Strategic group influence on entry mode choices in foreign markets

Abstract

This study examines imitation behavior in the foreign entry mode of the members of a strategic group within the industry. Following the institutionalist perspective, we argue that legitimating actors (trade associations, training institutions and investors, among others) can exert pressure on strategic group members to conform to institutionalized organizational practices and structures. We hypothesize that a company’s choice of foreign entry mode is determined by the previous choices of other companies within the strategic reference group. Thus, the probability of entry with a wholly owned subsidiary (versus shared-control entry) increases when the number of wholly-owned subsidiaries established by companies within the strategic reference group of the home-country is higher. We analyze 351 foreign direct investments of 30 Spanish banks in 55 countries between 1986 and 2008. Our results reveal imitation behavior between members of the strategic group and highlight the important role of the strategic group in strategic thinking.