Myth, Language and Complex Ideologies

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Abstract

Ideologies use for their conservation and propagation persuasive methods of communication: Rhetoric. Rhetoric is analyzed from the semiotic and logical-mathematical points of view. The following hypotheses are established: 1) Language L is a self-explanatory system, mediated by a successive series of systems of cultural conventions. 2) Connotative significances of an ideological advertising rhetoric must be known. 3) The notion of ideological information is a neutral notion that does not imply the valuation of ideology or its conditions of veracity or falsification. Rhetorical figures like metonymy, metaphor, parable analogy and allegory are defined as relations. Metaphor and parable are order relations. Operations of metonymic and metaphoric substitution are defined and several theorems derived from these operations have been deduced.

Keywords: Allegory, Analogy, Connotation chains, Ideology, Metaphor, Metonymy, Parable, Rhetoric.

1. INTRODUCTION

We tend to think of ideology as something like Marxism or liberalism, an elaborate state-sponsored politico-philosophical conceptual system, overt and explicit. Not to distinguish between complex ideologies, and ordinary ideas, beliefs, myths, prejudices etc., is to lose a whole level of analysis, and fails to differentiate between some rather low-level, trivial kinds of ideas, and more powerful, state-sanctioned or religious ideologies. It also fails to look at the components or elements of the ideological system, but treats them as an undifferentiated whole. Religious ideologies that influence language would of course include such things as the stance of Islam toward language (especially the status of Arabic, in the Koran), Christian and Jewish ideas expressed by terms such as "And God said, let there be light" or "In the beginning there was the Word, and the word was with God, and the word was God." "Nobody," says Terry Eagleton, "has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology" (Eagleton, 1991). Eagleton may be right as far as the wording of the concept of ideology is concerned. However, scholars generally agree on the social nature of ideology: it is about social relations, consciousness, and the power struggle which plays important parts in carrying out ideological objectives. Ideology, thus, is also about the consciousness of these relations (Kelle and Kovalson, 1973; Gouldner, 1976; Thompson, 1984; Fairclough, 1989). Because definitions of ideology have as their context Western society and its political-economic problems and issues, it would be relevant also to consider non-Western perspectives on ideology. For instance, in the Islamic context, ideology is not a negative concept. It is, indeed, an exceedingly positive, inspirational notion which governs people’s lives. From the Islamic point of view, ideology and religion do not exclude each other: ideological truths are religious truths and vice versa (Fitzgerald, 2003). Islamic scholars have claimed that there is no difference between the Islamic and the ideological (Nasr, 1994). For an Islamist a statement like, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (Marx and Engels, 1974) should be meaningless. The positive image
of ideology in Islam can be understood from the fact that the most influential Islamic scholars of the twentieth century have argued that Islam is not a religion, but an ideology.

Ideology endeavors (or claims) to change a situation/system (e.g., Lenin in the former Soviet Union, Hitler in Germany, Castro in Cuba, the Ayatollah in Iran). But once a system has been established, the same ideology can be used as an instrument to maintain the status quo. The Bolsheviks in the former Soviet Union, and Ayatollah Khomeini claimed to move into new eras of change, prosperity, and equality (Beetham, 1991); hence, the centrality of the role of the systematic use of power and myth-making in ideology. Ideology, says Lemberg, is synonymous with myth because both are “systems of ideas which constitute and pilot the large power blocks of our society” (Eugen Lemberg cited by Wodak, 1989). By “systematic exercise of power” is meant that an ideological movement or struggle is based on a definite line of action, and is not random. Power is “the production of intended effects” (Russell 1995 [1938]:), or one’s “ability to produce intended effects upon the world around them” (Beetham, 1991).

The following ideas were developed by George Herbert Mead (1964) and by structuralists such as Claude Levi-Strauss, beliefs about social issues, meanings of pertinent events, feelings about problems, role definitions and self-conceptions can be considered integral parts of a single cognitive structure, each facet of which defines and reinforces the others. Conventional thinking about each part of such a structure as being distinct and arrived at independently, enhances confidence in and attachment to them. Because they may be false, but nonetheless give meaning to events: such structures are forms of myth. The more critical reason why linguistic cues are evocative of larger belief structures must lie in the mutually reinforcing character of the distinct parts of any structure of ideological cognitions—their transformations into each other. Any one of these beliefs inevitably implies the others.

Levi-Strauss declares that "the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction [an impossible achievement if as it happens, the contradiction is real]...." (Levi-Strauss et al., 1963). Each of the primitive and religious myths he analyzes in his own work includes the oppositions and contradictions within itself. In the case of political myths, the basic function of overcoming a contradiction is still central, but there are pairs of opposing myths for each of the conflicting cognitive patterns that define attitudes toward social problems, authorities who deal with them and people who suffer from them. Our ambivalence is expressed in separate, concomitant myths, which are internally consistent, but inconsistent with each other. The structural difference between ideological and folk myths makes sense when we recall that a ideological myth serves to express and to undergird conflict between organized political groups as well as within the individual. As members of political parties, ideological groups and social movements, individuals lean toward one mythic pattern or the other. In this way, organized conflict between groups reflects separate mythic patterns. At the same time, the availability in the culture of the opposing myth permits the individual to reconcile contradictions and live with his ambivalence.

The following generalizations can be made about the structure of ideological myths:

1) For any pattern of beliefs about a controversial issue, the various components of the cognitive structure (beliefs about the cause of the problem, the roles of authorities, the classification of people according to levels of merit and the effective remedies) reinforce and evoke each other.
2) Myths regarding social problems conventionally classified as different (crime, poverty, mental illness) include the same fundamental mythemes.

3) Minor variations in the same basic myth at different times and different places reflect and express the range of tensions and intellectual impulses within the society.

4) The two mythic patterns that reflect conflicting cognitions remain separate, though both remain available for use when groups or individuals need them to resolve conflicts.

5) A fifth generalization, following another lead suggested by Levi-Strauss, is that the actions governments take to cope with social problems often contradict, as well as reflect, the myths used to rationalize them.

Perhaps the archetypical device for influencing opinion regarding ideological issues and actors is the evocation of beliefs about problems, intentions or moral conditions of large groups of people whose very existence is problematic, who become the benchmarks by which real people shape their political beliefs and perceptions. Sometimes such myths are essentially accurate. Politicians' statements about people's attitudes or situations are often impossible to verify or quite clearly invalid. Anxious people reliant upon dubious and conflicting cues usually choose from available public messages one that supports a policy consistent with their economic interests or ideological bent. The facts regarding controversial political issues are typically so complex, difficult to observe and ambiguous that it is usually easy to find a set of allegations that serve this rationalizing function and are not manifestly untrue. They can be and sometimes are deliberate lies; they are often interpretations their audience would recognize as dubious if enough was known about the observations on which they are based. Sometimes they are factual. As influences upon political opinion, however, their verifiability is less important than their availability.

2. LANGUAGE AND IDEOLOGY

Language is one of the given s in our lives. In this regard, Paul Ricoeur (1981) notes “the impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization.” Nevertheless, despite the ways in which our native language structures our initial ways of describing the world, linguists and philosophers of language have offered various accounts of how language changes and arguments concerning whether such changes are creative. Less frequently addressed are questions about how to assess the perceptual implications of these linguistic innovations (Goodman, 1978). In language, the processes of creativity and distortion are interrelated. However, the conclusion is one which proposes a distinction between and criterion for “positive” changes or creative distortions and “negative” changes or distortive creations (Gay, 1992). Nevertheless, creative distortions are not associated exclusively with metaphors and distortive creations exclusively with ideologies. For metaphor and ideology, “positive” and “negative” depend on how practical activity is facilitated, using a criterion of expansion or enrichment versus contraction or impoverishment of the semiotic-perceptual field. Hence, throughout we will stress how metaphor and ideology are similar, not how they are different.
Much philosophical effort has been expended in making the rather obvious point that a one-to-one correspondence between words (signs) and things (reference) is neither actual nor practical. Despite common rejection of even the possibility of such correspondence, theories of reference typically do not imply that because strict similitude of or correlation between words and things is absent that ineradicable incommensurability of or disproportionality between words and things is present. To affirm the latter is to abandon the quest for any instances of referentially transparent and unambiguous discourse. Because at least this quest is necessary if any spheres for the application of linguistic positivism are to be prescribed, some look for instances of such discourse and assume that, otherwise, we would have a “distinction without a difference.” The methodological guard against this situation is often termed the “principle of no vacuous contrast,” i.e., the requirement that a genuine predicate can never refer to either everything or nothing within its ‘universe of discourse.’ (Dray, 1964). In other words, talk of distorted communication presumably makes sense only if non-distorted communication is also actual or, at least, possible. In the phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty argued quite early that language is unalterably and ubiquitously allusive and implied that creative language is intentionally distortive. He even went so far as to correlate such linguistic creativity with authentic language. Hereby, he, along with Heidegger and others, initiated the over-emphasis within much phenomenology on creative speech as authentic. When taken in isolation, some of Ricoeur’s work, especially his remarks on metaphor, can be viewed as falling victim to the same error. For Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, at any moment chosen, a given lexicon establishes set oppositions which function as a totality. Since “the learned parts of a language have an immediate value as a whole,” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) a speaker moves from one ‘whole’ to another ‘whole’ (each a temporarily ‘closed’ totality) with the expression of new oppositions. Hence, acquisition is a process of internal division of a whole into further differences that are articulated in terms of more specific oppositions. This fact makes complete equivalence adequation between words and things unrealizable. Because internal division can in principle progress ad infinitum, Merleau-Ponty (1964) claims “the genesis of meaning is never completed.” Moreover, he maintains that “all language is indirect or allusive--that it’s, if you wish, silence.” Conversely, complete expression (direct and fully adequate signification) would be possible only if a specific language at a particular synchronic moment ‘captures’ things themselves in their forms. If expression were transparent, we would see through the glass of language clearly rather than dimly. If language per se is allusive and if expression depends on using signs against signs, then no standards for transparency exist which preclude the possibility that experimentation with how signs are opposed might better convey the meaning one intends to express. To speak or to write places a panel of glass before one’s audience providing an invitation to perceive in terms of its idiosyncratic focus. Sometimes, when previous perception is jolted rather strongly by new combinations of signs, creative distortions result; we see things in an altered light, from a different angle, in a “new sense.” Implicitly realizing the inadequacy of words to things, we often applaud the subtle nuance that even blatant distortions sometimes facilitate. We accept this practice in poetry; in fact, we employ metaphor across the board. But theories of linguistic creativity too easily assume that such innovations are in toto authentic, enriching creations, albeit distortive like all the rest. Rejecting any exact knowledge of or adequate language for “things in themselves” or reality, Ricoeur still views metaphor as one of our best vehicles for enriching our expression and perception. Although he focuses on how metaphor redescribes reality,
he stresses that its role is more hermeneutic than ontological, i.e., metaphor interprets, not makes, reality. The creative function of metaphor pertains to its impact on changing our perception. As Ricoeur says (1978), the purpose of metaphor "is neither to improve communication nor to insure univocal argumentation, but to shatter and to increase our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language." A new metaphor is like a new, distortive panel of glass in the corridor of language which alters how we focus on the landscape that it frames. At various points, Ricoeur even hints at how metaphor can convey an entire Weltanschauung, viewing metaphor as a work in miniature. Ricoeur (1981) sees indirect and polysemic language not only as ‘always already there’ for speakers but also as an ineluctable mediator of social reality. He states: If it is true that images which a social group forms of itself are interpretations which belong immediately to the constitution of the social bond, if, in other words, the social bond is itself symbolic, then it is absolutely futile to seek to derive the images from something prior which would be reality, real activity, the process of real life, of which there would be secondary reflections and echoes.

Ricoeur makes this point while discussing ideology, not symbol or metaphor. According to Hübler (2007), a concept is identified by a name or a symbol and contains the following items: an objective; a definition; a collection of examples; a collection of typical applications; and a list of related concepts. Moreover, the preceding quote is followed by the statement that, a non-ideological discourse on ideology here comes up against the impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization. Social reality, as “always already” symbolized, is mediated not only by polysemic language but also through ideologically-charged discourse. It is the classic view of Marxism’s ideology critique that to the extent that class bias permeates language distorted communication results. Ricoeur, of course, concedes the link between the images a social group forms of itself and the class bias of that social group. This concession, along with the preceding quote, would seem to imply that not only is language allusive but also it is ideological. Moreover, while this view of the ideological character of language avoids a naive equation of creative speech with authentic speech, it throws the polysemic character of language into a different light and introduces a tension between what Ricoeur says about metaphor and ideology. For Ricoeur, both metaphor and ideology exploit poliesmies, although he makes these points separately and does not pursue their joint effect for his theory of creativity. Of course, one can experiment with ideologies and the various foci they facilitate. Hence, it would seem that ideology, like metaphor, can be compared to distorting glass panels. Moreover, all layered language is a product of metaphorical expansion of polysemy; even it is a product of ideological expansion of polysemic as well. These considerations could lead one to ask whether metaphor and ideology (instead of authenticity) are to be equated. Once one sees semiology as ideology, the temptation arises to equate ideology with domination. Of course, Marxists from Volosinov to Habermas would agree; they could even be correct. A theory of linguistic creativity which includes a comparative analysis of metaphor and ideology can avoid these pitfalls. Moreover, viewing a metaphor or an ideology as a “panel of glass” allows, as well, for comparison of their impact on perception, i.e., on their differing affects on our focus.

Linguistic/language ideologies have been defined as "sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use" (Woolard and. Schieffelin, 1994). With a greater social emphasis "self-evident ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group" and "the
cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together "with their loading of moral and political interests"; and most broadly as shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world. The basic division in studies of ideology is between neutral and critical values of the term. The former usually encompasses all cultural systems of representation; the latter is reserved for only some aspects of representation and social cognition, with particular social origins or functional or formal characteristics. The identification of a language with a people has been given the most attention (Fishman, 1989; Hymes, 1984; Urban, 1991). It is a truism that the equation of language and nation is a historical, ideological construct (Coulmas, 1989; de Certau et al., 1984; Grillo, 1989; Handler, 1989; Mackey, 1991), conventionally dated to Herder and eighteenth century German romanticism, although the famous characterization of language as the genius of a people can be traced to the French Enlightenment and specifically Condillac (Aarsleff, 1982; Koepke, 1990; Olender, 1992).

The equation of one language/one people, the Western insistence on the authenticity and moral significance of the mother tongue, and associated assumptions about the importance of purist language loyalty for the maintenance of minority languages have all been criticized as ideological red herrings, particularly in settings where multilingualism is more typical and where a fluid or complex linguistic repertoire is valued (Attimasi, 1983; Khubchandani, 1983; Le Page, 1988; McDonald, 1989; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1989). Modern linguistic theory itself has been seen as framed and constrained by the one language/one people assumption. Although the validity of the nationalist ideology of language has often been debated or debunked, less attention traditionally has been given to understanding how the view of language as symbolic of self and community has taken hold in so many different settings. Where linguistic variation appears to be simply a diagram of social differentiation, the analyst needs to identify the ideological production of that diagram (Irvine, 1989). Recent studies of language politics have begun to examine specifically the content and signifying structure of nationalist language ideologies (Silverstein, 1987; Sontag and Pool, 1987; Woolard, 1989).

Language varieties that are regularly associated with (and thus index) particular speakers are often revalued (or misrecognized) not just as symbols of group identity, but as emblems of political allegiance or of social, intellectual, or moral worth. Although the extensive body of research on linguistic prestige and language attitudes grew up in a social psychological framework (Giles et al., 1987), the intrapersonal attitude can be recast as a socially-derived intellectualized or behavioral ideology (Bourdieu’s habitus) (Bourdieu, 1991; García and Evangelista, 1988; Gross, 1983; Woolard, 1985, 1989a,b; Woolard and Gahng, 1990). Such meanings affect patterns of language acquisition, style-switching, shift, change, and policy. Moreover, symbolic revalorization often makes discrimination on linguistic grounds publicly acceptable, whereas the corresponding ethnic or racial discrimination is not (Leibowitz, 1976; Messick, 1993). However, simply asserting that struggles over language are really about racism does not constitute analysis. Such a tearing aside of the curtain of mystification in a "Wizard of Oz theory of ideology" (Asad, 1979) begs the question of how and why language comes to stand for social groups in a manner that is socially both comprehensible and

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1 The actual problem of Catalan separatism is based precisely on this fact: one language, one people, one nation. No matter that there are centuries of common history, similar or equal customs, etc. Myths that contradict real historical figures have been falsified and have even come to invent the Catalan identity of Cervantes, the great writer of Don Quixote. It is a clear example of the ideological use of language.
acceptable. The current program of research is to address both the semiotic and the social process. Communities not only evaluate but may appropriate some part of the linguistic resources of groups with whom they are in contact and in tension, refiguring and incorporating linguistic structures in ways that reveal linguistic and social ideologies. Linguistic ideology is not a predictable, automatic reflex of the social experience of multilingualism in which it is rooted; it makes its own contribution as an interpretive filter in the relationship of language and society. The failure to transmit vernaculars intergenerationally may be rationalized in various ways, depending on how speakers conceptualize the links of language, cognition, and social life.

Beliefs about what is or is not a real language, and underlying these beliefs, the notion that there are distinctly identifiable languages that can be isolated, named, and counted, enter into strategies of social domination. Such beliefs, and related schemata for ranking languages as more or less evolved, have contributed to profound decisions about, for example, the civility or even the humanity of subjects of colonial domination. They also quality or disqualify speech varieties from certain institutional uses and their speakers from access to domains of privilege (Bourdieu, 1991; Davies, 1984; Gumperz, 1982; Labov, 1982). Grammatical variability and the question of whether a variety has a grammar play an important part (Eckert, 1983). The extension of the notion grammar from the explicitly artifactual product of scholarly intervention to an abstract underlying system has done nothing to mute the polemics.

Even the syntactic structure of ideological language can evoke a set of mythic beliefs, perhaps in even more subtle and powerful fashion than metonymy or metaphor. When politicians and government officials appeal for public support for policies or candidates, the form of their statements conveys the message that public opinion is influential, and it does so for those who accept the particular appeal and for those who do not, regardless of the content of the statement. If an appeal for support is made, then support obviously counts. Language also conveys a reassuring message regardless of its content. Because the language of statutes, constitutions and treaties consists of definitions and of specific commands to judges, administrative officials and the general public to behave in ways specified by elected representatives of the people, its very form reassures popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Lawyers take the ambiguity of legal language for granted in their practice, constantly disputing the meaning of terms. To the general public, legal language symbolizes precision and clarity in specifying the will of legislatures and constitutional conventions.

The model of Quillian\(^2\) is governed by a limitless semiosis, that is to say, each lexeme, sooner or later, acquires connections with another one, and each substitution has to

\(^2\) The model of Quillian or model of limitless semiosis (Quillian, 1968) is based reciprocally on a series of nodes connected by different types from associative vehicles. For each meaning of a lexeme, a node must exist anticipating the term that it is to define. The definition of a type \(X_1\) anticipates the use of a series of different significants, as their interpretants, receiving the name of tokens (Peirce, 1931-1935) being lexemes. The configuration of the lexemes’ meaning comes given by multiplicity of bonds with different tokens, each one of which becomes type \(X_2\), from where it creates a new configuration including as tokens many others lexemes, some from which were lexemes of the type \(X_1\). The complete structure will have to form an enormous aggregation of ramifications in which each sign will be defined by another sign and each sign will become interpretant or interpreted of other signs. From any sign adopted as a central type is possible to get to cross all the universes of cultural units, each one of which can be the centre and generate infinite peripheries. This model tries to be a class of pluridimensional network, equipped with topological properties, in which the routes are extended and shortened and where each term comes near to the others through short cuts and direct contacts, remaining simultaneously tie to the others by flexible
depend on a connection that the code anticipates. Of course, connections can be created about which nobody has thought. In this case, we have an ambiguous message. The aesthetic function of the language tends to create new connections, and therefore, to enrich the possibilities of the code. Because of the importance this has with respect to belief systems and ideologies, we are going to study four rhetorical figures: metonymy, metaphor, parable and analogy. Rhetorical figures can be explained using the Quillian model. Both rhetorical figures can be explained as two forms of operational substitution operating on paradigmatic or syntagmatic axes. Through metaphor, metonymy and syntax, linguistic references evoke mythic cognitive structures in people's minds. This is hardly surprising, for ambiguous situations that concern us are naturally defined by focusing on one part of them or by comparing them with what is familiar.

3. RHETORICAL FIGURES

In the Deontical Impure Systems (DIS)\textsuperscript{3} approach i.e. human society, the Superstructure has been divided in two (Usó-Domènech et al. 2009\textsuperscript{a,b}; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Domènech, 2013\textsuperscript{b,c,d,e}; Usó-Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2013; Usó-Domènech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012):

1) The Doxical Superstructure (DS) is formed by values in fact, political and religious ideologies and culture of a human society in a certain historical time.

2) The Mythical Superstructure (MS) also has been divided in two parts:

   a) MS\textsubscript{1} containing the mythical components or primogenial bases of the ideologies and cultures with the ideal values.

   b) MS\textsubscript{2} containing ideal values and utopias that are the ideally wished and unattainable goals of belief systems of the Doxical Superstructure (DS).

relations. Nevertheless, in fact, a graph does not exist representing the model in all its complexity. Quillian admits that the nodes representing specific words can be augmented with new research data. It is a model of linguistic creativity. In addition, it gives a comprehensive image of the discussions of Wittgenstein on meaning as a continuous superposition of correlations (Wittgenstein, 1953).

\textsuperscript{3} Impure sets (Maddy, 1990) are sets whose referential elements (absolute beings) are not counted as abstract objects and have the following conditions: a) They are real (material or energetic absolute beings). b) They exist independently of the Subject. c) S develops p-significances on them. d) True things can be said about them. e) Subject can know these true things about them. f) They have properties that support a robust notion of mathematical truth. A simple impure system-linkage $\Sigma = (M, R)$ is a semiotic system consisting of the pair formed by an impure object set $M$ the elements of which are p-significances (relative beings) of entities belonging to Reality (absolute beings) or certain attributes of these, and a set of binary relations, such that $R \subseteq P(M \times M) = M^2$. That is $\forall r \in R : r \subseteq M \times M$ being $r = \{(x_i, x_j) \in M \times M \mid x_i, x_j \in M\}$. An impure system-linkage defined within an impure object set $M$ is a simple system $S = (M, R)$ or a finite union of simple systems-linkage $\Sigma = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \Sigma_i$ such that $\Sigma_i$ are simple systems. This shall be denoted as $\Sigma = (M, R)$ such that $R \subseteq P(\cup_{\text{finite}}M^2)$. A Deontical system is an organization of knowledge on the part of the subject $S$ that fulfils the following conditions: a) Other subjects (human beings) are elements of the system. b) Some existing relations between elements have Deontic modalities. c) There is purpose (purposes).
These ideas are summarized in the following diagram (Figure 1):

![Diagram of DIS approach. Structural base and superstructures.](image)

**Figure 1: DIS approach. Structural base and superstructures.**

Let $\rho^j_i$ be a connotative chain\(^4\). Index i expresses a connotative chain and supraindex j expresses a connotative chain after passing through a certain doxical filter. Let L be a language. The experience of the individuals or social groups moves in a double domain; all of this is articulated linguistically by mediation of a set of the connotative chains $P = \{\rho^j_i\}_{i=1}^{\ldots,m}$, and can, at any moment, be represented less than adequately by the invoked significants, to be translated to an organizing language. Language L is surpassed always

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\(^4\) Connotation is the sum of all the cultural units that the significant can evoke institutionally in the mind of the addressee Subject whose only psychic possibility is cultural availability. The connotation of socio-cultural and individual associations, are the ideologies derived from the belief systems, and the emotional ones belonging to the psychology of the Subject, and that is the indirect function of the Semiotic Environment (context) in which is immersed. The B-significant (B-2), second order significant or connotation is the significant of significance s. Changes in the form of the significant $n$ can generate different connotations. The sequence of connotations is a chain of connotations o connotative chain (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech. 2013\(^{a,b,c,d,e}\)).
and the possibility of a linguistic structuring is outlined permanently. This exteriority is 
real; the individual is in front of diverse sublanguages $L_i \subset L$, formed by the different 
connotative chains that occur in the crucible of his experience and so that $\rho_j \in L_i$. 
These sublanguages are supported by social groups, associations, and individuals that 
update them with their behaviors, giving a social dimension assuring its coherence and 
permanence. Therefore, all social experience is located inside a semantic field of 
connotative significances. By definition, it can never correspond to the language L, 
which includes it. The individual finds a sublanguage $L_i$ constituted so that it seems apt 
to translate all the sense of his history; it enriches him with specific details of his 
existence, but at the same time, this existence loses its chaotic sense, is ordered, and 
completed in an intelligible place with other human lives. Community and difference 
overlap closely. In addition, suddenly, this dissymmetric and heterogeneous 
environment is reconstructed. Sublanguage $L_i$ explains, gives a sense, and fixes the 
identity of the condition. By this only fact, it is validated and reassumed in its 
generality. The encounter with the sublanguage $L_i$ is a rare time theoretically or 
abstractly. It happens through an individual mediation that is a conscious vehicle and 
that is incarnate in his existence. They appear as unified forms with which the others 
could identify. Peculiarly, they are the true connotative significances for this one 
sublanguage. The contingency of the encounter is not for that reason less evident. 
Moreover, although it is contingent, this encounter does not let have irreversible effects. 
The individual is marked by the sublanguage $L_i$ that has totalized his experience; here 
significance is pronounced as the quasi-biological incidence of the connotative 
significances on the human being. The better proof is the fact that sometimes another 
sublanguage $L_j$ cannot be sufficient. Nevertheless, how are sublanguages selected? By 
mediation of a technique of persuasion defined as Rhetoric. Ideological rhetoric and 
action comprise an elaborate dialectical structure, reflecting the beliefs, tensions and 
ambivalences that flow from social inequality and conflicting interests. 
For our intentions we are going to define some of the more important rhetorical figures 
and then they are widely used in the ideological discourse having the objective to 
transmit the ideology, assuring its permanence and diffusion (Beekman and 
Callow, 1974; Corbett, 1971; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013a,b,c,d; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012)

3.1. Metonymy

Metonymy is a figure of speech in which a thing, concept, person, or group is 
represented by something closely associated with it. Metonymy is often contrasted with 
metaphor. Metonymy is characterized by association, whereas metaphor establishes a 
relationship of similarity. Thus referring to a king as the throne is an instance of 
metonymy. Referring to the king as a lion is an instance of metaphor. A conventional 
metonymy is a metonymy that is commonly used in everyday language in a culture to 
give structure to some portion of that culture’s conceptual system.

Let $c_s_i$ and $c_s_j$ be two connotations (cultural units). We denote as $\mu$ the relation of 
metonymy and $c_s_i \mu c_s_j$ we will say that $c_s_i$ is metonymically related to $c_s_j$ 
or $c_s_j$ is a metonymy of $c_s_i$. The metonymy has the following properties:

- **Reflexive property:** $c_s_i \mu c_s_i$. Every connotation is metonymy of itself.
- **Symmetrical property:** $c_s_i \mu c_s_j = c_s_j \mu c_s_i$. 

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c) **Transitive property:** If $c - s_i \quad c - s_j$ and $c - s_j \quad c - s_k$ then $c - s_i \quad c - s_k$

We are to define the operation of **Metonymic substitution**. In the common practice of the language, proximities have been verified on the **sintagmatic axis**. Let $c - s_i$ and $c - s_j$ be two lexemes. We define an **operation of metonymic substitution**, denoted by $(\mu s)$, and so that $c - s_i \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_j \rightarrow c - s_j$.

**Example 1:** Consider the following chain of connotations (figure 2):

![SINTAGMATIC AXIS](image)

**Figure 2:** Chain of connotations.

In figure 1 we can establish the following metonymic substitutions:

- $c - s_1 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_2 \rightarrow c - s_2$
- $c - s_1 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_4 \rightarrow c - s_4$
- $c - s_2 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_3 \rightarrow c - s_3$
- $c - s_2 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_5 \rightarrow c - s_5$
- $c - s_4 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_6 \rightarrow c - s_6$
- $c - s_6 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_9 \rightarrow c - s_9$.

Then

- $c - s_1 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_2 \rightarrow c - s_2 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_3 \rightarrow c - s_3 \quad (\mu s)^2 \quad c - s_3 \rightarrow c - s_3$
- $c - s_1 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_2 \rightarrow c - s_2 \quad (\mu s) \quad c - s_5 \rightarrow c - s_5 \quad (\mu s)^2 \quad c - s_5 \rightarrow c - s_5$
Generalizing
\[ c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_j = (\mu s) c - s_i \]
m being the number of existing semantic connections of substitution between \( c - s_i \) and \( c - s_j \) in the model of Quillian.

Let \( c - s_0 \) be a connotative significance of null meaning. Metonymic substitution has the following properties:

1) Commutative property: \( (c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_j) = (c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_i) \).
2) It has no Neutral element: \( (c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_0) \neq (c - s_0 (\mu s) c - s_i) \).
3) Associative property:
\[
(c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_j)(\mu s)[(c - s_k (\mu s) c - s_i) c - s_j] = (c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_k (\mu s) c - s_j)
\]

We are to define the operation of double metonymic substitution.

Let \( c - s_i, c - s_j \) be two connotative significances fulfilling the condition of metonymy so that \( c - s_i \equiv c - s_j \). Let \( c - s_i^*, c - s_j^* \) be its two equivalents in a different context and so that \( c - s_i^* \equiv c - s_j^* \) and so that \( c - s_i^* \equiv c - s_j^* \). We will designate by \( (\mu s)^{++} \) the operation of double metonymic substitution.

**Theorem 1:** \( c - s_j (\mu s)^{++} c - s_i^* \)

**Proof:**

By the symmetrical property of the metonymic relation, we may establish that:
\[
c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_j \land c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_i
\]
\[
c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j^* \land c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_i^*
\]

If
\[
[(c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_i) \land (c - s_i \equiv c - s_i^*)] \rightarrow c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_i^*
\]
\[
[(c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \land (c - s_j \equiv c - s_j^*)] \rightarrow c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j
\]

Therefore \( c - s_j (\mu s)^{++} c - s_i^* \)

**Theorem 2:** \( c - s_i (\mu s)^{++} c - s_i^* \)

**Proof:**

If
\[
[(c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \land (c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j)
\]
than
We are to define the operation of **Multiple Metonymic Substitution**.

Let $c - s_i, c - s_j, \ldots, c - s_n$ be $n$ connotative significances fulfilling the condition of metonymy so that:

$c - s_i \mu c - s_j \ldots c - s_j \mu c - s_n \ldots c - s_n \mu c - s_{n-1} \mu c - s_n$.

Let $c - s_i^*, c - s_j^*, \ldots, c - s_n^*$ be its equivalents in a different context and so that:

$(c - s_i \equiv c - s_i^*) \land (c - s_j \equiv c - s_j^*) \land \ldots \land (c - s_n \equiv c - s_n^*)$ and so that:

$c - s_i^* \mu c - s_j^* \ldots c - s_j^* \mu c - s_n^* \ldots c - s_n^* \mu c - s_{n-1} \mu c - s_n$.

**Theorem 3:**

$(c - s_j (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_j^*) \land \ldots \land (c - s_n (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_n^*) \land (c - s_j (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_j^*) \land \ldots \land (c - s_n (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_n^*)$

**Proof:**

By the symmetrical property of the metonymic relation, we may establish that:

$c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_j \land c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_i, \ldots, c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_n \land c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_i$

$c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_k \land c - s_k (\mu s) c - s_j, \ldots, c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_n \land c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_j$

$c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j \land c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j^* \land c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j \land c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j^*$

$c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j^* \land c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j^* \land c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j^*$

$c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_n \land c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_n^*$

If

$[(c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j) \land (c - s_i \equiv c - s_i^*)] \rightarrow c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j^*$

$[(c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_j) \land (c - s_i \equiv c - s_i^*)] \rightarrow c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_i^*$

$[(c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j) \land (c - s_j \equiv c - s_j^*)] \rightarrow c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j^*$

$[(c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_j) \land (c - s_j \equiv c - s_j^*)] \rightarrow c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_j^*$

$[(c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_i) \land (c - s_j \equiv c - s_j^*)] \rightarrow c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_i^*$

$[(c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_i) \land (c - s_i \equiv c - s_i^*)] \rightarrow c - s_i (\mu s) c - s_j^*$

therefore

$(c - s_j (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_j^*) \land \ldots \land (c - s_n (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_n^*) \land (c - s_j (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_j^*) \land \ldots \land (c - s_n (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_n^*)$

$\ldots \land (c - s_j^* (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_j^*) \land \ldots \land (c - s_n^* (\mu s)^\leftrightarrow c - s_n^*)$
Theorem 4: \( c - s_i (\mu s) \) \( \Rightarrow \) \( c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_k \) \( c - s_j (\mu s) nsc - s_n \) \( c - s_n, \ldots, c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_n \)

Proof:

If \( [(c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \) (a)

\[ [(c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \] (b)

\[ [(c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_k^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \] (c)

\[ [(c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_k^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \] (d)

\[ [(c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_n) \] (e)

then of

(a) \( \Rightarrow [(c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \) therefore \( c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j \)

(b) \( \Rightarrow [(c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_i^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \) therefore \( c - s_k (\mu s) c - s_j \)

(c) \( \Rightarrow [(c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_k^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \) therefore \( c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j \)

(d) \( \Rightarrow [(c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_k^* (\mu s) c - s_j)] \rightarrow (c - s_j^* (\mu s) c - s_j) \) therefore \( c - s_j (\mu s) c - s_j \)

(e) \( \Rightarrow [(c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_n)] \rightarrow (c - s_n^* (\mu s) c - s_n) \) therefore \( c - s_n (\mu s) c - s_n \)

Multiple metonymic substitutions are essential to understand mathematically the ideological transmission through messages of advertising type. Any reader of publicity understands this process developed in theorems 3 and 4 with no need to be involved in such a laborious analysis.

3.2. Metaphor

A metaphor is the expression of an understanding of one concept in terms of another concept, where there is some similarity or correlation between the two or understanding of one concept in terms of another. Metaphor is a word used in an unfamiliar context to give us a new insight; a good metaphor moves us to see our ordinary world in an extraordinary way. For example: My salad days, when I was green in judgement. (Shakespeare).

Metaphors and symbols are better means to communicate than explicit discursive non-symbolic language. Thinking entirely symbolically is not effective either. A 'mature' thinker uses both, and so does a 'mature' civilization. Symbol differs from metaphor in that it need not contain a comparison. A symbol is an object or event that, by virtue of association, represents something more or something other than the referent. Using symbols is not a sign of regression. We use symbols and metaphors to explain things. They are our best method of thinking creatively. They are much more effective means of communication than discursive non symbolic language. The symbol and the metaphor are like the egg of the phoenix. A symbol dies when it ceases to inspire and create an emotional response from those who encounter it. But a symbol can rise up
from the ashes of its so-called death and be re-born into new meaning. That is its power. Symbols and metaphors are part of the unconscious language. Jung and Giegerich are correct. But, this is not primitive in a historic sense. Metaphors and symbols are primitive in the sense of being part of the thought processes that we developed prior to the more formal systems of logical and analysis, that non-symbolic discursive language. We cannot think new thoughts or ideas without symbols and metaphors. When we are inspired to make use of symbols and/or a metaphors it is an example of our unconscious thought processes trying to communicate with our conscious mind. Sometimes the ideological appeal of a symbol is stronger than the observable conditions in which people live. One study has noted, for example, that welfare recipients almost always refer to other recipients as "they" rather than "we"; and that a majority of people on welfare favour midnight searches of the homes of welfare recipients and require budget counselling. These people ignore their own experiences and focus upon a mythical population of welfare parasites created by the language of their political adversaries. Fortunately, such symbolic devices are not omnipotent. People often resist them when they run counter to their self-evident or perceived interests, but many do not.

What is at issue, of course, is not just metaphor as a useful (or even a necessary) means of communicating something we already know. This would be allegory, not metaphor. Rather metaphor is a way of knowing, not just a way of communicating. In metaphor knowledge and its expression are one and the same; there is no way around the metaphor, it is not expendable.

Metaphor is equally effective and probably even more common in the linguistic evocation of ideological myths. The eminent psychologist Theodore Sarbin (1994) has suggested that when Teresa of Avila referred, in the seventeenth century, to the problems of emotionally disturbed people as being like an illness, she used a metaphor which ultimately became a myth. In view of anthropological evidence that cultures differ greatly in what they define as mental abnormality and other studies demonstrating the social basis of such labelling, many social scientists, including Sarbin, believe that the judgment involved in calling someone "schizophrenic" is basically moral, not medical. Yet the metaphor of mental illness has become a myth widely accepted by laymen and conventional psychiatrists. It is used every day to deny freedom and dignity to people who already suffer from too little of either, and it is often used to enforce conformity to middle-class norms in the United States and to Communist party norms in China. Sarbin suggests that such movement from metaphor to myth is a common social phenomenon; it is especially common as a political phenomenon as well.

We denote as \( \mathbf{M} \) the relation of metaphor and \( c - s_i \mathbf{M} c - s_j \) we will say that \( c - s_i \) is metaphorically related to \( c - s_j \) or \( c - s_j \) is a metaphor of \( c - s_i \). Metaphor has the following properties:

a) **Reflexive property:** \( c - s_i \mathbf{M} c - s_i \). Every connotation is metaphor of itself.

b) **Antisymmetrical property:** \( c - s_i \mathbf{M} c - s_j \neq c - s_j \mathbf{M} c - s_i \).

c) **Transitive property:** If \( c - s_i \mathbf{M} c - s_j \) and \( c - s_j \mathbf{M} c - s_k \) then \( c - s_i \mathbf{M} c - s_k \)

Then, metaphorical relation is an order relation.

We define the operation of **metaphoric substitution**.
Let \( \rho \) be a connotative chain and \( c - s_j^i \) be connotative significances (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). We are going to establish the following rule of substitution: any connotative significance can be replaced by another one, that belongs or not to the same connotative chain. We will denominate \((\mathbf{Ms})\) to the operation of metaphoric substitution and so that \( c - s_j^i (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_j^l \) and that we can read \( c - s_j^i \) has metaphorically replaced \( c - s_j^k \) or \( c - s_j^l \) is a metaphor of \( c - s_j^k \).

a) Simple metaphors

1) Substitution by primary antonymy: \( c - s_1^1 (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_1^2 \)
2) Substitution by secondary antonymy: \( c - s_1^1 (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_2^1 \)
3) Substitution by n-th antonym: \( c - s_1^1 (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_n^1 \)
4) Substitution by obvious connotation: \( c - s_1^1 (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_1^1 \)

b) Mediate metaphors

5) Substitution by sharpness: \( c - s_1^1 (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_n^1 \)

And so on.

Any type of previously defined metaphor can be created by the operation of metaphoric substitution. It is enough that lexemes exist or are introduced in the code.

Let us suppose that in language L there is a habitual practice in which \( c - s_1^1 \) is replaced by \( c - s_1^2 \). This case \( c - s_1^2 \) becomes by convention in one of the possible connotations of \( c - s_1^1 \). Substitution by antonymy, when a habit enters into the code and in the end it fossilizes as a catachresis. Metaphorical substitution takes place by the fact that in the code connections exist, and therefore, proximity. Metaphoric substitution has the following properties:

1) Metaphoric substitution has not commutative properties: \( c - s_1^k (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_1^l \neq c - s_j^k (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_j^l \).
2) Multiple substitution: If \( c - s_1^k (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_1^l \) and \( c - s_j^k (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_j^l \), then \( c - s_m^k (\mathbf{Ms}) \rightarrow c - s_m^l \).

Any symbolic representation of reality can be considered as a text \( T \). Logically a text can be divided in subtexts, such as \( T_i \subseteq T \). Simultaneously, each subtext can be divided in smaller units, arriving at the word (or an elementary sign) level that would be the primitive text.

Let \( T_1 \) and \( T_2 \) be two texts and \( T_1^* \) be a subtext of \( T_1 \), such as \( T_1^* \subseteq T_1 \). We define as

\[ \implies \text{ the operation of semantic resemblance and } \approx \text{ the operation of semantic } \]
equality such as \( T_1 \approx T_2 \) such that \( T_2 \) is used to enhance the meaning associated with \( T_1 \).

**Axiom 1:** The operation of semantic equality is a suboperation of semantic resemblance.

**Definition 1:** Metaphor is when we say \( T_1 \approx \text{cesignifican} \ T_2 \).

### 3.3. The Parable

A parable is a brief allegory that is used to teach a moral lesson. A parable is a metaphor that has been extended to form a brief, coherent fiction. Parables are stories, of course, but of a particular kind -- stories that set the familiar in an unfamiliar context, which is also, what a metaphor does. Parables are not used by religious ideologies solely. Different kinds of policy assumptions are based on distinct political beliefs and their often-implicit philosophical traditions, and these “political parables of citizenship and personhood” provoke different kinds of political activism.

We denote as \( \mathcal{P} \) the relation of parable and \( c - s_i \mathcal{P} c - s_j \) we will say that \( c - s_i \) is parabletically related to \( c - s_j \) or \( c - s_i \) is a parable of \( c - s_j \). In this case \( c - s_j \) always explains or interprets \( c - s_i \).

The properties of parabietical relation are:

- **a) Reflexive property:** \( c - s_i \mathcal{P} c - s_j \). Every connotation is parable of itself.
- **b) Antisymmetrical property:** \( c - s_i \mathcal{P} c - s_j \neq c - s_j \mathcal{P} c - s_i \).
- **c) Transitive property:** If \( c - s_i \mathcal{P} c - s_j \) and \( c - s_j \mathcal{P} c - s_k \) then \( c - s_i \mathcal{P} c - s_k \)

The transitive property indicates the possibility of chained parables as in the case of Ignacy\(^5\) Krasicki (Milosz, 1983). Then, parabetical relation is an order relation.

### 3.4. The Analogy

In preceding works, we established the deontical modalities: *obligation, prohibition, permission and faculty*. Nevertheless, a Deontical Impure System (Nescolarde-Selva et al, 2012\(^{a,b,}\); Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013\(^{a,b,e}\); Usó-Doménech, and Nescolarde-Selva 2013; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012), presents five modalities in many of their relations. *Analogy and allegory* are essential in the understanding of the transmission conservation and materialization of the belief systems and ideologies, belonging to the Doxical Superstructure (IDS). The fundamental question in this ongoing debate is, how do we know an analogy really exists? Analogy as a procedure of unification and arrangement

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\(^5\) Parables are chained, as for example, when Matthew 13 puts together the Treasure, the Pearl, and the Fishnet; or when Luke 15 chains the Lost Sheep and the Lost coin with the Lost (Prodigal) Son. In the chains Gospel writers have recast parables in a parallel style in order to indicate similar meaning.
continuously appears in myth, art and poetry. Its presence always exposes a spiritual force (mythical) in action, the necessity to reunite what is dispersed. There is an asymmetry of metaphorical statements. As metaphors, analogies are always asymmetrical. The primary purpose of analogy, in most cases, is to compare a lesser-known domain with a better-known one. This allows one to carry structure from the better-known domain over to the lesser-known domain, in the form of inferences, to produce more knowledge about it. This sort of directional production of inferences is what produces the asymmetry in metaphors as well. In metaphor, the vehicle corresponds to the better-known domain, and the topic to the lesser-known, and inferences are produced from the vehicle to the topic. The "Aquinas was a midwife" metaphor demonstrates this. The inferences about internal development are carried from the topic to the vehicle, and no inferences are made in the other direction.

**Definition 2:** An analogy is a figure of speech in which there is a likeness in one or more ways between things unlike otherwise.

**Definition 3:** An analogy is when $T_1^* \subseteq \frac{T_1}{T_1^* \sim} T_2$.

In analogy there is no replacement, only aspectual comparison, and implied in this is that if $T_1 \sim T_2$ in certain states, there is a chance that other similar states will also be found. The analogy has the following characteristic:

**Definition 4 (Principle of sufficient identification):** There is a relative assimilation between objects, not by their values, but by the sense of their situations, since it only concerns the dynamic position, is to say the symbolic position of the objects, and it is considered the nucleus of the symbolic action.

It is comprehensible that identification is sufficient from the moment at which it takes place exactly in the symbolic tension. Two objects, essentially the same and with similar functions, but that are existentially different, become an interchangeable symbolic unit. While agreeing in their functions, with the same properties, both objects that existentially are different, become a unit in the symbol and are interchangeable. The symbolic image is not an "example" (an external and possible relation between two objects or connections), but an internal analogy (a necessary and constant relation). To infer the analogy underlying somebody's thinking from the metaphors used in their speech is chancy; sometimes one set of metaphors is conventionalized for a given topic, but people can, on command, rapidly switch to a different set of metaphors to express the same ideas about the same topic. The structure mapping theory of metaphor treats metaphors as analogies, at least in their underlying cognitive mechanisms. Some metaphors are obviously similar to analogies, and may even be considered analogies. However, structure mapping theory can handle similarity comparisons and metaphors that only involve the mapping of attributes. On the surface, the existence of these two different types of metaphor seems to make the possibility of a general theory of metaphor that treats metaphor as analogy impossible. However, it turns out that literal similarity comparisons may also involve the same processes as analogies, which means that metaphors that function as literal similarity comparisons could also be analogies. Yet it is generally the ideas we care about.
To distinguish between analogy and metaphor, we note that:

1) When analyzing a metaphor, we then notice aspectual similarities between it and a different metaphor and say $T_1^\text{MA} \equiv T_2^\text{MB}$; this is analogy, and the ability to do this rests on the sharing of the proposed template. Metaphor is as analogy. Analogies involve the structural alignment of two (or more) structured representations (representations containing objects, their relations, and their attributes, along with relations between relations) so that the common elements in the representations are mapped onto each other.

2) Systematicity requires that, all things being equal, higher-order mappings are preferred. This means that mappings involving relations between relations will be preferred to mappings involving relations between objects, and mappings between relations between objects will be preferred to mappings between objects or their attributes.

3) The one-to-one mapping constraint requires that each element in a representation be connected to at most one element in the other domain. For instance, in "The atom is as the solar system" analogy, once we map the planets in the solar system domain onto electrons in the atom domain, we cannot also map the planets onto the nucleus or some other element in the atom domain.

4) Parallel-connectivity requires that when elements are mapped onto each other, their arguments are also mapped. For instance, when we map the "Revolve around" relation in the "Atom is as the solar system" analogy, then parallel connectivity requires that the arguments (planets-sun in the solar system domain, and electrons-nucleus in the atom domain) be mapped as well.

Since metaphors resemble both types of comparisons, structure mapping has been used as a theory of metaphor.

**Theorem 5:** A metaphor is a verbal construction, which expresses an analogy.

**Proof**

Let $T_1 \approx T_2$ a metaphor. Since for Axiom $1 \equiv \subset \equiv$ then $T_1 \equiv T_2$.

**Theorem 6:** An analogy can be expressed non-metaphorically, and metaphors can be so confused as to not express any coherent analogy.

**Proof**

It is trivial.

**Conclusion:** Metaphors are a special case of analogies.

4. ALLEGORY
An allegory is a story with two meanings, a literal meaning and a symbolic meaning. An allegory involves using many interconnected symbols or allegorical figures in such a way that nearly every element of the narrative has a meaning beyond the literal level, i.e., everything in the narrative is a symbol that relates to other symbols within the story. The allegorical story, poem, or play can be read either literally or as a symbolic statement about a political, spiritual, or psychological truth. If we wish to be more exact, an allegory is an act of interpretation—a way of understanding—rather than a genre in and of itself. Poems, novels, or plays can all be allegorical. These can be as short as a single sentence or as long as a ten-volume book. The label "allegory" comes from an interaction between symbols that creates a coherent meaning beyond that of the literal level of interpretation. A simple description of allegory based on this etymology is “to speak otherwise than one seems to speak.” That is to say that in allegory there are two distinct levels on which meaning is being conveyed, the level on which one is seeming to speak and the level which is being alluded to by that speech. The meaning to which an author is alluding requires an interpretive effort on the part of the listener, as it is not necessarily or immediately revealed. For this reason, allegory is often associated with criticism and exegesis, which seek to expound meanings beyond what is evident. Because allegory can connect what is evident to our senses to an idea that can never take physical form, it is useful for connecting images or objects to ideas and ideals whose ends would be served by the validation and empirical reality of physical evidence, such as liberty, freedom, and justice. A history of the modern use and interpretation of allegory is given by Walter Benjamin in his essay The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1977), written originally in 1924-25. After surveying the history of allegory, Benjamin concludes that it became more than just an illustrative technique during its apotheosis in the Baroque period. He shows that allegory became a “form of expression, just as speech is expression, and indeed, just as writing is. Benjamin situates his definition of allegory specifically in the historical contrast between classicism and the Baroque. Thus, the historical contrast between the Baroque and the classical is echoed in the functional contrast between allegory and the symbol. Walter Benjamin observes that classicism adored the brevity of the symbol, which instantaneously linked it with its meaning. Allegory, on the other hand, is determined to be less forthcoming. It indulges the reader in a suspension of time, a step into the void that separates the layers of meaning. Benjamin uses the metaphor of the woods versus an abyss to contrast the mystery of the symbolic that absorbs meaning into its connection with the distance of allegory that separates visual being from meaning. The allegory searches for something outside itself through; the symbol instead finds it immediately, demonstrating nothing more than itself, it is just through its self-evident reason of existence that it carries within itself the essence of the universal. 

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6 Maximen und Reflexionen, 1833 (postumo)
with cross cultural patterns of significance, the allegory becomes mythic and archetypal. In fact, an entire area of literary criticism tries to uncover the universal or collective unconscious patterns of symbol and allegory that lie behind all cultures' narrative and artistic production. Sometimes called Archetypical or Jungian Criticism, it is associated with major scholars such as Carl Jung, Northrup Frye and Joseph Campbell. According to Jung (Jung and Franz, 1964), the unconscious nature of the symbol is clearly enounced. Just as clear is the opposition between symbol and allegory bases itself on the dualism of conscious\unconscious. Like the artist also the interpreter unconsciously reaches the symbolic depths abandoning his critical vigilance and letting himself be carried along by the action of the work (as also in Jung the "mystic" promise of the symbol is fulfilled). Taking the opposite direction to that suggested by Goethe, the symbolists concentrate on evanescence; the symbol is not to be found in a single element, but in a multiplicity, that establishes an atmosphere. In the atmosphere, it is not so much the "relation" between the related ideal and a particular and the related ideal, but a group of infinitesimal particulars, that contribute to a sense of globality which is an unattainable ideal.

Allegory is a form of extended metaphor in which objects, persons, and actions in a text are equated with meanings that lie outside the text itself. Thus, it represents one thing in the guise of another, an abstraction of a concrete image. By a process of double signification, the order of textual elements represents actions and characters, and they, in turn, represent ideas. Allegory often clarifies this process by giving patently meaningful names to persons and places. Symbolism and allegory are similarly mixed up in too many students' minds. Here's the difference. In common parlance, a parable is a story or short narrative designed to reveal allegorically some religious principle, moral lesson, psychological reality, or general truth. A distinction between symbol and allegory is established. For Jung and Campbell (1976) the allegory is a symbol reduced to the category of sign, to the designation of a single one of its serial and dynamic possibilities.

The sign is a semiotic expression, a conventional abbreviation for a well-known thing. Then, the allegory is mechanization from symbol, thus its dominant quality is petrified and turned into a sign, apparently even animated by traditional symbolic clothes. The allegory has often been transformed to total conscienciousnesse for scenographic or literary purposes. The elements of the allegory are symbolic and when used, they are distinguished from true symbols. Only their function is modified, because instead of alluding to Metaphysical and spiritual principles, allegories have been created artificially to designate concrete realities. However, the elements of the allegory can return to their symbolic state if the subconscious, forgetting their semiotic and merely representative purpose, frames them as such. This happens in art; the symbols that were ordered in conscious and traditional systems, but their inner flourishes under that rationalized arrangement, thus being concealed but ready.

The allegorical mode dealing with the elements of representation like words in speech, empties them of sensitive immediacy. The usual and intuitive link between significant and significance is put aside by the hypothesis of a new meaning, and a gap opens between the two levels; in this can be found the critical attitude that does not take for granted the appearance of the world. The opposition to the symbol is strong: that promises to the implied elements salvation, transfiguration and realization, whereas the allegory operates in a double direction:

1) It devaluates the images endowed with vital representative plenitude.
In allegory the objective referent evoked is without value until it is translated into the fixed meaning that has its own particular structure of ideas. In allegory, it seems to me, the goal of the work is to bring the reader to that particular structure of ideas, and, in that case, the reader who tends to read literally is likely to miss the point entirely. The interior essence that the symbol preserves within itself rendering invisible, hiding, is projected out of itself externalised, exposing it in things by the allegory. The unit symbol, its mystical union corresponds to the fragmentary. The irreparable dissolution of reality achieved by allegory that, being a fragment, leaves no lasting appearance of reality, and no illusion of regaining the totality.

To the classical harmony of the symbol is opposed the unbalanced and rebellious nature of the allegory that destroys any aura of magic and sense of world totality. Dialecticism, concerning the allegory which does not address itself only towards the external, but which is also internal and that manifests itself in antitheses and antinomies of a Hegelian nature. Such dialecticism therefore, does not provide for any mythical narrative or epic itinerary. On the contrary, the myth remains as an appendage of the symbol, being an event outside of history. Benjamin (2007), in opposition to Husserl’s phenomenology and influenced to a certain extent by Neo-Kantianism, affirms that the totality of things appear to the intellect through artistic work in an enigmatic way and these enigma are a challenge to philosophy. According to Morowitz (2012), physics is the one science where the Kantian epistemological ontological approach has been applied. The details are worked out in Margenau’s book, “The Nature of Physical Reality: A Philosophy of Modern Physics” H. Margenau (1950).

In light of the above, where the symbol is the holy word, the language of religion is identified with all that represents duplicity of meaning, and its contrast to allegory can be placed only on an interpretative plane. In this way, therefore we are witnesses of the reassertion on the part of allegory, of its previous negative role: that of representation and the attempt to definitely restrain the opening up of meanings offered by the symbol. It is possible to consider the symbol and allegory as two forms of expression. However, one has to separate them and places them in opposition schematically: a) In the symbol, the spatial simultaneity of image and substance is recognized. b) In the allegory the temporal difference (temporal disjunction) is recognized. In conclusion, we may affirm that the symbol and the allegory have to be considered as ways of organization, that is to say the tendency that guides the entire textual work. In the symbol, one finds a return of the synthesising element of salvation, in the allegory the cutting analytic dialectic, representing life. The one is inexplicable mystery, the other an enigma always ready to be reassembled. An object, a setting, or even a character can represent another, more general idea. Note, however, that symbols function perfectly well in isolation from other symbols as long as the reader already knows their assigned meaning. Allegory, however, does not work that way; allegory requires symbols working in conjunction with each other. We can ask the following questions:

1) What exactly are symbols and how do they differ from ordinary language and other figures of speech?

2) How can we determine if a text invites a symbolic reading?
3) How can we distinguish various types of symbols such as personal, conventional, cultural, archetypal and allegorical?

Let $S$ be a subject and let $\Phi, \Psi$ be two sets of symbols having different connotative significances. We will represent like $c-\phi$ and $c-\psi$ the connotative significances of the symbolic objects $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ respectively. Let $\Rightarrow_S$ be the semiotic implication, and $\equiv_S$ be the semiotic equality.

**Definition 5:** The objects of the allegory $A$ are sets of symbols and we define as symbolic objects.

**Definition 6:** An allegoric morphism $A : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi$ is a binary relation between the connotative significances $\phi$ and $\psi$ of symbolic objects $\Phi$ and $\Psi$ respectively. Then $(A : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow_S \left( A : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi \right)$. This morphism is referred to as an allegorical involution.

**Definition 7:** Every allegoric morphism $(A : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow_S \left( A : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi \right)$ is associated with an anti-involution $(A^{-1} : \Psi \rightarrow \Phi) \Rightarrow_S \left( A^{-1} : c-\psi \rightarrow c-\phi \right)$.

The allegoric morphisms must obey the following laws:

1) If $A_1$ is an allegoric morphism from $\Phi$ to $\Psi$, in short $(A_1 : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow_S \left( A_1 : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi \right)$, and $(A_2 : \Psi \rightarrow \Theta) \Rightarrow_S \left( A_2 : c-\psi \rightarrow c-\pi \right)$, then there is an allegoric morphism $A_1 \bullet A_2$ commonly read $A_1$ composed with $A_2$ from $\Phi$ to $\Theta$.

2) The composition of allegoric morphisms is associative, so if $(A_1 : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow_S \left( A_1 : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi \right), (A_2 : \Psi \rightarrow \Theta) \Rightarrow_S \left( A_2 : c-\psi \rightarrow c-\pi \right)$, and $(A_3 : \Theta \rightarrow \Omega) \Rightarrow_S \left( A_2 : c-\pi \rightarrow c-\omega \right)$, then $(A_1 \bullet A_2) \bullet A_3 = A_1 \bullet (A_2 \bullet A_3)$.

3) For each symbolic object $\Phi$, there is an identity allegoric morphism $I_\Phi(A)$, such that for any $(A : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow_S \left( A : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi \right)$, $I_\Phi(A) \bullet A \equiv_S A$ and $A \bullet I_\Phi(A) \equiv_S A$. 

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We adopt the convention that allegoric morphisms compose from right to left, so $A_1 \circ A_2$ means "first do $A_1$, then do $A_2$".

**Definition 7:** The connotative relation between symbolic objects $\Phi, \Psi$ is a span of the allegoric morphism $(\Phi \leftarrow A \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow \left( c - \phi \leftarrow A \rightarrow c - \psi \right)$ that is jointly-monic.

**Definition 8:** Two such spans $(\Phi \leftarrow A_1 \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow \left( c - \phi \leftarrow A_1 \rightarrow c - \psi \right)$ and $(\Phi \leftarrow A_2 \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow \left( c - \phi \leftarrow A_2 \rightarrow c - \psi \right)$ are considered equivalent when there is an isomorphism between $A_1$ and $A_2$ that makes everything commute.

The composition $(\Phi \leftarrow A_1 \rightarrow \Psi \leftarrow A_2 \rightarrow \Theta) \Rightarrow \left( c - \phi \leftarrow A_1 \rightarrow c - \psi \leftarrow A_2 \rightarrow c - \pi \right)$ is found by first pulling back the cospan $(A_1 \leftarrow \Psi \leftarrow A_2) \Rightarrow \left( A_1 \rightarrow c - \psi \leftarrow A_2 \right)$ and then taking the jointly-monic image of the resulting span $(\Phi \leftarrow A_1 \leftarrow A_2 \rightarrow \Theta) \Rightarrow \left( c - \phi \leftarrow A_1 \leftarrow A_2 \rightarrow c - \pi \right)$.

**Definition 9:** A map is an allegoric morphism that has a right adjoint in the allegory $A$, when $A$ is considered, using the local order structure as a 2-category.

Maps in an allegory $A$ are closed under identity and composition. Thus there is a subcategory $\text{Map}(A)$ of $A$, with the same symbolic objects but only the maps as allegoric morphisms.

**Definition 10:** In an allegory $A$, an involution $(\Lambda : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \Rightarrow A : c - \phi \rightarrow c - \psi$ is tabulated by a pair of maps $A_1 : \Theta \rightarrow \Phi \Rightarrow A_1 : c - \pi \rightarrow c - \phi$, $A_2 : \Theta \rightarrow \Psi \Rightarrow A_2 : c - \pi \rightarrow c - \psi$ if $A_2 \cdot A_1^{-1} = A$ and $A_1^{-1} \cdot A_1 \cap A_2^{-1} \cdot A_2 = I$.

**Definition 11:** An allegory is called tabular, and we designate as $A_T$ if every involution has a tabulation.
Definition 12: A symbolic unit in an allegory is a symbolic object \( \Phi \) for which the identity is the largest involution \( \Phi \rightarrow \Phi \xrightarrow{c-\phi} c-\phi \) and such that from every other object there is an entire relation to \( \Phi \).

Definition 13: An allegory with a symbolic unit is called unital allegory \( \mathbb{A}_0 \).

Given a tabular allegory \( \mathbb{A}_T \), the category \( \text{Map}(\mathbb{A}_T) \) is a regular symbolic category iff \( \mathbb{A}_T \) is unital \( \mathbb{A}_0 \), this is \( \mathbb{A}_r = \mathbb{A}_o \).

Definition 14: A symbolic category \( C \) consists of the following:

1) A collection of symbolic objects.
2) For each pair of objects a collection of involutions from one to another.
3) A binary operation defined on compatible pairs of involutions called composition.

The category must satisfy an identity axiom and an associative axiom which is analogous to the monoid axioms.

Definition 15: An allegory \( \mathbb{A} \) is a symbolic category \( C(\mathbb{A}) \) in which:

1) If \( \phi(\mathbb{A} : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi) \xrightarrow{c-\psi} (\mathbb{A} : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi) \)

2) Every pair of involutions \( \mathbb{A}_1, \mathbb{A}_2 : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi \) with common domain/codomain is associated with an intersection, i.e. an involution \( \mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2 : \Phi \rightarrow \Psi \xrightarrow{\mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2} \mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2 : c-\phi \rightarrow c-\psi \) such that has the following properties:
   a) Idempotent \( (\mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2) = \mathbb{A} \)
   b) Commutative \( (\mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2) = (\mathbb{A}_2 \cap \mathbb{A}_1) \)
   c) Associative \( (\mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2) \cap \mathbb{A}_3 = (\mathbb{A}_1 \cap (\mathbb{A}_2 \cap \mathbb{A}_3)) \)

3) Anti-involution distributes over composition \( (\mathbb{A}_1 \bullet \mathbb{A}_2)^{-1} = (\mathbb{A}_1^{-1} \bullet \mathbb{A}_2^{-1}) \) and intersection \( (\mathbb{A}_1 \cap \mathbb{A}_2)^{-1} = (\mathbb{A}_1^{-1} \cap \mathbb{A}_2^{-1}) \).

4) Composition is semi-distributive over intersection:
\[(A_1 \bullet (A_2 \cap A_3) \subseteq A_1 \bullet A_2 \cap A_1 \bullet A_3), \quad (A_1 \cap A_2) \bullet A_3 \subseteq A_1 \bullet A_3 \cap A_2 \bullet A_3).\]

5) The modularity law is satisfied: \((A_1 \bullet A_2 \cap A_3) \subseteq (A_1 \cap A_2 \bullet A^{-1}_3) \bullet A_3).\)

6) The composition of allegoric morphisms is a composition of connotative relations.

7) The intersection of allegoric morphisms is an intersection of connotative relations.

Let \(C\) be a symbolic category. Composition of connotative relations will be associative if the factorization system is appropriately stable. In this case one may consider a symbolic category \(\text{Rel}(C)\), with the same symbolic objects as \(C\), but where allegorical morphisms are connotative relations between the symbolic objects. The identity connotative relations are the diagonals of Cartesian product \(\begin{pmatrix} c - \phi \rightarrow (c - \phi) X (c - \phi) \end{pmatrix}\).

**Definition 16:** The symbolic category \(C\) is regular if it has a terminal term.

For a regular symbolic category \(C\), there is an isomorphism of symbolic categories \(C = \text{Map}(\text{Rel}(C))\).

For a regular symbolic category \(C\), the allegory \(\text{Rel}(C)\) is always tabular. On the other hand, for any tabular allegory \(A_T\), the symbolic category \(\text{Map}(A_T)\) of maps is a locally regular symbolic category: it has pullbacks, equalizers and images that are stable under pullback\(^7\). This is enough to study relations in \(\text{Map}(A_T)\) and, in this setting, \(A_T = \text{Rel}(\text{Map}(A_T))\).

5. CONCLUSIONS

In the contemporary world, a governmental decision can have severe effects upon many aspects of our lives. For this reason, labelling policies as military or medical is both metaphoric and metonymic. It stands for a larger pattern of cognitions, or it highlights a similarity to something familiar while masking other critical features. In doing so it legitimizes a specific kind of political authority while degrading the claim of the Public to participate in policymaking. Because anxiety about foreign enemies, internal subversion and deviant behaviour is frequently reinforced by government officials and is especially widespread, military, police and psychiatric authorities benefit most consistently from this form of linguistic structuring. Anxiety about economic survival and social problems is limited to particular groups, is more sporadic and is constantly deflated by governmental claims that the outlook is good. Every regime thinks it is politically essential to claim that economic and social policies are working successfully,

\(^7\) In mathematics, a pullback is either of two different, but related processes: pre-composition and fiber-product. Pre-composition with a function probably provides the most elementary notion of pullback: in simple terms, a function \(f\) of a variable \(y\), where \(y\) itself is a function of another variable \(x\), may be written as a function of \(x\). This is the pullback \(f\) by the function \(y(x)\): \(f \left( y(x) \right) \equiv g \left( x \right)\). This is the case.
even while reinforcing fears of foreign and internal enemies. In consequence economic and social deprivations that flow from decisions classified as military, security or rehabilitative are more readily concealed from the Public through metaphor. Such systematic inflation of the forms of threat that legitimize authority and systematic deflation of the forms of threat that legitimize domestic redistribution of goods and power inevitably have consequences for the effectiveness of public policies. They divert resources toward coping with mythical threats and make it unlikely that the real problems of the ordinary people will be solved.

In every significant respect, political issues and actors assume characteristics that are symbolically cued. From subtle linguistic evocations and associated governmental actions we get a great many of our beliefs about what our problems are, their causes, their seriousness, our success or failure in coping with them, which aspects are fixed and which are changeable and what impacts they have upon which groups of people. We are similarly cued into beliefs about which authorities can deal with which problems, the levels of merit and competence of various groups of the population, who are allies and who are enemies. Though symbolic cues are not omnipotent, they define the geography and topography of everyone's ideological world (Edelman, 1985).

From historical times we have known that the rhetorical formulas specified certain ideological positions. We can identify these ideological positions as a very precise world vision, made and explained by mediation of structural models. As Rhetoric and ideology intimately overlap we can anticipate that neither can act independently. According to Eco (1968), a revision of the ideological expectations can be proposed appealing to redundancy i.e., to a purely referential function of the messages. Then:

1) Each real upheaval of the ideological expectations is effective in the measure that messages upset systems of rhetorical expectations.
2) Each deep upheaval of the rhetorical expectations is as well a summary of the ideological expectations. There is a clear relation between Rhetoric and ideology. Therefore:
3) The ideology may be considered as a cultural unit that is similar to a rhetorical formula as a significant unit.

For that reason it is possible to construct a connotative code that corresponds to any rhetorical expression of an individualized ideological unit (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013cd, Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012).

Ideological belief systems assume their status as natural common sense for groups of minds by reification, which Georg Lukács (1980) defines as the abstraction of relationships and processes into ideological objects of thought, and which is one of the most common operations of allegory. Conceptual blending offers a model of this process in allegory that is particularly revealing, and I claim that such a model extrapolates well to ideological systems generally. Allegory, that is, with its walking and talking reifications, provides an excellent testing ground for ideological belief formation and maintenance, and the lessons conceptual blending can teach us about the cognitive dimensions of allegory can teach us more broadly about the cognitive construction of ideology.

Ideological beliefs are reified through abductive inference, where observation and interpretation blend with attitudes and values to form mentally objective abstractions out of subjective processes and relationships. The resultant reified beliefs chain into ideological belief systems to form the basis of ideological thought. According to
Marxist Theory, allegory existed to reflect and reinforce what were held to be proper relationships between the feudal and renaissance ruling class ideologies. (Cantarow, 1972). We believe allegory reifies thought while at the same time dereifying ideological beliefs. Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual blending theory (2002) and Teun van Dijk’s theory of context models (2008) model the dereifying effect of allegory on ideological mental spaces and in so doing form new mental spaces of ideological belief.

Allegory achieves dereification of ideological belief systems by forming blended mental spaces that weaken the reified nature of ideological belief spaces. Allegorically blended mental spaces result in a mental foregrounding of ideological spaces through what Mark Turner refers to as a waking up the generic space (1996). The generic mental space contains elements that the input spaces of an allegory have in common and is itself a blend of other mental spaces including ideological belief systems. We believe generic spaces to be platforms that hold a wide range of mental space categories from beliefs of truth and fact to opinions, values, and attitudes. Generic platforms create what van Dijk refers to as a context model or the group of blended mental spaces that serve as interface between discourse and conceptual integration.

Allegorical blends shift the generic platform by disrupting categories of belief. Beliefs about truth subsumed by ideology may be shown to be opinion. Allegory does not disprove or reject ideological beliefs; dereification may reaffirm or disavow depending on the individual and the context of the model constructed. Dereified belief spaces immediately reify back into concrete abstractions that form new ideological spaces as the chain of blending continues. It is in the instant when reified beliefs lose objectivity that allegory has its cognitively rhetorical effect on the construction of ideology.

No belief system, no ideology, no religion is immune from self-serving delusional tenets linked to false perceptions of reality, although, in due time, each of them will undergo the process of demythologization and eventually become a laughing stock for those who see the illusions underlying these delusional myths. People have always wished, by means of different allegories, to transcend their cursed reality and make frequent excursions into the spheres of the hyperreal, the unreal, or the surreal — in order to offset the absurdity of their existence. It is natural that they resort to religious and ideological devices, however aberrant or criminal these allegorical devices may subsequently turn out to be.

REFERENCES


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