Competition for procurement shares

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Title: Competition for procurement shares
Authors: Alcalde, Jose | Dahm, Matthias
Research Group/s: Grupo de Estudios de Paz y Desarrollo (GEPYD)
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica
Keywords: Procurement auction | Affirmative action
Knowledge Area: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Issue Date: Jul-2013
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Games and Economic Behavior. 2013, 80: 193-208. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.007
Abstract: We propose a new procurement procedure that allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are the following: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows variations in the extent to which affirmative action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even while accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement expenditures might be lower than under a standard auction format.
Sponsor: Dahm acknowledges the support of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and the Government of Catalonia as well as of the Government of Spain under projects SEJ2007-67580-C02-01 and ECO2010-19733.
ISSN: 0899-8256 (Print) | 1090-2473 (Online)
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.007
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Peer Review: si
Publisher version:
Appears in Collections:INV - GEPYD - Artículos de Revistas
INV - DMCTE - Artículos de Revistas

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