TRANSLATION AND TERMINOLOGY. APROPOS OF TWO SPANISH VERSIONS OF DUMARSAIS’ LOGIQUE (MADRID, 1800)

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Abstract

Framed in the field of philosophical translation (lato sensu), this article deals with two different versions of Dumarsais’ Logique ([1769] 1797, Paris), both published in Madrid in 1800. We argue that these two Lógicas, which were translated by two different persons, had distinct purposes. This is evidenced by their respective bibliographical contexts and metatexts and by their translators’ use of different sets of Spanish terminological equivalents for the concepts that, as set out in the first few pages of his Logique, are key in Dumarsais’ theory of knowledge. In the first of these translations, which envisions logic as having an introductory role in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, terms are systematically borrowed from the source text. On the other hand, in the second translation, by J. M. Alea (1781-1826), we find an entirely different set of terminological equivalents, none of which coincide with those used in the first text. J. M. Alea’s terminological (and philosophical) infidelities may be explained by the translator’s desire to update Dumarsais’ theory of knowledge by using the alternative terminology of Condillac.

Résumé

Cette étude qui relève du domaine de la traduction philosophique (lato sensu) a pour objet deux versions de la Logique de Dumarsais (Paris [1769] 1797) éditées en Espagne (toutes deux à Madrid en 1800). Nous montrons que ces deux Lógicas, œuvres de deux traducteurs différents, qui eurent chacun des fins également différentes, comme le prouvent le contexte bibliographique et les métatextes respectifs, manifestent la présence d’une terminologie espagnole divergente pour les termes clé de la théorie de la connaissance que l’auteur français exposa dans les pages initiales de sa Logique. La première de ces traductions, qui attribue à la logique un rôle d’introduction aux sciences, choisit des termes systématiquement calqués sur ceux de Dumarsais tandis que J. M. Alea (1781-1826) argumente l’emploi d’une terminologie spécifique, non concordante avec celle du texte source. Ces infidélités terminologiques (et in fine idéologiques) de J. M. Alea peuvent s’expliquer par le désir de ce traducteur de mettre à jour une théorie de la connaissance qu’il voudra rendre conforme à celle de Condillac.


1 This article is the English version of “Traducción y terminología. A propósito de dos versiones al español de la Logique (Madrid, 1800) de Dumarsais” by Brigitte Lépinette. It was not published on the print version of MonTI for reasons of space. The online version of MonTI does not suffer from these limitations, and this is our way of promoting plurilingualism.
Matters pertaining to the translation of scientific and technical terminology gained special significance in the 18th century when a great number of translators tried to render into the Spanish language texts that could introduce a whole new range of scientific and technical knowledge into the Iberian Peninsula. In these specialized scientific and technical fields, neological procedures were used by translators, following in the footsteps of those previously adopted by the French, which included: creations of a metaphorical nature as well as new words with a basis or an affix of learned origin (Greek or Latin). In both cases, neologisms were integrated into the Spanish language according to its specific procedures of terminological creation, even in the case of metaphorical expressions. However, it must be noted that, owing to their characteristic nature, metaphorical expressions took some time to be finally integrated into dictionaries as new entries.

Philosophical terminology – we consider the scholarly logic of the 18th century to be within this field and to make use of its specific terms – poses problems that differ from those that emerge when dealing with purely technical or scientific texts. Indeed, although philosophical contents may be new in some works (this is the case of the Logique by Dumarsais or that by Condillac because their ideas mark a turning point in relation to other systems of thought that had preceded them), terms, on the other hand, are not (and, therefore, they cannot be considered, from a formal point of view as neologisms). What actually vary in these texts are the concepts, the interpretation of which will differ in accordance with each system of thought. For example, terms such as ‘âme’, ‘entendement’ or ‘esprit’, which we will be examining here, each correspond to a specific notion that transmits the ideology of the author or that of the school of thought in which it was used. Moreover, in the 18th century, a time of constant change, these notions were greatly influenced by their rejection or their adoption by traditional thinking. In this kind of text, the author must, therefore, establish which concept corresponds to each term. Translation of philosophical terminology in this context is far from being an innocent act, as many translators already know, and, in some cases, it requires an explanation of the concepts and the use of equivalents that are not necessarily related in a morphological sense (as in âme and alma). It is precisely on these conceptual shifts that occur in relation to a particular ideology that we will be focusing throughout this paper by studying two different translations into Spanish (1785/1800 by J. Serrano and 1800 by J. M. Alea, 1781-1826) of Dumarsais’ Logique ou Réflexions sur les principales opérations de l’esprit ([1769] 1797).

1. Dumarsais’ Logique: thought and terminology

1.1. Dumarsais’ Logique has been considered a text that has (Brekke 1971: x, cited in G. Sahlin, 1928: x):

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3 César Chesneau Dumarsais (or du Marsais) (1676-1756) was not able to see all of his works published before his death. La Logique ou Réflexions sur les principales opérations de l’esprit – which is the focus of this study – was first published in 1769, under the general title Logique et Principes de grammaire. La Logique was reedited in 1797 (7 volumes in-8°) in Oeuvres complètes de Dumarsais edited by Duchosal & Millon (Sahlin 1828: X-XI). In this paper we will be using the Logique that is included in Reproduction en facsimilé du cinquième volume de l’édition complète de 1797 (Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Günther Hozboog): Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1971).

très peu de valeur […], vide d’idées personnelles et assez scolastique, quoique la méthode proposée à la fin soit celle de Descartes. L’auteur examine d’abord la différence entre langage et l’âme humaine et d’autres questions scolastiques. Il passe ensuite très rapidement sur l’idée et le jugement pour consacrer la plus grande partie du livre aux syllogismes et aux sophismes. En somme, cet ouvrage est sensiblement inférieur à la logique de Port-Royal.

Even though Sahlin insists on the scholastic basis of Dumarsais’ *Logique*, as far as we are concerned, the first part of this text has given rise to other works which, from diverse perspectives, integrate a theory of knowledge that would later take shape during the 18th century, especially in the works of Condillac—a philosopher that was known in Spain better and earlier than Dumarsais was. As we will see, by drawing on Condillac’s *Logique*, J. M. Alea, one of the translators we will be studying, initiated the terminological discussion to which we would like to add some light in this paper. The terms ‘âme’, ‘esprit’ and ‘entendement’ are the pillars that support Dumarsais’ thought. Consequently, in the first place we will try to describe the conceptual content of the terms ‘âme’ and ‘esprit’, as well as that of ‘entendement’, ‘idée’ and ‘sentiment’, within Dumarsais’ *Logique*.5

1.2. In the first pages of Dumarsais’ *Logique*, the soul is primarily “substance spirituelle” (in opposition to “substance corporelle”, both created by God, *Dieu*) and it is defined as (1971: 303): “ce qui a la propriété […] d’avoir des affections sensibles”. Thus, the soul is the organ (in its literal sense) that allows external objects to arouse human sentiments—a term that has been translated differently depending on the translator. As we will see, Spanish translators hesitated between ‘sentimiento’ and ‘sensación’.

Dumarsais argues that there are two types of sentiments: the “sentiment immédiat”, which is defined as: (1971: 309) “celui que nous recevons immédiatement des impressions extérieures des objets sur les organes des sens” and which (ibid.) “ne suppose que l’objet et l’organe”, and the “sentiment médiait”, considered as: (ibid.) “sentiment du sentiment, [qui] suppose un moyen et ce moyen est le sentiment immédiat”. According to the theory of the Encyclopedist, which can be defined as organicist (not far from Descartes), the “sentiment immédiat” is aroused because the nerves connect the human extérieur to the brain. And it is the brain –specifically the (1971: 311) “corps calleux, regardé comme le siège de l’âme”8—that can be marked by impressions (in its literal sense), “traces” or “plis” which, “rappelés par le cours des esprits animaux”9 ou du sang” enable us to conceive an “idée”. In this way, the “sentiment médiat” can be said to be a kind of internalization of the external impression that would allow us to identify the “sentiment immédiat” and turn it into an “idée” (Dumarsais considers that the soul has other additional faculties such as willpower (1971: 313): “qui est aussi une propriété de notre âme”. However, *La Logique* does not make reference to other “propriétés de l’âme”).

1.3. The “simple” idea is the “image d’une chose”, the result of perception, which is turned into a “complexe” idea when it includes two elements. For example, (1971: 312) the idea of *montagne* coupled with that of *or* results in *montagne d’or*. The notion of an “idée complexe”

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5 We have only considered here the pages that range from Article I to Article VIII, and we have decided to exclude the rest of the text taking into account that it focuses on syllogism and sophism and not on Dumarsais’ *philosophy*.
6 It should be noted that the term *Dieu* appears in Dumarsais’ work but not in Condillac’s *Logique*. On the other hand, the distinction between *substance corporelle* and *substance spirituelle* or *âme* inevitably brings to mind the philosophy of Descartes, who separated the human *corps-machine* from the *âme-conscience*. All the functions of the body are conducted automatically. The soul, related to the pineal gland, is connected to the organs which allow it to perceive different sensations.
7 (1971: 310): “Il suffit de remarquer ici que les nerfs, par lesquels toutes les sensations se font, ont deux extrémités; l’une extérieure, qui reçoit les impressions des objets; l’autre intérieure, qui la communique au cerveau”.
8 The term ‘âme’ (in contemporary French) is spelled ‘ame’ (as was the case in the 18th century) in Dumarsais’ writing.
9 It is well known that the *esprits animaux* are present in Bacon’s and Descartes’ philosophy as material bodies. In this sense, Descartes seems to be a keen follower of Bacon’s ideas, though Bacon identified the *esprits animaux* with the sensitive soul as Dumarsais did.
takes us from the sphere of the soul to that of the spirit. Hence, (1971: 312) “à l’occasion des impressions que nous avons reçues”, it is possible to carry out some “opérations”, including “joindre ensemble certaines idées” or “former des idées par abstraction”. These “idées complexes”, which the reader may consider as an image or a concept, are “simples considérations de notre esprit [car] elle se représente un objet sans en porter aucun jugement”. So, if we proceed from Dumarsais’ thought, while the soul is spurred in pure sensation (idée simple), when the idea is complex it is the spirit that is involved. The term ‘esprit’ – and no other – is used when talking about opérations, which are not images or ideas, but judgements (1971: 316): “si je pense par exemple que le triangle a trois côtés, je passe de l’idée au jugement”.

1.4. The word ‘jugement’ can also be found to be used in a more classic sense (in previous logics), as the faculty of reasoning or expressing propositions (jugements, mental o verbal, although Dumarsais refers to the mots used, 1971: 317). Esprit, in this case, can be considered to be an equivalent of entendement, that is, the faculty that favours raisonnement (discursus, i.e. tirer un jugement d’autres jugements, 1971: 325), which, at the same time, allows for syllogism, something that Dumarsais would touch upon extensively in his Logique. It is not surprising that Dumarsais decided to study the operations of the esprit and those of the entendement and that he did not concentrate on the description of sensations (even though beforehand he had to establish his understanding of them).

1.5. So, in a few words, the polyvalence of the notion esprit, a conceptual equivalent of âme as well as of entendement, will be, as we will see in the case of J. M. Alea, the main source of the discussion surrounding, on the one hand, the notional content of ‘âme’ ‘esprit’ and ‘entendement’, and, on the other, the translation of ‘alma’ vs. ‘espiritu’, ‘entendimiento’ and ‘mente’. The reason in both cases is the absence of neat definitions for each of the terms used by Dumarsais – a reason that is to be found in the source text. Moreover, some of the ideological a priori of one of the translators have also played a major role in the conscious usage of this unfaithful terminology.

2. Bibliographical context and metatexts regarding the Spanish translations of Dumarsais’ Logique

[1785: Lógica sacada de la Enciclopedia traducida por […] Don Joaquín Serrano Manzano con Elogio de Du-Marsais (Madrid, Miguel Escribano);10

1800 Elementos de medicina del Doctor Juan Brown, traducidas del latin al ingles con comentos é ilustraciones por el mismo autor Y del ingles al Castellano por el Doctor Don Joaquín Serrano Manzano Físico, Secretario perpetuo del Real Colegio de Medicina de Madrid y del Real Colegio de la Facultad reunida en S. Carlos. Lleva a su frente la Lógica de Mr. Du-Marsais.11 Contient : Lógica o Reflexiones sobre les principales operaciones del entendimiento escrita en frances por Mr. Du-Marsais Sacada de la Enciclopedia y traducida por el mismo Don Joaquín Serrano Manzano;

1800 Colección española de las obras gramaticales de Cesar Du-Marsais ordenada para la Instrucción pública con aplicaciones y exemplos correspondientes a la elocución española, Madrid : Imprenta de Aznar [included in part II (p. 148-266): Lógica o Reflexiones sobre las principales operaciones del alma].

2.0. In relation to the bibliography of the translated texts – see description above –, which, as earlier indicated, will constitute the basis of our study, it should be noted that three versions of

10 This reference to El Elogio de Du-Marsais means that the source text of this translation is the French reedition of the 1769 text.
11 Madrid, Imprenta Real 1800.
Dumarsais’ *Logique* appeared on the Spanish market between 1785 and 1800. Two of them were done by the same translator, Joaquín Serrano Manzano, who would later (in 1800) use his first version and would include it in a treatise on medicine (initially in English).

As José Miguel Alea points out in the introduction to his translation (that is, the third into Spanish), at that moment two translated versions already existed of Dumarsais’ *Logique* in Spanish (1800: 148):

Dos traducciones se han hecho en España de la *Lógica* de Du-Marsais: la primera en esta corte, imprenta de Miguel Escribano, año de 1785; sin el nombre del traductor y con el *Elogio de Du-Marsais* por D’Alembert al principio de ella; y la segunda del Dr. D. Joaquín Serrano y Manzano, imprenta Real, año de 1800, al frente del tomo primero de los *Elementos de Medicina* del Dr. Brown, a cuy a obra tuvo por conveniente (y con razón) dicho Dr. Serrano agregarla, para dar a los principiantes de medicina las nociones lógicas que necesariamente deben preceder al estudio fundamental de aquella ciencia.

On the other hand, although we have not been able to actually see the text of the 1785-version, it is interesting to underline that *La Gazeta* (sic) de Madrid (25th September 1785, p. 612) reported that a volume titled *Reflexiones sobre las principales operaciones del entendimiento* written by Du-Marsais had just been published. The title was followed by two other specifications: firstly, the allusion to what, according to the translator, is the origin of the source text, [*Lógica* sacada de la Enciclopedia], and, secondly, a reference to the name of the translator, “[obra] traducida por el mismo Don Joaquín Serrano Manzano”. We can therefore put forward the hypothesis that the translation by Serrano Manzano (1785) of Dumarsais’ *Logique* is the same as the one that, in 1800, would precede *Elementos de medicina* by ‘Juan Brown’ (1800, Madrid: Imprenta Real), taking into account that this second text by Serrano Manzano includes the same allusions as those used in 1785, with the exception of the reference to *L’ Eloge de Dumarsais* by D’Alembert. The omission of *L’ Eloge de Dumarsais* is actually not surprising since it had nothing to do with the treatise on medicine to which the *Logique* was added.12

2.1. As for Serrano Manzano, we must underline the fact that this translator declares that he is a *físico*13 and that what really interests him about the text is the formation of future doctors for whom the combination *Lógica* and *Elementos de medicina* by John Brown is directed. This combined publication of two documents of apparently very different nature was not at that time as incongruous as it may seem today.

2.1.1 According to L. Sánchez Granjel (1979: 44), in the educational reform designed by Carlos III, the learning of experimental physics was made compulsory in the field of *Artes* (from 1771). Future doctors also studied this modern subject. Some years later, in 1786, this same monarch established that (ibid.):

no deberán ser admitidos a oír la explicación de la Facultad de Medicina en la Universidad los que no justifiquen haber cursado en ella […] los cuatro años; a saber uno de lógica parva y magna, o sea dialéctica y lógica, otro de metafísica, otro de aritmética; Algebra y Geometría, y otro de Física experimental.

So, ‘logic’ as a discipline came to be a part of medicine studies (entirely theoretical in those days).14

In so far as the metatext that introduces his translation is concerned, J. Serrano Manzano alludes in his preface not to the translation as such—as opposed to what J. M. Alea would later

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12 In this page of the *Gaceta*, Du-Marsais’ *Lógica* is described as clear and simple. Surely this is because the author expounds extensively, as is common practice in other *lógicas*, on the subject of syllogisms and sophisms.

13 In the Spanish terminology of that time a *físico* was a doctor.

14 L. Sánchez Granjel (1979: 44): “La formación del médico es exclusivamente teórica, sujeta a la lectura de los libros galénicos, que solo muy avanzado el siglo serán sustituidos por las obras de Boerhaave y la reactualización de los escritos hipocráticos”.

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todo lo que se sabe en medicina sea respecto á las enfermedades y sus causas, sea respecto á su pronostico y su curación, todo debe su origen á la observacion de los fenomenos que se presentan á los sentidos.

And, on the other, el estudio de los hechos which involves reasoning (p. xi): “el buen método [es] observar y raciocinar”, as Serrano asserts in a less orderly fashion than could be expected. 15

La Lógica, in this sense, seems to be well placed as an introduction to Elementos de medicina. The critique that Serrano makes of Descartes, an important element of his argumentation, is not surprising at that moment in time and, especially, in that specific context given that it underlines that the basic principle of Cartesian thought, which privileges reasoning and not the consideration of fact, should be excluded from medical studies.16 It is important nonetheless to take into account that knowledge has its origin in perception (which is shaped by the senses). Consequently, when teaching future doctors, the process of observation (in this case of symptoms) could be privileged instead of an a priori reasoning.

2.1.2. There is another reason that, perhaps in a more convincing manner, can explain the appearance of La Lógica at the beginning of Brown’s Elementos de medicina. As S. Auroux points out, at the end of the 18th century logic was defined as (1993: 42-3): “une étude préliminaire, préparatoire, certes, à l’éloquence mais aussi à la réflexion scientifique”. This linguist cites several works in order to support his statement among which we can find the logic of J.-B. Cochet (Paris, 1750): La clef des sciences et des Beaux-arts ou la logique.17 In his preface, Cochet defended that logic is more important than any other discipline ( Préface, 1750: xiij):

La logique qui perfectionne la raison, & enseigne à en faire un bon usage dans le discernement du vrai & du faux, est utile à toutes sortes de personnes. Toutes les autres sciences ont des usages bornés; mais l’utilité de la Logique s’étend aussi loin que l’utilité du bon sens & de la justesse de l’esprit. Rien n’est plus important que de penser juste. In this sense, the main purpose of logic would be (ibid.) “découvrir, […] enseigner, […] prouver le vrai”, beyond its traditional usage as a way of introducing the subject of rhetoric. It may well be the case that Serrano was aware of this, although we do not know if, at some point, he read Cochet in French or the translation of La clef des sciences, which was published after Serrano’s translation (1785) of Dumarsais’ Logique. Either way, in Serrano’s case, the Enciclopedist’s Logique served as an introduction to a scientific treatise which means that he must have approved of Cochet’s statement when he asserts that (translated by Vicente Martínez, 1793: iv): “[La lógica] conduce al más fácil conocimiento de las otras ciencias; porque suponen

15 (1800: xi): “Aquel arte [La lógica de Dumarsais] enseña quales son las fuerzas del entendimiento, qual es el uso que se debe hacer para llegar al conocimiento de la verdad, especialmente tratándose en ellos de una doctrina enteramente nueva en su modo, y para cuya inteligencia se requiere mucha penetración y sèria meditación. [Este arte] pues nos enseña á raciocinar exactamente y con orden , y á perfecicionar el discurso ó raciocino, el cual nos dirija para conducir la razón en el conocimiento de las cosas él indagación de la verdad”.

16 (1800: xi): “Descartes cayó en […] muchos errores por haberse apartado del camino que nos dicta la razon, y es el que naturalmente sigue el entendimiento en sus operaciones, caminando desde los mas sencillo á lo mas compuesto, como que las ideas sencillas son las primeras que resultan de los sentidos y de la reflexion, y que no hubiera tomado el muy contrario, despreciando el estudio de los hechos, y queriendo que sirviesen de principios sus nociones abstractas, por haberse persuadido que nuestros sentidos son unas guias falaces y engañadoras que no pueden alcanzar verdad alguna”.

17 Paris: Dessaint, 1750. Cochet’s logic was translated into Spanish as: La llave de las ciencias y bellas artes ó La lógica traducida al castellano por D. Vicente Martínez, Madrid: Ibarra 1793.
Translation and terminology. Apropos of two Spanish versions of Dumarsais’ Logique…

todas la rectitud del juicio y del razonamiento á caminar advertidamente en la investigación de la verdad”.

2.1.3. The appearance of the Lógica as an introduction to a scientific text destined for pedagogical usage (it serves as justification of the method that should be adopted in medicine) can help to understand why matters related to the process of translation, especially in regard to terminology and its translational difficulties, are not described by J. Serrano.

Furthermore, as a strong believer in the benefits of the experimental method for medicine, the translator will tend to emphasize intellectual work in order to put such a method into practice. This explains why, from the very beginning, Serrano chose to translate esprit as entendimiento instead of using the word alma as J. M. Alea (see below).

2.2. In comparison to Serrano y Manzano’s, the initial metatext included in J. M. Alea’s version does insist on the translation of the terminology related to logic and metaphysics (Lógica, Advertencia, 1800: 148):

Uno y otro traductor varían más ó menos en el uso de algunos términos que la precisión del lenguaje filosófico ó de las ideas tiene consagrados como técnicos é insustituibles por otros, y que yo he conservado cuidadosamente para no faltar á la exactitud y precisión de ideas del autor. Y porque en materia de tanta importancia, cual es la significación determinada de las voces en punto de lógica y metafísica, no debe haber vaguedad, ni la menor indeterminación, me he separado también de los referidos traductores de la Lógica de Du-Marsais en la version del título francés: Reflexions sur les principales opérations de l’esprit tomando la voz esprit por alma, y no por entendimiento, como aquellos hacen. No hay precaucion que sobre, tratándose de metafísica; y el medio más seguro de precaver el abuso de las palabras es simplificar el lenguaje […].

In this explanatory note to the reader (ibid.), Alea defends the thesis that the expression opérations de l’esprit had to be translated as operaciones del alma. In this regard, he follows Condillac, who had previously affirmed that, although technical terms were sometimes necessary, for pedagogical reasons, one could decide not to use them (Principes généraux de grammaire, an VI: 5):

Persuadé que les arts seroient plus faciles s’il étoit possible de les enseigner avec des mots familiers à tout le monde, je pense que les termes techniques ne sont utiles qu’autant qu’ils sont absolument nécessaires. C’est pourquoi j’ai banni [du Cours d’étude] tous ceux dont j’ai pu me passer.

Moreover, Alea claims that esprit has to be translated as âme. This affirmation, as we will later see, has its roots in Condillac’s Cours d’étude. But, for now, let us examine Condillac’s definition of entendement:

la collation ou la combinaison des opérations de l’ame. Appercevoir, ou avoir conscience, donner son attention, reconnôître, imaginer, se ressouvenir, réfléchir, distinguer des idées, les abstraire, les composer, les décomposer, les analyser, affirmer, nier, juger, raisonner, concevoir: voilà l’entendement.

This quotation taken from Condillac’s Cours d’étude proves that there is a semantic equivalence between entendement and âme. These terms involve, in an undifferentiated manner, an ensemble of opérations which were however divided in Dumarsais’ work between (i) feeling –it was the soul that was involved– and (ii) judging and reasoning –in this case, it was the spirit and understanding that were involved.18

Condillac asserts that the term âme (linked to thought) –his logic is a reflection on les premiers développements de l’art de penser– refers to the same concept as esprit (chap. VII, p.

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18 Dumarsais attributed other faculties to the soul, among them willpower.
“On trouve dans la faculté de sentir toutes les facultés de l’âme: attention, comparaison, jugement, réflexion, imagination, raisonnement, entendement”.

Succinctly, these are Dumarsais’ and Condillac’s definitions:

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<th>Dumarsais</th>
<th>Condillac</th>
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<tr>
<td>El concepto de alma (âme) está diferenciada del de espiritu (esprit): el alma (âme) siente / el espíritu (esprit) concibe y juzga. El entendimiento (entendement) – también – juzga.</td>
<td>El alma (âme) engloba sensación, juicio, así como las demás facultades humanas no puramente físicas.</td>
</tr>
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It is possible to realize that trying to translate such important concepts in Dumarsais’ work as âme, esprit o entendement according to Condillac’s theorizations, which was what Alea did, involved the risk of creating conceptual difficulties, making the target text unclear for the prospective reader and, finally, transferring into the country of reception a theorization whose profound meaning was, as we shall see, distorted.

3. J. Serrano’s and J. M. Alea’s translations

If the title of the translations is already highly significant,

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<th>Dumarsais 1797</th>
<th>Serrano 1800</th>
<th>Alea 1800</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logique ou les principales opérations de l’esprit</td>
<td>Lógica o las principales operaciones del entendimiento</td>
<td>Lógica o las principales operaciones del alma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

there is another parameter that can also be considered as essential (as the metatexts below reveal), that is: the purpose each translator considered the text to have and their specific ideological stance in relation to the ideas that underlie Dumarsais’ Logique. Such a purpose will also have an influence on other translational equivalences we have been able to observe within the target text.

3.1. For J. Serrano Manzano, the main function of La Lógica was to encourage the development of the reasoning capacities of future doctors by carefully selecting facts and subsequently observing and interpreting them. Undoubtedly, this is why, in his text, Serrano always translates âme as alma and entendement as entendimiento or espiritu, taking into account that Dumarsais uses entendement as a synonym of esprit (p. 316). For example:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 313)</th>
<th>Serrano 1800 (p. 6)</th>
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<tr>
<td>C’est par cette opération de l’esprit que les géomètres disent que la ligne n’a point d’étendue</td>
<td>Por esta operación del entendimiento, dicen los geómetras que la línea no tiene latitud.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 314)</th>
<th>Serrano 1800 (p. 7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ce nom marque le point de vue de l’esprit qui considère par abstraction</td>
<td>Esta mira de nuestro entendimiento es una abstracción</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 313)</th>
<th>Serrano 1800 (p. 7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Il n’y a de réel que les êtres particuliers, qui existent indépendamment de notre esprit</td>
<td>no hay de real sino los seres particulares que existen independientemente de nuestro entendimiento</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the above cases, the presence of the term *espíritu* is made possible as a result of the synonymic relation established by Dumarsais.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 316 Article V)</th>
<th>Serrano 1800 (p. 8 Articulo V)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Des quatre principales opérations de l’<em>esprit</em>. Par ce mot <em>esprit</em> on entend ici la faculté que nous avons de concevoir et d’imaginer, On l’appelle aussi entendement.</td>
<td>De las quatro principales operaciones del <em>espíritu</em> Por esta palabra <em>espíritu</em> se entiende aquí la facultad de concebir, de imaginar. Se llama también entendimiento</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dumarsais’ theory of knowledge does not seem to pose great comprehension difficulties for the translator, who systematically uses morphological equivalents that are close between French and Spanish.

Nonetheless, Serrano Manzano seems to doubt when confronted with the term *sentiment*, which coincides in Dumarsais’ writing with *sensation*, the effect produced by sensorial perception. The doctor resorts therefore to both words, something common in scientific translations (see, for example, the work of J. Pinilla 2004, who analyses the Spanish translations of Duhamel du Monceau). So, in Serrano’s translation we are faced with an equivalent relation between *sentiment (inmediat et médiat) = sentimiento o sensación (inmediato y mediato)*. It must however be noted that he employs both terms in a different manner: in order to translate the word *sentiment*, Serrano Manzano sometimes uses only the term *sentimiento*, but he never uses *sensación* on its own (p. 4):

*Quando yo he visto el sol, este *sentimiento o sensación* que el sol ha excitado en mí por él mismo, es lo que llamamos el *sentimiento inmediato* (en cursiva en el texto), porque este *sentimiento* no supone sino el objeto y el órgano.

The appearance of structures comprising two words is quite frequent, although they are not always that relevant from a terminological point of view:

*Quando las impresiones de los objetos *afectan ó estimulan* [affectent] la parte exterior de los sentidos, son como se dice comunmente, *conducidas ó llevadas* [portées] por la extremidad interior de los nervios á la sustancia del celebro (sic).

Here are other examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais (p. 311)</th>
<th>Serrano (p. 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[Le cerveau] est le réservoir et la source des esprits animaux</td>
<td>[el celebro] es el receptáculo, y el origen o fuente de los espíritus animales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais Article VII (p. 325)</th>
<th>Serrano (p. 12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Du raisonnement</td>
<td>Del razonamiento o raciocinio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term *raciocinio* comes up as a translation of *raisonnement*, and, as in the case of Dumarsais, as a synonym of *syllogisme*. So, it is not surprising to observe that structures comprising two words serve to define certain concepts that may be difficult for the Spanish reader to understand (depending on the nature of the concept or the characteristics of the translation which, as in *sentimiento*, could seem imprecise).

On the other hand, Serrano Manzano does not appear to have any problem with Dumarsais’ description of the process of perception and includes a footnote that refers to a treatise of medicine (p. 4, note I, “Véase el epitome Esplanalógico y Fisiológico de Rousley, T. 4”). As for the general term *cerveau*, he decides to use a more technical one, *sensorio* (p. 5). We could say that we are dealing here with a *faithful* translation: Serrano does not intervene in the
interpretation of Dumarsais’ doctrine (we have already stated why in 2.1.2). Alea, on the contrary, will act differently.

3.2. As we have already mentioned, Alea considers the Lógica to be a scholarly treatise that can open the way for a new theory of knowledge. He is particularly interested in Dumarsais’ understanding in regard to the perception and formation of ideas. This specific interest places Alea within the ideological margins of L’Encyclopédie, whose conceptions are still well known among the Spanish elite. It is interesting to underline that in 1800, there were already two published translations of Condillac’s Logique (see appendix). The fact that Alea decided to translate Dumarsais’ Logique, the first edition of which dates back to 1730, leads us to develop several hypothesis about the reasons for choosing such a source text.

3.2.1. On the one hand, it may be that the translation was commissioned by Manuel Godoy (1767-1851), as in the case of Des tropes, since the Logique is included within the collection: Colección de las obras gramaticales de Cesar Du Marsais (Madrid, Aznar 1800). On the other hand, we know that J. M. Alea was part of –although we do not know if there was a personal relationship– the circles of erudites and translators who, as praised by Godoy in his memoirs, made a whole range of texts, translations from French or reeditions of the Spanish classics of the Golden Age, available for the Imprenta Real at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century. More than thirty years later, Godoy in an evidently pro domo discourse exclaimed that (Memorias 1836 : 247):

¡Qué nación de Europa entre las vecinas de la Francia pudo entonces atender á las letras y á las ciencias como atendidó España en aquel tiempo! Lo excelente, lo bueno, lo mediano y aun lo ínfimo que vió la luz en aquel tiempo fue un tributo, si se puede decir así, de oro, plata y cobre y talco que una infinidad de aspirantes al honor de enriquecer su patria presentaron al común tesoro.

After listing all of the works and translations whose writing and impression he promoted in the Imprenta Real –the Colección española de las obras gramaticales de Du-Marsais being one of them– Godoy highlighted that his purpose was linked to his wish of improving education.

3.2.2. Alea’s decision to embark on the translation of Dumarsais’ work may also have its roots in Serrano’s version and his apparent interest in a specific point (alma vs. espíritu). It became an opportunity to criticize Serrano Manzano’s text (first published in 1785). Alea sometimes looked for specific arguments in Condillac’s writings while, on other occasions, reading Condillac meant acquiring the ideological and translational stance he defends. In both cases, the result is the same in relation to the translation of the controversial notions alma and espíritu.

3.2.3. Alea argues that esprit should be translated as alma, taking into account that the soul becomes the place where sensations have their origin and ideas are generated, something already suggested by Condillac (whom he only quotes once in a footnote, 1800:169, making reference to the introduction that we have already mentioned). The use of the term alma to translate esprit can be detected from the very beginning as we read the Spanish title in relation to the French one:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797</th>
<th>Alea 1800</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Logique ou les principales opérations de</em></td>
<td><em>Lógica o las principales operaciones del</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 There is however an important omission of information in Serrano Manzano’s translation. Dumarsais affirms that (p. 1) : “A l’égard des anges, la foi nous en apprend fort peu de choses, l’imagination beaucoup et la raison rien ; en effet le peuple en rapporte une infinité d’histoires fabuleuses”. The first part of this affirmation appears to be modified in the translation while the second part has been cut (Serrano, p.1): “En quanto a los ángeles, nosotros no sabemos sino lo que la fe nos enseña”. In the case of Alea’s translation, it is interesting to point out that this reflection about faith has been included entirely (p. 154): “En quanto a los ángeles la fé nos enseña muy pocas cosas, la imaginacion mucha, y la razon nada, en efecto el vulgo cuenta de ellos una infinidad de historias fabulosas, de patrañas”.

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There are several points in the text that we are analysing here where esprit is translated as alma. For example, even judgement, reasoning and method are considered to be operations of the soul or alma (p. 167):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 314)</th>
<th>Alea 1800 (p. 167)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Il y a surtout quatre opérations de notre esprit qui demandent une attention particulière 1º l‘idée […], 2º le jugement, 3º le raisonnement, 4º la méthode”.</td>
<td>“Las operaciones del alma que piden una atención particular, son cuatro principales. La 1º es la idea […]. La 2º el juicio. La 3º el raciocinio o discurso. La 4º el método”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further on, Aale includes something not found in Dumarsais’ text: he states that it is within our soul where ideas merge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 312)</th>
<th>Alea 1800 (p. 164)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Voici quelques opérations que nous pouvons faire à l’occasion des impressions que nous avons reçues […].”</td>
<td>“con ocasion de las impresiones recibidas, puede nuestra alma hacer las operaciones siguientes […].”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Aale’s text, this transformation of esprit into alma seems to be the result of a philosophical interpretation in which the specificities of the soul or âme (as defined by Dumarsais) and those of the spirit or esprit (also described by Dumarsais) are erased. Thus, for our translator there could only be one unique entity, the soul, spiritual and mental at the same time, in opposition to the physical one (grosso modo as described by Condillac, see 2.). However, it is possible to observe that Aale’s understanding of Dumarsais’ work was difficult to sustain given that one of Dumarsais’ main purposes until Article VIII was precisely to differentiate in his text two distinct entities, l’esprit and l’âme, each with its own particularities. As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to successfully transmit a theory by changing one of its main concepts, as Aale tried to do throughout his entire translation.

This a priori determination to translate esprit as alma in accordance with specific ideological beliefs is in fine the cause of some translational decisions which seem quite surprising. For example, Aale, who did not know (or did not want) to use the term espíritu (or what Dumarsais’ defines as its equivalent: entendement entendimiento), which he refers to in his initial comment to the reader as being unacceptable, will simply delete it from the translation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 313)</th>
<th>Alea 1800 (p. 166)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“C’est par cette opération de l’esprit que les géomètres disent que la ligne n’a point d’étendue”.</td>
<td>“Por esta misma operacion, dicen los geómetras que la línea no tiene latitud”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other cases, Aale finds himself, despite his initial statements, having to follow the source text and ends up using a structure comprising two words. This appears to be incoherent in relation to his explanations to the reader and other parts of the translated text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dumarsais 1797 (p. 316 Article V)</th>
<th>Alea 1800 (p. 167)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Des quatre principales opérations de l’esprit. Par ce mot esprit on entend ici la faculté que nous avons de concevoir et d’imaginer, On l’appelle aussi entendement”.</td>
<td>“De las cuatro principales operaciones del espíritu (ó alma) Por esta voz espíritu se significa aquí la facultad que tenemos de concebir y de imaginar Llámase tambien entendimiento”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3. These attempts to \textit{rewrite} Dumarsais’ text carried out by Alea were, from the point of view of the target text, doomed to failure. They made the Encyclopedists’s text less coherent and increased the possibilities of it being misinterpreted.

Although the \textit{Logique} was not Dumarsais’ best piece of work (in fact, the information offered in the long part devoted to syllogisms was hardly new), it did provide access to a theory of knowledge that made Cartesianism obsolete. This aspect, as we have already stated, was actually pointed out by Serrano Manzano in his introduction. What Alea did, on the other hand, was to \textit{rewrite} the \textit{Logique} by erasing the differentiation that Dumarsais had established between two main concepts, \textit{âme} and \textit{esprit}. Alea’s decision may be explained taking into account not only his determination to adapt Dumarsais’ terminology to Condillac’s, which was more modern and better known, but also his interest in updating a 1730-text to a translation done in 1800.

4. At the end of this analysis concerning the terminological changes consciously introduced (although not always coherently) by one of the translators as opposed to the way the other translator renders his text in a more literal manner, it must be underlined that such changes are also ideological. If we take into consideration our previous explanations, we can assert that modifications were part of the adaptation process of the text to an updated theory of knowledge that dominated the Spanish elites in 1800. It was basically an attempt by Alea to progress from Dumarsais, still \textit{scholastic} in some ways, to Condillac.

From a translational point of view, the aforementioned changes –terminological, although they also impinge on the basis of philosophical theory–, reveal the great liberty the translator was able to take with respect to the source text during the 18th and 19th centuries. Furthermore, it is obvious that a close examination of the social context in which the translation is produced as well as that of the initial metatexts (in this case put in contrast since we have two different translations of the same text) allows us to better understand how and why two translators have happened to choose such different options when dealing with the same text in the same period. Serrano’s \textit{Lógica} was part of an attempt to develop the genre, transforming it into a helpful introduction to the sciences. However, J. M. Alea’s \textit{Lógica} was conceived as an oeuvre of prestige –commissioned by the political establishment– whose potential readers were not clearly defined. This \textit{Lógica} underwent a process of renewal of the aspects that were considered obsolete from a philosophical point of view. Clearly, the decision to translate Dumarsais’ work in 1800, a moment when his theory of knowledge was less prestigious than Condillac’s, can only be understood within a systematic programme of translation approved (imposed) by the establishment – in this case, Godoy – and whose participants were not always as \textit{enlightened} as could be expected. They were, nonetheless, informed about what went on in France at that time. Without a doubt, the reedition of Dumarsais’ works in 1797 was crucial in the enhancement of his prestige and the main cause for Alea’s translation of the \textit{Colección española de las obras gramaticales de Cesar Du Marsais, ordenada para la instrucción pública}.

Finally, it may be said that a study of this nature brings to the fore the special interest of the data that can be generated by the linguistic analysis of translations, i. e. a better understanding of the manner in which this kind of knowledge is transmitted and the way in which it is received in the target culture. In all, this study constitutes a valuable contribution to the history of translation as well as to the history of linguistics and linguistic historiography.

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Translation and terminology. Apropos of two Spanish versions of Dumarsais’ Logique…


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Appendix 1

Editions of Condillac’s La logique published in France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>La logique ou les premiers développements de l’art de penser; ouvrage élémentaire</td>
<td>Paris : L’Esprit &amp; De Bure aîné</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1789</td>
<td>La logique ou les premiers développements de l’art de penser; ouvrage élémentaire que le conseil préposé aux Ecoles palatines avoit demandé &amp; qu’il a honoré de son</td>
<td>Paris : (s.n.) An XI (1802)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1792</td>
<td>La logique ou les premiers développements de l’art de penser</td>
<td>Brigitte MonTI</td>
<td>Paris : s.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An III 1795</td>
<td>Ouvrage ou les premiers développements de l’art de penser</td>
<td>Brigitte MonTI</td>
<td>Paris : Impr. de F. Dufart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An VI 1798</td>
<td>Oeuvres de Condillac. La Logique, ou les premiers développements de l’art de penser</td>
<td>Houel, Charles/Gratiot Guillaume (Impr.): Paris/Strasbourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 2

Condillac’s *Logiques* translated into Spanish at the end of the 18th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>B.M de Calzada</td>
<td>La Lógica o Los primeros elementos del arte de pensar Escrita en francés por el abad de Condillac.</td>
<td>Madrid : J. Ibarra (203 p.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786</td>
<td>B.M de Calzada</td>
<td>La Lógica o Los primeros elementos del arte de pensar Escrita en francés por el abad de Condillac.</td>
<td>Madrid : J. Ibarra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796</td>
<td>Valentín de Foronda</td>
<td>Lógica de Condillac puesta en dialogo por D. - y adicionada con un pequeño tratado sobre toda clase de argumentos y sofismas con varias reflexiones de la aritmética moral de Buffon, sobre medir las cosas inciertas, sobre el modo de apreciar las relaciones de verisimilitud, los grados de probabilidad, el valor de los testimonios, la influencia de las casualidades, el inconveniente de los riesgos, y sobre formar el juicio del valor real de neutros temores y esperanzas.</td>
<td>Con licencia Madrid: en la imprenta de González</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3

Other *lógicas* translated into Spanish at the end of the 18th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Translator</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1797</td>
<td>Borrelli, M</td>
<td>Elementos del arte de pensar, ó la Lógica reducida á lo que es meramente útil / trad. del francés por D. Josef Maria Magallon y Armendariz, Marqués de Santiago,</td>
<td>Madrid: Aznar (262 p.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1798</td>
<td>Baldinotti, Cesare</td>
<td>Arte de dirigir el entendimiento en la investigacion de la Verdad ó Logica, escrita en latin por Cesar Baldinoti y traducida en castellano por Don Santos Diez Gonzalez y Don Manuel de Valbuena</td>
<td>Madrid: Benito Cano (VIII + 399 p.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 B. M de Calzada (ca. 1750-1807).
BIONOTE / NOTICE BIOGRAPHIQUE

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