The complete information first-price auction or the importance of being indivisible
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| Title: | The complete information first-price auction or the importance of being indivisible |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Alcalde, Jose | Dahm, Matthias |
| Research Group/s: | Grupo de Estudios de Paz y Desarrollo |
| Center, Department or Service: | Universidad de Alicante. Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo Social y Paz | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico | Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Keywords: | First-price auctions | Undominated Nash equilibria |
| Knowledge Area: | Fundamentos del Análisis Económico |
| Date Created: | 27-Feb-2008 |
| Issue Date: | 5-Mar-2008 |
| Abstract: | Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the First-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. |
| Sponsor: | The authors' work is partially supported by the Institut Valencià d'Investigacions Econòmiques. Alcalde acknowledges support by FEDER and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project SEJ2007-62656/ECON. Dahm acknowledges financial support by the Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (Generalitat de Catalunya) under project 2005SGR00949 and by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project SEJ2005-04085/ECON. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10045/4506 |
| Language: | eng |
| Type: | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
| Peer Review: | no |
| Appears in Collections: | INV - GEPYD - Artículos de Revistas INV - DMCTE - Artículos de Revistas |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 FirstPriceAuction_Alcalde08.pdf | 164,84 kB | Adobe PDF | Open Preview | |
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