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AN ESSAY ON TASTE,

BY

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TO WHICH IS ADDED,

A DISSERTATION ON THE SAME SUBJECT,

BY

M. DE MONTESQUIEU.

Omnes tacito quodum sensu, sine ulla arte aut ratione, quae
sint in artibus ac rationibus recta et prava judicant.
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1804.
THE Edinburgh Society for the encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture, proposed, in the year 1755, a gold medal to the best essay on taste; and, not having assigned it that year, repeated the proposal in 1756. This determined the author to enter on the following enquiry into the nature of taste; the general principles of which only he presented to the Society, suspecting that the whole might exceed the limits which they had fixed, by requiring an essay. The judges appointed for that subject, having been pleased to assign the premium to him, he was encouraged to offer the whole, as it was at first composed, to the public.
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A FINE taste is neither wholly the gift of nature, nor wholly the effect of art. It derives its origin from certain powers natural to the mind; but these powers cannot attain their full perfection, unless they be assisted by proper culture. Taste consists chiefly in the improvement of those principles, which are commonly called the powers of imagination, and are considered by modern philosophers as internal or reflex senses,*

* Mr. Hutcheson was the first who considered the powers of imagination as so many senses. In his Enquiry concerning beauty and virtue, and his Essay on the passions, he calls them internal senses. In his later works, he terms them subsequent and reflex senses; subsequent, because they always suppose some previous perception of the objects, about which they are employed; thus a perception of harmony presupposes our hearing certain sounds, and is totally distinct from merely hearing them, since many, who enjoy the external sense of hearing in the greatest perfection, have no musical ear; reflex, because in order to their exertion, the mind reflects upon and takes notice of some
supplying us with finer and more delicate perceptions, than any which can be properly referred to our external organs. These are reducible to the following principles; the senses of novelty, of sublimity, of beauty, of imitation, of harmony, of ridicule, and of virtue. With the explication of these, we must, therefore, begin our enquiry into the nature of taste. We shall next endeavour to discover, how these senses cooperate in forming taste, what other powers of the mind are combined with them in their exertions, what constitutes that refinement and perfection of them, which we term good taste, and by what means it is obtained. And last of all, we shall, by a review of the principles, operation, and subjects of taste, determine its genuine rank among our faculties, its proper province, and real importance.

circumstance or mode of the object that was perceived, besides those qualities, which offered themselves to its attention at first view. Thus the perception of any object does not give us the pleasant sentiment of novelty, till we have reflected on this circumstance, that we never perceived it formerly. In the following essay the terms internal sense and reflex sense are used promiscuously.

PART I.

TASTE RESOLVED INTO ITS SIMPLE PRINCIPLES.

SECT. I.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF NOVELTY.

THE mind receives pleasure or pain, not only from the impulse of external objects, but also from the consciousness of its own operations and dispositions. When these are produced by external objects, the pleasure or the pain, which arises immediately from the exertions of the mind, is ascribed to those things, which give occasion to them. We have a pleasant sensation, whenever the mind is in a lively and elevated temper. It attains this temper, when it is forced to exert its activity, and put forth its strength, in order to surmount any difficulty: and if its efforts prove successful, consciousness of the success inspires new joy. Hence moderate difficulty, such as exercises the mind, without fatiguing it, is pleasant, and renders the object by which it is produced agreeable. Even plainness and per-
spicuity becomes displeasing in an author, when it is carried to excess, and leaves no room for exercising the reader's thought: and though great obscurity disgusts us, yet we are highly gratified by delicacy of sentiment, which always includes some degree of it, occasions a suspense of thought, and leaves the full meaning to be guessed at, and comprehended only on attention.* The ex-

* Some critics have explained this gratification, either by supposing imaginary refinements of reflection, or by principles which are only consequences of the pleasure that attends the moderate exercise of thought.

exercise of thought, which moderate difficulty produces, is a principal source of the pleasure we take in study and investigation of every kind; for though the utility of many subjects enhances our satisfaction, yet the former principle, without any aid from this, often renders very great labour, not only supportable, but agreeable. Witness the delight, with which antiquaries bestow indefatigable pains on recovering or illustrating ancient fragments, recommended only by their age and obscurity, and scarce apprehended to be, on any other account, of great importance. This is in general the cause of our pleasure in all enquiries of mere curiosity.

Not only the performance of actions, but...
also the conception of most objects, to which we have not been accustomed, is attended with difficulty. On this account, when new objects are in themselves indifferent, the efforts that are necessary for conceiving them, exalt and enliven the frame of the mind, make it receive a strong impression from them, and thus render them in some measure agreeable. When the objects are in themselves agreeable, these efforts heighten our satisfaction. A fine country or an agreeable prospect is doubly beautiful to a stranger. It gives considerable exercise to the mind, to observe every part of it, and to conceive the situation of the several objects, which it includes. A fresh discovery in science, or a new performance in the arts gives greater satisfaction, when we become first acquainted with it, than ever after. The first time that we study a philosophical theory, the mind runs through it with eagerness, that it may get a view of all its parts, is constantly engaged in tracing the connection of the arguments, in examining their force, in conceiving what objections can be formed against them, and is by this means affected with an agreeable agitation, which ceases, after repeated perusals have rendered the theory familiar to us. A poem or a picture is examined, with a similar ardour and unremitting exertion of mind, by a person who has not seen it formerly.

Though a new object be so simple as to be conceived without any difficulty, there are some situations, in which it will give exercise to the mind, and will, for this reason be agreeable. It is extremely disagreeable, to be sunk into indolence and languor, without anything to awaken our attention, or give play to our faculties. This state is almost unavoidable, when we are long confined to the contemplation of a single object, or when the same object recurs very often to our view. In this case, it soon becomes so familiar, that the impression which it makes upon the mind, is too faint to give it any exercise. Memory retains all the parts of the object so distinctly, that it outruns sense, and, before we have surveyed them, informs us, that we are perfectly acquainted with them already. We find ourselves cloyed, and im-
mediately turn from the object with disgust. Any new object will, in this situation, be agreeable; it occurs opportunely to occupy the mind, when it was at a loss how to employ itself; it frees us from the pain of satiety and languor; it gives an impulse to the mind, and puts it in motion. This is always pleasant, but its pleasure is greatly augmented by the uneasiness from which it has relieved us. This is a pleasure which most men taste every day, by varying their studies, their business, or their recreations. When genuine elegance in furniture or architecture has been long the fashion, men sometimes grow weary of it, and imitate the Chinese, or revive the Gothic taste, merely for the pleasure they receive from what is unlike to those things, which they have been accustomed to see. The pleasure of novelty is, in this case, preferred to that which results from real beauty.

If there are some things, whose novelty produces no degree of pleasure, it arises from their not at all enlivening the thought, or exercising the mind. If their novelty is even painful, it proceeds from their exciting some other sensation, which destroys the pleasure naturally attendant on the novelty. The exercise of mind, which the conception of new objects occasions, though it be pleasant in its own nature, renders a disagreeable object more disagreeable at first: for the most opposite sensations produced by the same cause, and existing in the mind at once, are easily transfused into one another, and, by their composition form one more violent, which always follows the nature of the ingredient that was most intense.

Sometimes the elevation and exertion of mind, which springs from the mere difficulty of conceiving a new object, or from the liveliness of a new perception, is attended with surprise, which augments our delight or uneasiness, by farther enlivening the thought and agitating the mind. For this reason the poet and the orator, not only solicitously avoid sentiments and modes of expression which are trite and common, and search through all the stores of nature for images, figures, and illustrations, which have not
been appropriated by their predecessors; but also study to contrive the structure of their compositions in such a manner, that the commonest thoughts and arguments may surprise by the unexpectedness of their introduction.* Even the historian, who is confined to known materials and facts, endeavours to give them the appearance of novelty, by the light in which he represents them, and by his own reflections on the causes, the effects, and the nature of the transactions he narrates. Novelty can bestow charms on a monster, and make things pleasant which have nothing to recommend them but their rarity.

In like manner, any agreeable passion or emotion, which a new object happens to produce, will run into the pleasant sentiment that naturally arises from its novelty, and will augment it. A new suit gives pleasure to a child, by its being different from his former; it likewise excites his pride, and gives him an expectation of attracting the notice of his companions. It gratifies the vanity of a fine lady, to be among the first in a fashion; it seems to proclaim her rank, to distinguish her from the vulgar, and to command respect.

The pleasure of novelty is sometimes also heightened by reflection. When the conception of an object is attended with very considerable difficulty, the pleasure which we feel in the exertion of mind, necessary for overcoming this difficulty, is increased by the joy, with which we reflect on our success in having surmounted it. When objects are of such a nature that we reckon our acquaintance with them an acquisition in knowledge, the pleasure of their novelty arises in part from the satisfaction, with which we reflect on our having made this acquisition. Both these circumstances, the consciousness of success, and the opinion of improvement, contribute to that delight, which a mathematician enjoys, the first time that he comprehends a difficult and curious demonstration.

It may be farther observed, that novelty in the works of genius and art derives additional charms from another principle, to be explained afterwards, the ingenuity which it shews. To strike out a new track, to execute what was not attempted before, displays original genius, which we always observe with pleasure.

SECT. II.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF GRANDEUR AND SUBLIMITY.

GRANDEUR or sublimity gives us a still higher and nobler pleasure, by means of a sense appropriated to the perception of it; while meanness renders any object, to which it adheres, disagreeable and distasteful. Objects are sublime, which possess quantity or amplitude, and simplicity in conjunction.*

Considerable magnitude or largeness of extension, in objects capable of it, is necessary to produce sublimity. It is not on a small rivulet, however transparent and beautifully winding; it is not on a narrow valley, though variegated with flowers of a thousand pleasing hues; it is not on a little hill, though cloathed with the most delightful verdure, that we bestow the epithet sublime: but on the Alps, the Nile, the ocean,

* Most of the species of sublimity are explained, nearly from the principles here assigned, in an Essay on the Sublime, by Dr. Baillie.
the wide expanse of heaven, or the immensity of space uniformly extended, without limit or termination.*

We always contemplate objects and ideas with a disposition similar to their nature. When a large object is presented, the mind expands itself to the extent of that object, and is filled with one grand sensation, which totally possessing it, composes it into a solemn sedateness, and strikes it with deep silent wonder and admiration: it finds such a difficulty in spreading itself to the dimensions of its object, as enlivens and invigorates its frame: and having overcome the opposition which this occasions, it sometimes imagines itself present in every part of the scene, which it contemplates; and from the sense of this immensity, feels a noble pride, and entertains a lofty conception of its own capacity.†

* Ψυχής πυων ἀνόημος μᾶδ Δί οι τά μικρά ἐνθέςα Δαιμόνια
μεν, καὶ χριστίανα ἀλλὰ τοῦ Νείλου, ἐν Ἀρη δὲ Ρηίνι,
πολὺ δὲ τὰ μᾶλλον τῶν ὄκεανος. ΔΟΡΓΙΝ. περὶ ἦμε. ɲιμ. ἰε.
† Longinus contents himself with resolving the sensation of sublimity into the last of these principles,

Large objects can scarce indeed produce their full effect, unless they are also simple, or made up of parts, in a great measure similar. Innumerable little islands scattered in the ocean, and breaking the prospect, greatly diminish the grandeur of the scene. A variety of clouds, diversifying the face of the heavens, may add to their beauty, but must detract from their grandeur.*

Objects cannot possess that largeness, which is necessary for inspiring a sensation of the sublime, without simplicity. Where this is wanting, the mind contemplates, not one large, but many small objects:† it is

without investigating the others, of which it is but a consequence. Φυσική γὰρ πῶς ἐν τῶ τὰλινθῶς ἐν Ἕλλαν ἱπαται
τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ νυχτὶ, καὶ γαρὺ νἰ ἀλάμπια λαμβάνουσα πληθὺν
καὶ μεγαλαυχίας. Περὶ ἦμα. τῆς. ζ.

* It is not meant that, in these cases, the sublimity of the ocean, or of the heavens is destroyed; it is only asserted that it is diminished. A considerable degree of sublimity will remain, on account of the similarity that still subsists among the parts.

† Simplicity is recommended by an ancient critic, as requisite to sublimity in painting, on the very prin-
pained with the labour requisite to creep from one to another; and is disgusted with the imperfection of the idea, with which, even after all this toil, it must remain contented. But we take in, with ease, one entire conception of a simple object, however large: in consequence of this facility, we naturally account it one: the view of any single part suggests the whole, and enables fancy to extend and enlarge it to infinity, that it may fill the capacity of the mind.

Many things are indeed denominated sublime, which, being destitute of extension, seem incapable of amplitude, the first and fundamental requisite of the sublime. But such objects will be found, on examination, to possess qualities, which have the same power to exalt the disposition of the observer. Length of duration; prodigious numbers of things similar united, or so related, as to constitute a whole, partake of the nature of quantity, and, as well as extension, enlarge and elevate the mind, which contemplates them. Eternity is an object, which fills the whole capacity of the soul, nay exceeds its comprehension; and strikes it with astonishment and admiration. We cannot survey a vast army or navy, without being sensible of their grandeur; which arises, not so much from the largeness of the space they occupy, as from the numbers of men or ships, which are in them united under one direction, and co-operate to a common end; the union and similitude of the parts adding simplicity to the vastness of their number. Hence too is derived the sublime of science, which lies in universal principles and general theorems, from which, as from an inexhaustible source, flow multitudes of corollaries and subordinate truths.

But do not we attribute grandeur and
sublimity to some things, which are destitute of quantity of every kind? What can be more remote from quantity, than the passions and affections of the soul? Yet the most imperfect and uncultivated taste is sensible of a sublimity in heroism, in magnanimity, in a contempt of honours, of riches, of power, in a noble superiority to things external, in patriotism, in universal benevolence. To account for this, we must observe, that as no passion can subsist without its causes, its objects, and its effects, so, in forming the idea of any passion, we do not satisfy ourselves with conceiving it as a simple emotion in the mind, but we run over, in thought, the objects about which it is employed, the things by which it is produced, and the effects by which it discovers itself. And as these always enter into our conception of the passion, and are often connected with quantity, they naturally render the passion sublime. What wonder that we esteem heroism grand, when, in order to imagine it, we suppose a mighty conqueror, in opposition to the most formidable dangers, acquiring power over multitudes of nations, subjecting to his dominion wide extended countries, and purchasing renown, which reaches to the extremities of the world, and shall continue through all the ages of futurity? What can be more truly great than the object of that benevolence, which, unconfined by the narrow limits of vicinity or relation, comprehends multitudes, grasps whole large societies, and even extends from pole to pole?

It must also be remarked, that whatever excites in the mind a sensation or emotion similar to what is excited by vast objects is on this account denominated sublime; it being natural to reduce to the same species, to express by the same name, and even frequently to confound together those objects, which we contemplate with the same or a like disposition. Hence the raging of the sea in a storm, and the loud roaring thunder, which inspire an awful sedateness, are termed sublime. Objects exciting terror are, for this reason, in general sublime; for terror always implies astonishment, occupies the whole soul, and suspends all its motions.
In like manner, we admire as sublime, superior excellence of many kinds; such eminence in strength, or power, or genius, as is uncommon, and overcomes difficulties, which are insurmountable by lower degrees of ability; such vigour of mind as indicates the absence of low and groveling passions, and enables a person to despise honours, riches, power, pain, death; setting him above those enjoyments, on which men generally put an high value, and those sufferings, which they think intolerable. Such degrees of excellence excite wonder and astonishment, the same emotion which is produced by amplitude. A great degree of quality has here the same effect upon the mind, as vastness of quantity, and that by the same principles, by stretching and elevating the mind in the conception of it.

We shall but just observe that the sublime passions, habitually prevailing in the temper, and uniformly displaying themselves in suitable expressions and effects, constitute dignity and sublimity of character.

But in order to comprehend the whole extent of the sublime, it is proper to take notice that objects, which do not themselves possess that quality, may nevertheless acquire it, by association with such as do. It is the nature of association to unite different ideas so closely, that they become in a manner one. In that situation, the qualities of one part are naturally attributed to the whole, or to the other part. At least association renders the transition of the mind from one idea to another so quick and easy, that we contemplate both with the same disposition, and are therefore similarly affected by both. Whenever, then, any object uniformly and constantly introduces into the mind the idea of another that is grand, it will, by its connexion with the latter, be itself rendered grand. Hence words and phrases are denominated lofty and majestic. Sublimity of style arises, not so much from the sound of the words, though that doubtless may have some influence, as from the nature of the ideas, which we are accustomed to annex to them, and the character of the persons, among whom they are in most common use.
This too is the origin of the grandeur we ascribe to objects high and elevated in place; of the veneration, with which we regard things in any direction distant; and of the superior admiration excited by things remote in time; especially in antiquity or past duration.*

* The author of *A treatise of human nature* has very ingeniously reduced these phenomena into the principle of association. B. ii. P. 3. S. 8. The sum of his reasoning, so far as it is necessary to take notice of it here, is as follows. “Because we are accustomed every moment to observe the difficulty with which things are raised in opposition to the impulse of gravity; the idea of ascending always implies the notion of force exerted in overcoming this difficulty; the conception of which invigorates and elevates the thought, after the same manner as a vast object, and thus gives a distance above us much more an appearance of greatness, than the same space could have in any other direction. The sensation of amplitude, which by this means comes to attend the interposed distance, is transferred to, and considered as excited by the object that is eminent and above us; and that object, by this transference acquires grandeur and sublimity. And here we may observe in passing, that this natural tendency to associate ideas of grandeur with things above us, is the reason, why the term sublime is metaphorically applied to excellence of any kind, especially to that species of it, which elates the mind with noble pride in the conception. To our transferring, in like manner, the interposed space, and its attendant sensation, to the distant object, is owing the veneration, with which we regard, and the value we set upon things remote in place. And because we find greater difficulty, and must employ superior energy, in running over the parts of duration, than those of space; and in ascending through past duration, than in descending through what is future; therefore we value higher, and contemplate with greater veneration things distant in time, than things remote in space, and the persons and objects of antiquity, than those which we figure to ourselves in the ages of futurity.”

But the fine arts present the most numerous examples of grandeur produced by association. In all of them, the sublime is attained, chiefly by the artist’s exciting *ideas* of sublime objects; and in such as are mimical, this quality is chiefly owing to our being led by the exactness of the imitation to form ideas and conceive images of sublime originals. Thought is a less intense energy than sense: yet *ideas*, especially when lively, never fail to be contemplated with some degree of the same emotion, which attends
their original sensations; and often yield almost equal pleasure to the reflex senses, when impressed upon the mind by a skilful imitation.

Grandeur in works of architecture may, in some instances, arise from their largeness: for we generally estimate the magnitude of things, by comparison with those of the same species: and though no edifice is equal in quantity to many works of nature by no means accounted great; yet lofty palaces and pyramids, far exceeding the bulk of other buildings, have a comparative magnitude, which has the same influence upon the mind, as if they had been absolutely large. But still the principal source of grandeur in architecture is association, by which the columns suggest ideas of strength and durability, and the whole structure introduces the sublime ideas of the riches and magnificence of the owner.

In painting, sublimity is sometimes introduced by an artful kind of disproportion, which assigns to some well chosen member

a greater degree of quantity than it commonly has:* but chiefly those performances are grand, which either by the artful disposition of colours, light and shade, represent sublime natural objects, and suggest ideas of them;† or, by the expressiveness of the features and attitudes of the figures, lead us to conceive sublime passions operating in

* Thus, according to Hogarth, the inexpressible greatness of the Apollo Belvidere arises from the uncommon length of the legs and thighs. *Analysis of Beauty, ch. 11.*

† It may be here observed that, though the figures, in painting, can seldom have so great quantity, as is sufficient of itself to produce sublimity; yet the comparative magnitude, and also the simplicity of the figures, parts, and members, are among the principal means by which a work suggests sublime ideas; and thus becomes itself sublime. The preservation of magnitude and simplicity is therefore recommended as fundamental to sublimity, in the art of painting.

.........La via, plana,

Magnaque signa.................
Ex longo deducta fluant, non secta minutim.
Quippe solet rerum nimio dispersa tumultu
Majestate carere gravi.............

FRESN. de arte graph. ver. 108. 156. 204. 419.
the originals. And so complete is the power of association, that a skilful painter can express any degree of sublimity in the smallest, as well as in the largest compass. It appears in the miniatures of Julio Clovio, as really as in the paintings of Titian or Michelangelo.

The sublime of those arts, in which the instrument of imitation is language, must evidently arise entirely from association; as it is the only principle, from which words derive their force and meaning. And in these arts, sublimity precisely considered, will be found resolvable into a very few general qualities.

The poet or the orator is then possessed of this excellence, when the sentiments he utters, or the subjects he professedly describes, contain in themselves the sublime, either of nature, or of the passions and character: and the grander the originals are, the greater is the sublimity of the imitation. Whence, in classing sentiments that are sublime, the first place is assigned by critics, to those which have a relation to the Gods.* When Homer would convey a sublime idea of Discord, he gives greatness of quantity to this imaginary person, assigning her such prodigious stature, that, while she walks upon the earth, her head reaches to the heavens.

Oigitur  ως ἐν τοις θεσσαλοις ἐστιν, ἡ κοίμηται ἐπὶ βασιλέως
IA. 8. ver. 433.

By the same contrivance Virgil produces a great idea of fame.

Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubila condit.
Æn. 1. iv. ver. 177.

The sublimity of the rival sentiments of the two Latin poets, with respect to Cato, arises in like manner from the grandeur of the subject, from the dignity of the character described.

Et cuncta terrarum subacta
Prater atrocem animum Catonis. Hor.
Secretosque pios, his dantem jura Catonem.
Virg.

* "Εν τοις τοιούτοις συμμετοχαῖς μάλιστα μετὰ τὸ ποιῆσαι, ὡς ποιῆσαι μετά λαλομαίναι,' ΕΡΜΩΓ. περί άθεου.
On account of the superior grandeur of the subject, the latter claims an undoubted preference. The former indeed derives additional force from the art of the composition, by means of which the first hint of an exception from Cassar’s power occasions a suspense of thought, a kind of anxious expectation, which, mixing with the sublime sensation, heightens it. Subjects thus grand in themselves must bestow sublimity on a composition, whenever they are described in such a manner, as conveys entire, or augments the feeling, which they naturally excite.

If an author’s main subject is destitute of innate grandeur, it may be rendered grand, by comparing or someway associating it with objects naturally such. By the same means the real greatness of a subject is increased. Hence metaphor, comparison, and imagery are often productive of sublimity.* Cicero raises Cassar’s idea of clemency, by representing it as godlike.* Seneca† gives a sublime idea of Cicero’s genius, by comparing it with the majesty and extent of the Roman empire. The effect of the comparison is sometimes augmented, by the writer’s insinuating the superiority of his subject to that with which he compares it, and artfully annexing some circumstances to the latter, which, without rendering it mean (for that would destroy the effect of the comparison) yet depress it below the former. In this way Homer contrives to give a great idea of the Grecian army, by introducing Priam speaking magnificently of the armies he had formerly seen in Phrygia, but at the same time acknowledging it far superior to them.§ By the same means, an Italian poet

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* Homines ad Deos nulla re propius accedunt, quam salute hominibus danda. Pro. Ligur.

† Illud ingenium, quod solum populus Romanus par imperio suo habuit. Controv. lib. i.

‡ Ἡδη κε φρυγιν ἐισῆλθον ἀμφίπλατον, "Εν θα ἔδω πλείσσες Φρύγας, ἀμφιπλατός, Λαβίς ὀρθές κε Μύρυδος ἀντιθέτως, "Οι οἱ τούτοι εἰσαμφίπλατο παῖς" ὡς Σαγγαρίου. D 2
represents Venice, which he celebrates, as greater than Rome.

*Si pelago Tyberim preferes, urbem adspice utramque; Illam homines dies, hanc posuisse Deos.*

**Sanazar.**

Venice becomes grand by the metaphorical use of *pelagus*, and by the relation, which it is said to bear to the Gods; and its grandeur is increased, by comparison with Rome, acknowledged great, but at the same time purposely degraded, by the opposition of Tyber to pelagus, and its relation to men. The power of imparting sublimity to objects which naturally have it not, by giving them a relation to others, is an advantage peculiar to the arts, which imitate by language; for the rest can attain the sublime, only by co-

It is farther proper to observe, that things may be destitute of grandeur, and yet not be accounted low or mean; but may, on the

* It is perhaps necessary to repeat, that we here intend only the sublime precisely considered; for the term is often used to signify any great excellence of composition. It is thus defined by Longinus; ἐς ἀνάμνησιν εἴσοξι τις λογος ἡ τα Ὀρθ. In this latitude he explains it, treating of the nervous, the vehement, and even the beautiful and elegant.
contrary possess other qualities, which gratify us highly in a different way. It is only when grandeur is requisite and expected, that the mere absence of it produces meanness. Thus a remarkable defect in quantity, in comparison with things of the same kind; a resemblance in individuals of a superior species to the orders below them; or the defect of sublimity in compositions of art or genius, which propose to imitate originals or treat subjects confessedly noble, gives us distaste and inspires contempt. Meanness arises often likewise from association, when low and grovelling ideas are suggested; as when images and similes, taken from mean objects, are applied to an important subject. Thus also, words and phrases become mean, when they excite mean ideas, either by their proper signification, or by their being ordinarily used only by those of inferior rank.

SECT. III.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF BEAUTY.

BEAUTIFUL objects are of different kinds, and produce pleasure by means of different principles of human nature.

The first species of beauty is that of figure, and belongs to objects possessed of uniformity, variety, and proportion. Each of these qualities pleases in some degree; but all of them united give exquisite satisfaction.

Facility in the conception of an object, if it is moderate, gives us pleasure: the mind thinks well of itself, when it is able to form its conception without pain or labour. This constitutes the value of perspicuity, of thought and language, which is agreeable in opposition to obscurity, as this occasions an uneasy search into the meaning of the parts or the tendency of the whole, which requires greater labour than we are willing to bestow. Hence too it is, that uniformity and simplicity become agreeable. Objects endued with these qualities enter easily into the
mind: they do not distract our attention, or hurry us too fast from one scene to another: the view of a part suggests the whole, and impelling the mind to imagine the rest, produces a grateful exertion of its energy.

Accordingly, in all the beautiful works of nature, uniformity is preserved in the general appearance of the correspondent parts. And though a perfectly accurate regularity is avoided, both in natural effects and in the fine arts; yet so much of it must be retained, as to keep the variety from degenerating into perplexity and confusion. Regular figures are in general preferred to irregular; and such as have parallel sides to such as have not. Equality is requisite to the beauty of every piece of painting.* Even

* Altera pars tabula vacuo ne frigida campo,
    Aut deserta siet, dum pluribus altera formis
    Fervida mole sua supremam exurgit ad oram.
    Sed tibi sic positis respondeat utraque rebus,
    Ut si aliquid sursum se parte attollat in unà,
    Sic aliquid parte ex alià consurgat, et ambas
    Æquiparet, geminas cumulando aequaliter oras.

Fresn. de Art. Graph. ver. 145.

when a perfect similarity in the appearance of the counterparts seems to be studiously shunned, as in a side view of a human face, the attitude of the body, or the profile of a building; yet still it must be so contrived, that though it does not exhibit a sensation, it may notwithstanding, according to the rules of perspective, suggest the idea of exact uniformity. To bestow simplicity upon a multitude of separate phenomena, the philosopher traces them up to common qualities, and general causes; and it is only when he has done so, that the beauty of science begins.*

But uniformity when perfect and unmixed, is apt to pall upon the sense, to grow languid, and to sink the mind into an uneasy state of indolence. It cannot therefore alone produce pleasure, either very high, or

* Uniformity and simplicity are, strictly speaking, distinct ideas; the former implying the similarity of the correspondent parts; the latter the fewness of unlike parts in the whole object. But as both please by the same principle, it was judged unnecessary precisely to distinguish them here.
of very long duration. *Variety* is necessary to enliven it. Where this is wanting, uniformity degenerates into dull formality. Variety in some measure gratifies the sense of novelty, as our ideas vary in passing from the contemplation of one part to that of another. This transition puts the mind in action, and gives it employment, the consciousness of which is agreeable.*

In the works of nature we find variety studiously sought after, as in the uneven surface of the globe; the infinity of shapes and hues in the flowers that adorn it; the intricate windings of rivers; the wildnesses of nature, which we even set ourselves to copy by art; and in ten thousand other instances. To procure it, the architect enriches his buildings with ornaments of different forms. In all works of taste, too great uniformity is avoided by numberless graceful attitudes, by varying of members, and by contrasting the parts.*

So great is the power of variety in producing beauty, that an ingenious artist, who has lately analysed it, not altogether without reason, resolves almost the whole of it into that principle, and defines the art of composing to be nothing else but the art of varying well.”

He holds uniformity no further necessary, than it is requisite to convey the idea of rest or motion, without possibility of falling. But here he goes too far. It were easy to point out instances, where uniformity is studied, though it cannot have any degree of this effect: and he acknowledges that beauty resides only in a composed variety; which necessarily implies a mixture of uniformity. He indeed sufficiently proves that uniformity is not the only, or chief principle of perfect beauty. Yet it often by itself constitutes some degree of it; as in the straight and parallel sides of a canal.

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* Intricacy, which often greatly contributes to beauty, may be considered as a species of *variety*; at least its agreeableness is derived from the same cause; and variety is most naturally combined with uniformity, intricacy with simplicity.
continual shifting from part to part, without the prospect of any end of its labour: it would be displeased and disgusted, when it found that, after numberless efforts to conceive the object, the endless dissimilitude and perplexed composition of the parts still baffled its endeavours, and hindered it from perfecting its ideas. A certain degree of uniformity must therefore be blended with the variety of objects; otherwise this variety, instead of producing moderate energy, would subject us to insurmountable toil, which would make our pleasure soon degenerate into pain.

These two qualities, by thus moderating the effects of one another, increase the pleasure resulting from each: giving the mind at once the opposite gratifications of facility and active exertion, mixed with, and modifying one another.

Proportion consists not so much in relations of the parts precisely measurable, as in a general aptitude of the structure to the end proposed; which experience enables us instantaneously to perceive, better than any artificial methods can determine it. Its influence on beauty is therefore derived from fitness, a principle which will be illustrated presently.

A very small disproportion in any of the members of the human body produces deformity. The least deviation, in the productions of the fine arts, from the natural harmony of the parts, always occasions a blemish.

There is another kind of proportion, at least not wholly dependent on utility, which is preserved in the appearances of things, when none of the parts are so small, in respect of one another, and of the whole, as to disappear through their smallness, when we contemplate the whole; and when none of them are so large, that when we fix our view on them, we cannot distinctly perceive at the same time their relation to the whole, and to the other parts. Figures,

* See Hogarth's Analysis of Beauty, chap. xi.
whose sides are very numerous, lose a great part of the beauty, which would arise from this variety, by the want of proportion between the sides and the diameter. Works in the Gothic taste, crowded with minute ornaments, fall as much short of perfect beauty, by their disproportion, as by their deviation from simplicity.

As nothing gives us greater pleasure, than what leads us to form a lofty conception of our own faculties, so nothing is more disagreeable, than what reminds us of their imperfection. On this account it is, that the want of this kind of proportion disgusts us. It leads us to entertain a low, and of consequence ungrateful opinion of our capacity, by rendering it impossible to form one entire conception of the object. The variety of its parts may amuse us, and keep us from attempting to comprehend the whole; and then, especially if it be joined with uniformity, it will yield us some degree of pleasure, and constitute an inferior and imperfect species of beauty. But still proportion is necessary for perfecting the beauty, and fully gratifying a correct and improved taste.

Thus the absence of any one of these ingredients, the want either of uniformity, of variety, or of proportion, diminishes the beauty of objects: but where all of them are wanting, deformity must prevail. Figures may be desirable or valuable on other accounts; but without these qualities they cannot be beautiful.

Utility, or the fitness of things for answering their ends, constitutes another species of beauty, distinct from that of figure. It is of so great importance that, though convenience is sometimes in lesser instances sacrificed to regularity, yet a great degree of inconvenience generally destroys all the pleasure, which should have arisen from the symmetry and proportion of the parts. It is the peculiar excellence of nature's works, that, at least in the noblest of them, the most perfect fitness for their respective ends is united and rendered consistent with the great elegance

* This, which is the principle of a distinct order of beauty, is confounded with uniformity, which is but one ingredient in that of figures, by Crousaz; Traité du Beau, passim.
of form.* We pay a very great regard to fitness and utility, in establishing the standard of beauty and proportion in the several kinds. And though the most perfect art falls infinitely short of nature, in combining the useful with the regular; yet none of its productions is reckoned a master-piece, in which these excellencies do not meet†; and to obtain utility, forms of inferior beauty are, for particular purposes, constantly preferred, even where beauty is far from being neglected. The cube, not any of the more varied polygons, is chosen for a pedestal, on account of its stability. Utility has determined, though with considerable latitude, the dimensions and general form of most instruments and works, without adhering to which, the greatest profusion of decoration cannot render them beautiful in the kind. Unfitness renders ornaments displeasing when wrong applied, which, in their proper place, might be truly elegant. The splendor of a single figure in history-painting will but augment its faultiness, if it takes off the eye from what ought to be the principal, and obstructs the effect which should be produced by the whole. In composition the most refined reflections, the most elaborate descriptions, the warmest pathos displease, if they break the unity, if they do not promote, much more if they retard, the main design, to which all the parts should be subordinate.

*Sed nunc non erat his locus........

The impropriety of their position wholly defaces their intrinsic beauty. In general, it is from the end and design of works of genius that their peculiar rules can be deduced: this directs the author in the choice, disposition, and embellishment of the parts: and by this the critic must regulate his judgment. It is from the relation they bear to different ends, that narration, poetry, and eloquence are subject to very different laws:

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* In plerisque rebus incredibili horc natura est ipsa fabricata........ut ea, que maximam utilitatem in se continerent, eadem haberent plurimum vel dignitatias, vel sape etiam venustatis. Cic. de Orat. lib. iii.

† Cic. ibid.
and from the same source is derived the diversity of the rules belonging to the subordinate branches of each. Could fitness be dispensed with, a collection of fine sentiments and figures clothed in agreeable language, might fully gratify our taste, however unconnected with one another.

That we may comprehend the nature of that pleasure which is produced by fitness, it must be observed, that, whenever we discover in effects a greater degree of uniformity or well adapted complication, than could be expected from the laws of chance; especially when we recognize a fitness for answering an important end; we then infer, not only intention, but art and skill in the cause: which implying mental excellence and perfection, the view of it gives a noble satisfaction; as on the other hand faultiness of contrivance, by suggesting imperfect skill and want of genius, displeases us greatly. When therefore we see a work, it leads us by a natural association to conceive its end; prone to comparison, we examine the propriety of the parts in relation to this end; if any of them are prejudicial to it, we are disgusted with the want of skill, which this imperfection betrays. We dwell in imagination on the inconveniences which must arise from the unfitness of the structure; we form strong ideas of them, which produce almost the same uneasy sentiments and passions, as if we actually experienced them; and by this means often obliterate all the pleasing impressions, which the other qualities of the object might have caused. But when, on examination, the fitness of all the parts appears, the satisfaction, with which we think on the skill and ingenuity thus displayed, communicates itself to the effect so nearly allied to it, so closely connected with it by causation: and we sympathetically enter into a strong feeling of the delight which must attend the possession or use of what is so well designed and executed.

The beauty of colours is entirely distinct from both the former, and pleases us from principles wholly different. Colours being nothing else than various degrees and modifications of light, some of them are less hurtful to the organs of sight than others;
and are, on that account, in some instances approved as beautiful.

Some colours again, by their splendor, afford a lively and vigorous sensation, which gratifies us, by producing a cheerful and vivacious disposition of mind in contemplating them.

But the beauty of colours is, in most instances, resolvable into association; those being approved, which, either by a natural resemblance, or by custom, or opinion, introduce and are connected with agreeable ideas of any sort; and those being disapproved, which have any way become related to disagreeable ones. The verdure of the fields is delightful, not only by being inoffensive to the eye, but chiefly by its suggesting the pleasant idea of fertility. Heath in bloom would form a carpet agreeable enough to sight, if we could separate from its appearance the idea of the barrenness of the mountains and wilds it covers. In dress, colours are either beautiful or the contrary, according to the nature of the idea which they lead us to form of the station, sentiments, and character of the wearer.

In some cases, a particular dress, in consequence of established manners, suggest to the generality nearly the same idea. Wherever this general connection takes place, it forms a kind of standard in dress, for persons in certain stations or professions. We come to perceive a propriety in conforming to it; and we are displeased with the indecency of deviating remarkably from it.

When the idea suggested by dress is different in different persons, so also is the relish for the colour; what suggests to one a liveliness and vivacity of turn, gives another the idea of gaudiness and levity; the same dress may convey to some the idea of gravity and sedateness, to others that of dullness and austerity.

Colours, as applied in painting, come under consideration here only in respect of their delicacy or vivacity; which, however estimable, are not yet of so great importance, as the power they have of representing
grandeur or beauty of figure, or of exhibiting solid bodies, by such an artful and ingenious imitation, as itself delights us, in a way hereafter to be explained.

The beauty of colours may be heightened by the addition of variety, a circumstance which bestows some charms on the most irregular mixture of them, provided they be of themselves agreeable, especially if they be so disposed as to set off to advantage the separate brightness or beauty of each other.

There is perhaps no term used in a looser sense than beauty, which is applied to almost every thing that pleases us. Though this usage is doubtless too indefinite, we may, without a faulty deviation from precision, apply this epithet to every pleasure which is conveyed by the eye, and which has not got a proper and peculiar name; to the pleasure we receive, either when an object of sight suggests pleasant ideas of other senses; or when the ideas suggested are agreeable ones formed from the sensations of sight; or when both these circumstances concur. In all these cases, beauty is, at least in part, resolvable into association.

The first method of effecting beauty, we have already seen exemplified in colours, which are themselves objects of sight introducing pleasant ideas not derived from sight. Thus also the structure of a human face often indicates good mental dispositions, which are not only themselves approved as virtuous, but by being so, diffuse a beauty over the countenance in which they are imprinted: but bad affections, expressed in the look, throw deformity upon the finest features.

In the second way is produced the only beauty of thought or sentiment, which comes properly under the present head; that beauty which arises, when the subject described is agreeable to sight, as light, flowers, fields, meadows, groves; or when it is illustrated by images from things that are so agreeable. This is one great part of the beauty of pastoral; and enters in some degree into every kind of poetry.*

* The other qualities which render sentiments beautiful or agreeable, as metaphor, fable, antithesis, morality, elevation, &c. belong to other classes.
To the third cause, or the union of both the former, imitations of beautiful originals, by figure and colour, owe their beauty. It is observable that the arts which use these instruments have greater advantages for imitating beauty than sublimity. This they can represent, as we have seen, only by suggesting ideas of grand objects; but the copies would not, if considered as originals, be grand; since they are almost ever destitute of magnitude, its most essential requisite. But imitations of beautiful originals, independent of their resemblance to these, are beautiful; since they cannot otherways exhibit their beauties to the thought, than by themselves possessing them in some degree: and often they possess them as perfectly as their archetypes. A statue has the same regularity and proportion as its original. A painting may equal the object it represents, not only in symmetry and propriety, but in colour.

The classes of beauty, which we have been explaining, are distinct in their principles, though by reason of the similitude of their feeling, they are reduced to the same genus. But they are often in things variously united, and by their union they render our satisfaction more intense. In a fine face all the principles of beauty are combined. To an exact symmetry and regular proportion of varied features, and parts nicely adapted to their several purposes, is superadded complexion, composed of white and red, colours beautiful in themselves rendered still more so by the artful manner in which they are disposed, and by their indicating health and freshness; and the grace of the whole is heightened by a quick expressiveness of aspect, which forces us instantaneously to perceive acuteness, sagacity, sedateness, sweetness, or the like amiable qualities, in the mind which animates the elegant form; while the approbation attending this perception is reflected back upon the face which gave occasion to it.
SECT. IV.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF IMITATION.

EXACTNESS and liveliness of imitation supply us with another pleasure of taste, which, as it has no peculiar name, is commonly expressed by that of beauty; and is by some termed relative or secondary, to distinguish it from the kinds above explained, which are called absolute or primary.*

We have a natural sense, which is highly gratified by a designed resemblance, though there be nothing agreeable in the original. Similitude is a very powerful principle of association, which, by continually connecting the ideas in which it is found, and leading our thoughts from one of them to the other, produces in mankind a strong tendency to comparison. As comparison implies in the very act a gentle exertion of the mind, it is on that account agreeable. As a farther energy is requisite for discovering the original by the copy; and as this discovery produces a grateful consciousness of our own discernment and sagacity, and includes the pleasant feeling of success; the recognizing resemblance, in consequence of comparison, augments our pleasure.* And when the imitation is intended, our admiration of the skill and ingenuity of the artist diffuses itself over the effect from which that skill is inferred, and compleats the delight which the work inspires.

Hence the rapture with which a connoisseur beholds the capital performances of the eminent masters in painting or sculpture. Hence the main excellence of poetical or eloquent descriptions; the characteristical perfection of which arises from the author's judiciously selecting the most essential and striking qualities of his subject, and combining them into such a picture as quickly revives in the reader, and strongly impresses on his mind a lively idea of the original.

* See Hutcheson's enquiry into the original of our ideas of beauty and virtue. *Treat. I. sect. iv.*

* Διὰ γὰρ τούτου χαίρειν τὰς εικόνας ἐξῴκτυς, ὅτι συμβαίνει ἐμφανίζετε μαθηματικαι καὶ συλλογισμοῖς, η ἐκατερ. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤ. περὶ Ποιητικῆς, κεφ. 8.
The fundamental beauty of metaphor and allegory lies in their insinuating the analogies of things; that of similitude and comparison in their more explicitly proposing these analogies. By this they communicate fineness to a sentiment. Most of the figures and tropes of eloquence derive their grace from their being so employed, as to correspond with the natural expressions or objects of those passions and sentiments, which actuate the orator, or which he would inspire into his audience. Improbability, which is a want of resemblance to natural things, always renders a fable or story less entertaining; and if the improbability be very great, or extend to the material parts, it often makes it wholly nauseous.

When excellent originals are imitated, the copies derive their charms, not merely from exactness of imitation, but also from the excellence which they represent; and the gratification which these copies afford may almost as properly be ascribed to beauty or sublimity as to imitation. As the beauty here is complicated in its principles, it will of consequence be also compounded in its effect, and will ravish the mind much more than either of its constituents alone. An Hercules, exhibiting proportion, strength, and fortitude in perfection, must be a finer statue than the exactest imitation of a Thersites or Silenus. The works of Polygnotus, which represented beautiful objects, were doubtless more delightful than the pictures of Dionysius or Pauson, however skilfully they might represent ordinary or faulty objects. The ancient Greek, or the modern Italian painters will always be preferable to the Flemish, who, though they imitate well, do not make a judicious choice of such beauties of nature as deserve to be imitated. The Margites

* Ἄριστος. πείρα ποιήσ. κερ. β.  
† In this particular the ancient artists were so careful, that they were not content with imitating the most perfect individuals they could meet with; but, collecting the perfections of many, they formed one general idea more complete, than could be drawn from any single real existence. 'Οπλος τούτων και τῶν τὰ ἐγαλμάτων τέτοιων διαπλάτωσιν, οἱ παρά τοὺς ἰδιοὺς καλὸν ἐναγαγοίτες, κατὰ τὴν τίχυν ἐν διαφόρων συμμάτων ἀληθινό-
of Homer could not have given us so high entertainment as we receive from the Iliad. A comparison, however nicely suited to the subject, will please still more, if it is taken from what conveys no ideas, but such as are noble and agreeable: and indeed by suggesting such as are strongly the reverse, it will be sufficient to turn the most magnificent subject into ridicule.

But still the force of imitation is most conspicuous, when no other principles concur to heighten its effect; for as it is then pure and unmixed, we cannot question, that the whole pleasure of the sentiment produced is owing to it alone. Its power is indeed so great, that it not only, without the assistance of other principles, produces a considerable degree of pleasure; but often re-

commends and gains the preference to imperfect or faulty originals; and makes things grateful when reflected by it, which would be very ungrateful, if viewed directly. The rudest rocks and mountains; the objects that in nature are most deformed; even disease and pain, acquire beauty when skilfully imitated in painting.* It is chiefly by copying imperfections and absurdities that mimicry and humour please. A perfect imitation of characters morally evil, can make us dwell with pleasure on them, notwithstanding the uneasy sentiments of disapprobation and abhorrence which they excite. The character of Iago is detestable, but we admire Shakespeare's representation of it. Nay imperfect and mixed characters are, in all kinds of writing, preferred to faultless ones, as being juster copies of real nature. The pleasant sensation resulting from the imitation is so intense, that it overpowers and converts into delight even the uneasy impressions, which spring from the objects

* "Α γὰρ 'αυτὰ λυπητῶς ἀγαπᾶν, τὸτε τὰς εὐκάκια τὰς μάλιστα ὑπηκόωμεν, χαίρομεν ἡσυχῶς, ὅσον τῆς πρὸς τὸν ἁγιοτάτων καὶ οἰκρᾶν. ΑΡΙΣΤ. περὶ ποιτ. κεφ. 8."
imitated. There can be no stronger proof of the force of imitation in conferring on its effects the power of pleasing, than its rendering those passions agreeable, when excited by it, which, when produced in the natural way, are pure and unmixed pain. Suspense, anxiety, terror, when produced in tragedy, by imitation of their objects and causes, and infused by sympathy, afford not only a more serious, but a much intenser and nobler satisfaction, than all the laughter and joy, which farce or comedy can inspire. When thus secondarily produced, they agitate and employ the mind, and rouse and give scope to its greatest activity; while at the same time our implicit knowledge that the occasion is remote or fictitious, enables the pleasure of imitation to relieve the pure torment, which would attend their primary operation.

From what has been said, it is obvious that the pleasure of imitation arises from a combination of causes. Besides the act of comparison, which is the same in all instances, the exactness of the resemblance, our discovery of it, and the art we conceive necessary for producing it, concur to make up our gratification.

Exactness of resemblance is scarce farther approved, than as it evidences skill and enables us to discover the original. Caravaggio is censurable for too closely following the life, as well as Gioseppino for wantonly deviating from it into fantastical extravagances. Among the ancient statuaries likewise, Demetrius is censured for being too studious of likeness, and sacrificing beauty to it; and is on this account reckoned inferior to Lysippus and Praxiteles, who, at the same time that they excelled in producing likeness, carried it no farther than was consistent with beauty.* Exactness of resemblance may be carried so far in any work of genius, as to degenerate into disagreeable servility; and is easily dispensed with, when the deviation from similitude appears to be the result of

superior art. However, that instrument of imitation is doubtless the most perfect, which is capable of producing the most perfect likeness. Among the fine arts, this pre-eminence, in most subjects, belongs to sculpture; and more to painting, in subjects perfectly adapted to it, than to poetry.

But even the imperfection of the instrument of imitation may sometimes add merit to the effect. Though it renders the resemblance less accurate, this very circumstance enhances the pleasure, by producing a consciousness of greater sagacity in discovering the original; at the same time that the production of likeness with unapt materials, implying greater difficulty, gives rise to an higher approbation of the ingenuity of the artist. In this respect painting is more artificial than statuary. For that reason a fine picture will inspire full as great pleasure as a statue. Its representing solid bodies, only by the disposition of light and shade, though itself a plane, is a proof of the highest skill. And could a person be formed to delicacy of taste, and yet kept from seeing a picture till he were adult; it is scarce conceivable what rapture he should feel, when he first discovered it to be but a plane variously shaded, after having firmly believed, that, like the objects he had been accustomed to, it had itself the prominences and cavities which it represents.* And as every difficulty of execution heightens our idea of the skill by which it is surmounted, not only the importance of the work, but also the difficulty of representing passion and character by figure and colour, increase the beauty of history-painting. In this view, poetry, imitating by instituted symbols, no ways resembling things, is on most subjects more imperfectly mimetic than the other arts: but this imperfection gives it a kind of merit, as that art is able notwithstanding

* Hence in the celebrated contest between a painter and a statuary, concerning the merit of their arts, both argued from real principles of excellence; the statuary pleading the perfection of resemblance in his art; the painter the superior ingenuity which his discovered. The blind man gave the preference to the latter. The controversy cannot be determined, till it is previously fixed, which principle is, on the whole eligible.
to suggest very lively ideas of its objects. But what constitutes its unquestionable superiority to all its sister arts, is its peculiar and unrivaled power of imitating the noblest and most important of all subjects, the calmest sentiments of the heart, and human characters displayed in a long series of conduct. For in determining the comparative merit of the imitative arts, we must not only estimate the excellencies of the instruments or manners of imitation, which they respectively claim; but also the moment of what they imitate, the value of the ends to which they are adapted.*

* All this must be taken under consideration, in order to explain the nature of any one of the fine arts: and it is only after the nature of each has been unfolded that we can judge of their relative importance.

SECT. V.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF HARMONY.

THE sense of harmony, which confers a kind of beauty upon sound, not only is conversant in all the arts which employ language, but itself lays the sole foundation of the art of music. By it the ear derives from its objects a pleasure similar to what the eye receives from forms. This pleasure is resolvable into the agreeableness of single sounds, and into the charms and energy of a skilful complication of them.

Single sounds are either loud or low, acute or grave, slender or full, even or broken. To these qualities attention must be paid, if we would please the ear. If sounds are too low, they do not strike with force enough to gratify: if too loud, they confound us. Great acuteness lacerates the organ: and an excess of gravity renders the impression too dull and spiritless to please. Exility hinders sounds from sufficiently filling the ear, and thence is attended with a
perception of meanness and futility: but full and swelling notes, by occupying its whole expansion, acquire grandeur and inspire delight. *Broken sounds* grate the ear, by their harsh inequalities: *smoothness* and evenness is necessary to prevent their being disagreeable.

Harmony pre-supposes the agreeableness of the separate notes, but it is produced only by a *combination* of sounds. The different compositions of articulate sounds, added to the separate qualities of each, render some words harmonious, others harsh. Some articulate sounds do not easily concur; the transition from one configuration of the organs of speech to the other, is difficult and uneasy; and the hearer is led by a delicate sympathy with the speaker, to feel this pain and labour. It is the frequency of such combinations, that prevents euphony in any tongue; and renders some languages less smooth and harmonious than others. In sentences, periods, and discourses, the harmony or the asperity of style arises from the repetition of sounds and combinations separately agreeable or disagreeable: and the harmony is rendered more delightful, by the *variety* which the length of the composition admits. The importance of variety we shall acknowledge, if we but reflect how tiresome sameness of cadence is. The superior harmony of poetry is produced by the greater facility of its combinations, joined to a considerable degree of *uniformity*, and a regular *proportion* in time; the proper method of obtaining which, in every language, determine its prosody: and the variety of the means to be employed for this end in different languages, introduces a similar variety in the genius and measure of their verse.

Whenever our pleasure arises from a succession of sounds, it is a perception of a complicated nature; made up of a *sensation* of the present sound or note, and an *idea* or remembrance of the foregoing, which by their mixture and concurrence, produce such a mysterious delight, as neither could have produced alone. And it is often heightened by an *anticipation* of the succeeding notes. Hence it proceeds in part, that
we are in general best pleased with pieces of music, which we are acquainted with: our understanding them more thoroughly, counterbalances the power of novelty. Hence too it is, that we often acquire in time a fondness for what at first we did not highly relish; the anticipation, which repetition enables us to make of the succeeding note, supplying the defect in the sensation of the present, and the idea of the past sound when disunited from it, cementing them as it were, and making them run into one another without difficulty or harshness. Sense, memory, and imagination are thus conjunctively employed, in exhibiting to the interior organ a succession of sounds, which properly disposed, especially in music, fill us with exquisite delight.

It is observable that the proper and pleasing disposition of sounds in melody bears a great resemblance, in its principles, to that arrangement of parts, which constitutes the beauty of forms. It is a succession of notes, bearing to one another a regular proportion in time; so varied in their lengths and intervals,* as to relieve satiety and tediousness; and at the same time so far uniform, that the transitions are all in themselves agreeable, such as are taken in by the ear with ease, and are subordinate to the key which governs the whole.

The same principles are not less obvious in harmony; the superior delight of which springs from no other cause, but its possessing some of these qualities in greater perfection. The uniformity is preserved almost undiminished; the different parts being so combined, that no dissonance is occasioned by their multiplicity; but the concordant notes, melted into one another, strike the ear together without confusion or distraction. With this simplicity, an immense variety is made consistent; each separate part being a distinct series of artfully varied sounds; the melody of all the parts being

* As the great force of proportion in time is evident from the universal attention that is paid to it in music of every kind; so the influence of variety of time appears particularly in the drum, the whole music of which is owing to it alone.
enjoyed at once: the vibrations of the con-
cords coinciding not always, but at regular
periods; the diversity of the concords and
their successions producing a great diversity
of harmonies; and the judicious intermix-
ture of discords preventing the sense from
being cloyed with symphony too long con-
tinued. At the same time, the proportion is
rendered more conspicuous and artful, by
its being preserved in all the parts; and a
new kind of it is introduced by their com-
parative strength. So great is the efficacy
of these principles, that they alone produce
very high pleasure, though no passion is
excited by the music.

But still the chief excellence of music lies in
its expression. By this quality, music is applied
to a determinate subject: by this it acquires
a fitness, becomes adapted to an end, and
agitates the soul with whatever passion the
artist chooses.* Its power to operate on the

* Hence different kinds of music may, in a consist-
ence with their being all agreeable, answer different
and even opposite purposes. Καλὸν μὲν 'εν πολλῷ τὸ
εἴδων, καλὸν δὲ 'εν συμποσίῳ τῷ παράκολν καὶ καλὸν μὲν

passions is its most important virtue. And
indeed as all sensations and emotions re-
sembling in their feeling, tend to introduce
each other into the mind; music, producing
by its harmony a pleasant disposition of soul,
renders us peculiarly prone to every agree-
able affection. But it makes use too of
other instruments. By the natural fitness of
sound for accomplishing an imitation of, or
association with their objects and natural
expressions, it infuses into the breast passions
correspondent; settles into calm serenity,
melts into tenderness or pity, sinks into sor-
row, soothes into melancholy, agitates with
terror, soothes into melancholy, agitates with
terror, elevates with joy, excites to courage,
or enraptures with devotion; and thus in-
expressibly delights the soul.
SECT. VI.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF RIDICULE.

IN our enumeration of the simple powers which constitute taste, we must not omit that sense, which perceives, and is gratified by the odd, the ridiculous, the humorous, the witty, and whose gratification often produces, and always tends to mirth, laughter and amusement. Though inferior in dignity to the rest, it is far from being despicable. It has a province, less important indeed than that of the others, yet both useful and agreeable. As they judge of grave and momentous subjects, it claims the sole jurisdiction over such as are more ludicrous.

Its object is in general incongruity, or a surprising and uncommon mixture of relation and contrariety in things. More explicitly; it is gratified by an inconsistence and dissonance of circumstances in the same object; or in objects nearly related in the main; or by a similitude or relation unexpected between things on the whole opposite and unlike.

Jarring and incongruous circumstances meeting in the same subject form an absurdity, with which we are apt to be diverted. Such are cowardice in a boaster; ignorance in a man of what he ought or pretends to know; dignity of any kind blended with meanness; sentiments or style in composition unsuitable to the subject. We are disposed to combine the parts of things into a whole, and to bestow upon them unity and intimate relation; we expect that they should be all consistent, suitable, and of a piece; and when we find them otherways, we pronounce them ridiculous and absurd.

We compare in this light not only the qualities of the same subject, but also of objects resembling or otherways nearly connected; and their contrariety affects us with a similar sensation. An opposition of characters and behaviour in different persons, especially of the same family or profession, often forms a diverting contrast. A passion intense in its feeling, excited by a trifling cause, moves our laughter. A glaring disproportion betwixt the means and the end, when the means are either unequal to
its attainment, or too laborious and expensive for its importance, is on the same principle ridiculous.

So excursive is the human fancy, that it continually leads us to compare things the most dissimilar; and as on the former comparisons the appearance of incongruity, so on this the discovery of unlooked for likenesses, analogies, and relations, proves a source of pleasure and amusement. Inferior animals provoke our mirth, whenever they mimic the actions or sagacity of human creatures.

Objects, conceived to be in any of these ways incongruous, always gratify the sense of ridicule: but they may excite at the same time a more important feeling, which, by occupying the mind prevents our attending to the incongruity, or extinguishes the sentiment thence resulting, as soon as it begins to rise. Enormous vice, though of all things the most incongruous to the natural system of our minds, is never esteemed ridiculous.*

Pain or misery is never in itself ridiculous; it can become such only by being accidentally connected with unsuitable circumstances, and by failing to excite pity so intense as may swallow up the ludicrous sensation.

Wit, humour, and ridicule,* are skilful imitations of odd and incongruous originals; which please us not only by shewing them

* Nec insignis improbitas, et scelere juncta, nec rursus miseris insignis agitata ridetur: facinorosos mas-

* The author is well aware that these three modes of imitation are widely different. It would be a very curious work to ascertain the peculiar nature of each, and to mark its real distinction from the rest. But as the subject is in a great measure new, it could not be examined with accuracy, or so as to produce conviction of the justness of the theory, in a very narrow compass. And a large disquisition would be more than falls to its share in an enquiry concerning taste in general. It was therefore judged proper to be contented with pointing out what is common to wit, humour, and ridicule; and with giving examples which shew that the theory here established extends to all of them.
often more perfectly than we could have ourselves observed them; but also by super­
adding the gratification which results from imitation. This gratification is in its own nature serious, but is altered by the senti­
ment which attends the objects imitated, and only serves to heighten the contempt or amusement which they produce.

In all these modes of imitation the incon­
gruity of the object in itself, or in respect of the imagery used for illustrating it, is ob­
vious. When Butler represents all ranks as intent on reforming the church and the state, he employs a surprizing complication of wit and humour in order to ridicule the epi­
demical distraction. There is a wonderful mixture of dissonance and relation; disso­
nance, between the ordinary occupations of low mechanics, and the difficult and noble office of legislation and political government; relation, not only as the persons thus inconsistently employed are the same, but also as their demands of redress are generally ex­
pressed in language adapted to the style of their respective vocations.* The description of Hudibras's learning becomes witty, by the strange contrast between the dignity of the sciences ascribed to him, and the proofs of his understanding them, drawn from the lowest instances.† A hose used for a cup­board, the basket-hilt of a sword for holding broth, a dagger for cleaning shoes, or toast­
ing cheese to bait a mouse-trap, present ideas

* Then tinkers bawl'd aloud to settle
Church, discipline, for patching kettle, &c.
Botchers left old cloaths in the lurch,
And fell to turn and patch the church, &c.
And some for old suits, coats, or cloak;
No surplices nor service book.

Hudibr. Par. i. Cant. 2. ver. 536, &c.

† He was in logic a great critic,
Profoundly skilled in analytic, &c.
He'd undertake to prove by force
Of argument a man's no horse;
He'd prove a buzzard is no fowl,
And that a lord may be an owl;
A calf an alderman, a goose a justice,
And rooks committee-men and trustees, &c.

Cant. i. ver. 65.

For rhetoric, he could not ope
His mouth, but out there flew a trope, &c ver. 81, &c.
In mathematics he was greater, &c. ver. 119...188.
strikingly heterogeneous.* A sword and a dagger are so unlike to a knight errant and his dwarf; a restive horse to an unmanageable body politic; courage whetted by martial music, to ale turned sour by thunder; torn breeches to a leaky vessel; the dawning of the day to the change of colour in boiling a lobster; that when they are brought into view at once by comparison, metaphor, insinuation, or allusion, their unexpected similitude in some circumstances produces mirth.† In Addison’s humourous representation of Tinsel’s terror, it is the oddity and preposterous nature of the passion that diverts us; it is contrary to his professed principles and pretended fortitude, and it rises to a violent panic on a trifling occasion. When Swift ridicules human foibles, whether he makes the attack by wit or by humour, he paints their incongruity and absurdity. Attempts to produce learned volumes by the motions of a mechanical engine; to extract sunbeams from a cucumber; to build houses downward from the roof; to improve the

* When of his hose we come to treat,
  The cup-board where he kept his meat. ver. 303.
His puissant sword unto his side,
Near his undaunted heart was tied;
With basket-hilt that would hold broth,
  And serve for fight and dinner both. ver. 351.
When it had stabb’d or broke a head,
It would scrape trenchers, or chip bread,
Toast cheese or bacon, tho’ it were
To bait a mousetrap, ’twould not care.
’Twould make clean shoes, and in the earth
Set leeks and onions, and so forth. ver. 381.
† ’This sword a dagger had, his page,
That was but little for his age:
And therefore waited on him so,
As dwarfs upon knights errant do. ver. 375. 920. 931.

† Instead of trumpet and of drum,
Which makes the warrior’s stomach come,
Whose noise whets valour sharp, like beer
By thunder turn’d to vinegar. Cant. ii. ver. 107.
My Galligaskins that have long withstood
The winter’s fury and encroaching frosts,
By time subdu’d, (what will not time subdue !)
An horrid chasm disclose, &c.
Thus a well-fraught ship, &c.
Splendid Shilling.

The sun had long since in the lap
Of Thetis taken out his nap,
And like a lobster boil’d, the morn
From black to red began to turn.

Hud. Par. ii. Cant. 2. ver. 29.
webs into silk; to soften marble for pillows and pincushions; to propagate a breed of naked sheep; are palpably impossible or useless, or both at once.

SECT. VII.

OF THE SENSE OR TASTE OF VIRTUE.

The moral sense is not only itself a taste of a superior order, by which in characters and conduct we distinguish between the right and the wrong, the excellent and the faulty; but it also spreads its influence over all the most considerable works of art and genius. It is never unregarded in serious performances, and it enters even into the most ludicrous. It claims a joint authority with the other principles of taste; it requires an attachment to morality in the epos and the drama, and it pronounces the quickest flights of wit, without it, phrensy and distraction. Something moral has insinuated itself, not only into the serious designs of Raphael, but also into the humourous representations of Hogarth.

Nay our moral sense claims authority superior to all the rest. It renders morality the chief requisite; and where this is in any degree violated, no other qualities can atone
for the transgression. Particular beauties may be approved; but the work is, on the whole, condemned.

How great a part of the sentiments produced by works of genius arises from the exertion of this sense, approving or condemning, is too obvious to require our dwelling on it. The noblest and most delightful subjects of imitation are affections, characters, and actions: and their peculiar merit arises almost entirely from their continually drawing out and employing the moral faculty. By its approbation, more effectually than by any other means, we become interested for some of the persons represented, and sympathize with every change in their condition. It fills us with joyful approbation of the virtuous character, and with abhorrence, not ungrateful when thus excited, of the vicious. When prosperity and success attend the former, we feel his good desert, we rejoice to find it meet its due reward, we are composed into delightful serenity, complacence and affiance in righteous providence: when he is sunk into disappointment and adversity, we are sensible that he deserved it not, and taste the pleasurable pain of compassion for his sufferings, and virtuous resentment against the authors of them. When the vicious man is prosperous, we glow with indignation, we feel a kind of melancholy despondence: when he suffers, we become sensible to the danger of vice, to the terrors of guilt; we allow his ill desert, but mix pity with our blame. We are thus agitated by those most important passions; the infusion of which constitutes the highest entertainment that works of taste can give.

But what extensive influence the moral sense has on taste of every kind, it will be unnecessary particularly to describe, if we only recollect the various perceptions which it conveys. To it belongs our perception of fairness, beauty, and loveliness of virtue, of the ugliness, deformity, and hatefulness of vice, produced by the native qualities of each considered simply. From it is derived our perception of decency, fitness and congruity in the former; of incongruity, indecency
and unfitness in the latter; which arises from implicit comparison of them, with the structure and constitution of the mind. By it we perceive that virtue is obligatory, right, and due; and that vice is undue, unlawful, and wrong: the perception springs from the supremacy of our approving and disapproving faculty, as our internal governor prescribing a law of life. The same sense conveys a perception of merit and good desert in virtue, of demerit and ill desert in vice; a perception, which never fails to be excited, when we think at once of moral and natural good or evil. From this variety of sensations arise all the reflex passions which regard good or bad men as their objects. How much these sentiments and affections enter into the perceptions of taste, the least reflection will inform us.

Thus much may suffice for an analysis of taste into those simple powers of human nature, which are its principles. There are qualities in things, determinate and stable, independent of humour or caprice, that are fit to operate on mental principles, common to all men, and by operating on them, are naturally productive of the sentiments of taste in all its forms. If, in any particular instance, they prove ineffectual, it is to be ascribed to some weakness or disorder in the person, who remains unmoved, when these qualities are exhibited to his view. Men are, with few exceptions, affected by the qualities we have investigated: but these qualities themselves are, without any exception, the constituents of excellence or faultiness in the several kinds. What is necessary for perceiving them with perfect relish, we shall next examine.
PART. II.

THE FORMATION OF TASTE BY THE UNION
AND IMPROVEMENT OF ITS SIMPLE
PRINCIPLES.

SECT. I.

OF THE UNION OF THE INTERNAL SENSES, AND
THE ASSISTANCE THEY RECEIVE FROM
DELICACY OF PASSION.

ANY one of the internal senses, existing
in vigor and perfection, forms a particular
branch of *taste*, and enables a man to judge
in some one subject of art or genius: but
_all_ of them must at once be vigorous, in
order to constitute *taste* in its just extent.
This _union_ is necessary, not only for giving
it a proper compass, but also for perfecting
each of its exertions.

Our sentiments and emotions receive an
immense addition of strength from their re-
ciprocal influence on one another. Concomi-
tant emotions, related by their feeling, their
direction, or their objects, or even without
any relation existing _in the mind together_,
run into one, and by their mixture produce an intense sensation. Hence different gratifications, either of the same or diverse senses, occurring to the mind at once, give it a complicated joy. The stillness and serenity of a summer morning, the sweet fragrance of flowers, the music of birds, and a thousand other agreeable circumstances are even commonly observed to bestow extraordinary force on the grandeur or beauty of rural scenes.

Though each object of taste has some leading character by which it is peculiarly fitted to produce one principal sensation, it may at the same time, by its subordinate qualities produce attendant feelings, which will render the principal one higher and more intense, by their conspiring with it. But if the principles of taste, adapted to these, are weak or deficient, we not only lose entirely some of the pleasures, which the object might convey; but cannot even enjoy any of them with perfect relish, as we are insensible to the heightenings, which each receives from its connection with the rest.

None of our sensations is more able to support itself, without foreign aid, than that of grandeur; of which a great critic reckons it a necessary character, that it please still more the oftener it is examined.* Yet everyone is sensible how much more intense it is rendered by novelty; how weakly the sublimest objects often strike us, when by long custom they have become familiar. The sublimity of the heavens could not fail to enrapture one unaccustomed to the glorious spectacle. Though the sentiment of sublimity fills, and almost exceeds the capacity of the mind, we can yet receive along with it other pleasurable feelings, which will increase it by their conjunction. The most elevating objects in nature may be rendered more delightful by their beauty and utility. The most extensive power may be rendered more sublime, by its being exercised in such a manner as to produce moral approbation.

* "Οταν ει τη δα' άνθρω περιφέρεο ευχαριστήμενο, προς μεγαλοφιστήμενο την ψυχήν μα' συνελεύσθη, μαλ' εφεται κατα τη διανοια πλαος την λογομσία το ανώτερον μετανοημμενο, πιθαν γ', οτα το συνεχείς εντίμασις, εις απόφασιν ακάθι σην εσθ' ιι' αληθινής ευμο προ. ΔΩΣΙ. μερι υψ. τρις ζ.

Virgil gives a sublime idea of the Romans, when he represents them as destined for empire universal, as prescribing laws at pleasure, and forcing into subjection the most haughty opposers. But he artfully renders it more sublime, by insinuating that they exercised their power in clemency to willing subjects.* This procures our moral approbation, and augments the sentiment of grandeur, which it accompanies. In architecture, the separate pleasures, arising from the beauty, proportion, fitness, and ornaments of the parts, heighten the sublime. In painting the sublime is generally attended by the graceful.

Poetry is a complication of beauties, reflecting by their union additional lustre on one another. The sublime, the new, the elegant, the natural, the virtuous, are often blended in the imitation; brightened by the power of fiction, and the richest variety of imagery; and rendered more delightful by the harmony of numbers. When poetry is set to well adapted music, both gain new power by their alliance. The music, by exciting the requisite affections, puts the mind in a disposition to conceive ideas suited to them with peculiar facility, vivacity, and pleasure. These ideas the poet raises: and they, in their turn, enliven the affections, and preserve them from languishing or expiring, by rendering their objects more determinate. But in order to experience this compound pleasure, both a musical ear and a poetic taste are requisite: the want of either extinguishes one part of the delight, and very much diminishes the other.

The degree of force with which objects strike us, has a great dependence on the prevailing disposition of the mind. Things often affect us deeply, when we are in an humour suited to them, though at another time they would make small impression. The smallest injury may produce fury in a person naturally passionate, or by accident chagrined. When the temper of the mind

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* Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Ha; tibi erunt artes; pacisque imponere morem,
Pareere subjectis, et debellare superbos.

Æn. vi. ver. 847.
is such, as gives it an habitual turn to one kind of sentiments and affections, it enters into them, whenever they occur, with extraordinary spirit. As they fall in with its predominant bent, no force is required to adapt it to the perception of them; it spontaneously, and even eagerly embraces them, as perfectly conformable to its frame.

Now as all the objects of the same internal sense, however various, have their common qualities; so all these senses are analogous in their principles and feeling. The same turn of mind is, on this account, congruous to them all. The prevalence and exercise of any one of them disposes and attunes the mind to all the rest. And this previous disposition to them bestows strength and vigour on all their exertions. In fact, the kindred powers of taste are seldom disunited. Where all of them have considerable vigour, one may be, in comparison with the rest, predominant; either by the natural construction of the mind, or by peculiar culture. But where one of them is remarkably dull, or altogether wanting, the others scarce ever appear in full perfection.

The union of these powers has a farther influence in forming taste, as that union opens a new field, in which taste may exercise itself and gather flowers to adorn the native beauty of its objects. As the fine arts are truly sisters, derived from the same common parent Nature, they bear to one another, and to their original, various similitudes, relations, and analogies.* These, one who possesses all the internal senses vigorous, and has employed them all about their various objects, is able to trace out. They have charmed every genuine critic; and every reader of taste is delighted with the metaphors and comparisons, which are founded on the perception of them. In observing them we find a noble and exquisite entertainment. They continually occur to an extensive taste; and, mingling with the more immediate and confined gratification of each power of imagination, increase its

* Est etiam illa Platonis vera...vox, Omnen doctrinam harum ingeniorum et humanarum arium, uno quodam societatis vinculo contineri.....Mirus quidam omnium quasi consensus doctrinarum, concentusque reperitur. Cic. de Orat. lib. iii.
delightfulness. As one science, by supplying illustrations, makes another better understood; so one art, by throwing lustre on another, makes it more exquisitely relished. This enlargement of taste, places one as it were upon an eminence, and not only enables him to take in a wider prospect; but also improves all the parts of it, by comparing or contrasting them together.

In all these ways our interior senses, merely by their union, tend to form and perfect taste.

We may here take occasion to mention a principle, distinct from all the internal senses, from which taste will, in many instances receive assistance. It is such a sensibility of heart, as fits a man for being easily moved, and for readily catching, as by infection, any passion, that a work is fitted to excite. The souls of men are far from being alike susceptible of impressions of this kind. A hard hearted man can be a spectator of very great distress, without feeling any emotion; a man of a cruel temper has a malignant joy in producing misery. On the other hand, many are composed of so delicate materials, that the smallest uneasiness of their fellow creatures excites their pity. A similar variety may be observed, in respect of the other passions. Persons of the former cast will be little affected by the most moving tragedy; those of the latter turn will be interested by a very indifferent one. A performance, which can infuse the keenest passions into the breast of an Italian, will affect a Frenchman very little, and leave an Englishman perfectly unconcerned. We are apt to be astonished, when we read of the prodigious force, with which eloquence wrought upon the delicate spirits of the Atheniæs, and feel so little of any thing analogous to it, that nothing but the most unexceptionable evidence could make it credible. This diversity in the formation of the heart will produce a considerable diversity in the sentiments, which men receive from works of taste, and in the judgment, which they form concerning them.

A very great part of the merit of most works of genius arises from their fitness to
agitate the heart with a variety of passions. In the most excellent music, the agreeableness of the melody, and the richness of the harmony, are only subservient to the expression. It is so much the business of painting and poetry to affect us, by infusing suitable passions, that a very ingenious critic* has mistaken it for the only business of these arts. Some kinds of poetry are addressed principally to the powers of imagination, and attain their ultimate end, by exhibiting pictures of such objects as gratify our internal senses. Such particularly is descriptive poetry. But even this kind will soon grow languid and unentertaining, if it does not support itself, by introducing subjects of an affecting nature. In dramatic poetry, and in eloquence, the ultimate end is to affect; whatever only pleases the internal senses is subordinate to this end, and becomes faulty, if it be not conducive to it.

Since, therefore, the pathetic is a quality of so great moment in works of taste, a

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man, who is destitute of sensibility of heart, must be a very imperfect judge of them. He is a stranger to those feelings, which are of greatest importance to direct his judgment. If a person possessed all the internal senses in perfection, without delicacy of passion, he could estimate the principal works of genius, only by their inferior qualities. In a tragedy, he might perceive whether descriptions of natural objects are beautiful or sublime, whether the characters are natural and well supported, whether the sentiments are just and noble; he might examine, with coldness and indifference, the beauties and the faults of the composition: but whether it has accomplished its main end, whether the fable is fit to produce pity and terror in the spectators, he must be totally at a loss to determine. In a word, he can have no relish for any thing that is addressed to the heart.

Delicacy of passion must be united with vigorous internal senses, in order to give taste its just extent. Where this union takes place, works of genius produce their
full effect; and inspire a complicated pleasure. A man receives adequate perceptions of all their qualities, and by this means, has it in his power to allow each its proper weight in determining his judgment concerning the merit of the whole. Delicacy of passion may interest a person so much, that he cannot for some time examine a performance with critical exactness; but it gives him exquisite delight in the meantime, and enables him to pass a just sentence at last.

SECT. II.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF JUDGMENT UPON TASTE.

The compleatest union of the internal senses, is not of itself sufficient to form good taste, even though they be attended with the greatest delicacy of passion. They must be aided with judgment, the faculty which distinguishes things different, separates truth from falsehood, and compares together objects and their qualities. Judgment must indeed accompany even their most imperfect exertions. They do not operate, till certain qualities in objects have been perceived, discriminated from others similar, compared and compounded. In all this judgment is employed: it bears a part in the discernment and production of every form that strikes them. But in assisting their perfect energies, it has a still more extensive influence. Good sense is an indispensable ingredient in true taste, which always implies a quick and accurate perception of things as they really are.
That judgment may compleatly exhibit to the internal senses, the beauties and excellencies of nature, it measures the amplitude of things, determines their proportions, and traces out their wise construction and beneficial tendency. It uses all the methods, which art and science indicate for discovering those qualities that lie too deep spontaneously to strike the eye. It investigates the laws and causes of the works of nature; it compares and contrasts them with the more imperfect works of art; and thus supplies materials, from which fancy may produce ideas and form combinations, that will strongly affect the mental taste.

Judgment finds out the general characters of each art, and by comparing them, draws conclusions concerning the relations, which subsist between different arts. Till it has discovered these, none of them can acquire that additional power of pleasing, which is imparted to them by their reciprocal connection.

In every art, a just performance consists of various parts, combined into one system, and subservient to one design. But without the exercise of judgment, we cannot know whether the design is skilfully prosecuted, whether the means are well adjusted to the end, whether every member which is introduced, has a tendency to promote it.

In music the ear immediately perceives the pleasure resulting from each principle: but judgment, assuming the perceptions of that organ, compares them, and by comparison determines their respective merit and due proportion. It enables the ear, from its discovery of the general relations, to distinguish with precision between invention and extravagance, to discern the suitableness or unsuitableness of the parts, and their fitness or unfitness to sustain the main subject.

In painting judgment discovers the meaning of the piece, not only remotely, as it is the instrument of that previous knowledge, which is necessary for understanding it; but also more immediately, as from the structure and relation of the parts it infers the general design, and explains their sub-
serviency to the main end of the whole. It compares the imitation with its exemplar, and sees its likeness. It is judgment working on our experience, that puts it in our power to know, whether the painter has fixed upon the attitudes and airs in nature appropriated to the passions, characters, and actions he would represent; and, when these attitudes are various, whether he has chosen those, which most perfectly correspond with the unity and propriety of his design. Painting being circumscribed to an instant of time, judgment alone can perceive, whether that instant is properly selected, whether the artist has pitched on that moment, which comprehends the circumstances most essential to the grand event, and best allows, without a deviation from simplicity, the indication of the other requisite circumstances. It estimates the due proportion of all the figures, in dignity, elegance, and lustre, and their due subordination to the principal. In fine, it is necessarily employed in that exhibition of the object to the senses, which must be previous to their perception of it.

In order to approve or condemn in poetry or eloquence, we must take into view at once, and compare so many particulars, that none can hesitate to acknowledge the absolute necessity of a sound and vigorous judgment. We must determine, whether the fable or design is well imagined in congruity to the species of the poem or discourse; whether all the incidents or arguments are natural members of it; which of them promotes its force or beauty, or which, by its want of connection, obstructs the end, or debilitates its genuine effect; what degree of relation is sufficient to introduce episodes, illustrations or digressions, so that they may appear, not excrescences and deformities, but suitable decorations. It is sense, which is pleased or displeased, when these things are determined: but judgment alone can determine them, and present to sense the object of its perception. By an accurate scrutiny of the various relations of the parts, judgment fixes that situation, in which they will appear with greatest advantage, and most promote that regular organization, on which both the ele-
gance and vigour of the whole depends. It compares characters with nature; and pronounces them either real, or monstrous. It compares them with other characters; and finds them good or bad in the kind, properly or improperly marked. It compares them with themselves; and discovers whether they are consistent or inconsistent, well or ill supported, whether their peculiar decorum is preserved or violated. Truth and justness is the foundation of every beauty in sentiment: It imparts to it that solidity, without which it may dazzle a vulgar eye, but can never please one who looks beyond the first appearance. And to ascertain truth, to unmask falsehood however artfully disguised, is the peculiar prerogative of judgment. The finest sentiments, if applied to subjects unsuitable, may not only lose their beauty, but even throw deformity upon the whole: and judgment alone perceives the fitness or unfitness of their application. This faculty arrogates also to itself, in some degree, the cognizance of style and language; and, by bringing it to the test of custom, discovers its propriety, purity, and elegance. Judgment, not satisfied with examining the separate parts, combines them and the feelings they produce, in order to estimate the merit of the whole. It settles the relative value of different poems and discourses, of the same or various kinds, by a studious and severe comparison of the dignity of their ends, the moment of their effects, the suitableness, difficulty, and ingenuity of the means employed.

Thus in all the operations of taste, judgment is employed; not only in presenting the subjects on which the senses exercise themselves; but also in comparing and weighing their perceptions and decrees, and thence passing ultimate sentence upon the whole.

But, though the reflex senses and judgment meet, yet, in a consistence with true taste, they may be united in very different proportions. In some, the acuteness of the senses, in others, the accuracy of judgment is the predominant ingredient. Both will determine justly, but they are guided by
different lights; the former, by the perception of sense, the latter, by the conviction of the understanding. One feels what pleases or displeases; the other knows what ought to gratify or disgust. Sense has a kind of instinctive infallibility, by means of which, when it is vigorous, it can preserve from error, though judgment should not be perfect. Judgment, by contemplating the qualities that affect taste, by surveying its sentiments in their causes, often makes amends for dullness of imagination. Where that prevails, one’s chief entertainment from works of genius lies in what he feels: where this is predominant, one enjoys principally the intellectual pleasure, which results from discovering the causes of his feelings. This diversity in the form and constitution of taste is very observable in two of the greatest critics of antiquity Longinus is justly characterized

An ardent judge, who, zealous in his trust,
With warmth gives sentence...........

In him the internal senses were exquisitely delicate; but his judgment, though
good, was not in proportion. On this account he delivers just sentiments, with rapture and enthusiasm, and, by a kind of contagion, infuses them into his readers, without always explaining to them the reason of their being so affected. Aristotle on the contrary appears to examine his subject, perfectly cool and unaffected; he discovers no warmth of imagination, no such admiration or extacy, as can, without reflection, transport his readers into his opinion. He derives his decisions, not from the liveliness of feeling, but from the depth of penetration, and seldom pronounces them, without convincing us they are just. Some degree of the same diversity may be remarked in Bouhours and Bossu among the moderns.
SECT. III.

TASTE IMPROVEABLE, HOW, AND IN WHAT RESPECTS.

BOTH reflex sense, and judgment, and its associate, are originally implanted in very different degrees, in different men. In some they are so weak and languid, that they scarce at all show themselves in many instances, and are incapable of a very high degree of improvement by any education, care, or exercise. In others, they are naturally vigorous, so that they spontaneously exert themselves on most occasions, determine with considerable accuracy, and perceive with wonderful acuteness. In the former the seeds of taste must, without the greatest culture, lie for ever latent and inactive: and to the latter, culture is far from being unnecessary; by means of it, the principles of taste may be improved, very much beyond their original perfection.*

* Il est certain que la nature ne fait pas toute seule un bel esprit. La plus heureuse naissance a besoin d'une bonne education, et de cet usage du monde, qui refine l'intelligence, et qui subtilise le bon sens. 4. Entret. d' Aристе et d'Eugene. This remark is as applicable to taste, as to any other ingredient in the idea expressed by the term bel esprit.

We are scarce possessed of any faculty of mind or body, that is not improveable. Even our external senses may be rendered more acute than they were at first. Persons accustomed to observe distant objects can descry them more readily than others. Touch often becomes much more exquisite in those, whose employment leads them to examine the polish of bodies, than it is in those who have no occasion for such examination. Use very much improves our quickness in distinguishing different flavours, and their compositions. But the internal senses may receive vastly greater alterations. The former are ultimate principles in human nature; and like the elemental parts, or fundamental laws of the material world, are in a great measure exempted from our power: the latter are derived and compounded faculties, liable to alteration from every change in that series or combination.
of causes, by which they are produced. The former are more directly subservient to our preservation than our pleasure; and therefore, like the vital motions, are almost entirely subjected to the wiser government of the author of our natures: the latter, though highly conducive to our well-being and entertainment, are not necessary to our being; and may, for this reason, without great hazard, be in a considerable degree entrusted to our own care, and made dependent for their perfection on the consequences of our own endeavours to regulate and improve them.

Taste very early begins to shew itself; but it is at first very rude, inaccurate and confined. It is gradually formed, and by slow steps advances towards excellence. Every exertion of it, if properly applied, wears off some defect, corrects some inaccuracy, strengthens some of its principles, or gives it a relish for some new object. Like all our other powers, it is subject to the law of habit, which is the grand, indeed the only, immediate means of improvement of every kind, extending its power to all our faculties, both of action and perception. Every expedient for cultivating either is but a particular species of use and exercise, which derives its efficacy solely from the force of custom. To the forming of taste, peculiar means are in their nature suited. The same qualities of the mind, which, by their operation, produce the reflex senses, will, by co-operating with habit, improve and exalt them. Whatever therefore usually excites these qualities, and draws them out into act, must be a means of cultivating taste. It grows by such congruous exercise, and always holds proportion to the natural vigour of its principles, the propriety and efficacy of the culture bestowed upon it, and the skill and diligence with which it is applied.

It is easy to trace the progress of taste in ourselves or others. Children discover the rudiments of it. They are passionately fond of every novelty; pleased with order and regularity in such simple instances as they can comprehend; delighted with a glow of colours; admirers of every form which they
think August: they perceive often to a surprising degree the harmony of sounds; are charmed with an appearance of ingenuity in their diversions; prone to imitate, and gratified by every effect of imitation which they are capable of observing: they are very quick in discerning oddity, and highly entertained with the discovery of it; and will hardly ever fail of passing a right judgment concerning characters, when these characters are exerted in a series of actions level to their understandings. But a small degree of excellence satisfies them; a false semblance of it is easily imposed on them for the true; any disguise misleads them. The daubing of a sign-post, the improbable tales of nurses, the unnatural adventures of chivalry, the harsh numbers of Grub-street rhyme, the grating notes of a strolling fiddler, the coarsest buffoonery, are sufficient to delight them. In some, for want of exercise and culture, the same grossness and contraction of taste continues always, or it is applied in a low, perverse, or whimsical manner. They may despise a relish for childish trifles; but themselves enter into important subjects, with as little relish as the merest children; or are perhaps delighted with other trifles, a very little different or superior in kind. Of dress or equipage, of the beauties of a tulip, of a shell, or a butterfly, they are accurate judges and high admirers. But the sublimity of nature, the ingenuity of art, the grace of painting, the charms of genuine poetry, the simplicity of pastoral, the boldness of the ode, the affecting incidents of tragedy, the just representation of comedy; these are subjects of which they understand nothing, of which they can form no judgment. Many who pretend to judge, having pursued a wrong track of study, or fixed an erroneous standard of merit, betray an uninformed, fantastical, or perverted relish. It is only in the few, who improve the rudiments of taste which nature has implanted, by culture well chosen, and judiciously applied, that taste at length appears in elegant form and just proportions.

Thus taste, like every other human excellence, is of a progressive nature; rising by various stages, from its seeds and elements to maturity; but like delicate plants, liable to be checked in its growth and killed,
or else to become crooked and distorted, by negligence or improper management.*

Goodness of taste lies in its maturity and perfection. It consists in certain excellencies of our original powers of judgment and imagination combined. These may be reduced to four, sensibility, refinement, correctness, and the proportion or comparative adjustment of its separate principles. All these must be in some considerable degree united, in order to form true taste. The person in whom they meet acquires authority and influence, and forms just decisions, which may be rejected by the caprice of some, but are sure to gain general acknowledgment. This excellence of taste supposes not only culture, but culture judiciously applied. Want of taste unavoidably springs from negligence; false taste from injudicious cultivation.

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* Le sentiment dont je parle est dans tous les hommes, mais comme ils n'ont pas tous les oreilles et les yeux également bons, de même ils n'ont pas tous le sentiment également parfait. Les uns l'ont meilleurs que les autres, ou bien parce que leurs organes sont naturellement mieux composés, ou bien parce qu'ils l'ont perfectionné par l'usage fréquent qu'ils en ont fait et par l'expérience. Reflex. Crit. sur la poésie et sur la peinture. Part ii. § 23.
the pursuits of gain, are perfect strangers to the satisfactions or uneasinesses of taste; they can scarce form any idea of them. *Addison* mentions a celebrated mathematician, who was so perfectly incapable of any impression from the charms of poetry, that he read the *Aeneid*, with no other satisfaction, than what he derived from a comparison of it, with a map of the travels of *Aeneas*.

Sensibility very much depends on the original construction of the mind; it being less than any other of the qualities of good taste improvable by use. The effect of habit on our perceptions is the very reverse of that which it produces on our active powers. It strengthens the latter, but gradually diminishes the vivacity of the former. Custom wears off the difficulty of conception, which renders new objects peculiarly agreeable or disagreeable. They come by repetition to enter the mind with so great facility, that they give no exercise to its faculties; and of consequence convey much less intense delight or uneasiness than at first. Hence it would seem to follow, that the more we are conversant with objects of taste, the less formidable our sentiments should be. And indeed the most unexperienced feel the most turbulent and violent pleasure or pain. Use renders both more reserved and castigated.

*For fools admire, but men of sense approve.*

But still we find in fact, that an extensive acquaintance with the beauties of art and nature heightens our relish for them. When we are accustomed to the study, we can survey no object with indifference; but receive higher pleasure or more pungent disgust, than those whose taste is wholly unimproved.

The following observations will account for this seeming paradox.

Were the same object, however excellent, to be continually presented to our taste, it must soon lose its charms; first becoming indifferent, and then disgusting, by the languor, which a continual identity of exercise would introduce. Hence no natural
scene, no production of art or genius can please us long, except every new survey discovers beauties unobserved before, or gives us additional assurance of its perfection. But the objects of taste are infinitely various. One who indulges it is continually changing his subjects, and feeling pleasures or pains really distinct, though in the highest degree analogous. He thus preserves a sort of novelty, which tends to keep up the original vivacity of his perceptions, and the continual employment of taste produces some effects, which compensate, nay, often overbalance the gradual decay of sensibility by repetition.

It is by enabling us to conceive objects with facility, that custom diminishes the strength of their impressions. But facility, if moderate, is a source of pleasure: it will therefore, by its immediate influence, for some time prevent our delight from being weakened. It also renders our conceptions, though less striking, yet more complete and accurate. A more perfect object is presented to the mind, than could be, previous to use: and its greater perfection may increase our approbation or dislike, as much as novelty did before: a performance often fails to please or disgust, merely because, having an adequate idea of its parts, we do not observe the qualities from which these sentiments should result. A person unskilled in poetry or painting will survey a work with perfect indifference, because he does not really see its beauties or its blemishes. But let these be pointed out to him, by one more knowing in the art; immediately he begins to approve or disapprove. Custom supplies the place of an external monitor, by enabling us to take in at one view a full perception of every quality, on which the excellence or faultiness depends.

It may be observed farther, that taste, being a faculty of a derivative kind, implies in its exertion mental actions, which are strengthened by use and exercise. And their improvement tends to support the delicacy and liveliness of its perceptions. Custom strengthens those principles and processes of thought, by which our reflex sen-
sations are produced; and the sensations must always bear some proportion to the vigour of their causes. The mind acquires a habit of enlarging itself into the sentiment of sublimity, by being accustomed to expand its faculties to the dimensions of a large object: by use, it becomes skilful in compounding uniformity with variety; in measuring proportion; in tracing out design; in judging of imitation; in blending heterogeneous qualities. This expertness gives force and boldness to the sentiments produced, and heightens the attendant consciousness of our own abilities.

Objects impress us more or less, according to the degree of attention, which we bestow upon them. Custom enables us to apply our minds more vigorously to objects, than we could at first. It is not only difficult to form a complete conception of new objects, but when they excite neither surprise nor curiosity, it is sometimes even difficult to attempt conceiving them, and to bring ourselves steadily to contemplate them. Custom wears off this indisposition; begets an aptitude and previous bias to the emotions, which beauty and deformity inspire; and thus renders us prone to their peculiar sentiments. Works of taste fall in with the predominant temper, and on that account easily engage the attention, affect deeply, and excite the liveliest perceptions. It is remarkable too, from whatever cause it proceeds, that we set a high value on what we have been long accustomed to. A man of taste places the pleasures of imagination in a higher class than other men are apt to do; he esteems them more noble and substantial: and the opinion acquired by custom, of their value and importance transposes itself into each gratification.

The sentiments of taste depend very much on association. So far as they proceed from this, custom must augment them, as custom, by adding a new principle of union, renders the connection more intimate, and introduces the related ideas more quickly and forcibly. Custom likewise begets new associations, and enables works of taste to suggest ideas, which were not origi-
nally connected with them: and what a surprising intenseness, the association of ideas, originally foreign, bestows on our perceptions, both pleasurable and painful, is obvious in too many instances to require being enlarged on.

By the concurrence of these causes, the sensibility of taste is even augmented, notwithstanding the tendency of habit to diminish it. Its gratification or disgust is often more exquisite, than any of the emotions which attend appetite and passion. It becomes so acute that the smallest beauties and blemishes have force sufficient to affect it. But though the vivacity of its perceptions should sometimes decay by repetition; yet custom producing the other perfections of taste, gives a refinement, elegance, and assurance to our sentiments, which may compensate their violence at first. Judgment may approve with greatest confidence and justice, when fancy is no longer enraptured and enthusiastically agitated.

Sensibility of taste arises chiefly from the structure of our internal senses, and is but indirectly and remotely connected with the soundness or improvement of judgment. The want of it is one ingredient in many sorts of false taste; but does not constitute so much one species of wrong taste, as a total deficiency or great weakness of taste. Sensibility may sometimes become excessive, and render us extravagant both in liking and disliking, in commending and blaming. But in truth, this extravagance proceeds much less commonly from excess of sensibility, than from a defect in the other requisites of fine taste; from an incapacity to distinguish and ascertain, with precision, different degrees of excellence or faultiness. Instead of forming an adequate idea of the nature of the beauty or deformity, we go beyond all bounds of moderation; and when we want to express our sentiments, can do it only in general terms, tumid and exaggerated. If we are displeased, we signify it, with the inveteracy of a Dennis, in terms of general invective; and without explaining the causes of our disapprobation, pronounce it poor, dull, wretched, execrable. If we are pleased, we cannot tell with what,
how, or why; but only declare it fine, incomparable, with the unmeaning rapture of an ancient rhapsodist, who without understanding the principles of art, or the sense of an author, like a madman, really agitated by the fury which the poets feigned, could recite or praise them with such vehemence as transported himself, and astonished his auditors.*

* From Plato's dialogue inscribed Io, we learn that there were men of this character, who travelled through Greece and contended at the public festivals. Their chief employment was, to repeat beautiful passages from the poets, particularly Homer, with a rapturous and enthusiastic pronunciation, as if they had an exquisite and warm perception of their excellence. It is probable that they also declaimed in praise of their favourite verses; this seems to be implied in the expressions, πετοντες διαλεγοντες, πετοντες ὁμοιον λέγοντες ευφωμεν, and is insinuated by the proof which Socrates produces of their ignorance of art, from the capacity of every real artist to distinguish beauties from faults, and to point them out in the works of any performer in the kind. Socrates proves, from the concessions of his antagonist, that neither did his sentiments proceed from true taste, from a vigorous perception of the beauties he recited, nor his encomiums from judgment, from a critical skill in the principles of beauty. He therefore, in his usual strain of irony, resolves both into an unaccountable agitation of spirit, proceeding either from madness or from inspiration; and with great humour compares the several muses to as many magnets. The muse inspires the poet, without any agency or knowledge of his; he, in the same manner conveys the inspiration to his rhapsodist, and he to his attentive hearers; just as the loadstone by its imperceptible and unaccountable influence, attracts a ring of iron, that a second, and that a third.
SECT. V.

OF REFINEMENT OF TASTE.

REFINEMENT or elegance, which, as well as sensibility, is included in the idea of delicacy, is another quality requisite for forming a perfect taste.

Taste is so deeply rooted in human nature, that none are pleased but with some degree of real excellence and beauty. But a very low degree will satisfy one who is acquainted with nothing higher. As we can form no simple idea, till its correspondent sensation has been first perceived; so, with respect to many of our ideas, we are confined to that precise degree, of which we have had experience, and cannot by any means enlarge them. Our thoughts can scarce be raised to a distinct conception of higher pleasure or pain, than we have actually felt. On this account real excellence, however low, will not only gratify, but fill the unimproved sense.* But knowledge of greater perfection in the kind produces nicety; makes our pleasure, when obtained, more elegant; but renders it more difficult to be obtained. Thespis in his cart no doubt charmed his cotemporaries, though his rude and imperfect representations would have afforded little entertainment to their politer successors, accustomed to the completer drama of Sophocles and Euripides. The coarse jests of Plautus, not only pleased the general taste, but gained the approbation of Cicero; and never lost their credit, till the politeness of a court produced a refinement in wit.

* Je ne comprends pas les bas peuple dans le public capable de prononcer sur les poèmes ou sur les tab-
and humour.* A very sorry ballad, or the wildest flights of ungoverned fancy are admired by the vulgar: but nothing inferior to the regular invention and masterly execution of Homer can fully satisfy a perfect taste. An indifferent tune on a bad instrument contents the many: but the imperfection or grossness of its harmony is intolerable to a fine ear.

Habit, as was observed, tends to diminish the sensibility of taste. From this, refinement in some degree proceeds. In proportion as our gratifications lose their intenseness by repetition, we become indifferent to the imperfect degrees of beauty, which fully satisfied us before. We are no longer touched with ordinary charms; but acquire a kind of avidity, which demands the utmost beauty and perfection. Wherever this is wanting, we feel a deficiency; we are unsatisfied and disappointed.

But refinement and elegance of taste is chiefly owing to the acquisition of knowledge, and the improvement of judgment.

Use must greatly promote it, though without any cultivation of our faculties, it should only store our memory with ideas of a variety of productions. For we should thus be able to compare our present object with others of the kind. And though men are well enough satisfied with indifferent performances in every art, while they are ignorant of better; yet no sooner do they become acquainted with what has superior merit, than they readily, of their own accord, give it the preference. And as comparison has a great influence on the mind, many things which might be tolerable, if viewed by themselves, will disgust, when set in competition with others. To one who has been little conversant in works of art or genius, that may wear the charm of novelty, and appear to have the merit of invention;

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* At vestri proavi Plautinos et numeros et Landavere sales; nimium patiender utrumque (Ne dica miratur) mirari: si modo ego et vos. Scimus inurbanum lepido seponere dictum. Hor. Ars. Poet. ver. 270.
which another discerns to be trite and common, or a mere servile copy. What has in itself some degree of sublimity or beauty, often appears mean or deformed by comparison with forms more august or graceful. The unexperienced will admire as the effect of prodigious skill, what one who is acquainted with more artful contrivance, or more ingenious imitation, censures as arrant bungling. To a taste refined, and by practice qualified for making comparisons, an inferior sort or degree of beauty appears a real and positive blemish.*

* An ingenious French critic well remarks the importance of being enabled to form comparisons, by having had opportunity of studying many excellent performances. "On ne parle pas de l'expression aussi bien que Pliny et les autres Ecrivains de l'Antiquité en ont parlé, quand on ne s'y connaît pas. D'ailleurs il faudrait que des statues, où il se trouve une expression aussi savante et aussi correcte que celle du Laocoon, du Rotateur, de la paix des Grecs rendissent les anciens connoissoirs et même difficiles sur l'expression. Les anciens qui, outre les statues que j'ai citées, avaient encore une infinité d'autres pieces de comparaison excellentes, ne pouvoient pas se tromper en jugeant de l'expression dans les tableaux, ni prendre

Habitual acquaintance with the objects of taste, not only thus supplies a stock of knowledge, but also wonderfully improves the judgment. There is none of our faculties, on which custom has a greater influence. Though at first it could only discover and distinguish the most obvious qualities of things, it may by exercise, acquire acuteness, sufficient to penetrate into such as are most latent, and to perceive such as are most delicate. At first it can take in only the simplest combinations of qualities or short trains of ideas: but by being often employed, it acquires enlargement; and is enabled to comprehend, to retain distinctly, and to compare with ease, the most complicated habitudes, and the largest and most intricate compositions of ideas. In consequence of culture, it discovers, in objects, qualities fit to operate on taste, which lie too deep for the observation of a novice; it can in-
vestigate the nicest and most complex perfe-
fictions, and lay open the most trivial faults.*  Hence what was at first censured as a fault, often on our taste becoming re-
ained, appears a beauty. When reason is weak, it loses itself in a long and intricate demonstration; it cannot retain the connection of the whole; it sees nothing but confusion; and obtains neither conviction nor delight. In like manner, in matters of taste, judgment when rude and unimprov-
ed, is bewildered amidst the complexity of its object, or lost in its obscurity; and by being baffled excites disgust. But as soon as custom has enabled it to surmount this difficulty, and enlarge its views, it excites high approbation of those beauties, which were formerly disrelished. As the most complicated reasonings become most enter-
taining, the most subtle excellencies produce the most refined approbation. Being re-

* Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in en-
menticia, quae nos non videmus? quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati?
Cic. Acad. Quest. lib. ii.

mote, and veiled, as it were, they give exercise to our faculties; and by drawing out the vigour of the mind, continue to please, when the grosser and more palpable qualities have entirely palled upon the sense. They are like those delicate flavours, which, though not so agreeable at first, please much longer than such as are too luscious, or too much stimulate the organ.* The profusion of ornament, bestowed on the parts, in Gothic structures, may please one who has not

* The truth of this observation Cicero, without assigning the cause, illustrates in a variety of instances, with regard both to taste and the external senses. "Difficile enim dictu est, quamam causa sit, cur ea, que maxime sensus nostros impellunt, voluptate, et specie prima acerrime commovent, ab iis celerrime fastidio quodam, et satietate abalianemur. Quanto colorum pulchritudine, et varietate floridiora sunt in picturis novis pleraque, quam in veteribus? quas tamen etiam, si primo aspectu nos ceperunt, diutius non delectant: cum idem nos in antiquis tabulis illo ipso horrido obsoletoque teneamur. Quanto meliores sunt, et delicatiores in cantu flexiones, et falsae voculce, quam certae et severae? quibus tamen non modo austeri, sed, si saepius sunt, multitudo ipsa reclamat. Licet hoc videre in reliquis sensibus, uungulectis minus diu nos
acquired enlargement of mind, sufficient for conceiving at one view their relation to the whole; but no sooner is this acquired, than he perceives superior elegance in the more simple symmetry and proportion of Grecian architecture. Italian music gives small delight at first; but when once the ear is opened to take in the complexity of its harmony, and the delicate relations of discords, introduced with skilful preparations and resolutions, it then gives exquisite delight. The same may be observed of the refinements of poetry and eloquence, of wit and humour. The copious and varied declamation of Cicero will make a quicker delectari, summa et acerrima suavitate conditis, quam his moderatis: et magis laudari quod terram, quam quod crocum olere vidiatur. In ipso tactu esse modum et mollitudinis et levitatis. Quinetiam gustatus, qui est sensus ex omnibus maxime voluptarius, quippe dulcitudine præter ceteros sensus commovetur; quam cito id, quod valde dulce est, aspernatur ac respuit? quis potione uti, aut cibo dulci diutius potest? cum utroque in genere ea, quæ leviter sensum voluptate moveant, facillime fugiant satietatem. Sic omnibus in rebus, voluptatibus maximis fastidium finitimum est.”

Cic. de Orat. lib. iii.

impression, than the simple, nervous eloquence of Demosthenes; but this gives the highest and most durable satisfaction to a fine taste. The polite and knowing are chiefly touched with those delicacies, which would escape the notice of a vulgar eye.

It is possible to acquire so great refinement, especially when taste is accompanied with genius, that we conceive an idea a standard of higher excellence, than was ever in fact produced; and measuring the effects of art, by this absolute and exalted form, we always miss some part of that immensity, which we have figured out to ourselves.* Lionardi da Vinci is said to have

* M. Antonius...disertos ait se vidisse multos, eloquentem omnino neminem. Insidiebat videlicet in eis mente species eloquentiae, quam cernebat animo, re ipsa non videbat.....Multa et in se, et in aliis desiderans, neminem plane qui recte appellari eloquens posset videbat....Habuit perfecto comprehensam animo quandam formam eloquenti, cui quoniam nihil debeat, eos, quibus aliquid, aut plura debeat, in eam formam non poterat includere.......Ipse Demosthenes, quamquam unus eminest inter omnes in omni genere dicendi, ta-
conceived so high a standard of perfection, that from despair of reaching it in the execution, he left many of his pictures unfinished. When imagination is inflamed and elevated by the perfection exhibited to it, it goes on of its own accord to fancy completer effects than artists have found means actually to produce; by reason of some unliableness in the materials employed, the execution seems always to fall short of our conception. No performer can excel in every thing: each is characterized by some predominant talent. The particular excellence of one enables us to discern the faultiness of another. And by combining the virtues that are dispersed among the different masters, into one image; as Zeuxis produced an Helen, by selecting from many beautiful virgins, the parts that were in each most beautiful;* we form in our minds a model of perfection, the parts of which, though taken from different originals, are rendered consistent, by the skill with which they are articulated. A man of genius possessed of so sublime a standard, endued with such exquisite refinement of taste, in whatever art he practises, will represent his objects, not merely as they are, but like Sophocles, as they ought to be.* A taste thus refined, will not capriciously reject whatever it perceives to be deficient:

* Nam neque chorda sonum reddit, quem volt manus et mens;  
Nec semper feriet, quodcunque minabitur arcus.

But it can be satisfied and filled, only with the highest perfection that is practicable.

* Indeed the great masters in every art imitate, not so much individual nature, as a sublimer standard, which exists only in their own conceptions. This Aristotle observes in poetry, παντὸς ποιητῆς ἔφοβος. The same is true of painting. See above, Part 1. Sec. 4. This subject is explained with equal solidity and elegance, by the author of A Commentary and Notes on Horace's epistle to the Pisonis. Note on ver. 317.
Refinement of taste exists only, where, to an original delicacy of imagination, and natural acuteness of judgment, is superadded a long and intimate acquaintance with the best performances of every kind. None should be studied, but such as have real excellence; and those are chiefly to be dwelt upon, which display new beauties on every review. The most conspicuous virtues will be at first perceived. Farther application will discover such as lie too deep to strike a superficial eye; especially if we aid our own acuteness by the observations of those, whose superior penetration or more accurate study has produced a genuine subtlety of taste. An able master, or an ingenious critic will point out to a novice, many qualities in the compositions of genius, or the productions of art, which, without such assistance, would have long, perhaps always, remained undiscovered by him. And repeated discoveries of this kind, made either by one's own sagacity, or by the indication of others, beget in time an habitual refinement, a capacity of making similar ones, with facility and quickness.

Where refinement is wanting, taste must be coarse and vulgar. It can take notice only of the grosser beauties; and is disgusted only with the most shocking faults. The thinnest disguise, the least depth is sufficient to elude its scrutiny. It is insensible to the delicacies of art and nature: they are too fine, and make too slight an impression to be observed. As savages can be touched with nothing, but what excites the utmost extravagance of passion, so a gross and barbarous taste can relish nothing that is not either palpable or overdone. Chaste beauties it has not acuteness to perceive; complex ones it has not force enough to comprehend. Looking only to the surface, it often approves what is really faulty or defective, and is indifferent to what possesses the utmost elegance. Its decisions are, of consequence, disproportioned to the real merit of the objects: the most glaring, the least artificial performances are sure to gain the preference. It has been often remarked, that a certain grossness and want of refinement in the English taste, allows, and even demands a boldness, a grossness, and inde-
licacy in their theatrical entertainments, which would be intolerable to the elegant taste of a French audience.

But, an excessive or false refinement, is equally to be avoided.* It is like a weakly constitution, which is disordered by the minutest accident; or like a distempered stomach, which nauseates every thing. It is a capriciousness of mind, which begets an habit of constantly prying into qualities that are remote, of discovering imaginary delicacies, or faults which none else can perceive; while one is blind to what lies perfectly open to his view; like the old philosopher, who was so intent on the contemplation of the heavens, that he could not see the pit that had been dug directly in his way. Or it is a minuteness of taste, which

* True taste is a proper medium betwixt these extremes. "Ce discernement fait connoître les choses telles qu’elles sont en elles-mêmes, sans qu’on demeure court, comme le peuple, qui s’arrête à la superficie; ni aussi sans qu’on aille trop loin, comme ces esprits rafinez, qui a force de subtiliser s’évaporent en des imaginations vaines et chimeriques." Entret. iv. d’ Arist.

leads one to seek after and approve trifling excellencies, or to avoid and condemn incon siderable negligencies; a scrupulous regard to which is unworthy of true genius. Or it is a fastidiousness of judgment, which will allow no merit to what has not the greatest, will bear no mediocrity or imperfection; but with a kind of malice, represents every blemish as inexpiable.

This depravity of taste has led many authors, studious of delicacy, to substitute subtlety and unnatural affectation* in its stead. The younger Pliny says, "The Gods took Nerva from the earth, when he had adopted Trajan, lest he should do any action of an ordinary nature, after this divine and immortal deed. For this noble work deserved the honour of being the

* Quintilian marks strongly some features of this vicious refinement, as it appeared among the orators of his time. "Tum demum ingeniosi scilicet, si ad intelligendos nos opus sit ingenio.....Nos melius, quisbus sordent omnia quæ natura dictavit; qui non ornamenta querimus, sed lenocinia." Inst. Orat. lib. viii. proem.
"last action of his life, that the author of
"it being immediately deified, posterity
"might be left in doubt, whether he was
"not really a god, when he performed it."*
This is mere subtlety, not true refinement;
for it has no solidity. Seneca, aiming con-
stantly at elegance, corrupted the Roman
elocution, by introducing a childish pretti-
ness, a profusion of antithesis and point.†
When poetry and eloquence are brought to
perfection, the next generation, desiring to
excel their predecessors, and unable to reach
their end by keeping in the road of truth
and nature, are tempted to turn aside into
unbeaten tracks of nicety and affectation.
The novelty catches and infects the general

* Dii ccelo vindicaverunt, ne quid post illum divi-
num, et immortale factum, mortale faceret. Debere
quippe maximo operi hanc venerationem, ut novissi-
mum esset, auctoremque ejus statim consecrandum,
ut quandoque inter posteros quareretur, ad illud jam

† This censure is passed on him by an unquestion-
able judge. "In eloquendo corrupta pleraque, atque
eo perniciosissima, quod abundant dulcisius vitius."

taste. By its standard the simplest and the
correctest authors are canvassed, secret mean-
ings, artful allegories, distant allusions, and
the like fanciful qualities are discovered and
applauded, where they never were intended.
Homer compares Menelaus, exulting at the
sight of Paris, when advancing to engage
him in a single combat, to a hungry lion,
when he seizes a deer or a wild goat.* This
similitude strongly and beautifully expresses
the courage and alacrity, with which he met
his rival. But this does not satisfy some of
his scholiasts. They will have Paris com-
pared to a goat for his incontinence, and to
a deer for his cowardice, and his love of
music. In Jupiter’s golden chain,† some
have discovered an emblem of the excellence
of absolute monarchy; and in Agamemnon’s
cutting off the head and hands of Antima-
chus’s son,‡ have imagined an allusion to
the crime of the father, who had proposed
to lay hands on the ambassadors that de-
manded the return of Helen, and from whose
head the advice to detain her had proceeded.

* I. xii. 1. ver. 21. † Ia. 9. ‡ Ia. 11.
False refinement dislikes on grounds equally chimerical and inadequate as those which procure its approbation. The delicacy of *Aristarchus* was so much shocked with *Phœnix’s* horrible intention of murdering his father in the extravagance of his rage, that he cancelled the lines in which it is, with great propriety, related, on purpose to represent to Achilles the fatal mischiefs that spring from ungoverned fury and resentment.* The nicety of *Rymer* is disgusted with the cunning and villany of *Iago*, as unnatural and absurd, soldiers being commonly described with openness and honesty of character.† To critics of this class, *Homer’s* low similitudes and simple manners, or *Shakespear’s* irregularities and unharmo-nious numbers, are intolerable faults.

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* I. l. ver. 460. Τὸ μὲν ἐγὼ βλέπων, x. v. λ. This nicety *Plutarch* justly censures, as capricious and ill applied, 'Ο μὲν ἀριστοχρόνος ἔξελε πάντα τὰ ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς τῶν καιρῶν ὀφθαλμοῖς, τὸ φοίνικος τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως διδάσκοντος, εὐν ἦν ἄρα καὶ ὁ σωσία ἐνθέως τοιχώματι, μὴ χερσόμενος λογισμῷ, μὴν πενθόμειν τοῖς παρηγορηταῖς. Πάντα δὲ τὸ νῦν ποταμάτων ἀκρόν.

† See *Rymer’s View of Tragedy*, chap. vii.

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False delicacy in critics may in some measure proceed from an excessive sensibility of taste, or subtlety of judgment indulged without distinction or reserve. But most commonly, it is the offspring of vanity and ignorance. Pride leads us to affect a refinement, which we have not. We know not in what real excellence consists; we therefore fix some partial or whimsical standard, and judging by it, run into false elegance, and capricious nicety. True taste penetrates into all the qualities of its objects, and is warmly affected with whatever it perceives. Its mimic, false refinement, fearful lest any thing should escape its notice, imagines qualities which have no existence, and is extravagantly touched with the chimeras of its own creation.
SECT. VI.

OF CORRECTNESS OF TASTE.

SENSIBILITY disposes us to be strongly affected with whatever beauties or faults we perceive. Refinement makes us capable of discovering both, even when they are not obvious. Correctness must be superadded, that we may not be imposed upon by false appearances; that we may neither approve shining faults, nor condemn chaste virtues; but be able to assign to every quality its due proportion of merit or demerit.

Correctness of taste preserves us from approving or disapproving any objects, but such as possess the qualities, which render them really laudable or blameable; and enables us to distinguish these qualities with accuracy from others, however similar, and to see through the most artful disguise that can be thrown upon them. Though we never approve, or disapprove, when those characters, which are the natural grounds of either, are known to be wanting; yet we often embrace a cloud for Juno, we mistake the semblance for the substance, and in imagination, attribute characters to objects to which they do not in fact belong. And then, though merely fictitious, they have as real an effect upon our sentiments, as if they were genuine: just as the chimerical connection between spirits and darkness, which prejudice has established in some, produces as great terror, as if they were in nature constantly conjoined.

Every excellence is a middle between two extremes, one of which always bears some likeness to it, and is apt to be confused with it. The right and the wrong are not separated by an unconnected boundary. Like day and night they run insensibly into one another: and it is often hard to fix the precise point, where one ends and the other begins. In attempting it, the unskilful may readily misapply their censure or their praise. In every art sublimity is mimicked by prodigious forms, empty swelling, and unnatural exaggeration.

Dum vitat humum, nubes et inania captat.
Some of Homer's images, admired by Longinus as eminently great, less judicious critics have, notwithstanding his authority, arraigned as monstrous and tumid: and many passages, which he rejects, would have given no offence to a judge of less correctness: he condemns as extravagantly hyperbolical the image used by an orator to express the stupidity of the Athenians, "that they carried their brains in the soles of their feet;" which yet Hermogenes, a critic of considerable accuracy, approves. The former of these critics charges Gorgias with the tumid for calling vultures "living sepulchres;" and the latter thinks the author worthy of such a sepulchre, for

* Such as his description of discord, already taken notice of, which is highly blamed by Scaliger, Poet. l. v. c. 3.

† This sentiment is ascribed by some to Demosthenes, by others to his colleague Hegesippus. It is blamed by Longinus περὶ δ. τμ. ά. But Hermogenes περὶ θεῶν, τμ. ά. κεφ. 5', admits it as a genuine beauty.

† ταύτα καὶ τὰ τῆς Λεωτίνου Δαργίου ηκάτακα γράφοντες, γάρ τις ἐμίσχυν τάφων. Αὐτῇ περὶ οὗ ὁ Φίλων τμ. γ'.

* Τάδε τοι γὰρ ἔμφυθεν τοις τρόποις λέγοντα, αὐτὴ τε οὐκ ἐμίσχυν αξιοῦ. ΕΡΜΟΝ. περὶ διήθ. τμ. ά. κεφ. 6.

† Je doute qu'elle déplût aux poètes de notre siècle, et elle ne serait pas en effet si condamnable dans le ver. Boileau Remarq., sur Longin. Bouhours, La Man. de bien penser. Dial. 3.
and copiousness; languor and softness; enervation and perspicuity: or to distinguish the formal from the solemn; the excessive from the bold and masterly, or the stiff and insipid from the correct. Protogenes is said to have dispirited his pictures, by extreme care to obtain correctness; for which he is censured by Apelles, as not knowing when to give over.* Cicero himself records and approves many turns of wit, which to a modern taste appears low or coarse; many of the ornaments which he recommends to an orator, would pass with us for mere pun and quibble. In the extremes, affectation and frigidity are very different from wit, distortion of thought or illiberal buffoonery from humour; and scurrility or invective from genuine ridicule: but there are particular instances, which very good judges may hesitate, before they can assign them to one species or the other. Beauties and blemishes often so far resemble in their general appearance, that an imperfect taste may readily confound them; approving where it should condemn, or blaming what merits praise. It is only a well cultivated taste, implying vigorous judgment, sharpened by exercise, that can in every case pull off the mask, and certainly distinguish them.

Custom enables us to form ideas with exactness and precision. By studying works of taste, we acquire clear and distinct conceptions of those qualities, which render them beautiful or deformed: we take in at one glance all the essential properties; and thus establish in the mind a criterion, a touchstone of excellence and depravity. Judgment also becomes skilful by exercise, in determining, whether the object under consideration perfectly agrees with this mental standard. While it is unaccustomed to a subject, it may, through its own imbecillity, and for want of clear ideas of the characters of the kind, mistake resemblance for identity; or at least be unable to distinquish

* Cum Protogenis opus, immensi laboris et cura, supra modum anxie miraretur, dixit omnia sibi cum illo paria esse, aut illi meliora; sed uno se præstare, quod manum ille de tabula nesciret tollere; memorabili præcepto, nocere sæpe nimium diligentiam. Plin. Hist. Nat. lib. xxxv. cap. 10.
guish them, without laborious application of thought, frequent trials, and great hazard of error. But when use has rendered any species of exertion familiar, it easily and infallibly discriminates, wherever there is the minutest difference. We grow so well acquainted with every form, and have ideas so perfectly adequate, that we are secure against mistake, when sufficient attention is bestowed. The real qualities of things are presented to taste pure and unmixed, in their genuine features and proportions, and excite sentiments entirely congruous.

Justness of taste extends still farther, than to the distinction of counterfeit for real. We can compare the sentiments produced, and discover readily the different classes, to which they belong. We not only feel in general that we are pleased, but perceive in what particular manner; not only discern that there is some merit, but also of what determinate kind that merit is. Though all the sensations of taste are, in the highest degree, analogous and similar; yet each has its peculiar feeling, its specific form, by which one who has a distinct idea of it, and possesses exactness of judgment, may mark its difference from the others. It is this which bestows precision and order on our sentiments. Without it they would be a mere confused chaos: we should, like persons in a mist, see something, but could not tell what we saw. Every good or bad quality, in the works of art or genius would be a mere je ne sais quoi.

As a correct taste distinguishes the kinds, it also measures the degrees of excellence and faultiness. Every one is conscious of the degree of approbation or dislike, which he bestows on objects. But sometimes the ideas we retain of these sensations are so obscure, or our comparing faculty is so imperfect, that we only know in general, that one gratification is higher or more intense than another; but cannot settle their proportion, nor even perceive the excess, except it be considerable. We are often better pleased at first with superficial glitter or gaudy beauty, which, having no solidity, become on examination insipid or distaste-
ful, than with substantial merit, which will stand the test of reiterated scrutiny;

Te capiet magis;........
Judicis argutum que non formidat acumen;

But as the perceptions of an improved taste are always adequate to the merit of the objects; so an accurate judgment is sensible, on comparison, of the least diversity in the degree of the pleasure or pain produced. And if we have ascertained those qualities, which are the causes of our sentiments, reflection on the degrees of them, which things possess, will help to regulate our decision, and prevent our being imposed upon by any ambiguity in our feelings; giving us both an exacter standard, and an additional security against judging wrong.

The accuracy of taste may become so exquisite, that it shall not only discriminate the different kinds and degree of gratification; but also mark the least varieties in the manner of producing it. It is this accuracy, habitually applied to works of taste, that lays a foundation for our discovering the peculiar character and manner of different masters. A capacity for this, as it implies the nicest exactness, is justly assigned as an infallible proof of real and well improved taste.

Incorrectness of taste may arise, either from the dullness of our internal senses, or from the debility of judgment. The former renders our sentiments obscure and ill defined, and therefore difficult to be compared. The latter incapacitates us for perceiving the relations even of the clearest perceptions, or the most distinguishable qualities. In either case, the mind is distracted with suspense and doubt. This is an uneasy state, from which we are desirous to extricate ourselves, by any means. If we have not vigour of taste enough, to determine the merit of the object, by its intrinsic characters, we take up with any standard, however foreign or improper, that can end our wavering. Authority in all its forms usurps the place of truth and reason. The usage
of an admired genius will procure approba-
tion even to faults, from one whose taste is
languid. He is unable readily to detect
them; and their being committed by so great
a master, and intermixed with many beaut-
ties, will keep him from even suspecting
that they can be wrong; and consequently
prevent his scrutiny. Like the spots of the
sun, which cannot be discovered by the na-
ked eye, the faults of an eminent genius re-
quire something more to enable us to discern
them, than the elements of taste which na-
ture bestows: till these are invigorated by
culture, they will disappear in the general
splendor. The genius of Shakespear
may betray an unformed taste into an approba-
tion of the barbarities, which are often
mingled with his beauties. The wits of king
Charles's court are said to have allowed Cow-
ley an undistinguished admiration. One
may be too much pleased with Congreve's
wit, to remark its incongruity to the char-
acters to which it is ascribed. The venerate-
ration we have for antiquity, aided by the
show of learning, which acquaintance with
it implies, and by the malignant joy, which
envy feels in depreciating cotemporaries,
often stamps a value on its productions, dis-
proportioned to their intrinsic merit:

Et nisi qua terris semota, suisque
Temporibus defuncta videt, fastidit et odi.

The opinion and example of others often
recommends to us, what is fashionable or
new, without our taking the pains to exa-
mine it. And their opinion is often not
founded on judgment, but dictated by in-
terest, friendship, enmity or party spirit.
Every period of time has produced bubbles
of artificial fame, which are kept up a while
by the breath of fashion, and then break at
once and are annihilated. The learned often
bewail the loss of ancient writers, whose
characters have survived their works; but,
perhaps, if we could retrieve them, we
should find them only the Granvilles, Mon-
tagues, Stepneys, and Sheffields of their time,
and wonder by what infatuation or caprice
they could be raised to notice.* False or

* Rambler, No. 106.
imperfect rules, either established by ourselves, or implicitly received from others, may corrupt or constrain our taste, and render our decisions unjust. Had criticism in its infancy fallen into the hands of one, in judgment and penetration, inferior to Aristotle, a number of precarious and unnatural rules might have long obtained an undisputed authority. A prevailing turn and disposition of mind often makes us unable to relish any thing, but what falls in with it, and thus perverts and prejudices our judgment. Hence generally proceeds the depravity of public taste, and the pernicious influence it has on public entertainments and dramatic works: and hence, in a great measure, the connection of the taste of a people with their morals.

These corruptions of taste can be avoided only by establishing within ourselves an exact standard of intrinsic excellence, by which we may try whatever is presented to us. It will be established by the careful study of the most correct performances of every kind, which are generally indeed the most excellent. But though they should only rise to mediocrity, they are fitter for laying the foundation of correctness, than such as are far superior on the whole, but faulty in some particulars: for the greater the beauties, the reader are the faults to debauch the taste. Till it is formed, and has acquired considerable vigour, it is dangerous to be much conversant with those productions, the virtues of which are eminent, but blended with many faults. The chief utility of criticism lies in promoting correctness of taste. In the most imperfect essays, the authority of the critic will, at least excite our attention, and provoke our enquiry. But every one who really merits the name conveys much more momentous instruction, and more effectually teaches justness of thinking, by explaining the kind and degree of every excellence and blemish, by teaching us what are the qualities in things, to which we owe our pleasure or disgust, and what the principles of human nature, by which they are produced.
Care however must be taken to preserve our taste unconstrained though exact, to avoid that scrupulous formality, often substituted for true correctness, which will allow no deviation from established rules. To disapprove a transgression of a general law, when the spirit is observed, and when the end is, perhaps more effectually promoted, is not justness, but servility and narrowness of taste. Who will dislike the landscapes of Poussin, though he has disregarded correctness of drawing in his animals? Parmegiano is said by good judges to owe the inexplicable greatness of manner in his pictures, to the neglect of just proportion in some of the members of his figures. A contracted taste is chiefly incident to those, who would supply the want of natural talents, by the drudgery of application. But in every thing, the finical is essentially different from the neat, the exact from the precise, the regular from the formal.

SECT. VII.

OF THE DUE PROPORTION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF TASTE.

The last finishing and complete improvement of taste results from the due proportion of its several principles, and the regular adjustment of all its sentiments, according to their genuine value; so that none of them may engross our minds, and render us insensible to the rest. This is justness and correctness, not confined to the parts of objects, but extended to the whole. Taste is not one simple power; but an aggregate of many, which, by the resemblance of their energies, and the analogy of their subjects and causes, readily associate and are combined. But every combination of them will not produce a perfect taste. In all compositions, some proportion of the ingredients must be preserved. A sufficient number of members, all separately regular and well formed, if either they be not of a piece with one another, or be in the organization improperly
placed, will produce, not a comely and consistent animal, but an incongruous monster. In like manner, if our internal powers are disproportioned to one another, or not duly subordinated in their conjunction, we may judge well enough of some parts, or of particular subjects, but our taste will be upon the whole distorted and irregular.

As an overgrown member, by drawing the nourishment from the rest, makes them weak and puny; so one of the principles of taste may, by its too great strength, detract from the natural force and operation of the others; and by attaching us entirely to its own gratifications, render us too little sensible of theirs, though perhaps equally or more important. If, through an excessive liveliness of imagination, our sentiments of excellence and deformity are too violent, they will so transport us, as to prevent judgment from scrutinizing and comparing them: our taste may be sensible and feeling, but will be incorrect. A mind over fond of sublimity, will despise the less elevated pleasure which results from elegance and beauty. On the other hand, a soul devoted to the soft impressions of beauty is unable to expand itself into the conception of sublimity. A prevailing relish for the new, the witty, the humourous, will render every thing insipid, which has not, or cannot, suitably to its nature, have these qualities.*

* Le poète dont le talent principal est de rimer richement, se trouve bientôt prévenu que tout poème dont les rimes sont négligées ne sauroit être qu'un ouvrage médiocre, quoi qu'il soit rempli d'invention, et de ces pensées tellement convenables au sujet, qu'on est surpris qu'elles soient neuves. Comme son talent n'est pas pour l'invention, ces beautés ne sont que d'un faible poids dans sa balance. Un peintre qui de tous les talents nécessaires pour former le grand artisan, n'a que celui de bien colorer, décide qu'un tableau est excellent, ou qu'il ne vaut rien en général, suivant que l'ouvrier a su manier la couleur. La poésie du tableau est comptée pour peu de chose, pour rien même dans son jugement. Il fait sa décision sans aucun égard aux parties de l'art qu'il n'a point. Un poète en peinture tombera dans la même erreur, en plaçant au dessous du médiocre, le tableau que manquerait dans l'ordonnance et dont les expressions seront basses, mais dont le coloris mériterait d'être admiré.

The want of due proportion is one of the most fertile causes of false taste; and one of the most common sources of that variety of forms and modifications, which true taste assumes in different persons. Every one has a predominant turn of genius and taste, by which his relish is more adapted to some one species of excellence, than to others. This is inevitable on account of the diversities incident to men, in the natural bent of their temper and passions; which always renders them peculiarly accessible to some kinds of gratification or disgust. According as the sublime or the humble passions, the grave or the lively, are predominant in the structure of the soul, our relish will be keenest for the grand or the elegant, the serious or the ludicrous. In this manner, the necessary imperfection of human nature prevents our ever being able to establish a proportion and economy of our internal senses, nicely accurate in every respect. A small disproportion is not censured, because it is natural: but when it exceeds certain bounds, it is acknowledged to degenerate into a partial and distorted form. This distortion is not, however, so much owing to the original excess of one principle, as to other causes. *That* lays the foundation of it; but these augment the natural inequality, and render it more observable. The principal of these causes is a narrowness of mind, by reason of which, we cannot comprehend many perceptions at once, without confusion, nor trace out their relations, and ascertain their respective moment, without distraction and perplexity. We fix upon a part, we are engrossed by the separate sentiment which it excites, we are blind to the nature of the other parts, or at least, cannot extend our thoughts so far, as to combine them all into one conception. A due proportion of the principles of taste presupposes the correctness of each, and includes, additional to it, an enlargement and comprehension of mind.

That it may be acquired, all the internal senses must be equally exercised. If, by accidental disuse or perversion, any of them has fallen below its proper tone, it must, by particular attention, be again wound up to it.
Habitual exercise promotes an harmonious subordination of the principles of taste, by producing a large compass of thought. It renders ideas and sensations so determinate and familiar, that the largest collections of them find room to lie distinctly exposed to the mental eye; and at the same time strengthens judgment to such a pitch, that it can view with ease the most complicated subjects, and decide with accuracy concerning them. Till this enlargement and extensive amplitude of taste is once acquired, our determinations must be essentially defective. Every part has a whole for its object: the contrivance, disposition, and expression of this is its main requisite: the merit of the parts arises, not so much from their separate elegance and finishing, as from their relations to the subject: and therefore, no true judgment can be formed, even of a part, without a capacity of comprehending the whole at once, and estimating all its various qualities.

Though pleasure and pain are counterparts in taste, our sense of them may be proportioned and unequal. If uneasy and gloomy passions preponderate in the constitution, and form the prevailing temper, they produce a superior proneness to sentiments of disapprobation and dislike. The cheerful and pleasurable affections, on the other hand, diffuse a tincture over all our powers, which makes us much more susceptible of admiration, than of its opposite. This inequality is frequently destructive of true taste. A perfect and faultless performance is not to be expected in any art. Our gratification must in every case be balanced against disgust, beauties against blemishes, before we have compared and measured them, we can form no judgment of the work. For want of the quickness and compass of thought requisite for this, or of inclination to employ it, we often err in our decisions. Excellencies and faults are sometimes united in the same part. A member may be so elegantly finished, as to gain the applause of the unskilful; but so unsuitable to its place, so prejudicial to the unity and effect of the whole, as to deserve the severest censure. But in every performance, beauties and blemishes
are to be found in different parts. A contracted mind fixes on one or the other. It is related of *Apollodorus*, an ancient painter, that he destroyed his finest pictures, if he could discover in them any, even the minutest fault. Some critics, as if possessed with the same frantic spirit, will condemn a thousand beauties of the highest rank, on account of a few intermingled faults, which bear no proportion to them, and do not perhaps at all affect the whole. On the contrary, the merit of a single part will strike a more candid judge so strongly, as to make him overlook multitudes of faults, which infinitely overbalance it.

But a person of true taste forms his judgment only from the surplus of merit, after an accurate comparison of the perfections and the faults. And indeed the greatest critics* allow the chief merit, not to the greater number, but to the higher rank of

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* This subject is professedly examined by *Longinus*, *ταϊ ἔργα, τοπ. λύ...λυ.*

beauties; not to that *precision* and constant attention to every trifle, which produces a cold and languid mediocrity, but to that noble *boldness* of genius, which rises to the height of excellence, with a kind of supernatural ardor, that makes it negligent with regard to numberless *minutiae*; in fine, not to that *faultless* insipidity, which escapes our blame, but to that daring *exaltation*, which, however shaded by inaccuracies, or even debased by the mixture of gross transgressions, forces our admiration. *Demosthenes* has been justly preferred to *Hyperides*, *Archilochus* to *Eratosthenes*, and *Pindar* to *Bacchylides*. A man should justly expose himself to a suspicion of bad taste, who approved a faultless, uninteresting tragedy, more than *Othello* or *King Lear*; or who gave *Waller* greater applause than *Dryden*. *Titian* has been blamed for incorrectness of design; but he will ever hold a rank among painters, far superior to *Andrea del Sarto*, who finished all his drawings with the most scrupulous care and diligence. Where eminent merit
is found, real taste disdains the malignant pleasure of prying into faults.*

.....Ubi plura nitent...........non ego paucis
Offendar maculis, quas aut incuria fudit,
Aut humana parum cavit natura..........}

Thus we have explained the manner in which the principles of taste must be confined, to form its just extent; and the finishing it must receive in order to its perfection. As it necessarily includes both judgment and all the reflex senses, so it must by culture, be improved in sensibility, refinement, correctness, and the due proportion of all its parts. In whatever degree any of these qualities are wanting, in the same, taste must be imperfect. Could any critic unite them all in a great degree, to his sentiments we might appeal, as to an unerring standard of merit, in all the productions of the fine arts.


The nearer one comes to a complete union of these qualities of taste, the higher authority will his decisions justly claim. But when none of them is wanting, a peculiar predominance of one will by no means vitiate taste. They are so analogous, that an eminent degree of one will supply the place of another, and in some measure produce the same effect: or rather, perhaps, one cannot exist in full perfection, without implying all the rest, at least in an inferior degree. Longins, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Aristotle, all possessed fine taste. But it will scarce be denied, that the first peculiarly excelled in sensibility, the second in refinement, and the last in correctness and enlargement. There is none of the ancients, in whom all the four appear to have been more equally, or in a higher degree, combined, than in Quintilian.

Before we conclude our researches, it will not be amiss to explain the place, which taste holds among our faculties; and to point out its genuine province, and real importance.
PART III.

THE PROVINCE AND IMPORTANCE OF TASTE.

SECT. I.

HOW FAR TASTE DEPENDS ON THE IMAGINATION.

It has been observed above, that those internal senses, from which taste is formed, are commonly referred to the imagination; which is considered as holding a middle rank between the bodily senses, and the rational and moral faculties.

It must be owned that the vulgar divisions of our faculties are generally superficial and inaccurate. Our mental operations, though of all things the most intimately present to us, are of such a subtle and transitory nature, that, when they are reflected on, they in a great measure elude our view, and their limits and distinctions appear involved in obscurity and confusion. The common distribution of our most ob-
vious powers, our external senses, is acknowledged to be faulty: much more may we expect inaccuracy in the ordinary methods of classing such as are less generally attended to. All divisions of our derived and compounded powers must be liable to error, till the simple qualities, from which they proceed, have been investigated.

It sometimes happens, notwithstanding, that by a kind of natural anticipation, we strike out juster divisions, than could have been expected, without reflection on the real foundation of them. This holds in the present case. If we will but recollect and compare those qualities of human nature, from which taste has been explained, we shall be convinced that all its phenomena proceed, either from the general laws of sensation, or from certain operations of the imagination. Taste, therefore, though itself a species of sensation, is, in respect of its principles, justly reduced to imagination.

That taste is properly a kind of sensation, can scarce be called in question by any one who has clear and distinct ideas. It supplies us with simple perceptions, entirely different from all that we receive by external sense or by reflection. These make us acquainted with the forms and inherent qualities of things external, and with the nature of our own powers and operations: but taste exhibits a set of perceptions, which though consequent on these, are really different; which result from, but are not included in the primary and direct perception of objects. They are however equally uncompounded in their feeling, as incapable of being conceived prior to experience, as immediately, necessarily, and regularly exhibited in certain circumstances, as any other sensation whatsoever.* Taste is subjected to the

* Indeed as our external senses are ultimate and original principles, it may perhaps be taken for granted that this circumstance is essential to the idea of a sense, and that no power of the mind can be properly expressed by this name, which is derived and compounded; and capable of being resolved into simpler principles. According to this hypothesis, the powers of taste would not be senses. To enquire whether
same general laws, which regulate our other senses. To trace out all these would be

they are or are not, may perhaps be deemed a dispute about words, as the determination will depend upon the definition of a sense. It is however of some real moment, that the powers of the mind be reduced into classes, according to their real differences and analogies; and therefore, that no definition be received, which would disturb the regular distribution of them. And that the powers of taste may with the greatest propriety be reckoned senses, though they be derived faculties, will, it is hoped, appear from the following observations. We are directed by the *phenomena* of our faculties, in reducing them to classes. The obvious *phenomena* of a *sense* are these. It is a power, which supplies us with such *simple* perceptions, as cannot be conveyed by any other channel to those who are destitute of that sense. It is a power which receives its perception *immediately*, as soon as its object is exhibited, previous to any reason concerning the qualities of the object, or the causes of the perceptions. It is a power which exerts itself *independent of volition*, so that, while we remain in proper circumstances, we cannot, by any act of the will, prevent our receiving certain sensations, nor alter them at pleasure, nor can we, by any means, procure these sensations, as long as we are not in the proper situation for receiving them by their peculiar organ. These are the circumstances which characterize a sense. Sight, foreign to our subject. We shall mention but one law of sensation, which has been so

for instance, conveys simple perceptions, which a blind man cannot possibly receive. A man who opens his eyes at noon immediately perceives light; no efforts of the will can prevent his perceiving it, while his eyes are open; and no volition could make him perceive it at midnight. These characters evidently belong to all the external senses, and to reflexion or consciousness, by which we perceive what passes in our minds. They likewise belong to the powers of taste; harmony, for example, is a simple perception, which no man who has not a musical ear can receive, and which every one who has an ear immediately and necessarily receives on hearing a good tune. The powers of taste are therefore to be reckoned senses. Whether they are ultimate powers, is a subsequent question. Those who are unacquainted with philosophy reckon all our powers ultimate qualities of the mind. But nature delights in simplicity, and produces numerous effects, by a few causes of extensive influence; and it is the business of philosophy to investigate these causes, and to explain the phenomena from them. On enquiry it appears that the internal senses are not ultimate principles, because all their phenomena can be accounted for, by simpler qualities of the mind. Thus the pleasure we receive from beautiful forms is resolvable into the pleasure of facility and that of moderate exertion. But, notwithstanding this discovery.
often hinted at already, and which, by its immediate effects and remoter consequences, of the causes of our reflex sensations, we may continue to term them senses, since it does not contradict any of the phenomena, on account of which this name was originally bestowed upon them. Beautiful forms have uniformity, variety, and proportion; but the pleasure they give is, an immediate sensation, prior to our analysing them, or discovering by reason that they have these qualities. We find on examination, that uniformity and proportion are agreeable. As they enable us to conceive the object with facility and variety; as it hinders this facility from degenerating into languor; and thence we conclude, that the pleasant sentiment of beauty is the result of those simple principles which dispose us to relish moderate facility, and moderate difficulty; but the sentiment of beauty arises, without our reflecting on this mixture. This sentiment is compound in its principles, but perfectly simple in its feeling. If this should seem to imply a contradiction, let it be remembered, that two liquors of different flavours may, by their mixture, produce a third flavour, which shall excite in the palate a sensation as simple, as that which it receives from any of the ingredients. In like manner, the perception of whiteness is as simple as that of any colour; but philosophers know that, in respect of its cause, it is compounded of the seven primary colours. Lord Verulam*


has so great influence on the sentiments of taste, that it will be proper in a few words concludes from some experiments that the external sense of taste is compounded of smell and touch. Suppose this conclusion just, taste would be a derived power; but still it would be a distinct sense, as its perceptions are peculiar, and specifically different in their feeling both from colours and tangible qualities. Just so each principle of taste is with reason accounted a particular sense, because its perceptions, however produced, are peculiar to it, and specifically different from all others. Each conveys perceptions, which, in respect of their feeling, are original, though the powers, by which they are conveyed, are derived. It is scarce necessary to observe that our ascribing the sentiments of taste to mental processes is totally different from asserting that they are deductions of reason. We do not prove that certain objects are grand by arguments, but we perceive them to be grand, in consequence of the natural constitution of our mind, which disposes us, without reflection, to be pleased with largeness and simplicity. Reasoning may, however, be employed in exhibiting an object to the mind, and yet the perception that it has, when the object is once exhibited, may properly belong to a sense. Thus reasoning may be necessary to ascertain the circumstances, and determine the motive of an action; but it is the moral sense that perceives it to be either virtuous or vicious, after reason has discovered its motive and its circumstances.
to illustrate it. When an object is presented to any of our senses, the mind conforms itself to its nature and appearance, feels an emotion, and is put in a frame suitable and analogous; of which we have a perception by consciousness or reflection. Thus difficulty produces a consciousness of a grateful exertion of energy: fallacy of an even and regular flow of spirits: excellence, perfection, or sublimity, begets an enlargement of mind and conscious pride; deficiency or imperfection, a depression of soul, and painful humility. This adapting of the mind to its present object is the immediate cause of many of the pleasures and pains of taste; and, by its consequences, it augments or diminishes many others. Though the actions of the mind succeed one another with surprising quickness, they are not instantaneous: it requires some time to pass from one disposition or employment to another. Every frame of mind has a kind of firmness, tenacity, or obstinacy, which renders it averse to quit its hold. Every sensation or emotion, as much as possible, resists diminution or extinction. We find it difficult to dismiss at once any object, which has engrossed our thoughts, and to turn in an instant to another.* Even after an object is removed, the frame it produced, the *impetus* it gave the mind, continues, and urges us to go on in the same direction: it requires time and labour to destroy it. If the succeeding object demand a different conformation of mind, our application to it must, on this account, be less vigorous, and its impression fainter. But if it be analogous to the preceding, it finds the suitable disposition already raised, and therefore strikes the sense with all its force. Hence the mighty efficacy which perceptions acquire, in poetry or eloquence, by being introduced in a proper order, and with due preparation. Hence the influence of an habitual and prevailing temper or turn of mind, in enlivening congruous perceptions, and in debilitating such as are incongruous. As far as the sentiments of taste depend on these principles, so far they arise immediately from the general laws of sensation.

* Difficile est mutare habitum animi semel constitutum. **QUINT. Inst. OraL. lib. iv. cap. 2.**
We can explain our external senses no otherwise, than by marking their differences, reducing them to classes, and delineating the laws of exertion common to all, or peculiar to each. They are original qualities of human nature, not resolvable into any others, more ultimate and simple; but taste, in most of its forms, at least, is a derivative and secondary power. We can trace it up to simpler principles, by pointing out the mental process that produces it, or enumerating the qualities, by the combination of which it is formed. These are found, on examination, to be no other than certain exertions of imagination. That this may become more obvious, we shall briefly ascertain the nature and extent of fancy, by exhibiting a detail of its principal operations, as far as they concern the present subject.

Imagination is first of all employed in presenting such ideas, as are not attended with remembrance, or a perception of their having been formerly in the mind. This defect of remembrance, as it prevents our referring them to their original sensations, dissolves their natural connection. But when memory has lost their real bonds of union, fancy, by its associating power, confers upon them new ties, that they may not lie perfectly loose, ranges them in an endless variety of forms. Many of these being representations of nothing that exists in nature, whatever is fictitious or chimerical is acknowledged to be the offspring of this faculty, and is termed imaginary. But wild and lawless as this faculty appears to be, it commonly observes certain general rules, associating chiefly ideas which resemble or are contrary, or those that are conjoined, either merely by custom, or by the connection of their objects in vicinity, coexistence, or causation. It sometimes presumes that ideas have these relations, when they have them not; but it generally discovers them, where they are; and by this means becomes the cause of many of our most important operations.*

* For instance, some ideas are of such a nature, that, whenever they occur, they impel to action. It is by making such ideas frequently occur, by constantly
Wherever fancy supposes, or perceives in ideas any of the unifying qualities just now mentioned, it readily, and with a kind of eagerness, passes from one idea to its associates; it bestows such a connection on them, that they become almost inseparable, and generally appear together. Their union is so strong, the transition from one to the other is so easy, that the mind takes in a long train of related ideas with no more labour than is requisite for viewing a single perception; and runs over the whole series with such quickness, as to be scarce sensible that it is shifting its objects. On this account, when a number of distinct ideas are firmly and intimately connected, it even combines them into a whole, and considers them as altogether composing one perception. This is the origin of all our complex perceptions. It is fancy which thus bestows unity on number, and unites things into one image, which in themselves, and in their appearance to the senses, are distinct and separate. All the objects that affect taste, and excite its sentiments, are certain forms or pictures made by fancy, certain parts or qualities of things, which it combines into complex modes.

Ideas, which are thus compounded, or which are even, without composition, only associated, communicate, by the closeness of their relation, their qualities to one another. The disposition with which the mind contemplated the first, by its own firmness, which makes force requisite to destroy or change it, and by the strength of the union, which keeps this force from being applied, continues while we view the others. And we imagine, by a kind of illusion, that they produced the disposition, which in reality was brought to the perception of them; and we ascribe to them the qualities which are necessary for its production. A perception, by being connected with another, that is strong, pleasant, or painful, becomes itself vigorous, agreeable or disagreeable. Hence may be deduced the force of sympathy, which
enlivens our ideas of the passions infused by it to such a pitch, as in a manner converts them into the passions themselves.

If indeed the connected ideas have such a degree of relation, as unavoidably leads us to compare them, the phenomenon will be reversed, the effect of the comparison over-balancing that of the association. An idea will appear weaker, less pleasant, or less painful than it really is, by being introduced by one which possesses a greater degree of these qualities, if it is at the same time compared with it.

Imagination sometimes operates so strongly, as not only to associate, or even combine but also to confound together ideas or sensations that are related, and to mistake one for the other. This is the cause of our often ascribing the pleasure or the pain, which results merely from our own operations, to the objects about which they happen to be employed; and of our confounding together objects, or ideas, which are contemplated with the same or a like disposition. It is likewise the source of many figures, in which one thing is used for another, as metaphor, denomination, abuson, and the like.

Imagination does not confine itself to its own weak ideas; but often acts in conjunction with our senses, and spreads its influence on their impressions. Sensations, emotions, and affections are, by its power, associated with others, readily introducing such as resemble them, either in their feeling or direction. Nay, they are capable of a closer union, than even our ideas; for they may not only, like them, be conjoined, but also mixed and blended so perfectly together, that none of them shall be distinctly perceivable in the compound, which arises from their union.

All these are operations of imagination, which naturally proceed from its simplest exertions; and are the principles, from which the sentiments of taste arise. These sentiments are not fantastical, imaginary, or unsubstantial; but are universally produced
by the energies of fancy, which are indeed of the utmost consequence, and have the most extensive influence on the operations of the mind. By being compounded with one another, or with other original qualities of human nature, they generate most of our compounded powers. In particular, they produce affection, and taste of every kind; the former, by operating in conjunction with those qualities of the mind, which fit us for action; the latter, by being combined with the general laws of sensation.

SECT. II.

OF THE CONNECTION OF TASTE WITH GENIUS.

TASTE may be considered either as an essential part, or as a necessary attendant of genius; according as we consider genius in a more or less extensive manner. Every one acknowledges that they have a very near connection. It is so evident, that it has almost past into a maxim, that the ablest performers are also the best judges in every art. How far the maxim is just will best appear, by briefly determining the nature and principles of genius.

The first and leading quality of genius is invention, which consists in an extensive comprehensiveness of imagination, in a readiness of associating the remotest ideas, that are any way related. In a man of genius the uniting principles are so vigorous and quick, that whenever any idea is present to the mind, they bring into view at once all others, that have the least connection with
it. As the magnet selects from a quantity of matter the ferruginous particles, which happen to be scattered through it, without making an impression on other substances; so imagination, by a similar sympathy, equally inexplicable, draws out from the whole compass of nature such ideas as we have occasion for, without attending to any others; and yet presents them with as great propriety, as if all possible conceptions had been explicitly exposed to our view, and subjected to our choice.

At first these materials may lie in a rude and indigested chaos: but when we attentively review them, the same associating power, which formerly made us sensible of their connection, leads us to perceive the different degrees of that connection; by its magical force ranges them into different species, according to these degrees; disposes the most strongly related into the same member; and sets all the members in that position, which it points out as the most natural. Thus from a confused heap of materials, collected by fancy, genius, after repeated reviews and transpositions, designs a regular and well proportioned whole.*

This brightness and force of imagination throws a lustre on its effects, which will for ever distinguish them from the lifeless and insipid productions of inanimate industry. Diligence and acquired abilities may assist or improve genius; but a fine imagination alone can produce it. Hence is derived its inventive power in all the subjects to which it can be applied. This is possessed in common by the musician, the painter, the poet, the orator, the philosopher, and even the mathematician. In each indeed, its form has something peculiar, arising either from the degree of extent and comprehension of fancy; or from the peculiar prevalence of some one of the associating qualities; or from the mind being, by original constitution, education, example, or study, more strongly turned to one kind than the others.

* This operation of genius, in designing its productions, is described with all the beauties of poetical expression, in The pleasures of imagination, B. iii. ver. 348,...410.
A genius for the fine arts implies, not only the power of invention or design, but likewise a capacity to express its designs in apt materials. Without this, it would not only be imperfect, but would for ever lie latent, undiscovered, and useless. It is chiefly the peculiar modification of this capacity, which adapts a genius to one art rather than another. To form a painter, the ideas assembled by fancy must give him a view of their correspondent objects, in such order and proportion, as will enable him to exhibit the original to the eye, by an imitation of its figure and colour. To form a poet, they must lead the thoughts, not to the corporeal forms of things, but to the signs, with which by the common use of language, they are connected; so that he may employ them with propriety, force, and harmony, in exciting strong ideas of his subject.

Culture may strengthen invention; knowledge is necessary for supplying a fund from which it may collect its materials; but improvement chiefly affects the capacity of expression. Painting requires a mechanical skill, produced by exercise: music a knowledge of the power of sounds, derived from experience: poetry and eloquence an acquaintance with all the force of words and instituted signs, an advantage which can be obtained only by careful study.

Thus genius is the grand architect, which not only chooses the materials, but disposes them into a regular structure. But it is not able to finish it by itself. It needs the assistance of taste, to guide and moderate its exertions. Though the different relations of the parts, in some measure, determine the form and position of each, we acquire much ampler assurance of its rectitude, when taste has reviewed and examined both the design and execution. It serves as a check on mere fancy; it interposes its judgment, either approving or condemning; and rejects many things, which unassisted genius would have allowed.

The distinct provinces of genius and taste being thus marked out, it will be easy to discover how far they are connected. They
must be connected in a considerable degree, since they both spring from imagination: but as it is differently exerted in each, their connection will not be perfectly accurate and uniform.

Genius is not always attended with taste precisely equal and proportioned. It is sometimes incorrect, though copious and extensive. It is sometimes bold, yet can transfuse no delicacy or grace into its productions. But it is never found where taste is altogether wanting. The same vigour of the associating principles, which renders genius quick and comprehensive, must bestow such strength on the several dependent operations of fancy, which generate taste, as shall make that faculty considerably active and perceptive.* The genius of the greatest masters in every kind has not been more perfect than their taste. The models they have given are so finished and correct, that the general rules and precepts of the art, afterwards established by critics, are deduced from their practice, and the very same which they observed, though uninstructed. The epos was not subjected to rules, when Homer composed the Iliad. Aristotle did not write his Art of Poetry, till after the greatest tragic poets of antiquity had flourished. These great originals possessed, not only an excellent genius, but equal taste. The vigour of their imaginations led them into unexplored tracts; and they had such light and discernment, as, without danger of error, directed their course in this untrodden wilderness. Taste united with genius renders the effects of the latter like to diamonds, which have as great solidity as splendour.*

* There is in one view a still closer connection between genius and taste. A genius for the fine arts implies, at least, sensibility and delicacy of taste, as an essential part of it. By means of this, every form strikes a man of true genius so forcibly, as perfectly to enrapture and engage him, and he selects the circumstances proper for characterizing it, and impresses them upon others, with the same vivacity, that he apprehends them himself. See this elegantly explained in *A discourse on poetical imitation*, § 1.

* Le bel esprit est de la nature de ces pierres précieuses, qui n'ont pas moins de solidité, que d'éclat.
But taste often prevails where genius is wanting; they may judge, who cannot themselves perform. The operations, that depend on the imagination, may be vigorous enough to form a high relish, though it be destitute of that brightness and extension, which is necessary for a comprehensive genius. The associating principles may be strong and active within their bounds, though these bounds be narrow. And soundness and strength of judgment may be possessed without considerable genius; but must always, if joined with any degree of the internal senses, produce acuteness and justness of taste. This rendered Aristotle the greatest of critics, though he was not like Longinus, blest with a poet’s fire.

It must however be acknowledged, that

Il n'y a rien de plus beau qu'un diamant bien poli et bien net; il éclate de tous côtés, et dans toutes ses parties.

Quanta sodezza, tanto ha splendore.

C'est un corps solide qui brille; c'est un brillant qui a de la consistance et du corps. iv. Entret. d' Ariste et d' Eugene.
SECT. III.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF TASTE ON CRITICISM.

As taste gives the last finishing to genius in the author or performer, so is it the fundamental ingredient in the character of the critic. The greatest refinement and justness of taste is necessary, but not alone sufficient, to qualify one for this office. A critic must not only feel, but possess that accuracy of discernment, which enables a person to reflect upon his feelings with distinctness, and to explain them to others.

Taste perceives the particular beauties and faults, and thus supplies the facts, for which we are to account; and the experiments, from which our conclusions are to be deduced. But these conclusions cannot be formed without a vigorous abstracting faculty, the greatest force of reason, a capacity for the most careful and correct induction, and a deep knowledge of the principles of human nature. One does not merit the name of a critic, merely by being able to make a collection of beauties and faults from performances in the fine arts; to tell in general that those please, these displease; some more, some less. Such particular observations fall as much short of genuine criticism, as a collection of facts and experiments does of philosophy; or a series of newspapers of a system of politics. They are its rude materials, and nothing more. And to exhibit them is the whole that taste can do.

In order therefore to form an able critic, taste must be attended with a philosophical genius, which may subject these materials to a regular induction, reduce them into classes, and determine the general rules which govern them.* In all this operation respect

* Nihil est, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius, qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quorum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit.........Omnia fere, quae sunt conclusa nunc artibus, dispersa et dissipata quando fuerunt, ut in musicis,.......in hac denique ipse ratione dicendi.......Adhibita est igitur ars quaedam extrinsecus ex alio genere quodam, quod sibi totum
must be had to the subjects in which the excellencies or blemishes reside, and to the similitude of the qualities themselves, or of the sentiments which they excite. These are the circumstances common to a variety of particular phenomena, which must regulate our distribution of them. It is not enough to discover that we are pleased or displeased; we must ascertain the precise species of either; and refer it to the sentiment or the expression; to the design or the execution; to sublimity or beauty; to wit or humour.

The qualities common to the lower classes will naturally be determined first, by regular induction. But a true critic will not rest satisfied with them. By renewing the induction, and pushing it to a greater degree of subtlety, he will ascertain the less conspicuous properties, which unite several inferior species under the same genus;* and will carry on his analysis, till he discovers the highest kinds, and prescribes the most extensive laws of art, and thus arrives at the most universal distinctions that can be made, without falling into the uninstructive affirmation of mere excellence or faultiness in general.†

* Turn sunt notanda genera, et ad certum numerum, paucitatemque revocanda. Genus autem est id, quod sui simileis communione quadam, specie autem differentiis, duas aut pluribus complexitatis partes. Partes autem sunt, quæ generibus iis, ex quibus emanant, subjiciuntur. Cic. ibid.

† This order of proceeding from the more particular, to the more general distinctions of our sentiments may, perhaps, seem liable to an objection drawn from matter of fact: for it would appear, that critics have determined the most universal classes, but have not yet sufficiently ascertained the species that are subordinate to them. The common defect, with which they are charged, is, that their observations are too general. This is undoubtedly the case, as criticism has been generally managed: and the reason is, that it has been seldom cultivated by a regular and just induction. It was long ago observed by Lord Verulam, that there are two kinds of induction, one imperfect and insufficient, which leads us at once from experiments, to
To complete the criticism, and render it truly philosophical, the common qualities of
the most general conclusions; the other legitimate and perfect, but scarce ever used, which rises gradually from less general, to more general principles.

"Dux vite sunt, atque esse possunt, ad inquirendam et inveniendam veritatem. Altera a sensu et particularibus ad axioma maxime generalia, ut hæc via in usu est. Altera a sensu et particularibus excitat axioma, ascendendo continentur et gradatim, ut ultimo loco perveniatur ad maxime generalia; quæ via vera est, sed intentata." Nov. Org. i. aph. 19.

In criticism, as well as in philosophy, the former method has been generally practised. Indeed in whatever regards sentiment, there is a peculiar temptation to pursue this course. For the very feelings excited by qualities that belong to different genera, being sensibly distinct, direct men, in some measure, to distinguish them, though not with sufficient precision. But it requires attention and acuteness to mark the lesser varieties of sentiment, which correspond to the species of each. The matter of fact objectied only shews, therefore, that criticism has been cultivated by a wrong method of induction. The consequence has been, that even those general distinctions, which appear to be ascertained, are loose, uncertain, and ill defined; a defect that can never be remedied, till the other sort of induction is applied, and critics be content to rise from particular principles gradually to such as are more

the several classes, both superior and subordinate, must be compared with the principles of human nature, that we may learn by what means they please or displease, and for what reason.

All this is included in perfect criticism, which requires therefore the greatest philosophical acuteness, united with the most exquisite perfection of taste. If taste is wanting, our conclusions must be defective, faulty, or precarious: if philosophical genius, our observations will be trifling, superficial, unconnected, and perplexed with too great particularity.

It has often been observed that nature is the standard and archetype of all true rules of criticism. Indeed the fate of criticism has been similar to that of every species of philosophy. It has fallen into the hands of incapable professors, who, without any regard to the reality of nature, have attempted
to prescribe rules, formed by their own imaginations. The accidental usage of an eminent author on a particular emergency, has been converted into a standing law, and applied to cases no ways similar: arbitrary restraints have been imposed without necessity, and even shining faults have been recommended as beauties. But these false systems of criticism, like their kindred ones in philosophy, have obtained only a local and temporary reception. Genuine criticism is evidently very different; and is justly esteemed a faithful transcript of nature. For it investigates those qualities in its objects, which, from the invariable principles of human nature, must always please or displease; describes and distinguishes the sentiments, which they in fact produce; and impartially regulates its most general conclusions according to real phenomena.

SECT. IV.

OF THE OBJECTS OF TASTE.

WE have seen the importance of taste, both to the performer, and the judge. But its proper office and extensive influence will perhaps appear still farther, by considering its objects in a somewhat different light. It may be conceived as employing itself about **nature**, **art**, and **science**. With regard to nature, which is the common subject of the other two, taste and reason are employed in conjunction. In art, taste is the ultimate judge, and reason but its minister. In science, reason is supreme, but may sometimes reap advantage, from using taste as an auxiliary.

As reason investigates the **laws** of nature, taste alone discovers its **beauties**. It fills us with admiration of the stupendous magnitude of the mundane system. It is charmed with the regularity, order, and proportion, which every part of it displays, even to the most illiterate; with the beauty and variety
of colours, which tinge the face of nature; with the fitness and utility of all its productions; with the inexhaustible diversity and endless succession of new objects, which it presents to view. Flowers disclose a thousand delicate or vivid hues. Animals appear in comely symmetry. Here the ocean spreads forth its smooth and boundless surface; there the earth forms a verdant carpet. Mountains rise with rugged majesty; the valleys wear a pleasant bloom; and even the dreary wilderness is not destitute of august simplicity. The day is ushered in by a splendid luminary, whose beams expose to view the beauties of the world, and gild the face of nature. And when the curtain of night veils terrestrial objects from our eye, the wide expanse appears spangled with stars, and opens the prospect of multitudes of worlds past reckoning. Spring, summer, autumn, present us with natural beauties, in the successive periods of their growth; and even stern winter leaves many objects undestroyed, from which a vigorous taste may extract no inconsiderable degree of entertainment.

Scarce any art is so mean, so entirely mechanical, as not to afford subjects of taste. Dress, furniture, equipage, will betray a good or bad taste: nay the lowest utensil may be beautiful or ugly in the kind.* But the finer arts, which imitate the excellencies of nature, supply it with more proper materials; and thence derive their merit. Music, painting, statuary, architecture, poetry, and eloquence, constitute its peculiar and domestic territory, in which its authority is absolutely supreme. In this department, genius receives its decrees with implicit submission; and reason is but its minister, employed to bring into view, and reduce into form, the subjects of which it is to judge.

The sciences are susceptible, not only of truth or falsehood; but also of beauty or deformity, excellence or defect. As the

* In how great a degree the beauty of these meaner subjects is regulated by the same principles, from which that of the nobler springs, appears in many instances, produced by Mr. Hogarth, in his Analysis of beauty.
former are primarily regarded, reason, by which they are distinguished, here reigns supreme, and is the immediate and proper judge of merit. Taste exercises only a subordinate jurisdiction, and must be employed in subservience to understanding. When this subordination is perverted, and taste is principally regarded, false and erroneous theories are introduced. Imagination is substituted for reason; prejudice supplies the place of evidence; plausible fables are embraced instead of solid truths. An immoderate attachment to novelty or antiquity, to sublimity or simplicity, has often in science given rise to whimsical principles, and distorted explications of the phenomena of things. To one or other of these causes, we may ascribe most of the systems of false philosophy, that have ever prevailed in the world.

But taste, when under the entire controul of reason, and used only as its assistant, is highly useful in science. It judges, not only of the manner in which science is communicated, but also of the subject matter itself. Every just conclusion, by extending our knowledge of nature, discovers some new beauty in the constitution of things, and supplies additional gratification to taste. The pleasure which attends the perceptions of this faculty, strongly prompts us to exert reason in philosophical enquiries, and with unremitted assiduity, to explore the secrets of nature that we may obtain that pleasure. By its approbation, it confirms the deductions of reason, and by making us feel the beauty, heightens our conviction of the truth of its conclusions. The Newtonian theory is not more satisfying to the understanding, by the just reasonings on which it is founded, than agreeable to taste, by its simplicity and elegance. As the operations of taste are quick, and almost instantaneous, it is sometimes disgusted with the bungling appearance of principles, and leads us to suspect them, before reason has had time to discover where the falsehood lies. A king of Spain, who had made considerable progress in astronomy, is said to have been highly disgusted with the confusion and perplexity, in which the Ptolemaic system involves the
motions of the celestial bodies. His reason submitted to that hypothesis; but his taste disliked it. Instead of censuring the constitution of nature, he should have suspected the explication, which represented it as irregular, and ill contrived. When the mundane system is justly explained, it appears to be adjusted with the nicest regularity and proportion; the sense of which at once confirms the theory, and fills us with admiration of the supreme wisdom.

SECT. V.

OF THE PLEASURES OF TASTE.

THE observations we have made concerning the subjects of taste not only ascertain its genuine province, but likewise, in some measure, evince its extensive utility and importance. It will not however be improper to complete our view of its advantages, by considering its effects, both immediate and remote.

It is the immediate source of pleasures, not only innocent, but elegant and noble. The powers of imagination are a striking instance of the munificence of our creator, who has furnished us not only with those faculties, which are necessary for the preservation of our being, but such also as may fit us for receiving a rich variety of enjoyment. And by the improvement of these powers, our pleasures may be still farther multiplied, and rendered more exquisite. A fine taste qualifies a man for enjoyments, to which others are perfect strangers, and
enables him to derive entertainment from almost every thing in art or nature. It enlarges his sphere of happiness, by yielding delights, which employ the mind without fatiguing it, and gratify without cloying.

The pleasures of taste, though less improving than such as are intellectual, are often as great, generally more rapturous, always more universally attainable. We need but attend, and they are infused by every object, without labour or expense of thought. The beauties of nature are open to all: and though few can have the property, most men may have the enjoyment of many of the wonders of art. The improvement of taste is easier, and more certain, than that of reason. Some are indeed incapable of the highest perfection of it: but few are so entirely destitute of the natural seeds of it, as not to receive some pleasure from its proper objects. Though all cannot attain such justness of discernment, as may qualify them for being judges, or gain them authority as critics; there are scarce any, who may not acquire the sensibility that is requisite for their own gratification.

The pleasures of taste are not like the gratifications of external sense, followed by uneasiness or satiety: nor reflected upon with dissatisfaction. They are confessedly of an higher order. A relish for them adds dignity to a character, and commands no inconsiderable degree of approbation. A man, who devotes a considerable part of his time to the gratification of sense, is an object of contempt or indignation: but a person who can fill up those parts of life, that afford no opportunities for social offices, with pleasures of taste, who can find entertainment for many hours in a gallery of pictures, or in a collection of poems, is esteemed on this very account. Justness of taste procures an author as high a degree of reputation, as the most curious abstract disquisitions. Aristotle's critical works are more generally valued than his logic. To the latter he owed the veneration of his implicit followers; a veneration which free enquiry has already extinguished: but on account of the former, all ages will probably admire him.
The sentiments of taste spread a lustre over most of our enjoyments. The pleasures of sense and the external decorations of life would be insipid and despicable to every man of understanding, if ideas of elegance and magnificence, derived from taste, were not associated with them. Taste stamps a value upon riches, as the procuring its gratifications, is the great end for which they are desired, and the worthiest use to which they can be applied, the execution of benevolent and virtuous designs alone excepted.

Sect. VI.

Of the Effects of Taste on the Character and Passions.

The more remote advantages of taste arise from the influence it has on the passions and the character.

The passions, as well as taste, depend for their production on the imagination; and may therefore reasonably be expected to bear some analogy to it. Were it proper to enter on a full discussion of the origin of the passions, it might be shown, not only that they derive their existence, their particular turn, and their various degrees of strength, from the operations of fancy, but also that they owe them, in many instances, to the very same operations of fancy, which produce the sentiments of taste. Fancy forms the pictures which affect taste, by compounding several distant ideas into one whole; and these same pictures excite the passions. Association has a very great influence on taste; and every philosopher, who has examined the affections with tolerable care, has remarked the great dependence
which they have on association. Many of them arise from sympathy; and this principle is likewise the source of many sentiments of taste. Both our sentiments and our affections are often rendered more intense by the mixture of concomitant emotions. A strong imagination produces a vigorous and lively taste; and it is always attended with keen and ardent passions.

Thus taste and affection are effects of the same cause, streams issuing from the same fountain; and must therefore be in a considerable measure similar. They likewise mutually influence one another, and hence derive a farther similarity. We have remarked already, that the prevailing passion often enlivens the sensations of taste, and determines its particular form. Taste as often augments the vigour of the passions, and fixes their prevailing character. Present a mere abstract idea of good or evil; the mind feels no emotion. Mention a particular advantage or disadvantage; desire or aversion, joy or sorrow is immediately aroused. Tell us that a man is generous, benevolent, or compassionate, or on the contrary that he is sordid, selfish, or hard-hearted; this general account of his character is too indefinite to excite either love or hatred. Rehearse a series of actions, in which these characters have been displayed; immediately the story draws out the affections correspondent. It is only a perception enlivened by fancy, that affects our active powers. A very general idea is so unstable, that fancy cannot lay hold of it: but when a particular idea is presented, the imagination dwells upon it, cloaths it with a variety of circumstances, runs from it to other ideas, that are connected with it, and finishes a picture of the object represented by that idea, which will infallibly produce a suitable affection. Now if we examine the colours, which imagination throws upon our ideas, in order to enable them to excite the passions, we shall find that the greatest part of them are extracted from the sentiments of taste. Honours have a great influence on most men; but greatest on those, whose taste is of such a structure, as to give them a high relish of the magnificence and pomp, which the possession of honours naturally
procures. There is scarce any quality, that recommends a person more strongly to our friendship, than a fitness for gratifying our taste in some way or another. A genius for music or painting will sometimes more speedily and certainly introduce a stranger to the notice or good offices of a man, who is a tolerable judge in these arts, than more important accomplishments, of which he is not equally qualified to judge. A sense of beauty has generally much greater influence upon the amorous passion, than the mere appetite for sensual pleasure; and is sometimes so powerful, as even to overbalance, in our choice, the natural approbation of agreeable mental qualities. An elegant entertainment is prepared, not to satisfy hunger, but to please taste. We may perhaps venture to assert, that every appetite and passion in our nature, except avarice alone, or the love of money for the sake of hoarding, derives its origin and its vigour, in a great measure, from those ideas, which imagination borrows from taste, and associates with the object of that passion. This being the case, the passions will naturally receive one tincture or other, in every man, according to the particular constitution of his taste.

We find by experience such a connection between the tastes and the passions of men, as these observations would lead us to expect. Great sensibility of taste is generally accompanied with lively passions. Women have always been considered as possessing both in a more eminent degree than men. Quickness of taste is essential to poetic genius; and *Horace* has assigned to poets the correspondent turn of passion, when he characterises them *genus irritabile*. A gross, uncultivated taste produces a grossness and indecency of passion. But wherever a delicate taste prevails, it bestows a certain refinement and elegance on our principles of action, which makes us despise many objects as gross and coarse, which vulgar minds pursue with ardour: and even when we are attached to the very same things with other men, it gives a peculiar politeness to our manner of affecting them. Savages have a grossness both of taste and of passion, which distin-
guishes them from civilized nations. The vulgar in every nation are distinguished, by the same circumstance, from the polite. Whatever quality gives a tincture to the taste of a nation, is found to tinge also the national character. The French have a peculiar delicacy of taste: and a peculiar vivacity and elegance runs through their manners. The irregularity and boldness of the English taste corresponds exactly with the general spirit of the nation. The stateliness, which the Spaniards affect in their behaviour, is analogous to the loftiness which they approve in composition. It is no difficult matter to trace a like connection between taste and character in individuals.

This connection may be owing, in some measure, to the influence, which the passions have on taste. But it can scarce be doubted, that it arises as frequently from the tincture, which taste gives to the passions: especially when we recollect that the ideas which excite the passions are, in a great measure, derived from the sentiments of taste.

If it should farther appear, that a just and well regulated taste has a peculiar tendency to confirm virtuous affections and principles, its importance would be still more conspicuous. Those who have enquired, whether it has this tendency, seem to have run into extremes. Some represent these qualities in actions and affections, which excite our moral approbation, as the same with those qualities, which, in a picture or a poem, produce the gratification of taste; and think that it is the same faculty, which is pleased in both cases.* But experience will scarce support this opinion. A taste for the fine arts, and a high sense of virtue, which, on this hypothesis, would be the same, are often separated: and a careful examination of the moral faculty, would probably lead us to derive it from other principles, than those from which taste has been explained. There seems however to be as little reason for determining with others, that taste has no influence upon morality.† It may be

* This is often asserted, or very directly insinuated, by Lord Shaftesbury. See Characteristics, passim.
† This opinion is maintained by Mr. Brown, Essay on Characteristics, § 7.
separated from virtue; it may accidentally lead men to act viciously, for its gratification: but that it is naturally more favourable to virtue than to vice, may be inferred from many of the acknowledged qualities of the human mind.

Most wrong passions may be traced up to some perversion of taste, which produces them, by leading us to misapprehend their objects. It would be almost superfluous to undertake a formal proof, that luxury, prodigality, ambition, arise chiefly from this cause. And it is evident, that, if taste were perfectly formed, so as to discover that it is a false beauty or sublimity, or at least an inferior species, that belongs to these vices or their objects; and if it were accustomed to the purer and nobler subjects about which it may be employed, those ideas, which now mislead so many, must lose a great influence upon them. Vice is often promoted by taste ill formed or wrong applied: let taste be rendered correct and just, vice will be almost extinguished; for our opinions of things will be, in most cases, true and suited to their natures.

A man who is acquainted with high and noble pleasures naturally despises such as are far inferior. A relish for the gratifications of taste will enable a man, in some degree, to undervalue the pleasures of sense, and to disregard the calls of appetite, which are the greatest obstructions to the prevalence of good affections. A man of an improved taste puts very little value on sensual delights, except so far as they come to him, recommended by an opinion of elegance. And it has been already observed that a perfectly just taste would enable him to strip this recommendation in a great measure of its force.

Any sentiment or affection which is suitable to the prevailing bias of the mind, will derive peculiar strength from that bias. A just and elegant taste, frequently employed, puts the mind into an habitual disposition, more congruous to the agreeable feeling and gentle impulses of kind affection, than to the more tumultuous agitations of the rougher passions. The exercise of taste begets serenity.
nity and satisfaction. When these prevail, the mind is prone to benevolence. This affection finds the mind already in a temper suited to it; and it strikes deep its roots, as in a soil, which supplies it with its natural nourishment, in great abundance. A man is seldom better disposed to friendship, generosity, love, and the whole train of kind affections, than when his mind has been softened, by the charms of music, painting, or poetry. It is universally acknowledged, that these arts, when properly applied, are very powerful in recommending virtue. And their power arises, in a great measure, from the circumstance which we are now considering. Their immediate gratifications, by producing a congruous disposition, prepare the mind for being deeply impressed with the moral sentiments and affections, which they are fitted to insinuate.

All the principles of the human mind have so near a connection, that one of them can scarce be considerably altered, but it produces a similar alteration in the rest. A vigorous taste, not only is affected with every the minutest object, directly presented to it; but imparts also a peculiar sensibility to all the other powers of the soul. Refinement of taste makes a man susceptible of delicate feelings on every occasion; and these increase the acuteness of the moral sense, and render all its perceptions stronger and more exquisite. On this account a man of nice taste will have a stronger abhorrence of vice, and a keener relish for virtue, in any given situation, than a person of dull organs can have, in the same circumstances. Hence it proceeds in part, that many actions are reckoned either virtuous or vicious by civilized nations, which to savages appear perfectly indifferent. This may rather be ascribed to an elegance of taste gradually introduced by society, than to any peculiar disposition to virtue. The moral sense is, in savages, so dull that the qualities of these actions are imperceptible to them, and their sentiments in other instances are weak in proportion. Civilized nations have delicacy sufficient to perceive moral qualities in actions, which make no impression on a savage; and this delicacy renders more vigo-
rous, in proportion, the perceptions which they have from those actions that are approved or disapproved by savages themselves. Thus the cultivation of taste gives new force to the sentiments of the moral faculty, and by this means renders it more powerful to repress the vicious passions, and support the virtuous.

It is likewise to be observed that, though taste and the moral sense are distinct powers, yet many actions and affections are fit to gratify both. What is virtuous and obligatory is often also beautiful or sublime. What is vicious may be at the same time mean, deformed, or ridiculous. A man, whose taste is uncultivated, has no motive in these cases, but what arises from the moral principle. A person of improved taste, not only has this in its greatest strength, but is capable of additional motives derived from taste; and having thus a double impulse, must be more strongly prompted than the other. It must be acknowledged indeed, that some vices appear sublime or elegant, and may therefore be recommended by taste.

But they always have these qualities in a less degree than the opposite virtues. Superiority to external things is nobler than ambition. Admiration of these vices therefore implies a defect of just taste. Where this faculty is perfect, it always prefers virtue to vice.

In order to give the foregoing observations their full weight, it is necessary to remember that many different causes concur in forming the characters of men. Taste is but one of these causes; and not one of the most powerful. It is not therefore to be expected that the character should be, in every instance, perfectly analogous to the taste. Other causes may counteract the influence of this principle and render the turn of the passions dissimilar to its structure. On this account, examples of a good taste joined with gross passions or a vicious character, are far from being sufficient to prove that taste has no connection with morals. This heterogeneous composition may be otherwise accounted for. All our conclusions concerning human nature must be founded on experience: but it is not neces-
sary that every conclusion should be immediately deduced from experiment. A conclusion is often sufficiently established, if it be shown that it necessarily results from general qualities of the human mind, which have been ascertained by experiment and induction. This is the natural method of establishing synthetical conclusions; especially where an effect is produced by a complication of causes. This is the case in the subject of our present enquiry. The character and the passions are affected by many different causes; of which taste is one. Taste in the fine arts may appear to be wanting in some men, because they have had no opportunities of exercising it on subjects of that kind; while, at the same time, the natural principles of it being vigorous, and all men being conversant about the objects of affection, it may bestow a delicacy and refinement on the character. Affectation may disguise the passions; imitation may render them unsuitable to the turn of taste; habit may make them run counter to it: but taste has, notwithstanding, a natural tendency to influence them.
THE following essay of the late president Montesquieu, is an imperfect fragment, an assemblage of scattered thoughts, the first strokes of his pencil, in which we see the noble subject sketched out in part, and the principal colours that enter into the composition of true taste, thrown carelessly upon the canvass. For while the noble artist was drawing his outlines, and gathering materials for his work, he was seized with a disorder, which prevented him from giving it the finishing touch, and deprived the republic of letters of one of its brightest ornaments. The thoughts, however, of such an original genius, unconnected as they may be, will be highly acceptable to such as know that there is a true sublime always to be found in the first and most imperfect sketches of great masters, and that the rude designs of a Rubens are infinitely more valuable than many a correct and finished piece.
AN ESSAY ON TASTE,

BY DE MONTESQUIEU.

The constitution of human nature in its present state, opens to the mind three different sources of pleasure; one in its internal faculties and essence, another in its union with the body, and a third in those impressions and prejudices, that are the result of certain institutions, customs, and habits.

These different pleasures of the mind constitute the proper objects of taste, those objects which we term beautiful, good, agreeable, natural, delicate, tender, graceful, elegant, noble, grand, sublime, and majestic, as also the qualities to which we give the name of je ne sais quoi. When, for instance, the pleasure we enjoy in the contemplation
of any object is accompanied with a notion of its utility to us, we call that object good; but when an object appears merely agreeable, without being advantageous, we then term it beautiful.

The ancients do not seem to have fully apprehended this important distinction; they considered as things of a positive nature those qualities, or rather perceptions, which are merely relative to the nature and operations of the soul. Hence, those dialogues so celebrated by the ancients, in which Plato gives us an ample account of the reasonings of his great master, are, in our times, unsusceptible of a rational defence, because they are founded upon the principles of a false philosophy. All the reasonings they contain concerning goodness, beauty, wisdom, perfection, folly, hardness, softness, &c. are entirely inconclusive,* as they suppose these various perceptions to be what they are not, real and positive qualities.

The sources, therefore, of beauty, goodness, &c. lie within us, and, of consequence, when we enquire into their causes, we do no more than investigate the springs of our mental pleasures.

Let us then turn the eye of the mind upon itself, examine its inward frame, consider it in its actions, and its passions, and contemplate it in its pleasures in which its true nature is best discovered. It derives pleasure from poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, dancing; in a word, from the various productions of nature and art. Let us, therefore, inquire into the reasons that render these objects pleasing, as also into the manner of their operation, and

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* This observation is entirely erroneous; for granting goodness, beauty, hard, soft, &c. to be merely perceptions of the mind, and nothing really existing without us, yet if these perceptions be invariably excited by certain objects and not by others, if they arise uni-

formly when these objects are presented, they form, of consequence, fixed and permanent relations, which render all the reasonings founded on them as conclusive, as if these perceptions were the inherent qualities of external objects. The translator thought this error of too much consequence to pass it over in silence.
the times and circumstances in which they produce their agreeable effects, and thus give an account of our various feelings. This will contribute to the formation of taste, which is nothing more than the faculty of discovering with quickness and delicacy the degree of pleasure, which we should receive from each object that comes within the sphere of our perceptions.

CONCERNING THE PLEASURES OF THE MIND.

THE mind, besides those pleasures which it receives by the organs of sense, enjoys others which are peculiar to its spiritual nature, and are absolutely independent on external sensation. Such are the pleasures that arise from curiosity, from the ideas of its own existence, grandeur and perfections, from the faculty of taking a general and comprehensive view of things, of contemplating a great variety of objects, and of comparing, combining, and separating its own ideas. These pleasures, which are attached to the nature of every intelligent being, depend not upon the external senses, but reside in the very essence of the soul; and it is needless to inquire whether the soul enjoys them, in consequence of its union with the body, or not; all that is necessary for us to know is, that it enjoys them always, and that they are the true and proper objects of taste. We shall not, therefore, take any notice here of the distinction that may be made between the pleasures that the soul derives from its own essence, and those that result from its union with the body, but shall comprehend both these kinds of enjoyment under the common name of natural pleasures. These pleasures we must, however, distinguish from others that have certain connections with them, and which we may call acquired pleasures. In the same manner, and also for the same reasons, we distinguish between the taste which is natural, and that which is acquired.

It is of great use in researches of this kind to know the source of those pleasures of which taste is the rule or measure: Since the knowledge of our pleasures, whether
natural or acquired, will contribute much towards the rectifying the two kinds of taste that correspond to them. We cannot truly appreciate our pleasures, nor indeed enjoy them with a proper relish, if we do not carefully examine the nature of those pleasures, and their first springs in the human constitution.

If our souls had not been united to material substances, they would still have been capable of knowledge, but it is probable they would have loved whatever they knew; whereas, in the present constitution of things, we scarcely love any thing but that of which we are ignorant.

The constitution of our nature is an arbitrary thing; we might have been otherwise constituted than we are at present; and in that case, our perceptions and feelings would have been quite different from what they now are. An external organ of sensation more or less would have given rise to a species of poetry and eloquence totally different from that which takes place at present; nay, even another contexture of the organs we possess would have changed vastly the nature of poetry; for instance, had the constitution of our mental and bodily powers rendered our attention and application of mind more vigorous and constant than what they are at present, this circumstance would have prevented the existence of those rules, which are designed to adapt the disposition of a subject to that measure of attention of which we are capable: had we been naturally endowed with a more perfect degree of sagacity and penetration, all the rules which are founded upon the degree which we now possess, must have been entirely different: in a word, all the laws that derive their existence and authority from a certain constitution of our nature, would have been totally different, upon the supposition of its being otherwise constituted.

If the sense of sight had been more feeble and confused than it actually is, it would have been necessary to have introduced into the plans of the architect fewer ornaments, and more uniformity; but the contrary rule
must have taken place had our sight been more distinct, piercing, and comprehensive. Had our sense of hearing been constituted like those of many other animals, the most of our musical instruments would have required a quite different construction and modulation. It is true the relations of things to each other would have still continued the same, let the construction of our organs have been ever so different from what it now is; but their relation to us being totally changed, they would not have produced in us the effects they now produce. And as the perfection of the arts consists in their presenting to us their respective objects in such a manner as will render them as agreeable and striking as is possible; so a different constitution of our nature from the present, would necessarily, require a change in the present state of the arts adapted to the change which that new constitution would occasion in the means of enjoyment, in the manner of being agreeably affected.

We are, at first sight, prone enough to imagine that a knowledge of the various sources of our pleasures is sufficient in order to the attainment of what is called taste, and that the man who has studied the dictates of philosophy upon this subject is a man of taste, and may judge with confidence concerning all the productions of nature and art. But this is a mistake: for the natural taste does not consist in a theoretic knowledge, but in the quick and exquisite application of rules which, in speculation, may be really unknown to the mind. It is not, for example, necessary to know that the pleasure we receive from a certain object which we call beautiful is the effect of surprise; it is enough that the object produces its effect, and surprises neither more nor less than is expedient for that purpose.

All therefore, that can be said upon the subject before us, and all the precepts that we can lay down for forming our taste, can only regard directly that taste that is to be acquired, though they have a distant and indirect relation to the natural one. This indirect relation is manifest; for the acquired taste affects changes, augments and dimi-
nishes the natural one, just as the former is affected, changed, augmented and diminished by the latter.

The most general definition that can be given of taste, considered antecedently to its division into good and bad, is, that it is something which attaches us to certain objects by the power of an internal sense, or feeling. This account however, does not suppose that it may not be applied to intellectual things, the knowledge of which is so delightful to the mind, that it has been looked upon by some philosophers as the only source of true felicity. The soul acquires knowledge by its ideas and its inward senses or feelings;* and its pleasures spring from the same sources: for though the latter be generally considered as the inlets of pleasure, and we suppose a total difference between ideas and feelings, yet it is certain that the soul feels whatever it perceives, and there are no objects so abstrusely intellectual which it does not either perceive in reality or in fancy, and which, of consequence, it does not feel.

CONCERNING INTELLECTUAL EXCELLENCE IN GENERAL.

Wit, * considered in a general sense, comprehends all the various kinds of intellectual endowments, such as genius, good sense, penetration, an accurate discernment, peculiar talents, taste.

"L'Esprit consiste à avoir les organes bien constitués relativement aux choses où il

* We take the word wit here in the extensive sense it bears in the old English authors, and in its original signification, which comprehends all the powers and faculties of the mind. Otherwise it is impossible to express in one word what the author understands by the term Esprit, in this passage.
CONCERNING CURIOSITY.

The human mind is naturally formed for thinking or perceiving, and curiosity is necessary to such a being: for as all things are connected in nature, and every idea and object are in the great chain of being immediately preceded by their causes, and as immediately followed by their effects, so we cannot desire the knowledge of one object without being desirous also of arriving at the knowledge of those that are intimately related to it. Thus when we see the part only of an excellent piece of painting, we are eagerly desirous of a sight of what remains concealed from our view, and the eagerness of this desire is proportioned to the pleasure we received from what we had already seen.

It is, therefore, the pleasure which we have received from one object, that carries forward our desires towards another; hence the mind is always bent upon the pursuit of something new, and never enjoys a permanent repose.

Thus we may be always sure of administering pleasure to the mind, by presenting to its contemplation a multitude of objects, or even a greater number than it expected to see.

By these observations we may be enabled to explain the reason, why we receive pleasure both from the view of a regular garden, and also from a rural prospect in which there is neither order nor proportion. The plea-
sure we receive from these different objects arises originally from the same cause, even from the natural desire we have of seeing a multitude of objects. This desire renders us eager to extend our views, and to wander from place to place; the mind, under its impulse, abhors all limits, and would willingly enlarge the sphere of its contemplation, and even of its actual presence; and thus one of its greatest pleasures is, to take in a large and distant prospect. But this pleasure is not easily attained: in towns and cities our view is obstructed by various ranges of buildings; in the country it is limited and interrupted by many obstacles. What then is to be done? Why, we must have recourse to art, which comes to our assistance, and discloses nature which was concealed from our sight; in this case we are more pleased with art, than with nature, that is to say, with nature veiled and unseen. But when nature presents itself to us in extensive prospects, in variegated landscapes, where the eye can roll uncontrolled through meadows and woods, through rising grounds and flowery plains, the mind is quite otherwise elated and transported with these rural scenes, than with the gardens of Le Notre; because such is the fecundity of nature, that it is always new and original, whereas art copies and resembles itself in all its productions. This also is the reason why in painting we are more pleased with a rural landscape, than with a correct plan of the finest garden upon the earth; because the painter represents nature in those scenes, where she appears with the greatest beauty, with the most striking variety, where the eye can ramble at liberty, and behold her in all her charms with pleasure and delight.

That which, generally speaking, renders a thought grand and striking, is when the object it represents opens to our view a multitude of other objects with which it is connected, so that we discover of a sudden, and, as it were, instantaneously what we had no hopes of knowing without a considerable degree of attention and application.

Florus expresses, in these few words, all the faults of Hannibal: *cum victoriā posset uti, frui maluit.*
He gives us an idea of the whole Macedonian war, when he says: *introisse victoria fuit.*

He exhibits to us a striking and sublime view of the whole life and exploits of Scipio, when he speaks thus concerning his youth: *hic erit Scipio, qui in exitium Africæ crescit.*

He paints, in the most lively colours, the restless spirit of Hannibal, the state of the nations, and the whole grandeur of the Roman people, when he says: *qui profugus ex Africà, hostem populo Romano toto orbe quærebat.*

**CONCERNING THE PLEASURES WHICH ARISE FROM ORDER.**

It is not sufficient to exhibit to the mind a multiplicity of objects; it is farther requisite that they be exhibited with order and arrangement, for then it retains what it has seen, and also forms to itself some notion of what is to follow. One of the highest mental pleasures is that which we receive from a consciousness of the extent of our views, and the depth of our penetration; but in a production void of order this pleasure is impeded; the mind, desirous to supply from its own ideas this want of regularity, is perplexed in the vain attempt; its plan mingles itself with that which the author of the work had formed, and this produces a new confusion. It retains nothing, foresees nothing; it is dejected by the confusion that reigns in its ideas, and by the comfortless void that succeeds the abundance and variety of its vain resources. Its fatigue is without its effect, and efforts are unsuccessful. Hence the judicious artist always introduces a certain order, even amidst confusion, where confusion is not the main object, the principal thing to be expressed. Hence the painter throws his figures into groups; and when he draws a battle, represents, as it were, in the front of his piece, the principal objects which the eye is to distinguish, and casts at a distance, by the magic of perspective, the groups where confusion and disorder reign.
CONCERNING THE PLEASURE THAT ARISES FROM VARIETY.

If order be thus necessary in all sorts of productions, *variety* is no less so; without *variety* the mind falls into a lifeless inactivity and languor; for similar objects appear to it as if they were wholly the same; so that if a part of a piece of painting was disclosed to our view, which carried a striking resemblance of another part of the same piece that we had already seen, this second part would be really a new object, without appearing such, and would be contemplated without the least sensation of pleasure. The beauties we discern in the productions of art, as well as in the works of nature, consisting entirely in the pleasure they administer, it is necessary so to modify these beauties as to render them the means of diversifying our pleasures as far as is possible. We must employ our industry in offering to the eye of the mind, objects which it has not as yet seen, and in exciting within it feelings different from those which it may have already experienced.

Thus history pleases by the variety of facts and relations which it contains; romance by the variety of prodigies it invents; and dramatic poetry by the variety of passions which it excites. Thus also they who are well versed in the art of education, endeavour to introduce as much diversity as they can amidst that tedious uniformity which is inseparable from a long course of instruction.

Uniformity carried on to a certain length renders every thing insupportable. The same arrangement of periods continued for a long time fatigues in a piece of eloquence. The same numbers and cadences become extremely tedious in a long poem. If the accounts given of the famous *Vista* or alley that extends from *Moscow* to *Petersburg* be true, the traveller, pent up between these two seemingly endless rows of trees, must feel the most disagreeable lassitude and satiety in the continuance of such a dull uniformity. Nay, even prospects which have the charm of *variety*, cease to please, if they be repeated without much alteration, and
are for a long time present to the mind. Thus the traveller, who has been long wandering through the Alps, will descend satiated with the most extensive views, the most romantic and delightful landscapes.

The human mind loves *variety*, and the reason is, as we have already observed, that it is naturally framed for contemplation and knowledge. If then the love of variety is subordinate and adapted to the attainment of knowledge, it is requisite, that variety, whether in the productions of nature or art, be such as will facilitate knowledge; or, in other words, an object must be sufficiently *simple* to be perceived with ease, and sufficiently *diversified* to be contemplated with pleasure.

There are certain objects, which have the appearance of variety, without the reality; and others, that seem to be uniform, but are, in effect, extremely diversified.

The **Gothic** architecture appears extremely rich in point of variety, but its ornaments fatigue the eye by their confusion, and minuteness. Hence we cannot easily distinguish one from the other, nor fix our attention upon any one object, on account of the multitude that rush at once upon the sight; and thus it happens that this kind of architecture displeases in the very circumstances that were designed to render it agreeable.

A **Gothic** structure is to the eye what a riddle is to the understanding; in the contemplation of its various parts and ornaments the mind perceives the same perplexity and confusion in its ideas, that arise from reading an obscure poem.

The **Grecian** architecture, on the contrary, appears uniform; but as the nature, and the number also of its divisions are precisely such as occupy the mind without fatiguing it, it has consequently that degree of *variety*, that is pleasing and delightful.

Greatness in the *whole* of any production requires of necessity the same quality in the *parts*. Gigantic bodies must have bulky
members; large trees must also have large branches, &c. Such is the nature of things.

The Grecian architecture, whose divisions are few, but grand and noble, seems formed after the model of the great and the sublime. The mind perceives a certain majesty which reigns through all its productions.

Thus the painter distributes the figures that are to compose his work, into various groups; and in this he follows nature and truth, for a crowd is almost always divided into separate companies. In the same manner in every complex piece of painting we see the lights and shades distributed into large masses, which strike the eye at a distance, before the whole composition is distinctly perceived.

CONCERNING THE PLEASURE THAT ARISES FROM SYMMETRY.

We have already observed that variety is pleasing to the human mind; and we must farther remark, that a certain degree of symmetry produces also an agreeable effect, and contributes to the beauty of the greatest part of those complex productions, which we behold with admiration and delight. How shall we reconcile this seeming contradiction? It will vanish if we attend to the following observations.

One of the principal causes of the pleasure which the mind receives in the contemplation of the various objects that are presented to it, is the facility with which it perceives them. Hence symmetry is rendered agreeable, as its similar arrangements relieve the mind, aid the quickness of its comprehension, and enable it, upon a view of the one half of an object, to form immediately an idea of the whole.

Upon this observation is founded the following general rule, That where symmetry is thus useful to the mind, by aiding its comprehension, and facilitating its operations and its perceptions, there it is, and must always be agreeable; but where it does not produce this effect, it becomes flat and in-
sapid, because, without any good purpose, it deprives an object of that *variety* to which nature has given superior charms. In those objects which are viewed successively, *variety* is requisite, because they are distinctly perceived without the least difficulty. On the contrary, where a multitude of objects are presented to us in one point of view, and rush in at once upon the eye, there *symmetry* is necessary to aid us in forming quickly an idea of the whole. Thus *symmetry* is observed in the front of a building, in a parterre, in a temple; and there it pleases extremely for the reason now mentioned, its aiding the mind to take in immediately the whole object without pain, perplexity, or confusion.

The object which the mind views not successively, but, as it were, by one effort, must be *simple* and *one*; all its parts must unite in forming one design, and must relate to one end. This is another consideration, that renders *symmetry* pleasing, as it alone properly constitutes what we call a *whole*, or the effect of a variety of parts that center in one general design.

There is yet another consideration that pleads in favour of *symmetry*, and that is the desire, so natural to the mind, of seeing every thing finished and brought to perfection. In all complex objects there must be a sort of counterbalance, or equilibrium between the various parts that terminate in one *whole*; and an edifice only with one wing, or with one wing shorter than the other, would be as unfinished and imperfect a production as a body with only one arm, or with two of unequal length.

**CONCERNING CONTRASTS.**

If the mind takes pleasure in *symmetry*, it is also agreeably affected by *contrasts*. This requires explication, and a few examples will serve for that purpose.

If painters and sculptors, in obedience to the directions of nature, are careful to observe a certain symmetry in their compositions; the same nature requires that the attitudes which they represent should contrast...
each other; and thus exhibit an agreeable variety, a pleasing opposition to the eye of the spectator. One foot placed precisely in the same position with the other, or any two of the corresponding parts of the body placed exactly in the same direction, disgust a judicious observer, because this studied symmetry produces a perpetual and insipid sameness of attitude, such as we observe in the Gothic figures, which all resemble each other in this respect. Besides, this uniformity of attitude is contrary to our natural frame and constitution; nature has not designed that we should imitate in our gestures the stupid uniformity that is observable in the Indian Pagods: no, she has given us the power of self-motion, and consequently the liberty of modifying our air and our posture as we please. And if stiffness and affectation be unsupportable in the human form, can they be pleasing in the productions of art?

The attitudes therefore, particularly of such figures as are represented in sculpture, must be contrasted in order to give them an agreeable air of variety and ease. What renders this more especially necessary in sculpture is, that of all the arts it is naturally the most cold and lifeless, and can only affect and enflame by the force of its contrasts and the boldness of its postures.

But as, according to an observation already made, the variety which the Gothic architects were studious to introduce into their structures, gave them an insipid air of uniformity; so has it happened that the variety, which other artists proposed effectuating by the means of contrasts, has degenerated also into a vicious symmetry.

This is not only observable in certain productions of sculptors and painters, but also in the style of certain authors, who, by perpetual antitheses form a contrast between the beginning and the end of each phrase. Of this we find several examples in St. Augustine, and others, who wrote during the low periods of the Latin language; and also in the writings of several moderns, particularly those of St. Evremont. The same ca-
dence or jingle repeated in every phrase is extremely disagreeable and fastidious. Contrasts thus multiplied become intolerably uniform; and those oppositions, that were designed to produce variety, degenerate, by perpetual repetition, into the most tedious symmetry. The mind finds so little variety in this sort of composition, that having heard but one half of a phrase, it will always anticipate the other. There is, indeed, a certain opposition in the words of each phrase; but this opposition is always the same; and the flowing of each period, though harmonious, is yet most fatiguing on account of the constant return of the same kind of contrasts.

Several painters have fallen into this vicious custom of multiplying contrasts beyond measure in all their compositions, so that the view of one single figure will enable the acute observer to guess at the disposition of all those that are contiguous to it. This perpetual study of diversity produces uniformity, as has been observed above. Besides, this passion for multiplying contrasts has no example in nature, which operates, on the contrary, with a seeming disorder, void of all affectation, and so far from giving to all bodies a determinate and uniform motion, gives to a great number no motion at all. The hand of nature diversifies truly her multifarious productions; some bodies she holds in repose, while she impresses upon others an infinite variety of tendencies and movements.

If the merely intellectual faculties of our nature determine us to take pleasure in variety, our feeling powers are not less agreeably affected by it. The mind cannot long bear the same objects, the same pleasures, the same situations, if I may use that term, because it is united to a body to which they are insupportable. The activity of the mind, and its sensations and feelings depend upon the course of the animal spirits that circulate in the nerves; there are, of consequence, two circumstances that suspend their vigour, viz. the lassitude of the nerves, and the dissipation of the animal spirits, or their entire cessation.
Thus every thing fatigues us after a certain time; this, at least, is undoubtedly true with respect to those pleasures that are extremely intense; we quit them always with the same satisfaction with which we embraced them; the fibres which were their instruments have need of repose; we must therefore employ others that are in a condition to serve us, and thus distribute equally to the various parts of our frame, the functions they are to perform in rendering us active and happy.

The soul finds its vigour exhausted by any long and intense feeling. But to be destitute of sentiment or feeling, is to fall into a void which sinks and overwhelms our better part. We remedy this disorder, or rather prevent this disagreeable alternative by diversifying the modifications and pleasures of the mind, and then it feels without weariness.

**CONCERNING THE PLEASURE WHICH IS THE EFFECT OF SURPRISE.**

The same disposition that renders variety agreeable to the mind, is also the occasion of those pleasures which it receives from surprise. This feeling of surprise pleases both from the nature of its object, and the quickness and rapidity with which it acts upon the mind, which perceives either an object it did not expect, or an object presented in a different manner from that which it imagined beforehand.

Surprise is excited by such objects as are either marvellous, new, or unexpected; and in those cases where we are struck with the marvellous, the principal feeling is accompanied with an accessory sensation which arises from this, that the object which we contemplate as marvellous is also new and unexpected.

Hence games of hazard attract the whole attention of the mind, and affect in a lively and agreeable manner, by presenting to it a
continual train of unexpected events; and hence also arises the pleasure we take in those games in which we are associated with partners, for they are also a combination of unforeseen events produced by the joint influence of dexterity and hazard.

We may farther reduce to the same principle, the chief pleasure we receive from dramatic compositions, in which we find an important series of events developed by degrees, the most striking occurrences studiously concealed until the very moment of their arrival, all the powers of invention employed to create new objects of surprise, and in which we are sometimes affected with a particular kind of surprise upon seeing things fall out, just as we might have conjectured beforehand.

We observe, finally, that the productions of wit and learning are read with eagerness only because they procure us the lively pleasure of novelty and surprise; and thus supply the defect of conversation, which is, almost always, uniform and insipid, and seldom excites the agreeable feeling now under consideration.

Surprise may be excited either by the object itself that is presented to our view, or by the manner in which we perceive it, and the circumstances under which we consider it; for an object may appear, in our perception, greater or less than it is in reality; it may appear different from what it actually is; and even in those cases where we see it as it is, we may see it under circumstances, which excite an accessory feeling of surprise. Thus in the view of any work, the mind may be struck with the circumstantial or accessory idea of the difficulty of its production, of the person that contrived and finished it, of the time or manner in which it was executed, or of any other circumstances that are intimately connected with it.

Suetonius recites the crimes of Nero with a certain coolness and tranquillity which astonish, and which almost persuade the reader that the enormities he describes excited but faintly, if at all, his indignation and horror.
But the historian stops short, changes his style suddenly, and says, "The earth, having suffered such a monster to breathe upon its surface for fourteen years, abandoned him at last;" *Tale monstrum per quatuordicem annos perpessus terrarum orbis tandem destituit.* In this short, but emphatic phrase, the mind is struck with different sensations of surprise arising from a variety of circumstances. We are surprised at the historian's sudden change of style, at the discovery of his being affected quite otherwise than we at first imagined, and at his describing in so few words, one of the signal revolutions that happened in the Roman empire. Thus the mind is affected, at one and the same time, by a variety of circumstances which concur to excite in it an agreeable emotion, and to strike it with a pleasing surprise.

**CONCERNING THE VARIOUS CAUSES WHICH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO EXCITE A SINGLE FEELING OR SENSATION IN THE MIND.**

It is necessary to observe that, generally speaking, every sensation is excited by more than one cause. The force of a sensation, and that variety of feelings into which it may be decompounded, are the result of various and distinct causes, which however, operate at one and the same time. The excellence of wit and genius consists in their exercising at once, several faculties of the mind, and exciting in it a variety of feelings; and if we examine attentively the merit of the most celebrated authors, we shall find that it lies principally in this; and that they please in proportion to the number of feelings which they produce at the same instant in the mind.

We are more pleased with a regular garden than with a confused and crowded heap of trees; but observe the multiplicity of reasons on which this preference is founded:

1. Our view is less confined by the one than by the other. 2. In a regular garden each walk or alley form a distinct and grand object, while, in a confused heap of trees, each tree forms indeed, a distinct object, but only a minute and inconsiderable one. 3. We see an arrangement and disposition of things
to which we are not accustomed. 4. We approve and appreciate the pains and industry that have been employed. 5. We admire the care that has been taken to combat and correct perpetually the irregular fecundity of nature, which, by new and undesired productions, seems disposed to involve in confusion the works of art; and this observation is verified by the disgust with which we behold a garden, which has been neglected, and suffered to run wild. But farther, we receive pleasure in the productions of art, not only from various, but also from contrary causes: sometimes we are pleased with the difficulty of a work; at others it is the facility of its execution that renders it agreeable. We often admire in the magnificence of a country-seat the splendor and profusion of its owner; and, as often, are pleased with the art which has formed a striking and agreeable arrangement with little labour and expence.

Play affects us agreeably, because it satisfies our avarice, and often fulfils the hopes we entertain of making an addition to our possessions; it flatters our vanity too, by a secret consciousness of our being the favourites of fortune, and by exciting the attention of those about us to our success; it gratifies also our curiosity, by presenting to our view a diversified spectacle of persons, characters, and passions; in a word, it yields the various pleasures of surprise.

Dancing pleases by its nimbleness and rapidity, by the gracefulness of its motions, by the beauty and variety of the attitudes it forms, by its connection with music which is so intimate that we compare the dancer to an instrument which plays in concert. But that which renders dancing peculiarly pleasing is a secret operation of the mind, which reduces all its movements to certain movements, and all its attitudes to certain attitudes.

CONCERNING SENSIBILITY.

Most objects please in certain respects, and displease in others. The singing virtuosi of Italy, for example, are little adapted
to please; 1. Because there is nothing surprising in the sweetness of their voices, after the preparations to which they have submitted; they resemble a piece of wood which the artist has curtailed in order to make it produce articulate sounds. 2. Because they can never enter truly into the tender passion which their music is intended to express. 3. Because they neither belong to the sex which we love, nor to that which we esteem. On the other hand, these same persons are not destitute of qualities that render them agreeable in certain respects, as they retain, much longer than others, the bloom and air of youth, and possess a flexibility and sweetness of voice which are peculiar to themselves and to their condition. Thus every object excites a feeling, composed of many others, which weaken each other reciprocally, and are sometimes in direct and violent opposition.

The mind sometimes augments its enjoyment by the power of imagination, which multiplies the causes of pleasure by the connections it forms, and the accessory ideas and perceptions it creates. Thus an object that has formerly pleased us, pleases us still, and that for no other reason but that it has formerly pleased us, and that we connect the past idea with the present. Thus again, an actress who has delighted us upon the stage, continues also to delight us in a chamber; her voice, her pronunciation, the remembrance of the applause that crowned her performance, nay a combination that we imperceptibly form between the idea of her and that of the princess she represented upon the scene, all this variety, all this mixture concur in exciting one full and lively sensation of pleasure.

We are full of accessory perceptions and ideas. A woman of a shining reputation with a small defect, will be able to reconcile us to that defect, and will even have credit enough to make it pass for an ornament. The greatest part of the women we love have little to recommend them, but the favourable prejudices we entertain of them on account of their birth and fortune, and the honours and esteem that are lavished upon them by certain orders of men.
CONCERNING DELICACY OF PERCEPTION
AND FEELING.

Persons of a delicate mental frame are those, who to every idea, and every sensation add a variety of accessory ideas and sensations. Gross minds receive no more upon the view of an object than the simple sensation which that object of itself is adapted to excite; they neither know how to compound nor to decompound their perceptions and ideas; they neither augment nor diminish the gifts of nature. The case is quite otherwise with persons of a delicate turn of mind; they refine upon vulgar sentiments, and improve and multiply their agreeable sensations, especially in love, the greatest part of whose pleasures is due to a quick and lively fancy. Polyxenes and Apicius enjoyed at table a variety of sensations of their own creating, which are unknown to vulgar gluttons; and those, who judge with taste, concerning the productions of wit and genius, have a multitude of perceptions, both natural and acquired, which are entirely peculiar to themselves.

CONCERNING THE JE NE SÇAI QUOI.

We find sometimes in certain persons and in certain objects an invisible charm, a natural gracefulness, which has not been hitherto defined, and which we have been obliged to express by the vague epithet Je ne sçai quoi. It appears to me highly probable that this secret charm is principally the effect of surprise. We are sensibly touched, when we find certain persons more agreeable than at first sight we imagined them to be; and we are filled with a pleasing kind of surprise, when we see them triumph over those defects, which the eye still perceives, but which the heart no longer feels. Hence we find often, among the female sex, those inexpressible graces adorn the ugly, which are very seldom lavished upon the fair and beautiful. A beautiful nymph generally disappoints our expectations, and appears, after some little time, less amiable than at first sight; after having surprised us at first by her charms, she falls greatly off, and sur-
prises us at length by her defects; but the first surprise is a past pleasure, which is become faint and languid, and is almost effaced, whereas the second is a fresh and lively sensation of disgust. Hence it rarely happens that the beautiful are the objects of a violent and durable passion, which seems rather reserved for the agreeable, than for the fair, for those graces which strike us unexpectedly, and which indeed we had no reason to expect. Sumptuous and magnificent robes are generally destitute of that graceful air, which we often find in the simplicity of the shepherd’s habit. We admire the air of majesty that reigns in the drape ries of Paul Veronese; but we are also most agreeably touched with the simplicity of Raphael, and the graces that flow from the pencil of Correggio. Paul Veronese promises much, and performs what he promises. Raphael and Correggio promise little, but perform a great deal, and this is doubly pleasing to the surprised spectator.

Those graces that can render even deformity agreeable, are more frequently centered in the mind, than expressed in the countenance. A beautiful face discloses at once all its charms, and conceals nothing; but an amiable mind shews itself only by little and little, and at such times and in such a degree, as it thinks proper; it can conceal itself dexterously for a time, in order to shine forth afterwards with a brighter lustre, and to administer that kind of surprise, to which the graces often owe their existence.

The graces are more rarely found in the features of the face, than in the air and manners; for these change every moment, and may therefore every moment produce new objects of surprise. In a word, beauty is limited to a certain set of features; but gracefulness may result from an infinite variety of circumstances; so that, if I may so express myself, there is scarcely more than one way of being beautiful, whereas there are an hundred thousand of being agreeable.

A general rule of conduct established between the two sexes in all nations, whether savage or civilized, requires, that the first
proposal of conjugal union should be made by the men, and that the fair should have nothing more to do than to grant or to reject the tender demands of love; and this very circumstance is a source of graces peculiar to the sex. As they are always obliged to be upon the defensive, they are consequently obliged to conceal their passions, and many of their charms. Under this necessary restraint, the least word, look, or gesture, that breaks loose from its confinement, without violating the natural and primitive law of shame-faced modesty, becomes a grace, and produces a delicious kind of surprise. Such is the wise and excellent constitution of nature, that those things, which, without the sacred law of modesty, would have been indifferent and insipid, are rendered most agreeable and interesting in consequence of that law, which is a source of delicate sensations, and refined pleasure to all rational beings.

As affectation and restraint are incapable of exciting surprise, it follows that gracefulness is neither to be found in those manners that are under the fetters of restraint, nor in those that are the result of a laborious affectation; but in a certain ease and liberty, that lies between these two extremes, the avoiding of which is a circumstance that surprises the mind in an agreeable manner.

One would imagine, that those manners which are the most natural should be the most easy in practice; but the case is quite otherwise; for, by the restraints of education we always lose more or less of the ingenuous simplicity of nature, whose recovery yields a high degree of pleasure.

Nothing strikes us so agreeably in dress, as that negligence and even disorder which conceal the pains that have been taken, and keep out of sight all the art that cleanliness did not require, and that vanity alone could employ. In the same manner wit is only agreeable, when its sallies are flowing and easy, and seem rather luckily hit off, than laboriously invented and far-fetched.

The man who amuses a company with
smart sayings, which are the fruits of premeditation and study, will pass indeed for a man of wit, but not of that easy wit, which is the spontaneous effusion of nature, and in which alone the graces display their genuine charms. Grace in manners or in discourse appears most in those who are the least conscious of possessing it, and whose plainness and simplicity, promising nothing of that nature, occasion an agreeable surprise in such as at length perceive, in the midst of this simplicity, a quality which they so little expected.

From all this we may conclude, that the graces now under consideration, are not to be acquired; in order to possess them we must be natural and ingenuous; and nothing is more self-contradictory than the attempt of studying to be natural.

One of the most beautiful fictions in the Iliad is that of the girdle, which imparted to Venus the power of pleasing. No image could contribute so happily to give us a notion of the secret magic and influence of those graces which seem to be shed upon certain persons by an invisible hand, and which are entirely distinct from beauty. The mysterious girdle could be given to no other than Venus. It was not suitable to the majestic beauty of Juno; for majesty requires a certain gravity, or in other words, a certain degree of restraint which is inconsistent with the easy and careless simplicity of the graces; nor was it better adapted to the bold and haughty air of Pallas, as haughtiness is irreconcileable with the mild sweetness of the graces, and is often liable to the suspicion of affectation.

CONCERNING SURPRISE IN ITS PROGRESSIVE STATE.

The most sublime and striking beauties are to be found in those objects, the first view of which excites but an inconsiderable emotion of surprise, an emotion, however, which continues, augments, and breaks forth, at last, into admiration and rapture. The works of Raphael do not affect us in
any extraordinary manner at first sight; his imitation of nature is so exact, that we contemplate it at first with as little surprise, as if we saw the real objects he represents, that is to say, almost without any. But the more we examine the sublime productions of that great artist, the more our surprise increases, until it arises into astonishment. In the work of an inferior pencil, we are immediately struck with a singular expression, a high colouring, a fantastic attitude, because we are not accustomed to observe them elsewhere. We may compare Raphael with Virgil; and the Venetian painters, with their forced attitudes, may be considered as the imitators of Lucan. Virgil, more natural and simple, strikes less, at first view, than after an attentive examination. Lucan, on the contrary, strikes at first view, and afterwards affects us little.

The exact proportion that is observed in the construction of the famous church of St. Peter at Rome, makes it appear, at first sight, less vast and ample than it is in reality; for we know not where to begin, nor on what point we should first fix our eye in order to judge of its dimensions. Were its breadth less considerable, we should be immediately struck with its length; and were its length diminished, its breadth would awake us at first sight. But if its vast dimensions do not strike us with astonishment at the moment that we cast our eye upon the mighty fabric, the case is quite otherwise when we set about examining it with application and attention of mind; then the eye perceives, as it were, the noble structure expanding itself on all sides; and surprise, gathering force from moment to moment, throws the soul, at length, into the deepest astonishment. Thus the traveller, upon the first view of the Pyrenean mountains, imagines that his eye takes in their whole extent; but as he advances he perceives his error, sees new summits arise, and loses himself in the wide and endless prospect.

It often happens that the mind enjoys pleasure in consequence of a feeling of which it has no distinct notion, and which arises
from its perceiving an object, as quite different from what it knows that object to be in reality. The following example will abundantly illustrate this observation. The cupola of St. Peter's is of itself an immense edifice; and it is well known that Michael Angelo, after an attentive view of the Pantheon, which was the largest of the Roman temples, said that he would erect a structure of the same kind, with this difference only, that it should be built in the air. He executed, accordingly, the cupola of St. Peter's after the model of the Pantheon; but ordered, at the same time, the pillars which supported it to be made so massy, that the cupola, though, in reality of a mountainous size, appears quite otherwise to the eye of the spectator. At the view therefore of this noble piece of architecture, the mind remains suspended between what it perceives, and what it knows, between the appearance and the reality, and cannot recover from the surprise it feels at the sight of an edifice, which is, at the same time so massy and so light.

Concerning those beauties that result from a certain embarrassment, and perplexity of mind.

The mind is frequently struck with surprise from its not being able to reconcile the past with the present, what it sees with what it has seen. There is in Italy a vast lake called Il lago maggiore, whose borders are entirely wild and barren: but, upon sailing about fifteen miles in this little ocean, we find two islands called the Borromees, about a quarter of a mile in circumference; and in these distinguished spots nature seems to have lavished all those rural beauties that the most exuberant fancy can paint. The mind is astonished at this singular contrast, and recals upon this occasion the pleasure it has received from the prodigies of romance, where the reader is transported from craggy rocks and barren desarts into smiling landscapes and enchanted ground.

All contrasts strike of necessity, because objects placed in opposition set off each other
reciprocally: thus a dwarf in company with a person of a tall stature forms a contrast that makes the latter appear more enormous, and the former more minute.

All these contrasts surprise; and hence the pleasure we receive from antitheses, and other such figures, and in general from all those beauties of nature and art that are produced or heightened by opposition. When Florus says, “Sora and Algidum, who would think it! were formidable enemies to Rome; Satricum and Corniculum were provinces: we blush at the mention of Bovillæ and Verulae, yet we triumph over them; and Tibur, now our suburbs, and Praeneste, where we fix our rural seats of recreation and pleasure, were formerly the objects of our ambitious desires, when we offered up to the gods our vows and petitions in the capital:” when Florus, I say, expresses himself thus, he shews us at the same time the grandeur to which Rome arose, and the small beginnings, from which it set out; and these are two objects, whose striking contrast excites our astonishment.

We may here observe the remarkable difference there is between an antithesis of ideas, and an antithesis merely of words. The latter is glaring, the former lies in some measure concealed; the one is always in the same form and dress, the other changes as we please; the one is diversified and complex, the other is uniform and simple.

The same historian, speaking of the Samnites, observes, that the ruin of their cities was so terrible, that in his time it was extremely difficult to conceive how this nation could have furnished to the Romans the occasions of four and twenty triumphs, ut non facile appareat materia quatuor et viginti triumphorum. It is remarkable here that the very same words, which intimate the destruction of that conquered people, convey to us an idea of their unparalleled obstinacy and fortitude.

The violence of a fit of laughter increases in proportion to the pains we take to stifle it; because there is then a striking contrast
between the air and gestures we assume, and those that naturally correspond with the present frame and disposition of our minds. In the same manner we laugh at the sight of an enormous nose, or any other remarkable defect in a countenance, on account of the unseemly contrast which such a feature makes, when compared with the rest. Hence we see that contrasts are sometimes the causes of deformity, as well as of beauty. When they are introduced without reason, or when they only serve to expose a defect and to place it in a striking and conspicuous point of view, then they render an object deformed. Deformity produces different effects upon the mind, according to the ideas that are associated with it. Considered in itself, and viewed of a sudden, it excites laughter; considered as a misfortune, it excites compassion; considered as a mark of some noxious quality, or only in comparison with objects which we are accustomed to contemplate with pleasure and with desire, it excites aversion.

One of the qualities that pleases us most in an author is a certain elegant simplicity of style.* The attainment of this is extremely difficult, because it lies between the sublime and its opposite, but so near the latter, that it is not easy to steer along its border without touching it, or, to speak without a figure, it is difficult to maintain this simplicity of style without falling sometimes into a low and vulgar strain.

* The French word naïveté, which signifies simplicity without meanness, is difficult to be expressed without a periphrasis.
The greatest masters in music acknowledge that those vocal pieces which are performed with the greatest facility are always the most difficult in the composition; a certain proof this, that there are limits prescribed, both to our pleasures, and to the art by which they are produced.

When we read the pompous and lofty strains of Corneille, and the natural and flowing versification of Racine, we can scarcely persuade ourselves that the former composed with ease, and the latter with difficulty and labour; yet such was really the case.

A low and insipid style is the sublime of the multitude, who are pleased with such productions as appear expressly made for them, and which are, at the same time, adapted to their capacities.

The ideas that arise in the minds of such as are blessed with elevation of genius improved and directed by a liberal education, are either natural*, noble, or sublime.

* Idées naites.

When an object is presented to us under various circumstances, or in accessory points of light that aggrandize it considerably, the complex idea, then excited in the mind, may be called noble. This is more especially observable in comparisons, in which the mind must always have its perceptions augmented and multiplied; for comparisons must, in their nature, necessarily add something to their objects, either by heightening our notions of their grandeur, or of their elegance; and similitudes taken from mean objects are carefully to be avoided; for the mind, instead of contemplating them with pleasure, beholds them with disgust, and would have studiously concealed them, had it first discovered them.

When the elegance or delicacy of any subject is to be displayed, by similitudes or comparisons, the mind is more pleased with the comparisons that are formed between the qualities, actions, and manners of the objects than with those that are drawn between the objects themselves; as when a hero is compared with a lion, a lady with a star, a swift runner with a stag.
Michael Angelo excelled in giving an air of dignity to all the subjects that exercised his sublime pencil. In his celebrated Bacchus he has not followed the ignoble manner of the Flemish painters, who represent that deity in a staggering attitude; for this would have been unsuitable to the majesty of a god. He has drawn him, on the contrary, firm upon his limbs, and in a steady posture; but at the same time, has diffused through the whole countenance of the jolly deity such a dissolute gaiety and such an exquisite air of pleasure and satisfaction at the sight of the sparkling liquor which he pours into his cup, as produces the most agreeable effect.

The same admirable artist, in a piece which represents the passion of Christ, and is now in the gallery of Florence, has drawn the Virgin standing in an erect posture, and beholding the crucifixion of her son without shedding a tear, or discovering the least mark of affliction or pity. The sublime painter supposes her instructed in the grand mystery of redemption, and therefore makes her support this dreadful spectacle with resignation and greatness of soul.

There is no production of Michael Angelo, which does not bear some marks of the grandeur and elevation of his genius. There is, in his very sketches, that air of majesty, which Virgil has left unfinished.

There is a gallery at Mantoua, in which Giulio Romano has represented the giants thunder-struck by Jupiter. In this celebrated piece, all the gods appear seized with astonishment and terror, while Juno, with an air of tranquillity and fortitude, sits near Jupiter, and points out to him a giant who has escaped his bolts, and whom she entreats to destroy with the rest. By this, the artist has given to Juno an air of majesty, which raises her vastly above the other deities. We observe also in the same piece, that the terror painted in the looks of the gods is greater or less, in proportion as their places are more or less distant from the throne of Jupiter. This is highly natural; since, in a battle, the proximity of the victor is every way proper to dispel the fears of his troops.
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