All-pay auction equilibria in contests

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Title: All-pay auction equilibria in contests
Authors: Alcalde, Jose | Dahm, Matthias
Research Group/s: Grupo de Estudios de Paz y Desarrollo
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Instituto Universitario de Desarrollo Social y Paz | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico | Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Keywords: Non-deterministic contest | All-pay auction | Contest success functions
Knowledge Area: Análisis Económico
Issue Date: 2007
Series/Report no.: Working Papers | 2
Abstract: We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value.
Sponsor: The authors' work is partially supported by the Institut Valencià d'Investigacions Econòmiques. Alcalde acknowledges support by FEDER and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project SEJ2007-62656/ECON. Dahm acknowledges financial support by the Departament d'Universitats, Recerca i Societat de la Informació (Generalitat de Catalunya), under project 2005SGR00949.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/2300
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
Peer Review: si
Appears in Collections:INV - GEPYD - Working Papers
INV - DMCTE - Working Papers

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