political Mobilisation, together with other factors such as membership of associations, family socialisation, expectations of living in the country of residence in the future or the political culture in the country of origin.

Keywords; Mobility; Participation; European Citizenship; Cognitive Mobilisation; Political Socialisation

Resumen

La participación política no convencional se ha extendido intensamente debido al cambio cultural y social, favoreciendo el proceso de desinstitucionalización de la política. Para comprobar si existe un vínculo entre esta difusión de la participación no convencional y la movilidad de los europeos que viven en otros países europeos, hemos explorado los datos recopilados por el proyecto europeo MOVEACT, incluyendo los datos sobre el comportamiento político de los "viejos europeos" (Británicos y alemanes), y de los "nuevos europeos" (polacos y rumanos), todos ellos residentes en Grecia, Francia, Italia y España. Nuestro análisis ha confirmado que hay una pluralidad de variables que intervienen en la relación entre las personas que experimentan esta movilidad internacional europea ("EU movers") y la participación política no convencional. Existen tres dimensiones relevantes para explicar la participación política no convencional en esta movilidad interna europea: integración social, contexto situacional y características individuales. Por otro lado, se observa que el aspecto clave para entender la participación no convencional de estos "UE movers" es el grado de movilización política cognitiva. Junto a ésta aparecen otros factores como son la pertenencia a asociaciones, la socialización familiar, las expectativas de vivir en el país de residencia en el futuro o la cultura política en el país de origen.

Palabras clave; Movilidad; participación; Ciudadanía Europea; Movilización Cognitiva, Socialización Política

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. The shift from conventional participation to non-conventional participation in advanced societies

Current democracies are characterised by internal and external challenges, regarding both the scale and the quality of democratic processes. The shift of power from States to international government organisations challenges the territorial understanding of popular sovereignty. In the context of globalisation, States are neither the only, nor the main loci of political processes, as decisions are more and more taken in supranational organisations and networks, comprising a multilevel governance system. The shift of power and the development of new paths and styles of policymaking are reflected in a deep transformation of the meaning and practices of citizenship. Democracy is subject to risks and challenges –affecting the national liberal-representative models– and new opportunities are rising from the making of postnational policies. This is especially the case in the European Union, where, as a result, political and civic participation are more and more loosening their national ties, reallocating in transnational networks, linking local and global dimensions. Advanced democracies have been labelled by Colin Crouch as "post-democracies" (Crouch, 2004), where citizens feel "a certain estrangement of the members of the polity from both its core political institutions and, more generally, from politics" (Torcal and Montero, 2006: 49).

According to Pharr and Putnam (2000), in "disaffected democracies", interest in politics and participation, in every form, are declining, influencing both institutional participation and civic engagement as social capital is deteriorating. According to an alternative point of view, citizens' distrust is not, *per se*, conducive to political alienation and to antidemocratic attitudes. On the contrary, it can promote the search for new forms of political commitment and a democratic experimentalism, especially regarding the collective practices of young people (Francés 2008; Raffini 2008). Thus, the crisis of conventional participation (Milbrath et al., 1977) is partially counterbalanced by the spread of non-conventional forms of participation (Barnes and Kaase, 1979).

Demonstrating, signing petitions, practising political consumerism, engaging in single-issue movements and in informal networks, in spontaneous rallies and in protest events, are becoming ordinary forms of action. Also, civic engagement in associations and neighbours' organisations, even if not directly politically oriented, are relevant as instruments of social participation.

New forms of cosmopolitan-oriented forms of solidarity are rising and experiments in new practices of democratic participation –beyond national borders– have been conducted.

Collective action and civic engagement can be integrated in a wider notion of political and social involvement, if we define participation as "the various ways in which individuals take part in the management of the collective affairs of a given political community" (Martiniello, 2006: 84), in a direct or indirect way, instrumentally and expressively (Klandermans, 1997). Furthermore, political and social participation, especially in the realm of non-conventional politics, can be locally, nationally or globally oriented and committed to link these different levels, promoting social and political networking.

These changes in political values and behaviours have been analysed in the context of wider trends of social change. Economic growth and greater levels of education favour the development of sceptical views toward hierarchies and bureaucratic structures and the spread of a more critical stance toward institutions. Indeed, the level of education has a significant effect on participation, both directly and indirectly (Santacreu, 2008). Cultural and cognitive skills are strongly correlated with value change and shape the ability to explore new political and social practices beyond borders. Cultural and cognitive resources explain not merely the degree of commitment, but also the type of involvement, and high-skilled individuals are leading actors in the reinvention of politics. A key concept in explaining the change in political orientations is cognitive mobilisation, describing an individual relation with society and politics by educated and skilled citizens, who do not need to be within the framework of political organisations as parties in order to be politically committed. As Russel Dalton states, in advanced societies (political) cognitive mobilisation is more and more substituting party mobilisation, allowing for an individualised and disintermediated relationship with politics. With the concept of cognitive mobilisation Dalton (1984) and Inglehart (1990) describe sophisticated, apartisan citizens whose cognitive and cultural skills provide them with resources to deal with political information and manage the complexities of politics without reliance on affective, habitual party cues. Cognitive mobilisation is strictly related to a general trend of change in individuals' values and attitudes in late-modern society, concerning also belonging and identities. Cognitively mobilised individuals tend to be more globally oriented and less linked to national identification. As a consequence, they are also carriers of a de-nationalised framing of politics and more inclined to develop social and political transnationalism (Duchesne, 2008). From a recent analysis we know that higher-class citizens are objectively and subjectively more Europeanised. They experience mobility, both virtual and physical, more than middle- and lower-class people, they express more interest in European matters and they feel themselves more Europeans than their fellow citizens (Baglioni and Recchi 2013). As intra-European mobi-

lity and Europeanisation are proved to be positively associated with having high social, economic and cultural resources, and the latter are also positively correlated with the experimentation of new kinds of social and political involvement, we expect European movers –i.e., EU citizens who have moved to live in a member state other than their own– to be particularly active in non-conventional politics. They represent a strategic component of the EU citizenry, as they live an experience of transnationality in their daily life (Glick Schiller et al., 1992). They could play a leading role in triggering the process of "horizontal Europeanisation" (Mau, 2010), and, as "pioneers of European integration" (Recchi and Favell, 2013), they are also potentially leading actors in the experimentation with novel forms of political involvement.

1.2. European integration and the reinvention of politics

Globalisation and Europeanisation deeply change political behaviours and repertoires of participation. European citizens participate in an unprecedented political, social and cultural experiment. Innovative forms of social and political involvement stem not only from the redefinition of the citizenship status, but are the result of social practices, such as intra-European mobility. Global society has been defined as the "age of migration" (Castles and Miller, 2009). Spatial mobility contributes to the redefinition of a social experience beyond borders, and, along with information and mobility of goods, to the creation of a network society (Castells, 1996), where fluxes overcome geographical, economic, cultural and political borders. Indeed, the political activism of non-nationals is in a broad framework of analysis inherent to social change. Migration and mobility challenge the national understanding of society, demanding for the overcoming of the notion of "national container of society" (Beck, 1992), also in terms of political organisation.

The EU is a privileged institutional framework for political transnationalisation: European citizens have the right to vote at European elections and to choose their representatives in the European Parliament. They also have the right to freely circulate and to settle in other European countries and the right to vote from the country of residence at European and local elections. As a result, citizenship loses its national framing and is redefined at three levels: the European level, the national level, and the local residence level.

Voting is not the only instrument that EU citizens have to express their views at local, national and European level. Many experts stress the role of transnational movement networks and NGOs in the promotion of bottom-up mobilisation on European issues. The "Europeanisation from below", can contribute to the formation of a European public sphere (della Porta and Caiani,

2010) and a European demos, socially and politically committed to the construction of European society, not only as passive subjects, but as leading actors. These theories turned out to be optimistic, as empirical studies converge in stating that a truly European public sphere does not yet exist (De Vreese, 2007) and the population of transnational activists still represents a small segment of the European population, in a context still characterised by disinterest and low commitment. They nevertheless identify actual dynamics of change, the analysis of which can encourage thinking on the possible path of self-constitution of European democratic policies (Trenz and Eder, 2009). The analysis of the change in political protest, mobilisation and transnational campaigns suggests that non-conventional participation actors have been able to modify their repertoires and scale of action, more than traditional political organisation (i.e. parties). Non-conventional participation is nowadays a consolidated instrument used by European citizens to express their voice, to generate solidarity and build common frameworks with their fellow European citizens and to influence policymaking, when institutional channels are deemed to be restricted or not fully accountable to people.

To sum up, non-conventional participation has dramatically spread as a consequence of cultural and social change, favouring a deinstitutionalisation of politics, but the shift of power toward supranational institutions exacerbates this trend of change, as non-conventional participation in fluid and loose transnational networks is revealed to be more equipped than conventional participation actors in dealing with the rescaling of politics. In this sense the EU can be looked upon as a laboratory of the reinvention of politics, where institutional change exacerbates the pre-existing trend of change in political participation and gives prominence to the role of transnational movements and informal networks, committed to a bottom-up democratisation of European society. The non-conventional participation experienced within movements is characterised, *in se*, as participation beyond borders, as it horizontally links people and groups from different places, and is accordingly favoured by the spread of ICTs.

Some features of non-conventional political participation are noteworthy, as they explain why this type of involvement fits well also with the experience of both virtual and geographical mobility. First, we must highlight the discontinuous nature of unconventional participation. Faced with the relative continuity of conventional participation, which is marked by election dates that imply a specific time schedule, unconventional participation can be characterised by discontinuity in the sense that all the actions (signing a petition or a letter to a politician, participating in a protest or a boycott, going on strike or

occupying a public place) are usually carried out in certain moments in which it is considered appropriate to make some sort of political statement. Second, their collective character must be considered. In contrast to the individual exercise of voting (even secret voting), the public side of collective action is intertwined with group-like interfaces such as organisations. Belonging to an organisation (with varying degrees of involvement and identification) increases the likelihood of participating in political action, because there is more information not only about the calls for mobilisation but also, and this is very important in the places of residence of migrants, about the social and political context and the issues/actions to be challenged. In addition, the organisation allows participants to apply the principle of individual interest (issues that directly affect the individual) and mutual support (matters that do not directly affect the individual but others with whom he/she sympathises). All these features fit with the movers' condition: non-conventional participation is more accessible, as it is less dependent on national framings, allows for a participative continuity and it is also able to match the needs and demands of mobile people.

These conditions foster the political participation of movers: the opportunity (particular threats to their rights as citizens, for example) and membership of an organisation (which provides information and establishes collective action). Organisations that are relevant in this sense are civic associations (very heterogeneous in terms of purpose and structure), because they combine integration (social networks, roots) with opportunity.

1.3. Mobility, participation and collective action

In traditional research on migration and political participation there is little room for an individual path of integration and much attention has been paid to the role of collective actors and networks. Furthermore, the concept of social capital has been usually treated as a group-level variable, depending on the characteristics of ethnic networks (cfr. Morales and Giugni 2011). To understand the repertoire of civic engagement and non-conventional participation of European citizens the ethnic social capital approach may be inadequate, or at least needs to be integrated and revised, as European movers experience mobility as fully-fledged citizens, and their legal and subjective status are meant to push toward more individualised forms of integration and political mobilisation.

Putnam's theory of social capital and empirical research on migration rooted in this theory are still premised on an implicit "national methodolo-

gism", and they are not fully able to grasp the post-national views, lifeworlds or experiences of citizens such as EU movers. In this sense, theories of trans-nationalisation seem to fit better, describing citizens who redefine their social relations, and consequently, their political and social paths of mobilisation, beyond geographical and political borders, not just reproducing their collective identity in the country of residence, but remoulding it in a cosmopolitan way, as they are inserted in multiple social networks.

Given their objective and subjective condition, EU movers are potentially leading actors in the reinvention of politics, as transnationalisation is strongly linked to the spread of new types of social and political commitment. Yet, the experimentation of new participatory practices, *inside* and *outside* the political system, is not an automatic result of mobility, but depends on the combination of individual characteristics and attitudes and structural macro variables. Besides, micro and macro variables do not act independently, as citizens coming from different countries of origin also have different social profiles.

The population of mobile Europeans is highly heterogeneous, in terms of individual characteristics and trajectories of mobility. Behind the formal equality provided by EU citizenship we find quite diverse types of mobility – from economic to lifestyle to romance-driven migration. A multivariate analysis will be proposed in order to identify which factors influence degrees, repertoires and styles of participation in the realm of non-conventional politics and civic commitment.

On the *micro* level, participation is influenced by individual resources (time, money, civic skills) and socio-economic status (Brady et al., 1995: 271-94), but also by the personal history of mobility. These variables interact in influencing other relevant variables, such as linguistic knowledge and understanding of the political system of the country of residence. In brief, we expect cognitively mobilised citizens to be more equipped to orient and adapt themselves to a different political system.

On the *macro* level, relevant variables are the political opportunity structure, both nationally and locally (Ireland, 1994; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 2000).

The political opportunity structure is defined as "the receptivity and vulnerability of the political system to the action of contesting groups and the degree and the type of access to institutions" (Danese, 2001). The country of origin affects political behaviours in different ways: influencing the political socialisation and the political culture of movers also in the long term (Marelman, 1986;

Glass at al., 1996), as well as providing transnational institutional resources of mobilisation (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

Finally, we expect the *meso* dimension, concerning the role of organisations and transnational and local networks of co-nationals (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Ryan et al. 2008), to be relevant, especially for movers equipped with fewer social, economic and cultural resources, living their experience in the more traditional frame of migration. This level of analysis corresponds to traditional research on migrants. Particular attention must be paid to the formation of social capital in a new social context, as associative and informal networks can play a vital part in view of obtaining information and support for social, economic and cultural integration at different stages of the migration experience (Moya, 2005; Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005).

Participation in collective activities, such as engaging in protests, or working for organisations, presumes the existence of collective identities and integration in social networks, besides being more time-consuming and demanding than voting, which does not require social networking (De Rooij, 2011: 470). Yet, for EU movers, and especially for those equipped with fewer individual resources (education, linguistic skills, money, time), voting can turn into a highly expensive form of participation, being dependent on formal and informal barriers, while collective action can be facilitated by integration in informal networks (Verba et al. 1995).

In the case of intra-EU mobility, we will pay attention to the difference between "new" and "old" European countries: consolidated and younger democracies, differentiated in terms of institutional system, civil society structure, and spread of non-conventional participation (Haerpfer, 2002). As Letki points out, in communist regimes before 1989 only protest-like forms of participation directed 'against the state' (such as mass strikes and demonstrations) were available for expressing citizens' opinions (Letki, 1995). Therefore, many researchers thought that this form of participation would produce low conventional participation among citizens of post-communist countries (Miller, 1993). As confirmed by the comparative research coordinated by Torcall and Montero, "if in western countries decrease in conventional participation is equilibrated by the increase in non-conventional and in social participation, in many new democracies, higher levels of political disaffection do not lead to higher levels of non-conventional political actions, but rather to generally low levels of political involvement" (Torcal and Montero, 2006: 15). Because of the inherited democratic values and participative attitudes, we expect, at least in the short term, a lower involvement among EU movers coming from a new democracy.

2. METHODS AND GOALS

We have explored the data gathered by the MOVEACT ("All Citizens Now": Intra-EU Mobility and Political Participation of English, Germans, Poles and Romanians in Western and Southern European Cities; a project funded by the European Commission, Directorate-General of Justice, Freedom and Security), that allows for a comparison of the political behaviour of "old Europeans" (British and Germans), and "new" Europeans" (Poles and Romanians), resident in Greece, France, Italy and Spain, and the data from the project "*La participación Política como candidatos de los residentes europeos en España*" (Ref. CSO2012-32930, Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, Spain).

The survey data from the MOVEACT project offers quantitative information on the social and political participation of EU movers through a random telephone survey, based on a standardised questionnaire. The target population were British, German, Polish and Romanian citizens living abroad in France, Greece, Italy and Spain. All respondents had to have the nationality of the country of origin (COO), be settled in the COR as adults (aged 18 or more) before January 2011, and reside in the COR for at least six months during 2011. Under these conditions, 125 people of each of these four nationalities were interviewed, for a total of 500 cases per country of residence and 2000 individuals for the four target countries, with a sampling error of ±2.24% with a confidence level of 95.5% (two sigma) and P = Q.

The sampling and screening of respondents combined telephone registers with linguistic information on names and surnames, in a similar way to the innovative technique developed in the PIONEUR EU project (V Framework Programme) – Cfr Recchi and Favell, 2013). Bilingual interviewers, most of them having the required nationality, conducted the interviews. Additional "onomastic" and "snowball" sampling was made to complete the field when required to balance respondents by gender (with a maximum of 10% of each national sample).

The goal is to identify the factors that influence non-conventional forms of participation. Which variables determine the relation of EU movers with non-conventional politics and civic commitment? How does mobility interact with individual characteristics and previous experience of participation? What are the roles played by the degree of integration and contextual factors? The analysis would be very limited if only non-conventional participation in the COR were studied, without comparing it to the participation in the COO. To this end, we introduce a dynamic element, distinguishing whether respondents stopped participating or began to participate after the change of residence. We can thus single out context-specific participation.

On the other hand, considering the diversity of the target population, this paper aims to find out what *all* national groups of migrants in *all* countries of destination have in common that significantly explains non-conventional political participation.

The overall goal is to verify the hypothesis of an "elective affinity" between mobility and spread of non-conventional participation. Is the EU really a laboratory of the redefinition of politics, where movers play a leading role? And what is the relation between transnationalisation, cognitive mobilisation and spread of non-conventional participation?

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. The dynamics of participation and spatial mobility

The non-conventional political mobilisation of mobile citizens can be considered from a comparative point of view, according to their behaviour in the country of origin and their behaviour in the country of residence.

To do this, we will use a variable of participation built from other two variables (participation in demonstrations + signing a letter to a politician). The classification of the different forms of political participation in the categories of conventional and non-conventional political participation has been subject to much controversy since the first development of Verba and Nie (1972). In this paper, we consider that the difference between both types of participation does not depend on the degree of radical political actions, defined from the degree of formalisation in the political system. We consider, from a structural-functional view, that the division can be established between, on the one hand, institutional demands, usually scheduled in time (such as elections), and on the other hand the demands of citizens to democratic institutions, usually without programming or temporal foresight. This participation, which is not institutionalised as a system-programmed demand (or as a substantial part of its legitimation), is what we call non-conventional (also called non-institutional by other authors). While conventional political channels are instruments with an institutional character, in the sense of being defined as part of the legitimation of the political system, unconventional channels have an origin from below because they meet certain specific needs and demands of civil society. This taxonomy of citizen participation has been used in recent European projects on political participation (PIDOP, 2012). In this Policy paper, the following examples of conventional and non-conventional participation are defined: "Examples of conventional political participation: voting, membership of a political party, running for political elections, working on political election

campaigns for candidates or parties, making donations to political parties, trying to persuade others to vote. Examples of non-conventional political participation: membership of groups or campaigning organizations with a political focus, participating in protests, demonstrations and marches, signing petitions, writing letters or emails to politicians or public officials, writing articles or blogs with a political content for the media, participating in fundraising events for a political cause".

We can observe the behaviour of this variable of participation according to four possibilities of participation over time (never participated, has always participated, stopped participating when migrated, and started participating in the destination country when migrated).

Table 1. Operationalization of the variable Dynamics of participation

		Country of Destination	
		Participate	Not participate
Country of origin	Participate	Always participate	Stopped participation
	Not participate	Began to participate	Never participate

The aim is to detect either continuity or rupture. Table 2 shows the structure of participation by migrant groups and country of destination.

In structural terms, we are unable to find a high motivation for political participation of migrants in either the country of origin or the country of residence. For all of the groups, political participation (signing a petition and sending letters to politicians) is never higher than 50%. The maximum and minimum are achieved by Germans and Romanians respectively.

In this sense, the data confirms a low participative aptitude, especially among new EU citizens, while the Germans are confirmed as being more participative (or perhaps the least disaffected). But to some extent we can see how, for all groups of migrants, mobility implies a change in the motivation for unconventional political action. In all cases where a variation occurs, it is more likely to be due to the emergence of rather than the decline in political participation.

We can see that, in the case of British migrants, their behaviour in unconventional political participation is almost invariant for the different countries to which they have migrated. Most of them continue their usual "non-participation", around 63% of the group, followed by an activation of participation (27%), those who never participate (5.6%) or cease to participate after installed in the country of destination (3.4%). However, the other three migrant groups

Table 2. Dynamics of participation and country of residence

Nationality		Dataset source				
		Greece	France	Italy	Spain	Total
United Kingdom	Never participated	68.8%	57.8%	69.0%	58.4%	63.3%
	Stopped participating	3.2%	3.0%	1.7%	5.6%	3.4%
	Began to participate	24.0%	31.9%	25.9%	28.8%	27.7%
	Always participate	4.0%	7.4%	3.4%	7.2%	5.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Germany	Never participated	33.3%	64.6%	62.9%	60.8%	55.5%
	Stopped participating	4.1%	3.9%	4.0%	4.0%	4.0%
	Began to participate	41.5%	21.3%	25.8%	22.4%	27.7%
	Always participate	21.1%	10.2%	7.3%	12.8%	12.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Poland	Never participated	40.0%	78.0%	71.0%	75.8%	66.2%
	Stopped participating	6.4%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	2.8%
	Began to participate	28.8%	17.3%	20.2%	14.5%	20.2%
	Always participate	24.8%	3.1%	7.3%	8.1%	10.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Romania	Never participated	93.7%	81.0%	81.3%	88.0%	86.0%
	Stopped participate	3.1%	4.8%	.8%	4.0%	3.2%
	Began to participate	1.6%	12.7%	12.2%	4.8%	7.8%
	Always participated	1.6%	1.6%	5.7%	3.2%	3.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

(Germans, Poles and Romanians) show a different dynamic in the case of Greece. Keeping each profile group in the other three countries, we found an increase in "started participating" among Germans and Poles in Greece, and in the case of Romanians, in France and Italy.

In dynamic terms for the different nationalities, Romanians in France and Italy have been mobilised more than in Spain and Greece. In France and Italy these mobilisations are likely to respond to a threat to their freedom of move-

ment as EU citizens after similar legislative and administrative initiatives (expulsion): the "safety plan" adopted in Italy in 2008 and, in France, the deportations in July 2010. In Greece, the increased participation of Poles and Germans may be due to the intensity of the economic and social crisis in this country and the dimension of social protest. This increases the likelihood of these groups participating in a demonstration.

Romanians are the group with lowest overall participation. However, the Poles (also new European citizens) show greater experience in unconventional demonstrations in their country of origin. In the case of Romanian migrants, non-participation is not only a consequence of mobility: they did not participate in their country of origin either. The dimension of democratic tradition (political culture) and the experience in the transition to democracy is clearly shown in overall participation levels. We could conclude that the democratic tradition of origin (political culture) shapes participation independently of one's place of residence.

The degree of participation is also significantly affected by elements that express integration, understood as knowledge of the social environment in which the migrants are living, such as the knowledge of the language or having friends in the country of destination. Other variables that affect the degree of participation are gender (generally greater participation for men), age (greater activation of participation at older ages), the migration period (in the most recent period there is a higher percentage of persons who have never participated, and more activation in migrants who arrived before the 90s, except in the case of the Poles, for whom activation was highest in the migration period 1990-2003), the class position (greater activation in classes I and II, especially Romanians) and education (higher participation among those with college education, in terms of when they start and whether they keep participating).

3.2. Cognitive Political Mobilisation and political socialisation

The political culture of origin has an important role in motivation for political participation. It is present in the whole process of citizens' political socialisation. The different political culture of origin, as well as the experiences lived in the process of political socialisation (political crises, democratic transitions, mobilisation of social resistance) are reflected in cognitive political mobilisation.

We have created an index of CPM, resulting from the combination of the answers to two questions: "frequency of discussing politics with the family" and "interest in national political news of the country of residence."

Table 3. Cognitive Mobilisation Index

Cognitive mobilisation	Persuade		Discuss
Low	Rarely, never or DK/NA	and	Never or DK/NA
Medium low	Rarely, never or DK/NA	and	Occasionally
	Often, fron time to time	and	Never or DK/NA
Medium high	Rarely, never or DK/NA	and	Frequently
	Often, from time to time	and	Occasionally
High	Often, from time to time	and	Frequently

Source: Alaminos-Penalva (2012), from Eurobarometer (adapted from Schmitt and Scholz, 2005). Note: DN/NA = Don't Know / Don't Answer

Cognitive Political Mobilisation is an indirect way to determine the degree of motivation for political participation (Alaminos and Penalva, 2012). This index, adapted to this population, incorporates the interest in the news of the destination country as a measure of political and cultural competence (qualification for understanding political affairs, local language) and as a measure of the interest in the political affairs of the country of destination.

Germans show a higher degree of CPM, followed by Poles, the British and Romanians. In the case of British movers, this result can be explained by the type of migration they experience. Most of them, especially in Spain and Italy, are elderly experiencing a post-retirement long-term mobility. They live in new segregated settlements and they are less permeable to the society of residence.

The sociodemographic profile of Poles (whose migration is mainly due to labour and economic reasons) and their history of political involvement in Polish political culture since before the transition to democracy are different. Therefore, they get high and average scores in cognitive mobilisation; higher in all cases than those of citizens of Romanian origin. We must emphasise this fact, because those remarkable differences between Romanians and Poles occur even though they joined the EU at a similar time (new Europeans) and both have a communist political tradition.

In general, cognitive political mobilisation is different for each country. However, the relationship between the rate of cognitive political mobilisation and the participation dynamics is evident, as can be seen for migrant groups in Table 5 (Polish, Romanian, British or German) and also when grouped by recipient country in Table 6 (Spain, France, Italy and Greece). For all tables,

Table 4. Discuss politics with family and interest in national political news of the country of residence

Nationality	CPM	Dataset source				Total
		Greece	France	Italy	Spain	
United Kingdom	Very high	24.8%	18.7%	10.1%	14.5%	17.1%
	High	37.2%	44.0%	26.9%	26.6%	33.9%
	Low	27.3%	27.6%	29.4%	24.2%	27.1%
	very low	10.7%	9.7%	33.6%	34.7%	21.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Germany	Very high	48.4%	33.9%	49.2%	43.2%	43.6%
	High	35.2%	41.7%	32.3%	25.6%	33.7%
	Low	9.8%	21.3%	12.9%	24.0%	17.1%
	very low	6.6%	3.1%	5.6%	7.2%	5.6%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Poland	Very high	22.4%	25.4%	20.0%	16.9%	21.2%
	High	46.4%	43.7%	40.0%	34.7%	41.2%
	Low	25.6%	15.9%	23.2%	34.7%	24.8%
	very low	5.6%	15.1%	16.8%	13.7%	12.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Romania	Very high	14.3%	22.2%	13.7%	8.9%	14.8%
	High	21.4%	49.2%	41.1%	25.2%	34.3%
	Low	42.1%	22.2%	22.6%	37.4%	31.1%
	very low	22.2%	6.3%	22.6%	28.5%	19.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

the *chi square* test shows no independence between dynamics of participation and cognitive political mobilisation. Therefore, the contingency coefficient shows that both variables are associated and have their own profiles. This is fully consistent with the profiles in the dynamics of mobilisation, given the attitudinal root of the variable CPM that has been measured as "talk politics" and "show interest in politics", and to the extent that the dynamic variable of participation expresses the interaction of CPM with social integration.

Table 5. Dynamics of participation as cognitive political mobilisation (dichotomous) by country of origin % of CPM

Nationality	**Dynamics of participation**	CPM		Total
		Low	High	
United Kingdom	Never participated	75.1%	51.8%	63.2%
	Stopped participating	2.1%	4.8%	3.5%
	Began to participate	19.5%	35.5%	27.6%
	Always participate	3.3%	8.0%	5.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Germany	Never participated	77.0%	49.3%	55.7%
	Stopped participating	3.5%	4.2%	4.0%
	Began to participate	12.4%	32.0%	27.5%
	Always participated	7.1%	14.4%	12.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Poland	Never participated	79.1%	58.2%	66.1%
	Stopped participating	2.7%	2.9%	2.8%
	Began to participate	12.3%	25.1%	20.3%
	Always participated	5.9%	13.8%	10.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Romania	Never participated	91.7%	79.9%	85.9%
	Stopped participating	2.8%	3.7%	3.2%
	Began to participate	4.4%	11.5%	7.9%
	Always participating	1.2%	4.9%	3.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

Table 6. Dynamics of participation as cognitive political mobilisation (dichotomous) by country of residence % of CPM

Country of residence		CPM		
		Low	High	Total
Greece	Never participated	80.0%	46.3%	58.9%
	Stopped participating	2.2%	5.5%	4.3%
	Began to participate	10.8%	31.9%	24.0%
	Always participated	7.0%	16.3%	12.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
France	Never participated	80.1%	65.6%	70.1%
	Stopped participating	2.6%	3.7%	3.3%
	Began to participate	14.7%	23.7%	20.9%
	Always participated	2.6%	7.0%	5.7%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Italy	Never participated	85.5%	61.0%	71.2%
	Stopped participating	.5%	3.2%	2.1%
	Began to participate	12.5%	26.6%	20.7%
	Always participated	1.5%	9.2%	6.0%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Spain	Never participated	80.6%	60.5%	70.7%
	Stopped participating	4.8%	2.9%	3.8%
	Began to participate	10.7%	24.7%	17.6%
	Always participating	4.0%	11.9%	7.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

We can see how the degree of cognitive political mobilisation globally explains the motivation or lack of motivation to participate, in any category of continuity (never / always) or discontinuity (start /stop). Thus, CPM affects participation in both cases, when participation is continuous or discontinuous.

Connecting it to the contextual factors of the place of residence, we can say that migrants with a high CPM are more likely to engage in political action. This participatory potential would be activated in conflictive situations which could possibly lead to protests, both for issues affecting them as a group (loss of rights, abuse, discrimination) and for issues affecting the general population. On the other hand, it is important to note that political socialisation is the main source of this motivation for political action, measured in the CPM index. We refer to one of the main agents of political socialisation: parents. The frequency of talking politics in the family environment when individuals were children explains CPM. The two approaches, by migrant group or by destination country, clearly show such dependence. Especially high are the asymmetric coefficients with CPM depending on socialisation.

Table 7. CPM by political socialisation in the family and migrant group

Where are you from?			Would you say your parents discussed political matters when you were a boy/girl			
			Frequently	Occasionally	Never	Total
United Kingdom	CPM	Low	30.4%	38.6%	66.1%	48.1%
		High	9.6%	61.4%	33.9%	51.9%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Germany	CPM	Low	11.2%	18.9%	39.0%	22.3%
		High	88.8%	81.1%	61.0%	77.7%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Poland	CPM	Low	19.5%	40.6%	53.2%	37.1%
		High	80.5%	59.4%	46.8%	62.9%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Romania	CPM	Low	19.1%	40.1%	68.4%	50.8%
		High	80.9%	59.9%	31.6%	49.2%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

Table 8. CPM by socialisation and country of residence of the migrant group

Dataset source			Would you say your parents discussed political matters when you were a boy/girl			
			Frequently	Occasionally	Never	Total
Greece	CPM	Low	19.2%	29.5%	62.3%	37.8%
		High	80.8%	70.5%	37.7%	62.2%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
France	CPM	Low	16.9%	25.1%	50.7%	30.5%
		High	83.1%	74.9%	49.3%	69.5%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Italy	CPM	Low	16.4%	39.9%	61.3%	40.0%
		High	83.6%	60.1%	38.7%	60.0%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Spain	CPM	Low	24.2%	49.4%	61.8%	50.4%
		High	75.8%	50.6%	38.2%	49.6%
	Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

3.3. The dimension of social integration

As seen above, cognitive political mobilisation comprehensively explains the participation of migrants. For all populations studied, the probability of unconventional political participation depends on a high cognitive mobilisation. In turn, this is the outcome of the socialisation process and the political culture of the country of origin.

Nevertheless, there are other variables that should be incorporated into the analysis to explain the discontinuities in the dynamics of participation in the mobility experience. These two variables point to the degree of integration into the host society. The first (membership of associations) has a strong socio-political character (integration through associative networks) and opens the possibility of coordinated collective action. The second (expectation that they will stay or return to the country of origin) allows us to observe the socio-cultural dimension of integration and shows a psychological attitude (in which social space respondents will be located in the future) that in terms of political participation may lead to a proactive orientation regarding political mobilisation. As we can see, for all countries of residence and all migrant groups, these two variables affect the dynamics of participation.

As for the membership of associations, the number of associations to which one belongs explains the beginning (Start) of unconventional participation. Regression analysis shows that this is true for all nationalities.

Table 9. Regression analysis (dependent variable: start to participate)

Where are you from?		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Error típ.	Beta		
United Kingdom	(Constant)	.301	.054		5.621	.000
	Number of associations	.059	.012	.217	4.924	.000
	Language knowledge now	-.051	.018	-.127	-2.894	.004
Germany	(Constant)	.351	.054		6.552	.000
	Number of associations	.027	.013	.091	1.992	.047
	Language knowledge now	-.060	.021	-.133	-2.928	.004
Poland	(Constant)	.159	.048		3.280	.001
	Number of associations	.059	.014	.186	4.123	.000
Romania	(Constant)	.076	.033		2.256	.025
	Number of associations	.036	.008	.206	4.537	.000

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

Table 10. Where will you live in five years * STOP/START non-conventional participation (by nationality) % of WHERE WILL LIVE IN FIVE YEARS

Where are you from?	Where will live in five years		STOP/START		Total
			0	1	
United Kingdom		COO	20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
		COR	9.8%	90.2%	100.0%
	Total		10.5%	89.5%	100.0%
Germany		COO	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		COR	8.3%	91.7%	100.0%
	Total		10.4%	89.6%	100.0%
Poland		COO	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
		COR	3.0%	97.0%	100.0%
	Total		9.9%	90.1%	100.0%
Romania		COO	100.0%		100.0%
		COR	26.3%	73.7%	100.0%
	Total		31.7%	68.3%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

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On the other hand, future projections of migrants largely explain the dynamics of participation in mobility. It is also the variable that could allow an operational distinction between "migrants" (those who intend to return to the country of origin) and "citizens" (those who develop their civic dimension in the destination country). The prospect of living in the country of destination for the next five years determines the start of unconventional participation. For all nationalities, over 90% of cases whose experience of migration brought a change in their political behaviour did so because they *initiated* their unconventional political activity then. In the case of the British participation is high in any case.

Table 11. Where will you live in five years * STOP/START non-conventional participation (by country of residence) % of WHERE WILL LIVE IN FIVE YEARS

Dataset source			STOP/START		Total
	Where will live in five years		0	1	
Greece		COO	31.3%	68.8%	100.0%
		COR	12.0%	88.0%	100.0%
	Total		14.8%	85.2%	100.0%
France		COO	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
		COR	8.4%	91.6%	100.0%
	Total		9.9%	90.1%	100.0%
Italy		COO	100.0%		100.0%
		COR	5.3%	94.7%	100.0%
	Total		7.7%	92.3%	100.0%
Spain		COO	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		COR	13.7%	86.3%	100.0%
	Total		18.1%	81.9%	100.0%

Source: Author's own research on MOVEACT data

4. CONCLUSIONS

Mobility is a characterising feature of contemporary society, and it is a key element in explaining social and political change. Spatial mobility promotes a redefinition of social experience beyond borders, and, therefore, also has a deep impact on participative repertoires. Non-conventional participation represents a distinct and autonomous field, and contributes to change in institutio-

nal arrangements, generating a reciprocal interaction with institutional change. Non-conventional participation constitutes a great channel of change, promoting a bottom-up democratisation of European society.

In this article, we have tried to shade light on how a strategic segment of the European population, European movers, redefine their participative repertoires of non-conventional participation. Our analysis has confirmed that mobility does not affect the type and degree of participation in a simple way. Several variables interact in shaping the relation between movers and non-conventional participation. The interaction between these variables leads some movers to diminish their activation, other movers to follow a continuity in the change, and finally, other movers to increase and diversify their participative repertoires. Specifically, data analysis highlights three relevant dimensions to explain the unconventional political participation of EU movers: social integration, situational context and individual characteristics. Among the latter, cognitive mobilisation plays a crucial role.

We can summarise some major findings of our analysis:

1) Membership of associations and social networks facilitates the non-conventional mobilisation of EU movers;

2) EU movers' expectations of living in the country of residence (COR) in the future affects their non-conventional participation. These expectations heighten attention to the problems of the COR, through a proactive psychological orientation. For many movers, the destination country is the place where they have established a new economic and sociocultural life. It makes sense to be interested in public affairs, and to be mobilised at certain times, in the civic space where people and their descendants will live for good (or an indefinite future, at least).

3) The degree of Cognitive Political Mobilisation (CPM) of EU movers is the key aspect to understand their non-conventional participation, both in general and to give support to the changing patterns of participation after their change of residence. CPM creates a mobilisation potential that is activated at critical moments. Cognitive Political Mobilisation is revealed to be a key factor: cognitively mobilised movers generally have a personal history of social and political commitment. Experiencing mobility is not an obstacle to participation. On the contrary, they get even more involved. This happens because they are better equipped with the necessary resources to adapt to different political and social contexts. As a result, mobility, from the point of view of participation, turns into a positive-sum game, while for less skilled movers' mobility does not promote an enrichment of repertoires of participation, but a general detachment from politics.

4) The degree of CPM of EU movers depends basically on family sociali-sation. An increasing degree of CPM is expected among movers who talked about politics in the family environment during their childhood. It is statis-tically significant that the more they talked about politics in their family, the greater their cognitive political mobilisation.

5) Together with political socialisation, the political culture represented by the democratic tradition of the country of origin is also a relevant variable that explains cognitive political mobilisation and participation levels. The culture of mobilisation in the country of origin explains the degree of non-conventional participation after the mobility experience.

Movers' mobilisation in the country of residence is influenced by certain conjuncture opportunities (conflictive political situations such as political and social crises, or threats to community residents) as well as by the opportunities that different destination countries offer for migrants. The problems that can affect immigrants are very diverse and common to the population where they live, but they are also specific. As non-conventional participation is, by its very nature, discontinuous and unstable, contingent and conjectural variables turned to be relevant in explaining political activation: when relevant issues are at stake, participation is higher.

Despite their legal status as citizens, many within the population of Euro-pean movers seem to have features in common with the more traditional expe-rience of migration. Migrants are traditionally less engaged than nationals and scarcely involved in the political life of the country of residence. Their par-ticipative repertoires are poorer and mainly oriented toward co-national com-munities and networks. We find nevertheless a significant portion of movers who experience mobility as truly European citizens. They do not merely use their right to free movement to pursue individual goals. Mobility also promotes a change in their civic and political aptitudes.

The comparison between nationalities, from this point of view, suggests that the lower participative aptitude of Eastern Europeans is indeed explainable by the different individual characteristics of this sub-population. Individual cha-racteristics, and in particular cognitive mobilisation, influence the objective and the subjective self-characterisation of European movers as citizens or migrants, and, consequently, their approach toward non-conventional participation. In other words, cognitive political mobilisation acts as a filter, allowing European movers to move beyond the mere legal status and to be active in the making of a novel political transnationalisation which is conducted in the realm of non-conventional politics, even more than in the realm of conventional poli-tics. Cognitive political mobilisation provides them with the cognitive tools

to orient themselves in a complex environment, offering new opportunities and stimuli, which for less skilled movers turn out to be barriers.

Europeanisation does not mean only a change in scale – it also promotes a more general dynamic of political change, where change in individual values and attitudes foster change in participative repertoires. Mobile European citizens are protagonists of these dynamics: they contribute to Europeanisation from below as leading actors in experimenting with forms of non-nation-based participation, primarily in the realm of non-conventional participation.

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