Preference Intensity in Positional Voting

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Title: Preference Intensity in Positional Voting
Authors: Mata Pérez, Esther | Laruelle, Annick | Martínez, Ricardo | Ponti, Giovanni
Research Group/s: Microeconomía Aplicada (GIMA)
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Keywords: Strategic manipulation | Borda Count | Positional voting | Experimental economics
Knowledge Area: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Issue Date: Oct-2014
Publisher: Scientific Research Publishing
Citation: Mata-Pérez, E. , Laruelle, A. , Martínez, R. and Ponti, G. (2014) Preference Intensity in Positional Voting. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 727-738. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.48092
Abstract: We report a laboratory experiment on strategic manipulation in positional rules, by which individuals are asked to elicit a complete ranking over 3 alternatives. The prominent rule in this set is the so-called Borda Count, but our experiment also considers other rules in which we increase the score associated to the second-best candidate and vary the monetary prizes in case of a victory of the latter (“preference intensity”). Our results suggest that, as standard game-theoretic logic would suggest, when the intermediate scores and prizes increase, strategic manipulation is reduced. We also see that group size affects the likelihood of strategic manipulation in a non-linear fashion, and mostly depends on how the intermediate score is manipulated. Furthermore, rule efficiency increases with group size (i.e., as the probability of being pivotal decreases) and with both the intermediate scores and prizes.
Sponsor: Financial support from the Spanish Ministries of Education and Science and Economics and Competitiveness (SEJ 2007-62656 and ECO2012-34928, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2011-29230), MIUR (PRIN 20103S5RN3\_002), Generalitat Valenciana (Research Projects Gruposo3/086 and PROMETEO/2013/037), Junta de Andalucía (SEJ5980 and SEJ4941), and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciónes Económicas (IVIE) is gratefully acknowledged.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/41924
ISSN: 2162-2078 (Print) | 2162-2086 (Online)
DOI: 10.4236/tel.2014.48092
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/article
Rights: © 2014 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Peer Review: si
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2014.48092
Appears in Collections:INV - GIMA - Artículos de Revistas

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