Re-reforming the Bostonian system: a novel approach to the schooling problem

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Title: Re-reforming the Bostonian system: a novel approach to the schooling problem
Authors: Alcalde, Jose | Romero Medina, Antonio
Research Group/s: Grupo de Estudios de Paz y Desarrollo (GEPYD)
Center, Department or Service: Universidad de Alicante. Instituto Interuniversitario de Desarrollo Social y Paz | Universidad de Alicante. Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Keywords: School allocation problem | Pareto effcient matching
Knowledge Area: Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Date Created: Jan-2011
Issue Date: 1-Feb-2011
Abstract: This paper proposes the notion of ε-stability to conciliate Pareto efciency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is "ε-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.
Sponsor: Financial support by the IVIE, and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under project ECON2008-027038 (Romero-Medina).
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/16118
Language: eng
Type: info:eu-repo/semantics/preprint
Peer Review: no
Appears in Collections:INV - GEPYD - Working Papers
INV - DMCTE - Working Papers

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