

The effect of the United Nations resolution for Olympic Truce on peace based on functionalism

KWANGHO PARK¹ ✉, GI YONG KOO², MINKIL KIM²

¹*Dahl School of Business, Viterbo University, United States of America*

²*The School of Hospitality, Sport and Tourism Management, The Sorrell College of Business, Troy University, United States of America*

ABSTRACT

The purpose of the current study is to identify if the UN resolution for Olympic Truce affects peace around the period of the Olympic Games based on functionalism. Methodologically, this study uses a diverse case technique and compares the two following cases: the first case is the Olympic Games, which did not have the UN resolution for Olympic Truce (The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics), while the other is the Olympic Games which had the UN resolution for Olympic Truce (The 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics). This study determines, firstly, that functional international organizations can actualize their common values (i.e., peace and human rights) and establish world order by cooperating with multiple international organizations, which is more effective than one organization behaving independently. Secondly, through the results, we have confirmed that sports can be an effective mediator in making the world peaceful with unanimous support from the international society.

Keywords: United Nations; UN resolutions; Olympic truce; Peace; Functionalism.

Cite this article as:

Park, K., Koo, G.Y., & Kim, M. (2023). The effect of the United Nations resolution for Olympic Truce on peace based on functionalism. *Journal of Human Sport and Exercise*, 18(1), 107-125. <https://doi.org/10.14198/jhse.2023.181.10>

✉ **Corresponding author.** *Dahl School of Business, Viterbo University, United States of America.* <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6021-6837>

E-mail: kpark@troy.edu

Submitted for publication March 31, 2021.

Accepted for publication May 19, 2021.

Published January 01, 2023 (*in press* June 15, 2021).

JOURNAL OF HUMAN SPORT & EXERCISE ISSN 1988-5202.

© Faculty of Education. University of Alicante.

doi:10.14198/jhse.2023.181.10

INTRODUCTION

On September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test. Afterward, the international community condemned the nuclear provocation more aggressively than before, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved to impose economic and oil sanctions on North Korea through Resolution 2375 (United Nations, 2017a). The United States has considered North Korea's nuclear weapon tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch tests as significant threats against the United States and the territory of South Korea. Moreover, the Trump administration had been considering multiple military options in response to the threats. From the standpoint of both South Korea and the United States, the necessity for the denuclearization of North Korea is a matter that absolutely cannot be given up in order to resolve the security threats and establish a peace regime because North Korea's nuclear weapons could have been a cause of WWII starting in far eastern Asia and the United States (Wilson, 2017).

In the 72nd session of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), however, the president of the Republic of Korea, Jae-In Moon, made a speech with a proposal for a peaceful solution to the nuclear threats by encouraging North Korea's participation in a mega sport event held in South Korea, the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games (United Nations, 2017b). In compliance with his request, the national athletic team of North Korea participated in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic games. After their participation, the once antagonistic atmosphere among the United States, South, and North Korea was completely reversed.

There have been two summits between the United States and North Korea and three summits between the two Koreas throughout nearly one year since the 2018 Winter Olympics. For about 70 years since the Korean War ceasefire agreement, there had never been so many summits in such a short time. Additionally, each of the three countries' leaders met together at the Korean Demilitarized Zone on June 30, 2019, and President Donald Trump was the first American president to step over the border between North and South Korea, which was a historical and peaceable moment in both American and Korean history (George et al., 2019).

All of the summits helped the related countries develop a pledge to work towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to establish a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War (Berlinger & Seo, 2018). Consequently, North Korea has not committed any provocations associated with both the nuclear bomb and ICBM tests to this day.

Until the atmosphere had become peaceful, the 2018 Olympic Games might have played a significant role in allowing the dust to settle from a possible war because the role of the Olympic Games originates from the Olympic Truce, which was an ancient Greek Olympic tradition. This traditional Olympic Truce aims to stop all conflict seven days before, during, and after the period of the Olympics to protect athletes and spectators' safety from any conflict during their travels to the Olympics (Loland & Selliaas, 2009; Burleson, 2012). However, it is unclear if the Olympics of all time contributed to maintaining peace because many Olympic Games have failed to maintain peace before, during, and after the period of the Olympic Games (e.g., the propagandization of the 1936 Berlin Olympics and Black September terror in the 1972 Olympic Games), despite the tradition of not attacking individuals and other countries (Burleson, 2012).

However, the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games have seemingly become the cornerstone of peace and have shown a possible function to maintain order among conflicting countries. The big difference between the 20th century Olympics mentioned, and the 2018 Olympic Games is whether or not the Olympic Games have the UN resolution for Olympic Truce. This resolution is a recommendation adopted by the members of the UNGA, to stop war and conflict and to develop human rights around the period of the

Olympics (United Nations, 2017c). Thus, this study assumes that the UN resolution for Olympic Truce may play an important role, which allows the dust to settle before waging a possible war among the related-countries through cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and International Olympic Committee (IOC).

Consequently, the purpose of the current study is to identify if the UN resolution for Olympic Truce affects peace around the period of the Olympic Games based on functionalism. Functionalism is a theoretical framework in international relations in which a form of authority promotes norms and values through the cooperation of functional, technical, or economic aspects (Rosamond, 2000), which verifies how crucial the cooperation is between international organizations for mega sport events and intergovernmental organizations in maintaining peace. Moreover, this study illustrates those sports can be an efficient way to make the world peaceful.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Functionalism and the United Nations

Functionalism, in the academic field of international relations, is one of the theoretical concepts of liberalism related to international organizations. According to Bennett (1991), functionalism is a theoretical approach explaining that a form of authority linked with needs, expertise, technology, and knowledge is established through international integration and interdependence for world order, which opposes realism that pursues self-interest through military power (Pease, 2018). In other words, the creation of international organizations with technical experts is useful to promote certain norms, values, and responsibilities through cooperation between governments in resolving economic and social issues functionally (e.g., sustainability, peace, pandemic diseases, education, refugee support, and so on) rather than waging war (Rosamond, 2000). Furthermore, such functional organizations (i.e., United Nations) have member-states and can only operate in the members' territories without threatening member-states' sovereignty (Bevir, 2007). Thus, this approach can lead many nations and societies to resolve and share knowledge of common issues and problems for peace and prosperity.

Based on the concept of functionalism, many international agencies establish policies and activities for implementation through cooperation with their members and make the following assumptions underpinning functionalism: (1) integration is based on the framework of human freedom; (2) international agencies are established with expert knowledge and technology, not power; (3) there is no sabotage during their political process or activities (Newton, 2019). A representative functionalist institution with these assumptions is the UN.

Typical examples of functionalism within the establishment of the UN include the six principal organs (i.e., the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat), specialized agencies of the UN (e.g., World Health Organization), and their programs (e.g., UN Children's Fund, UN environmental program). These agencies and programs are operated under the charter of the UN, which has the following purposes: (1) maintaining peace and security; (2) developing amicable international relationships; (3) and improving human rights. Namely, the related-policies and activities of UN systems are underpinned by functionalism (Pease, 2018).

Security and the UN resolution

Within functionalism, the UN is involved in peace and security for their member-states through international integration, which is called collective security; member-states deal with issues of international security, preventing future war, and managing negative effects of the war on their states by cooperation with other

states (Pease, 2018). To put it simply, the notion of collective security is to consider aggression toward a member-state as aggression on all. Furthermore, the UN focuses on human security, an approach for humanity, to prevent various physical threats to individuals (e.g., war, violence, disease, hunger, disaster, environments) (Pettman, 2005; MacFarlane & Khong, 2006).

To protect international and human security, the two following principal organs of the UN play a critical role based on the UN Charter: (1) The Security Council (SC); and (2) The General Assembly (GA). Firstly, The SC makes *decisions* to adopt resolutions, which are legally binding forces to the member-states (Moore & Pubantz, 2017). The resolutions have significant power and authority over collective security, being directly involved in international conflicts that hinder the security and peace of the member states. The SC's involvement in such conflicts consists of the establishment of peacekeeping activities, international sanctions, and military force. Furthermore, the SC has fifteen members, ten of which are non-permanent members and five permanent members (P5) (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of China). The P5 are regarded as 'a great power member of the UN alliance against the axis powers during World War II' (Adams, 2013, p. 25).

Secondly, according to Chapter IV in the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945), the GA refers to an authority which makes *recommendations* related to various situations or questions in terms of peace, economy, education, society, health, and human rights, among others. These recommendations are called a General Assembly resolution (GA resolution). Each member can be a representative and have one vote in the GA, and a two-thirds majority of the member states is required to adopt GA resolutions (United Nations 1945, Chapter VI, Article 10, 13, 18).

In briefly introducing the two principal organs of the UN (i.e., The Security Council and The General Assembly), there are two interesting varieties of resolutions (i.e., SC resolution and GA resolution). In detail, the two terms, *decision* and *recommendation*, in the sentences above make the characteristics of the resolutions diverse (Lagoni, 1995). In a legal effect, a *decision* makes a resolution binding, and a *recommendation* makes a resolution non-binding (Öberg, 2005). The characteristics of both resolutions have structural limitations that hinder the achievement of the UN's grand purposes.

Limitations and challenges of the resolutions of the United Nations

The two types of resolutions have enabled the UN to equip an essential authority that can impose international sanctions and exert military actions, all of which are to advance their grand vision: 'a guardian of international peace and security, as a promoter of human rights, as a protector of international law, and as an engineer of socioeconomic advancement' (Hanhimäki, 2015, p. 1). Based on Article 27 in the UN Charter, each permanent member of the SC can have a veto on any substantive resolution. However, the UN's efficacy and authority have been doubted, concerning whether this organization can be 'a mediator on matters of international security' (Hanhimäki, 2015, p. 3) because of 'the threat and exercise of the veto by individual permanent five (P5) members of the security council (SC)' (Carswell, 2013, p. 453). Since the P5 can exert the veto depending on each permanent member's interest and personal pursuit, the pass of binding resolutions is realistically difficult (Sterling-Folker, 2013). In other words, in the perspective of structural realism, concerns with relative gains make cooperation difficult because great powers (i.e., the P5) try to extend their control and maintain their authority to achieve their goals even in the UN (Sterling-Folker, 2013; Waltz, 1979).

There is a definite example that can explain such a limitation. In 2012, both Russia and China vetoed in opposition to a draft resolution that demanded the Syrian government to stop the violation of human rights

and violence, even though 13 members of the UNSC were in favour of the resolution (Carswell, 2013). Because of the vetoes on the resolution, there were killings of over 5500 people, including about 400 children, which shows that the UNSC failed to maintain international peace and security through the veto merely exerted by certain members' intransigence for their political interests (United Nations, 2012). As such, the self-interest of powerful nations undermines the binding involvement of the UNSC for peace and makes it impossible to respond to anti-humanitarian acts immediately. Many of the academic papers in the field of international relations insist on reforming the UNSC (Carswell, 2013; Kalantar, 2019; Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). However, the self-interests of the powerful nations slow down the Security Council's reformation process, and their vetoes incapacitate the functional mechanism of the peace-oriented institution.

In terms of The UN General Assembly (UNGA), significantly affecting collective security and peace enforcement would be challenging with a GA resolution because (1) a GA resolution is a non-binding recommendation, which causes the resolution to have inadequate power to be enforced practically and legally; and (2) a GA resolution is merely in the form of general statements, not a legal order (Pease, 2018). However, expressing the international community's consensus about various world issues through a GA resolution can functionally affect peace beyond simply causing temporary ceasefires and enforcing sanctions adopted in the UN (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1997).

Rather than the UNSC, the UNGA needs to be a leader to 'exert pressure on protagonists to halt hostilities and not renew warfare at some time in the future' (Diehl, Reifschneider, & Hensel, 1996, p. 688) and 'seek to install and internalize cultures of human rights' (Weiss, 2013, p. 5). Accordingly, a pre-emptive mechanism using a GA resolution is needed to resolve current conflicts and prevent future conflicts (Kalantar, 2019). To achieve this, the UN is trying to find possible outlets, including sport areas, to prevent future war and put an end to modern conflict through a mutual agreement among international society.

The relationship between sport and peace

According to the UNGA (United Nations, 2017c, p. 4), the Olympic Games have become 'as a tool to promote peace, dialogue and reconciliation in areas of conflict during and beyond the Olympic and Paralympic Games.' This section sheds light on the relationship between sport and peace, which gives an understanding of why the UN regards sport as one of the solutions to conflicts.

The Olympic Games are the biggest of all sport events in the world. In the field of sport politics, such a sport event is regarded by international organizations, politicians, and societies as a useful tool to create peace in countries having conflictual situations (Cárdenas, 2016). From the perspective of sport politics, the positive impacts of sport on peacebuilding are associated with a neoliberalist perspective, which emphasizes a peaceful international order with the cooperation of states through intergovernmental organizations (Lee, 2017). According to Cárdenas (2016), professional or recreational sport events can help communities or groups that have conflicts to reconcile their relationships because interventions through sport create many opportunities to have interactions with international society in conflicting situations (Sugden, 2010).

On the other hand, there are opposite perspectives on the effect of sport on peace. From the perspective of the realist, each state is considered an actor having desires to maximize its interests by having significant power to maintain hegemony and to survive in international relations (Waltz, 1979). Hence, sport has been used an excellent political means in international relations. For example, Nazi Germany used the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games for propaganda purposes because Adolf Hitler considered sports to be tools to secure hegemony since discrimination in the treatment of winners and losers is implicit in fascist ideology (Krüger &

Murry, 2010). Lee (2015, p. 181) also agrees that sport competitions at the international level can be considered 'a symbolic battlefield on which to display the ideological supremacy'.

Like this, sports can negatively affect peace by being used as a political weapon for states to enhance nationalism diplomatically, acquire prestige, make justification of their political actions, and so on (Lee, 2017). In this respect, according to Grix (2013), the most controversial of all international sport events is the Olympics.

The question of the effect of the Olympics on peace

The origin of the Olympic Truce is from an ancient Greek tradition called *ekecheiria*, dating back to the Ancient Greek Olympics in 800 B.C. The meaning of the traditional Olympic Truce is to lay down arms and cease all conflict during the period of the Olympics and to guarantee safety while athletes and spectators travel to the Olympic Games and return home (Loland & Selliaas, 2009).

Such principles and concepts revive in the modern Olympics. In 1892, based on the traditional idea of the Olympic Truce, Pierre de Coubertin established the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as a means of European peace (Hoberman, 1995). Unlike the traditional Olympic Truce, however, the modern Olympic Truce did not work for about 100 years from the 1896 Athens Summer Olympics to the end of the Cold War. In the earlier era of the modern Olympic Games, 'Coubertin believed that the power of the Olympic movement was such that the Germans, who had wanted the Games since their revival, would reduce their belligerent conduct' (Findling & Pelle, 1996, p. 51). However, the 1916 Berlin Olympic Games were cancelled because Germany entered World War I in 1914 by invading Belgium. The 1940 Olympic Games were planned to be held in Tokyo; however, Japan started the Second Sino-Japanese War with the intention to dominate China, and the IOC deprived Japan of its planned Olympic event (Yu & Liu, 2011). After that, the 1940 Olympic Games expected to be held in Helsinki, Finland, and the 1944 Olympic Games in London were cancelled because of World War II (Giatsis et al., 2004).

Moreover, many countries have exploited the Olympics to send political messages to others and pursue hegemony. In December of 1979, for instance, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which caused the United States to lead many countries to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics to protest the Soviet Union's invasion (Crossman & Lappage, 1992). Hence, only 80 countries participated in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, while 65 countries backed out (Reiche, 2016). On the other hand, the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations retaliated against the United States through their absence in the 1984 LA Olympic Games four years later. Eventually, 14 countries boycotted the LA Olympics, including the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, Mongolia, Namibia, Afghanistan, Laos, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Vietnam (Rennie-Short, 2013).

Other than these boycotts, several issues were degrading the value of the Olympics (e.g., the propagandization of the 1936 Berlin Olympics and Black September terror in the 1972 Olympic Games). Based on these historical events, the IOC neither deterred the war nor induced reconciliation; on the contrary, the Cold War disrupted the IOC's hosting of the Olympic Games and turned it into events that were ineffective for peace. At that time, the IOC was faithful to humanism based on the Olympic Charter but showed limits in the role of maintaining peace through sport.

The cooperation between the United Nations and The International Olympic Committee

After the era of the Cold War, both the UN and IOC had to take measures to overcome their limitations and began to cooperate to resolve interstate disputes and prevent war by adopting special resolutions in the

aspect of peacekeeping. When it comes to the UN, they contributed collective security and peace by cooperating with regional organizations (e.g., the African Union, European Union, and North American Free Trade Agreement) (Mackinlay & Chopra, 1997). According to Article 52 in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it states that 'nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action' (United Nations, 1945). In the 21st century, based on Chapter VIII, regional organizations are considered an alternative to direct involvement with the UN, which is a way to save costs for peacekeeping and effectively understand conflictual issues in related-regions (Diehl, 1993). According to Haftel (2007), cooperation through a regional integration arrangement is more likely to resolve interstate disputes peacefully.

As one of regional organizations, the IOC focuses on establishing both a peaceful world and establishing human rights under the Olympic Movement, its Charter, and through participation in sports (IOC, 2019), which follows the same view and context as 'the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN' (United Nations, 1993, p. 2). Thus, the IOC tried to partner with the UN. Firstly, to prevent boycotts like the 1980 Moscow and 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the IOC asked the UN to be a partner to expand the number of countries and athletes participating in the Olympic Games. To achieve this goal, the IOC and UN invited new independent states (e.g., Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia) and excluded countries that had civil wars and that had been sanctioned from participation in the Olympics (Roche, 2002).

Furthermore, in 1993, the IOC submitted a proposal to Boutros Ghali, the sixth UN Secretary-General. The proposal endorsed by the National Olympic Committees (NOC) of 184 nations was for the UN to support an Olympic Truce at the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games. Finally, 121 member-states of the UN acknowledged that the Olympic Truce contributed to the establishment of the UN Charter's purposes and principles (United Nations, 1993) and unanimously adopted the first resolution for Olympic Truce in the UNGA on October 25, 1993.

Moreover, the GA recommended member-states, or any countries in disputes, to stop all conflicts, threats, and wars 'from the seventh day before the opening and the seventh day following the closing of each of the Olympic Games' (United Nations, 1993, p. 2). Ever since 1993, the GA has unanimously passed a resolution for Olympic Truce every two years, a year before the summer and winter Olympic Games.

Does the UN Resolution for Olympic Truce work for peace?

Based on the traditional concept of the Olympic Truce, the current Olympic Truce has been aimed at building peace, encouraging reconciliation, improving human rights, and it 'epitomizes a bridge from the old and wise tradition to the most compelling purpose of the UN – the maintenance of international peace and security' (United Nations, 2000, p. 1). The UN resolution for Olympic Truce is valuable as long as the cooperation between the IOC and the UNs is maintained. To preserve such leverage, the IOC continues to cooperate with the UN to 'build a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic Ideal' (United Nations, 1993, p. 1).

After adopting the UN resolutions for Olympic Truce, there have been several examples that the resolutions positively influenced peace. During the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympic Games, the first resolution for Olympic Truce helped the Sudanese National Olympic Committee negotiate a ceasefire between the Sudanese people's liberation army and the government army (Reid, 2006). The second example occurred during the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympic Games. The UN Secretary-General led a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) between the UN and the Iraqi government, which contributed to the prevention of the recurrence of the Iraq war (United Nations, 1998).

However, it might be difficult for a resolution agreement to affect the collective security and peace enforcement significantly, because the UN resolution for Olympic Truce, adopted by the GA, is non-binding. A non-binding resolution cannot force non-signatory states to abstain from war during the period of the Olympics. Correspondingly, the UN resolution for Olympic Truce is met with scepticism. For this study, when it comes to peace between the two Koreas, it is unclear whether this resolution truly brings about peace and could solve the threat of nuclear weapons by North Korea. According to Bates (2010), the IOC has failed to maintain peace because the modern Olympic Games were cancelled and postponed several times due to wars, boycotts, and terrorist attacks for about 115 years. He concludes that 'the truce has been violated on virtually every occasion' (para. 3).

To investigate further on these issues, the purpose of this study is to clarify the ambiguities based on the effects of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce on peace as well as to verify if functionalism can be applied to the UN resolution for maintaining peace. Furthermore, this study indicates how important the cooperation is between intergovernmental organizations (i.e., United Nations) and non-governmental organizations related to sports (i.e., International Olympic Committee) for making the world peaceful without exercising any military or economic power.

Research question

Does the UN resolution for Olympic Truce functionally affect peace?

RESEARCH DESIGN

To examine the effect of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce on peace, this study uses case study which is one of the qualitative methods, 'an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a larger set of units' (Gerring, 2004, p. 341). When it comes to the case selection technique, this study has chosen to use 'diverse cases' among the nine techniques of case study suggested by Gerring (2017). The diverse case technique needs two or more occasions and indicates how the cause generates a change in the dependent variable by explaining in what way the presence or absence of the cause influences the outcome (Gerring, 2017).

Based on the purpose of this study and the methodological technique, the presence or absence of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce in the Olympic Games were chosen as independent variables. The dependent variable is the state of peace, which is measured by scrutinizing whether there are significant attacks, conflicts, or negative situations contrary to peace before, during, or after the period of the Olympic Games. Namely, this study examines how the presence or absence of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce generates a change in the state of peace through the diverse case technique.

In terms of cases observed in this study, two cases of Olympic Games held in South Korea are used: The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics and the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. There are three reasons why the authors chooses the two Olympics held in South Korea: (1) South Korea hosted two Olympics, one before and the other after the UN resolution for Olympic Truce was established; (2) Among the other countries hosting the Olympics twice, the Korean peninsula is still the only nation that remains divided into two countries due to a civil war and its armistice; and (3) the conflict and the relationship between South and North Korea significantly affect world peace (i.e., nuclear weapons and ICBM). For these reasons, this study is a unique

and meaningful way to evaluate the effect of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce on peace through the two Olympic cases held in South Korea.

Each case has different characteristics; first, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games occurred when there was no UN resolution for Olympic Truce. The other case is associated with the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games, which, conversely, did have the UN resolution for Olympic Truce. Namely, a case related to the absence of the UN resolution is the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, whereas the other case, the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic Games had the presence of the UN resolution. Based on the presence or absence of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce, this study examines how the UN resolution for Olympic Truce generates a change in the state of peace before, during, and after the period of the Olympic Games.

One crucial consideration in this method is that all case study research requires some form of comparison to be valid. A case study should have either spatial variation or temporal variation to establish a valid research design. According to Gerring (2017), spatial variation is a comparison across cases in the same period (e.g., comparison between the United States and China in 2019), while temporal variation is a comparison across time in the same place (e.g., comparison between events in 2000 and 2019 in the United States). If a case study did not have one of these comparisons, the study would not constitute a valid research design (Gerring, 2017). To validate the research design, this study uses temporal variation because the cases chosen occurred in one particular country, South Korea, but during different times (i.e., 1988 and 2018), which qualifies this study as valid. In other words, this study identifies whether the UN resolution for Olympic truce has any impact on peace maintenance by comparing the two Olympic events held on the Korean peninsula and during different times.

FINDINGS

Case 1: 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games (The Absence of the Resolution)

On December 12, 1979, in South Korea, there was a coup d'état by a military general, Chun Doo-Hwan (Chun); his military group succeeded in seizing power to control the country. Consequently, his military regime started the bloody massacre of people who participated in a demonstration for the democratization movement and kept imprisoning people who were against his regime. To change the negative political atmosphere on his regime, Chun put his best effort into bidding to host the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics because he believed that the Olympic Games would 'enhance their government image internationally and consolidate political power at home' (Dahlby, 1981). Finally, the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics was to be held in South Korea from September 17 to October 2, 1988.

Before starting the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics, the IOC had to increase the number of countries participating in the 1988 Olympics without countries boycotting participation in the Olympics (Pound, 1994). To do so, first, the IOC decided to directly send out invitations to countries instead of the Olympic Organizing Committee (OOC) that was established in the 1908 London Olympics. This decision was to reduce the level of tension between the OOC and the National Olympic Committees (NOCs). Second, the IOC had to examine the formal objection of North Korea against choosing South Korea as the host country because the IOC did not want to create a newly organized boycott (Loland & Selliaas, 2009). According to Loland and Selliaas (2009), the IOC suggested to North Korea that the two Koreas host the Olympics jointly. However, the IOC's action toward North Korea was a tactic to cause a delay in the consideration of a boycott in communist countries. Eventually, North Korea's proposal was denied, and the IOC decided that South Korea should host the mega sport event alone.

Subsequently, on November 29, 1987, North Korea attacked South Korea before the opening of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The attack took place on a flight from Baghdad to Seoul, which resulted in the death of all 115 passengers. The plane was a Korean Air Boeing 858 and was blown up by two disguised North Korean agents who installed a radio-shaped time bomb and liquid explosives on the plane. The purpose of the attack was to directly restrain and disturb the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and to generate social and political anxiety as well as confusion in South Korea (Lee, 2014).

During the 1988 Seoul Olympics, there was a massacre of people in the democracy movement against a dictatorship in Burma, now called Myanmar. To be specific, one day after the opening ceremony, September 18, 1988, General Saw Maung seized control of Burma in a military coup and slaughtered more than 1000 victims participating in a movement for democracy (Tarrow, 1996). However, international society could not deal with these conflicts because they had paid most attention to the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

After the 1988 Seoul Olympics, there were many infiltrations and provocations made by the North Korean Army. According to the Ministry of National Defence in South Korea (2018, p. 360), as shown in Table 1, North Korea committed more than 750 infiltrations and local provocations in South Korea since the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Table 1. The number of North Korea's local provocations and infiltrations before and after the 1988 Olympics.

	1970-1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	2018	2019	2020
Infiltrations	477	94	16	27	0	0	0
Local Provocations	153	156	225	237	0	0	1
ICBM	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
Nuclear Bomb Tests	0	0	2	4	0	0	0
Total	630	250	243	271	0	0	1

Sources adapted from Ministry of National Defence (2018; 2020) and Nuclear Threat Initiative's (2021) North Korea missile test database.

Since the year 2000, North Korea's strategy to collapse South Korea through deliberate military action was refocused on the firm protection of their regime through the development of nuclear weapons (having done six nuclear tests), and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), the range of which is likely to be more than 8,000 miles, reaching as far as Washington D.C. North Korea's development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) provoked condemnation from the international community and increased war tension that might have been a reason for World War III (Wilson, 2017).

Case 2: 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games (The Presence of the Resolution)

Before the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics, on September 3, 2017, North Korea carried out its sixth nuclear weapons test. Due to the numerous nuclear weapons tests, the level of war tension rose near the maximum. The UNSC had imposed more aggressive economic and oil sanctions on North Korea through Resolution 2375 on September 11, 2017 (United Nations, 2017a). The sanctions referred to a series of measures, including restrictions on imports, exports, and financial flows associated with the targeted country, which aim to resolve and punish the country's problems (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliott 1990; Alexander, 2009).

Moreover, leaders from all over the world discussed the issue related to the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons under the theme of the General Debate (GD), 'Focusing on people – Striving for peace and a decent life for all on a sustainable planet,' during the 72nd session of the UNGA, at UN Headquarters in New York. At the GD, the president of the United States, Donald Trump, used antagonistic language such as 'totally

destroy' and 'rocket man is on a suicide mission' (United Nations, 2017d, p. 5) to highly criticize and threaten North Korea. President Trump's language implied a pre-emptive strike against North Korea and that the U.S. government would never tolerate nuclear threats from North Korea (Hong, 2017). Around that time, the U.S. administration had declared to pursue the nuclear disarmament of North Korea by enforcing 'maximum pressure and engagement' (U.S. Department of State, 2018), acknowledging and criticizing the failure of the strategic patience toward North Korea's nuclear weapons threat, which had been implemented by the previous government (Easley, 2017). However, the president of the Republic of Korea, Jae-In Moon, made a proposal for a peaceful solution by inviting North Korea to participate in the mega sports event held in South Korea, the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games (United Nations, 2017b).

With the South Korean president's proposal, unlike the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the UN resolution for Olympic Truce was adopted unanimously by all present member states on November 13, 2017, at the 72nd session of the UNGA. The resolution for the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics titled 'Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal' is to call for 1) stopping hostilities from around seven days before the Olympics to seven days after the Olympics; 2) the development of human rights; and 3) looking forward to creating a peaceful atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia through the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics (United Nations, 2017c). Through such cooperative actions with the member states of the UN, Kim Jong-Un, the North Korean leader, announced North Korea's participation in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics in his 2018 New Year's address (Panda, 2018).

North Korea's delegation and the national athletic team ended up participating in the opening and closing ceremony of the 2018 PyeongChang Olympic Games. During the Olympics, the two Koreas made great efforts toward changing the atmosphere through various activities such as marching together at the opening ceremony under the Korean unification flag, organizing a unified Korean team to participate in a group sport (i.e., a women ice hockey team), and meeting with the high-level delegation of North Korea (Rich, 2018).

Table 2. The list of the summits that happened among the related countries.

	Date	Summit	Place
After the 1988 Olympic	13-14 June 2000	South Korea – North Korea	Pyongyang (North Korea)
	2-4 October 2007		
	27 April 2018	South Korea – North Korea	The border line of two Koreas
	26 May 2018		
After the 2018 Olympic	12 June 2018	The United States – North Korea	Singapore
	18-20 September 2018	South Korea – North Korea	Pyongyang (North Korea)
	27-28 February 2019	The United States – North Korea	Hanoi, Vietnam
	30 June 2019	The United States – Two Koreas	The border line of two Koreas

After the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, several historical meetings among the United States, North Korea, and South Korea have taken place to promote peace and reconciliation. As shown in Table 2, there were three inter-Korean summits and two summits between the United States and North Korea one year after the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. Each of these summits has been the beginning of peaceful gatherings, which had never been done in the previous regime of South Korea and the United States. The five summits resulted in North Korea, making a pledge to work towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to establish a peace treaty to end the Korean War formally (Berlinger & Seo, 2018). This pledge is recorded as a historical breakthrough in both American and Korean history. Moreover, as Table I shows, the most

important thing is that North Korea has never committed to any provocation associated with nuclear bomb testing and ICBM to this day since the 2018; 2020; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2021). Exceptionally, there was only one small local provocation where a North Korean Guard Post (GP) shot four bullets toward a South Korean GP in the demilitarized zone on May 3rd, 2020, which could not change the domestic and international situation. Additionally, there were several short-range missiles that North Korea launched since the 2018 Olympics. However, both South Korea and the United States' governments have not considered them as threats and provocations, but they understood the short-range missiles to be North Korea's self-defence and domestic politics (Ching & Seldin, 2020; Ward, 2019).

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce on peace based on functionalism. By comparing the two cases, this study finds that the UN resolution for Olympic Truce has a significant impact on encouraging the countries toward the process of reconciliation for peace, relieving serious issues (i.e., the threats of nuclear weapon testing and war among the three related-countries) from the perspective of functionalism. Based on the findings from the two cases, Table 3 indicates whether there are any significant provocations, associated with nuclear bomb testing and ICBM, from North Korea according to the absence or presence of the UN resolution for Olympic Truce.

Table 3. Whether there are any significant provocations around the period of the Olympics according to the absence or presence of the resolution.

	Before	During	After
The 1988 Olympics (The Absence of the Resolution)	O	O	O
The 2018 Olympics (The Presence of the Resolution)	X	X	X

Based on the analysis of both cases, this study finds that there was no international cooperation between the UN and IOC to prevent conflicts involving the relationship between the two Koreas before the 1988 Seoul Olympics. The reason was that the IOC mainly focused on increasing the number of countries participating in the Olympics as well as the prevention of a newly created boycott rather than reconciliation between South and North Korea. Several great countries (e.g., the United States, Germany, Soviet Union) also focused on maintaining hegemony through utilizing the Olympics. Namely, the Olympics were abused as a political tool, and to make matters worse, the UN had been debilitated by the exercise of the five permanent members' veto in the UNSC.

This situation can be explained from the perspective of structural realism in the field of international relations. According to Waltz (1979), the absence of international sovereignty, such as the loss of the UN's functions, causes balance of power effect and an anarchical structure where there is no authority to control conflicts, wars, and interventions because states fear how other nations might attack. Thus, states must enhance their capabilities in terms of 'population and territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability, and competence' by any means necessary for their survival (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). In such anarchy, without international cooperation and checks from the security institution, North Korea needed to send political messages and threats to South Korea and the international society through several attacks and provocations to disturb the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and to generate social and political anxiety in the South Korean society before the Olympics (Lee, 2014) because they did not want South Korea to be renowned and have a strong image internationally through the 1988 Olympics. Also, they had focused on nuclear and ICBM missile tests for their survival and political benefit after the 1988 Olympics.

Such offensive behaviours of North Korea against South Korea and the international society can be also interpreted based on the offensive realism theory from international relations. According to Mearsheimer (2001), offensive realism occurs when states strive to maximize their relative power under an anarchical structure because they believe that maximizing power is the best way to become secure in their survival. Namely, North Korea's anxiety of being an economically inferior country compared to South Korea and of being attacked by other countries causes the leaders to respond by placing much of their effort on a number of provocations and maximizing relative power (i.e., Nuclear weapons and ICBM). These efforts of North Korea caused conflicts among South Korea, the United States, and even the international society (Cha, 2002), which might cause significant damage to each other in various aspects and even the end of the world through a possible WWII or nuclear war. Based on the results, it is concluded that the IOC and the UN had failed to proactively prevent conflicts and to improve the relationship between the two Koreas because there was an absence of international integration and cooperation (i.e., the UN resolution for Olympic Truce) that could functionally control threats.

Unlike the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the IOC and the UN were in cooperation before the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics. In the 72nd session of the UNGA, the UN resolution for Olympic Truce was adopted unanimously for the 2018 Olympics (United Nations, 2017). Through adopting the UN resolutions for Olympic Truce, the international society had a clear justification for maintaining peace around the period of the Olympics in mutual agreement and mutual understanding. Additionally, the 2018 PyeongChang Olympics, with the UN resolution for Olympic Truce, gave the three related-countries a chance to progress the process of reconciliation for peace, relieving the threat of nuclear weapons, preventing possible wars in the future, and even establishing the cornerstone of future unification between the two Koreas.

This peaceful phenomenon can be explained from the perspective of neoliberalism. This theory is from in the field of international relations and explains that international cooperation through institutions (e.g., the UN) can make it easier to achieve and maximize common interests because states should observe 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (Keohane, 2005; Krasner, 1983, p. 2).

Lederach's (1997) web-making approach to peace-building theory also states that strategic networks between non-governmental organization levels and the top-level of leadership are efficient in solving conflicts and promoting peaceful development through sport. In line with this, cooperation between the UN, as the top-leadership level of an intergovernmental organization, and the IOC, a non-governmental organization, created the UN resolution for Olympic Truce through the international community's consensus before the 2018 Olympics. The UN resolution with the consensus acted like a binding resolution relieving the war tension around the period of the 2018 Olympics even though it is a non-binding resolution adopted by UNGA. The context of this case is in line with functionalism. According to Haas (2008), functionalists recognize that cooperation within international organizations for resolving narrow issues like social and economic problems can spill over into more pressing political issues such as national security (Haas, 2008). Namely, the 2018 Olympic case indicates that the UN resolution for Olympic Truce could play a key role in functionally affecting the aspect of national security and peace beyond social and economic issues.

Some readers may have doubts about North Korea's conciliatory behaviour, which is different from their previously offensive behaviours of testing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, readers might expect that the future relationship between South Korea and North Korea is unclear. However, North Korea's peaceful gestures since the 2018 Olympic Games can be explained from a defensive realism perspective in international relations.

According to researchers in the field of international relations (Glaser, 2010; Jervice, 1999), when states are in a security dilemma, states believe that the best way to secure their survival is to maintain the status quo through a defensive posture, without focusing on maximizing power as done in offensive realism. For these reasons, it can be assumed that North Korea had been more defensive than before the 2018 Olympic Games because of the pressure that came from cooperation in the international society. Consequently, this study assesses that the UN resolution for Olympic truce was functionally and politically successful in contributing to peace in the 2018 Olympics, even if the situation between South and North Korea may change due to unexpected matters in the future.

In the functionalism perspective and based on the results of the case study, this study argues that (1) the absence of the cooperation between functional institutions (e.g., the UN and the IOC) can cause disorder in terms of security and the exploitation of international sport events for political purposes; (2) cooperation between functional institutions motivates the international community to firmly follow a resolution (e.g., the UN resolution for Olympic Truce) that can resolve their common issues (e.g., the threat of nuclear war to the world, climate changes) and promote reconciliation between the countries where there are still conflicts (e.g., South and North Korea) because such an agreement created through cooperation eventually becomes legitimate by encouraging states to follow norms of behaviour in the international system; (3) cooperation can help institutions and the world to keep pursuing their noble values (i.e., world peace, prosperity, and human rights). Thus, this study finds that the UN resolution for Olympic Truce has the potential to develop peace beyond the message of the Olympic Truce: '[it] can help us to bring about even a brief respite from conflict and strife, it will send a powerful message of hope to the international community' (United Nations, 2000, p. 1).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this study determines, firstly, that functional international organizations can actualize their common values (i.e., peace and human rights) and establish world order by cooperating with multiple international organizations, which is more effective than one organization behaving independently. Secondly, through the results, we have confirmed that sports can be an effective mediator in making the world peaceful with unanimous support from the international society.

Furthermore, this study is limited due to its focus on the two Olympic Games in a single country. Thus, future studies can compare all Olympics according to the presence or absence of the UN resolution through comparative methods or any other method to observe the effect of the UN resolution for Olympic truce on peace. However, since the two cases (i.e., the 1988 and 2018 Olympic Games) held in South Korea are unique in the history of the Olympics, this study will be useful for practitioners to understand the importance of institutional cooperation for developing peace and for researchers to extend their study about sport-related international organizations from the perspective of international relations.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

KP established the design of the study, applied the method to the study, brought international relations theory concepts, and wrote the manuscript. GYK and MK gathered the data, classified the data into the two cases, and discussed the findings. All authors interpreted the findings by applying the theories and approved the final version of the paper.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES

No funding agencies were reported by the authors.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

REFERENCES

- Adams, K. R. (2013). Structural realism: The imperialism of great power. In J. Sterling-Folker (Eds.), *Making Sense of International Relations Theory* (2nd ed.) (pp. 21-46). Rienner.
- Alexander, K. (2009). Economic sanctions. Palgrave. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230227286>
- Bates, M. (2010). Olympic and Paralympic games 2012: Olympic truce. UK Parliament. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2010-12-15/debates/10121533000862/OlympicAndParalympicGames2012OlympicTruce>
- Bennett, C. J. (1991). What is policy convergence and what causes it? *British Journal of Political Science*, 21(2), 215-233. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400006116>
- Berlinger, J. & Seo, Y. (2018). North and South Korea commit to era of no war. CNN. Retrieved November, 10, 2019, from <https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/18/asia/north-korea-south-korea-summit-intl/index.html>
- Bevir, M. (2007). *Encyclopedia of governance*. Sage Publications. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412952613>
- Burleson, C. (2012). The ancient Olympic truce in modern-day peacekeeping: Revisiting Ekecheiria. *Sport in Society*, 15(6), 798-813. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2012.708282>
- Cárdenas, A. (2016). Sport and peace-building in divided societies: A case study on Colombia and Northern Ireland. *Peace and Conflict Studies*, 23(2), 4.
- Carswell, A. J. (2013). Unblocking the UN security council: The uniting for peace resolution. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 18(3), 453-480. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krt016>
- Cha, V. D. (2002). Hawk engagement and preventive defense on the Korean Peninsula. *International Security*, 27(1), 40-78. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228802320231226>
- Ching, N., & Seldin, J. (2020). US military dismisses threat from latest North Korean missile test. *Voice of America*. Retrieved May 20, 2020, from <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/us-military-dismisses-threat-latest-north-korean-missile-test>
- Choe, S., & Sanger, D. E. (2019). Hours after agreeing to resume talks, North Korea launches missile. *The New York Times*. Retrieved November 10, 2019, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/world/asia/us-north-korea-nuclear-talks.html>
- Crossman, J., & Lappage, R. (1992). Canadian athletes' perceptions of the 1980 Olympic boycott. *Sociology of Sport Journal*, 9(4), 354-371. <https://doi.org/10.1123/ssj.9.4.354>
- Dahlby, T. (1981). Award of 1988 Olympics boosts S. Korea's effort for political security. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved November 10, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/10/04/award-of-1988-olympics-boosts-s-koreas-effort-for-political-security/2db0f29f-29cd-4581-8771-2f08c225181f/?utm_term=.a8390fdf5557
- Diehl, P. F. (1993). Institutional alternatives to traditional UN peacekeeping: An assessment of regional and multinational options. *Armed Forces & Society*, 19(2), 209-230. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9301900204>

- Diehl, F., Reifschneider, J., & Hensel, P. R. (1996). United Nations intervention and recurring conflict. *International Organization*, 50(4), 683-700. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033555>
- Easley, L. (2017). From strategic patience to strategic uncertainty: Trump, North Korea, and South Korea's New President. *World Affairs*, 180(2), 7-31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0043820017721361>
- Findling, J. E., & Pelle, K. D. (1996). *Historical dictionary of the modern Olympic movement*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Finnane, M. (2015). The Munich Olympics massacre and the development of counter-terrorism in Australia. *Intelligence and National Security*, 30(6), 817-836. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2014.882680>
- George, S., Yeung, J., Griffiths, J., Liptak, K., & Berlinger, J. (2019). DMZ: Donald Trump steps into North Korea with Kim Jong Un. CNN. Retrieved November 10, 2019, from https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-dmz-kim-live-intl-hnk/h_8f4b268b1827c8c3d43909e24456f216
- Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? *American political science review*, 98(2), 341-354. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001182>
- Gerring, J. (2017). *Case study research: Principles and practices* (2ed ed.). Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316848593>
- Giatsis, S., Ziakas, V., Zygouri, C., & Giatsi, A. (2004). Sport and the Olympic games in the global post-cold war Era (1989-nowadays). *Journal of Olympic History*, 12(2), 35-45.
- Glaser, C. L. (2010). *Rational theory of international politics: the logic of competition and cooperation*. Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400835133>
- Grix, J. (2013). Sport politics and the Olympics. *Political Studies Review*, 11(1), 15-25. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-9302.12001>
- Haas, E. B. (2008). *Beyond the nation state: Functionalism and international organization*. ECPR Press.
- Haftel, Y. Z. (2007). Designing for peace: regional integration arrangements, institutional variation, and militarized interstate disputes. *International Organization*, 61(1), 217-237. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818307070063>
- Hanhimäki, J. M. (2015). *The United Nations: A very short introduction*. Oxford University. <https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190222703.001.0001>
- Hoberman, J. (1995). Toward a theory of Olympic internationalism. *Journal of Sport History*, 22 (1), 1-37.
- Hong, S. (2017). Trump is the right leader to achieve peace with North Korea. *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 34(3): 13-18. <https://doi.org/10.1111/npqu.12087>
- Hosli, M. O., & Dörfler, T. (2019). Why is change so slow? Assessing prospects for United Nations Security Council reform. *Journal of Economic Policy Reform*, 22(1), 35-50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2017.1305903>
- Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., & Elliott, K. A. (1990). *Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy*. Peterson Institute.
- IOC. (2019). *Olympic Charter*. International Olympic Committee. Retrieved from <https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic-Charter.pdf>
- Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: understanding the debate. *International Security*, 24(1), 42-63. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560040>
- Kalantar, N. (2019). The limitations and capabilities of the United Nations in modern conflict. *E-International Relations*. Retrieved May 10, 2020, from <https://www.e-ir.info/2019/07/10/the-limitations-and-capabilities-of-the-united-nations-in-modern-conflict/comment-page-1/>

- Keohane, R. O. (2005). *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy*. Princeton university press.
- Krasner, S. (1983). *International regimes*. Cornell University Press.
- Krüger, A., & Murray, W. (2010). *The Nazi Olympics: Sport, politics, and appeasement in the 1930s*. University of Illinois Press.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. United States Institute of Peace.
- Lennartz, K. (2002). The 2nd international Olympic Games in Athens 1906. *Journal of Olympic history*, 10, 3-24.
- Lagoni, R. (1995). Resolution, declaration, decision. *United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice*, 2, 1081-1091.
- Lee, J. W. (2015). Examining Korean nationalisms, identities, and politics through sport. *Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science*, 4(3), 179-185. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21640599.2016.1139533>
- Lee, J. W. (2017). Do the scale and scope of the event matter? The Asian Games and the relations between North and South Korea. *Sport in Society*, 20(3), 369-383. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2015.1088723>
- Lee, Y. G. (2014). Bukhan eui dobal sarye boonseok [A case study on the provocations by NK]. *Military History*, 91, 63-110.
- Loland, S., & Selliaas, A. (2009). The Olympic truce-the ideal and the reality. In K. Georgiadis, & A. Syrigos (Eds.), *Olympic Truce: Sport as a platform for peace* (pp. 57-69). The International Olympic Truce Centre.
- MacFarlane, S. N., & Khong, Y. F. (2006). *Human security and the UN: A critical history*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Mackinlay, J., & Chopra, J. (1997). Second generation multinational operations. *Washington Quarterly*, 15(3), 113-131. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609209550110>
- Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19(3), 5-49. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>
- Moore Jr, J. A., & Pubantz, J. (2017). *The new United Nations: International organization in the twenty-first century*. Taylor & Francis. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781317288435>
- Ministry of National Defense. (2018). The 2018 defense white paper. Republic of Korea: Ministry of National Defense. Retrieved November 25, 2019, from http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblict/PBLICTNEBOOK_201907110548253080.pdf
- Ministry of National Defense. (2020). The 2020 defense white paper. Republic of Korea: Ministry of National Defense. Retrieved May 31, 2021, from https://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd/upload/pblict/PBLICTNEBOOK_202102040549325290.pdf
- Mulcahy, K. V. (2017). Patronizing mega-events to globalize identity: The Olympic opening ceremony as a cultural policy. In K. V. Mulcahy, (eds.), *Public Culture, Cultural Identity, Cultural Policy* (pp. 65-92). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-43543-9_3
- Newton, K. (2019). *International Relations and World Politics*. UK: ED-Tech Press.
- Nuclear Threat Initiative (2021). The CNS North Korea missile test database. NTI. Retrieved June 1, 2021, from <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/>
- Öberg, M. D. (2005). The legal effects of resolutions of the UN security council and general assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ. *European Journal of International Law*, 16(5), 879-906. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chi151>
- Panda, A. (2018). 3 Takeaways from Kim Jong-un's 2018 New year's address. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved November 20, 2019, from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/3-takeaways-from-kim-jong-uns-2018-new-years-address/>

- Pease, K. S. (2018). *International organizations: Perspectives on Global Governance*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351213110>
- Pettman, R. (2005). Human security as global security: reconceptualizing strategic studies. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 18(1), 137-150. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570500059878>
- Pound, R. W. (1994). *Five rings over Korea: The secret negotiations behind the 1988 Olympic games in Seoul*. Little Brown.
- Rennie-Short, J. (2013). *Global metropolitan: Globalizing cities in a capitalist world*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203508657>
- Reid, H. L. (2006). Olympic sport and its lessons for peace. *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, 33(2), 205-214. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2006.9714702>
- Reiche, D. (2016). *Success and failure of countries at the Olympic Games*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315757308>
- Rich, M. (2018). Olympics open with Koreas marching together, offering hope for peace. *The New York Times*. Retrieved November 20, 2019, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/world/asia/olympics-opening-ceremony-north-korea.html>
- Roche, M. (2002). The Olympics and global citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, 6(2), 165-181. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020220142950>
- Rosamond, B. (2000). *Theories of European integration*. St. Martin's Press.
- Sterling-Folker, J. A. (2013). *Making sense of international relations theory*. Lynne Rienner.
- Tarrow, S. (1996). Social movements in contentious politics: A review article. *American Political Science Review*, 90(4), 874-883. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2945851>
- United Nations. (1945). *The UN charter*. United Nation. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>
- United Nations. (1993). *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly*. United Nations. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from <https://undocs.org/A/RES/48/11>
- United Nations. (1998). *Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and the Republic of Iraq*. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s98-166.htm>
- United Nations. (2000). *Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the Olympic ideal*. United Nations. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/628/01/pdf/N0062801.pdf?OpenElement>
- United Nations. (2012). *Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China veto text supporting Arab league's proposed peace plan*. United Nations. Retrieved May 26, 2020, from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10536.doc.htm>
- United Nations.(2017a). *Resolution 2375*. United Nations. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from [https://undocs.org/S/RES/2375\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2375(2017))
- United Nations. (2017b). *General debate: Republic of Korea*. United Nations. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from <https://gadebate.un.org/en/72/republic-korea>
- United Nations. (2017c). *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly*. United Nations. Retrieved November 15, 2019, from <https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/72/6>
- United Nations. (2017d). *General debate: United States of America*. United Nations. Retrieved June 1, 2020, from https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/us_en.pdf
- U.S. Department of State. (2018). *Department press briefing*. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved November 20, 2019, from <https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-february-13-2018/>
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Random House.

- Ward, A. (2019). North Korea tested a missile over the weekend: The Trump admin flubbed the response. Vox. Retrieved May 20, 2020, from <https://www.vox.com/world/2019/5/6/18531121/north-korea-missile-test-trump-pompeo>
- Weiss, T. G. (2013). International organization and global governance. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203795972>
- Wilson, G. L. (2017). World War III: Nuclear War. Archway Publishing.
- Yu, Y., & Jiangyong, L. (2011). A comparative analysis of the Olympic impact in East Asia: from Japan, South Korea to China. *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 28(16), 2290-2308. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2011.626682>

